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The problematic of art and politics, of cultural form and ideological motive, the 
political dimension of the aesthetic and vice versa, is at the root of many of studies of 
post-war American art. Depending on the author, this is the moment of the avant-garde’s 
complete depoliticization, or its politicization in the wrong direction; it is the moment 
when emancipatory politics is lost from art, or when it simply merges, along with art, into 
the rest of everyday life. This dissertation addresses this problem as well, but it suggests a 
vantage point and an example in which the energies of progressive Leftism at this 
moment are neither lost to conservative reaction nor hidden in increasingly exotic 
counter-cultural forms or in dense academic theorizing but staged, almost transparently, 
in the classic forms and traditional terms of socialist debate: anarchism vs. communism, 
the division of labor, self-alienation vs. self-realization, etc. The vantage point is located 
by the culture critic Harold Rosenberg. In the first half of this dissertation I focus on 
Rosenberg, particularly his concept of Action Painting. Against its common reading as 
referring to unbounded painterly spontaneity, I take Action Painting, informed by Marx’s 
philosophy of action, as outlining a materialist aesthetic grappling with the outstanding 
conundrums of revolutionary dialectics. It is with this re-vamped conception of 
vii  
 
Rosenberg’s criticism that I frame and enter the second part of the dissertation, a 
sustained comparison of Barnett Newman’s and Ad Reinhardt’s paintings and writings. 
Action Painting provides the theoretical arena in which to examine these two painters’s 
negotiations of artist and worker, art and labor, artwork and commodity, process and 
thing, theory and practice, freedom and necessity. It is within such a framework that I am 
able to indicate how political commitments and painting practices cohere in Newman’s 
and Reinhardt’s work. The socialist struggle over true revolutionary identity is here, both 
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Revisionist Historiography of Abstract Expressionism and the Cultural 







In the late summer of 1952 Barnett Newman, speaking at the Fourth Annual Woodstock 
Art Conference on the conference’s theme of “Aesthetics and the Artist,” alluded to the 
“great problem of art.”1 This reference was made within the context of Newman’s fiery 
opposition to those professional aestheticians—such as fellow conference attendees 
George Boas and Suzanne Langer—whose specialized aesthetic systems and theories, in 
Newman’s view, were steeped in scientific pretension, paved the way for what he 
deemed a dangerously “irresponsible position” towards art, one which calamitously 
validated “lack of commitments and lack of values.”2 The conference itself had been 
described by its organizers as an opportunity to bring “distinguished artists and thinkers” 
together so that they might “develop better understanding between themselves in order to 
establish a more significant relationship between theory and practice [emphasis added].”3  
This prospectus, as innocuous as it might seem, was precisely what riled Newman and led 
to his refusing to attend the conference as an “artist” but participating instead in the role 
of “citizen.” What he rejected was the conference’s very framing of the problem. To the 
theme of “Aesthetics and the Artist” he replied: “I consider the artist and the aesthetician 
to be mutually exclusive terms.” 
One way to misconstrue Newman’s pronouncement is to take it as a rejection of 
the conference’s stated premise of bringing theory and practice together.  Such a reading 
depends upon one’s aligning practice with the artist and theory with the aesthetician—a 
fairly typical presumption but one fundamentally at odds with Newman’s conception of 
how these terms worked.  It was not the union of theory and practice that Newman 
rejected—in fact, as I will explain later, this was an especially central preoccupation of 
2 
his.  Rather the aesthetician and the artist were mutually exclusive precisely because the 
artist, in Newman’s understanding of the term, embodied this very unity of theory and 
practice, while the aesthetician, in contrast, typified the treacherous professionalization 
that splits apart the theoretical and practical, exemplified, here, for Newman in 1952, by 
Boas and Langer with their dispassionate theories. In Newman’s colorful imagery, they 
were  “going up the mountain,” “assuming this holy, theoretical attitude towards art” 
while “practicing aestheticians, the museum directors and newspaper critics,” 
instrumentalize at the level of the agora the theoretical dictates sent down from the 
acropolis.4 Implicit in Newman’s rejection of the conference, therefore, was criticism of 
the failure of others—primarily the aestheticians—to recognize the artist as figuring 
precisely the identity of theory and practice.  Had the conference organizers understood 
the significance of the artist in terms closer to Newman’s, the absurdity of the proposition 
for calling together “artists and [emphasis added] thinkers” to “develop better 
understanding between themselves in order to establish a more significant relationship 
between theory and practice” would have been clearly, and comically, manifest.  This 
failure was the earmark to Newman that the great problem of art was indeed being falsely 
conceived. 
 In another lexicon, one developed out of nineteenth century class struggles, the 
proposed identity of theory and practice took on social revolutionary coloring and went 
by the appellation praxis. It came to signify, in a manner of summarizing image or master 
figure, the libratory promise of socialism, as the triumphant moment of a self-realizing 
dialectic between self and the world, between culture and nature, between word and deed, 
between subject and object, between agency and structure in which individual identity 
would be manifestly synonymous with true humanity, an authentic sense of self. But just 
as praxis stood, as it were, in the role of protagonist for this old dream of reconciliation of 
disembodied thought and disarticulated body, it also served, just, if not more, 
recognizably, as antagonist as well. That is, the unity of theory and practice locates both 
the Desideratum of the socialist imagination as well as its central conundrum, its pivotal 
crisis, its mark of failure. How did one reach that state of social, humanist achievement 
3 
which is the glorious, redemptive union of theory and practice as communist utopia? 
Through revolutionary theory? Revolutionary practice? Furthermore, to bifurcate in this 
manner or even to imagine this separation—is this not analogous to Newman’s 
compliant? Here the great problem of humanity is being falsely conceived. 
That the great problem of art, to which Newman referred, and the great problem 
of humanity, to which revolutionary socialism refers, share on a profound level as their 
image of reconciliation the dialectical one of praxis is the point from which I find 
discussion of the “art and politics” relation most compellingly begun. This master figure 
works both in the historical materialist’s enquiry into the possible forms of an 
emancipatory, critical-creative aesthetic and in the social historian of art’s enquiry into 
the ideological and political content of artistic forms. For the antithesis to praxis 
considered in this way is, in the modern period, from both the aesthetic and the social-
political vantage-points, labor, human activity as alienated and marked precisely as the 
ruinous disunion of theory and practice. As the critical theorist Theodor W. Adorno 
explains, the “relations between art and human labour” are the central contradiction of 
modern bourgeois conceptions of art. The realm of art, the ideal practice, the mode of 
free self-realization, is both posited through and posited against the wider world of far 
from ideal productions of the work-a-day world, the necessary, the “perennial unfreedom 
of the whole.”5 Here the figure of the artist and the figure of the worker stand to be 
mutually misrecognized as if from separate universes rather than as dialectically 
intertwined facets of human activity. That the concept of artistic creation exists but that it 
exists in largely mystified form (a special, even superhuman agency, the largely 
unaccountable domain of the genius); that what has not been democratized is the figure of 
the artist as the figuring of the subject and object of self-realizing dialectic; that what has 
not yet been negated is the historically-specific idea of art as a privileged mode of self-
expression for the few; that what has not been de-naturalized is this division in the quality 
of activity between the praxical and non-praxical—these are some of the difficulties that 
surface both as the tragedy of modern art and as the failure of modern socialism. To be 
blind to this relation, in which art passes as the estranged form by which the image of 
4 
non-estranged labor operates under the economic and productive conditions of modern 
capitalism is to miss something grave in both a materialist aesthetic and a socialist politic. 
Indeed, taken in this light, the matter of Marx’s lost, or “missing,” aesthetic—that volume 
on the aesthetic that Marx never produced, along with the ensuing debate generated 
around that aporia between official Soviet aesthetic programs and Western Marxism—is 
unexpectedly shut down. Capital itself becomes something of a materialist aesthetic, writ 
backwards, of course: the narrative of alienation played out by the worker and the 
commodity is the reverse script for the narrative of the freely creative self-realization of 
the artist and artwork. 
 The point is that there are moments in history that flesh this out, when something 
like a transparency between the artist and the worker is argued for, when critical 
discourse is centered around this schema of the dialectic of praxis, when the distinction 
“artist” and “worker” is seen as generated through the bifurcated modes of objectification 
of the self or subject—realization and alienation. The moment of recognition between the 
artist and worker that I will be concerned with in this dissertation falls within the space of 
the following bookends: a “thirties” bookend, captured perhaps in Irving Marantz’s 
photograph of members of the Artists’ Union in a picket line and bearing signs that read 
“Artists Union Jobs for All Unemployed Artists” and “We Demand the Right to Organize 
on Job!”(fig. 1); and a “sixties” bookend, captured perhaps in two photographs taken of 
Frank Stella by Hollis Frampton in 1959, one the portrait of the artist used in the 
exhibition catalogue for the Museum of Modern Art’s (New York) “Sixteen Americans,” 
and the second of Stella at work in his West Broadway studio (figs. 2 and 3). The space 
that the thirties bookend locates and delimits is one in which, under the special conditions 
generated by the massive economic crisis known as the Great Depression, the figure of 
the artist is proletarianized. Through government relief programs, artists become 
employed as workers—whose activity and products come to resemble common abstract 
labor, wage labor. These are the conditions under which something like the Artists’ 
Union begins to make sense: artists recognizing themselves as laborers, taking on the 
identity of workers—an immiserated form, but of possibly revolutionary substance—but 
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thus in a position to work through the contradiction between “art and human labor.” The 
two photographs of Stella aptly indicate the termination point of this artist/worker 
moment associated with the thirties. In the photograph for the Museum of Modern Art 
catalogue Stella, at a youthful twenty-three, stands, as one critic described him, “against 
an Avedon-white background, wearing a button down shirt and a stockbroker’s suit. His 
posture was nonchalant Madison Avenue contrapposto, one hand resting casually in his 
pocket.”6 What is presented is the artist as executive, professional, businessman, upper 
management, and it sits in contrast to the second photograph taken of Stella at work in his 
studio, pictured as a laborer. Here the artist wears a T-shirt, well-worn dungarees, stands 
on a paint-splattered floor and faces his work surface, a canvas. With brush in hand, he is 
seen in the (mindless? repetitive?) process of applying one of a series of black stripes. As 
a pair the Stella photographs would appear to illustrate the turn from envisioning the 
modern artist as a figure of social emancipation by his/her association with free praxical 
activity, creating out of the integration of theory and practice. Where the mimesis of artist 
and worker spoke to possibly revolutionary ends in the thirties, the mimesis of the 
sixties—seen through the Stella photographs—is that of internalizing the division of 
labor relations. These images of Stella exemplify the contradiction and separation: he is 
management, he is labor; he is theory, he is practice; but missing is the motor of dialectic. 
In broad strokes, the problematic of this dissertation is framed by these two 
moments. The preoccupations and questions that will be developed in the following 
chapters are generated from a nexus of concerns: the processes of recognition/ 
misrecognition between art (artist) and labor (worker) as episodes in a dialectic of theory 
and practice towards the attainment of the identical subject-object of knowledge; the 
misrecognition by which capitalism makes a fetish of artists and artworks; the recognition 
by which socialism turns to an aesthetics as a framework through which to articulate 
social revolutionary concerns. Both “cognitions” have their place and their 
representatives within the period roughly demarcated by the Artists’s Union photograph 
and the pair of Stella photographs, and a great deal of attention has been paid to this area. 
That is, for the period witnessing the rise of Abstract Expressionism or the New York 
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School, two primary critical trends have attempted to address questions of the 
relationship of art and politics: a “Cold War” thesis studying how art figures within 
capitalism primarily as capitalism’s figuring of art; and a “Cultural Turn” thesis studying 
how art figures socialism, albeit, from within capitalism. Before presenting my own 





The Perfect Storm: Cold War Debates Over Base and Superstructure 
In the face of the era of wars and revolutions which is drawing 
near, everyone will have to give an answer: philosophers, poets, 
painters as well as simple mortals. 
        Leon Trotsky7 
 
Culture for Marxism is at once absolutely vital and distinctly 
secondary: the place where power is crystallized and submission 
bred, but also somehow “superstructural,” something which in its 
more narrow sense of specialized artistic institutions can only be 
fashioned out of a certain economic surplus and division of labour, 
and which even in its more generous anthropological sense of a 
“form of life” risks papering over certain important conflicts and 
distinctions. Culture is more than just ideology, but it is not a 
neutral or transcendent entity either; and any Marxist criticism 
worth the name must thus adopt a well-nigh impossible double 
optic, seeking on the one hand to take the full pressure of a 
cultural artefact while striving at the same time to displace it into 
its enabling material conditions and set it within a complex field of 
social power. What this means in effect is that one will find oneself 
bending the stick too far towards formalism and then too far 
towards contextualism, in search of that ever-receding discourse 
which would in allegorical manner speak simultaneously of an 
artistic device and a whole material history, of a turn of narrative 
and a style of social consciousness. 
Terry Eagleton8 
 
In 1983, one art historian began his study of the social history of Abstract Expressionism 
by asking himself: “Why have I thought it necessary to take a fresh look at a subject 
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studied so many times before?”9 Close to twenty years later, another art historian began a 
similar venture by requiring: “Any justification for yet another study of an already well-
known and widely discussed group of artists should generally entail the disclosure of new 
material along with a novel approach to it.”10 As these two instances should suggest, the 
topic of post-war American culture in general and in particular Abstract Expressionism 
and its relationship to Cold War political ideologies of U.S. capitalism is not only a topic 
highly examined, but perhaps one excessively so.  Indeed, to scan the scholarship in this 
area of the last quarter century is to consistently encounter justifications, sometimes 
apologetic, at times defensive, for having supplied the field with yet another reworking, 
yet another entry for the ever-expanding bibliography. Obsessive might also be another 
way of likening these returns, which would mark the issues associated with this period as 
a site of trauma, with each revisitation a renewed attempt to finally come to terms. We 
have not, as another scholar has suggested, been able to make Abstract Expressionism “a 
thing of the past,” not been able “to lose it and mourn it and if necessary revile it”: we 
have yet to get over it.11 
 But what really is it in this history that so resists closure and that sustains such 
continued and heated investigation? “[T]here is of course,” as one observer put it, “a lot 
at stake [in these] theoretical wars [over] this most contentious ‘movement’ of the 
twentieth century . . . not just tenures, ambition and intellectual status, but also the 
broader empowerment that attaches to narratives themselves.”12 As an attempt to point in 
the general direction of an answer, let me try the following. Not only do the discourses in 
and around Abstract Expressionism focus an histrionic spotlight on the conjoining of the 
terms “art” and “politics”; they also put pressure on the very means of construing 
relationships between those terms, of the styles of narrative construction: they frequently 
question the sorts of ideological investments inhabiting those methodologies for 
correlating artistic and political signifiers and signifieds. What is put on the dock, to open 
this out by way of broadly inclusive terms, is a classic perturbation over issues of form 
and content, of the nature of the Sign, of the processes of signification through the 
ideational and material, and of what secures those bonds of meaning. Nor would it seem 
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particularly relevant to raise this sort of epistemic-ontological meta-crisis—whose 
capacity to stir genuine alarm surely ended with the advent of postmodernism—were it 
not for the power still available, or, alternatively, the aesthetic myths still operating for 
some in the interwar and early post-war periods, in the notion of the authenticity of 
artistic labor as generating the true Sign and as the bearer of an exceptional humanism 
transcendent of the grossest manipulations of political ideology. Or, as Newman offered 
in 1950: “I think the possibility of finding language still exists. . . .”13 
In a manner of speaking, what this describes is a perfect storm, a moment where 
and when elements appear simultaneously to both come together to a point of 
unprecedented focus and destructively, ruthlessly unravel. The issues that converge at 
this moment are ones that put into question some of the most cherished and redemptive 
notions of modern aesthetic avant-gardism, the tropes of cultural redemption and artistic 
exceptionalism. Indeed it appeared that the avant-garde’s very efforts at maintaining (as 
well as decrying) this critical and crucial difference between its mode of productive 
activity and that of capital’s modes of labor was what could so usefully serve and 
reinforce the interests of the status quo. Thus challenged in this is the validity of positing 
an avant-garde as oppositional, as critically negationist, as operating as a counter-force to 
hegemonic systems, as marking a hold-out space of expressivity as non-alienated agency, 
and thus as possessing access to a transformative subject-object dialectic. These 
challenges and reversals were just some of the disquieting features of the landscape left in 
this storm’s wake. In response to that question of why Abstract Expressionism has not 
become a thing of the past, I would hazard the guess that those thinkers who have yet to 
get over it, those scholars who continue to investigate the field through this rubric of 
questions, remain because they sense the nature of what is at stake: to come to terms 
would mean to resign oneself to the merely mythic, ideologically-degraded status of the 
artistic as the cultural receptacle of creative realization; one would stop dreaming of the 
good life in lands of milk and honey; and accept as permanent an exile in the barren 





The Cold War Thesis 
Though there had appeared a number of earlier studies putting forward theses suggesting 
complicity between the American avant-garde and the political motives of the U.S. State 
Department in thrall to the ideology of American capitalism in the post-war period, Serge 
Guilbaut’s How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art: Abstract Expressionism, 
Freedom, and the Cold War is now easily recognized as the apex of this argument. 
Guilbaut’s critical social history of this period is a narrative written against the idealist 
accounts provided by—in Guilbaut’s litany—Clement Greenberg, Alfred H. Barr, Jr., 
Irving Sandler and William Rubin, to list the most prominent. In aiming to illuminate the 
ideological conditioning, Guilbaut’s methodology treats these accounts as both 
expression and distortion of the material base. Thus, where formalist accounts have 
striven to “neutralize” this art in “aesthetic and stylistic considerations” by removing it 
from its context, by severing its links to history, politics, economics and thus barring a 
“critical analysis of the ideology that underlies the images and texts produced in this 
period,” Guilbaut’s project is precisely to work towards the “‘deneutralization’ of [this] 
art, the unearthing of its roots, the laying bare of its hidden mechanisms and 
contradictions.”14 The upshot of Guilbaut’s deneutralization might be called, for brevity’s 
sake, the Cold War thesis. Providing crucial elaboration to the earlier and far less detailed 
and researched 1970s arguments proposing links between State Department politics and 
ideological investments to the success and value of Abstract Expressionism, such as those 
made by Max Kozloff and Eva Cockcroft among others, Guilbaut continues the work of 
supplanting idealist narratives of the “victory of an American super-avant-garde” with a 
critical, materialist history of Abstract Expressionism, which tells not the tale of heroic 
opposition one expects as the badge and banner of avant-gardism but, if not exactly or 
openly a complicity, then what Guilbaut more delicately phrases “ideological resonance” 
between the American post-war avant-garde and Cold War liberalism.15  
10 
Avant-garde art succeeded because the work and the ideology that 
supported it, articulated in the painters’ writings as well as conveyed in 
images, coincided fairly closely with the ideology that came to dominate 
American political life after the 1948 presidential elections. This was the 
‘new liberalism’ set forth by Schlesinger in The Vital Center, an ideology 
that, unlike other ideologies of the conservative right and the Communist 
left, not only made room for avant-garde dissidence but accorded to such 
dissonance a position of paramount importance.16  
 
How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art works as an extended and contentious 
footnote to Greenberg’s 1939 essay “Avant-Garde and Kitsch” which presents the 
famous image of the “umbilical cord of gold” connecting the advanced culture of an 
avant-garde to a social and economic base, the cultured and enlightened of a bourgeois 
elite.17 What Guilbaut, in statements like the one above, is keen to stress, however, is that 
this “umbilical cord of gold” was far from a moment of noblesse oblige on the part of a 
disinterested patron class but rather serves to underscore within a materialist analysis the 
answerability of superstructure to base. The umbilical cord was never cut, the gold comes 
with strings fully attached, so to speak. 
The bluntness of Guilbaut’s “reestablish[ment] of the link between art and 
politics” has led his detractors to fault him for a methodological primitivism associated 
with a crude Marxist orthodoxy, and to accuse him of a continued subscription to what by 
post-structuralist standards appears to be a highly outmoded base-superstructure model 
relatively free of micro-mediations.18 Guilbaut oversimplifies; or, he sees in black-and-
white, and he is unwilling to support third-term speculation—all of which factors into 
what is taken to be Guilbaut’s lack of sensitivity to and sympathy for the particular 
complexities of the American avant-garde’s political situation. For, if there is any fallen 
or turned hero in Guilbaut’s narrative, it is the American intelligentsia in the process of a 
willing self-delusion, confusing base and superstructure, imagining that their mandate of 
radicalism could find resolution in art, and thus forgetting the basis of a true political 
practice. “Radical intellectuals,” Guilbaut charges, “unable to situate themselves in 
relation to contemporary political events or even to interpret those events in a satisfactory 
way, deserted politics altogether. The individual became the sole focus of interest, a 
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symbolic vestige of days gone by when radicals still had a definite function.”19 Or, 
elsewhere, “What I argue is this: that from compromise to compromise, refusal to refusal, 
adjustment to adjustment, the rebellion of the artists, born of frustrations within the left, 
gradually changed its significance until ultimately it came to represent the values of the 
majority, but in a way (continuing the modernist tradition) that only a minority was 
capable of understanding. The ideology of the avant-garde was ironically made to 
coincide with what was becoming the dominant ideology. . . .”20 However, Guilbaut is 
mindful of the pitfalls of too voluntarist an account of these political shifts, and this 
begins to describe what might be the true crime by Guilbaut’s account. The real failing of 
the radical intellectuals and avant-garde artists was not that, faced with a seemingly 
impossible political situation, they “deserted politics,” but rather that instead of 
maintaining the critical tension and willed awareness between “is” and “ought”—
however unsatisfactory or painful consciousness of that gap might be—they allowed 
themselves to believe in their having filled it. They allowed themselves the luxury of 
certain comforting myths, not least of which was the one that theirs was an art of 
“freedom” miraculously beyond the grasp of ideology.21 
If the fall from grace in Guilbaut’s account is the avant-garde’s relinquishing a 
consciously political role and in allowing themselves a convenient naïveté about the 
politically instrumentalist value of their art, then Michael Leja’s account makes this point 
moot. Indeed, within his argument for the thorough ideological interpellation and 
political instrumentalization of subjectivity to an agentless pulp, no subject to speak of 
remains and certainly not an avant-garde subject in a position to consciously relinquish 
its politically oppositional roles. Leja’s Reframing Abstract Expressionism: Subjectivity 
and Painting in the 1940s carries forth the Cold War thesis generally but professes to 
advance it through a more methodologically sophisticated approach to ideology and its 
critique. As Leja sets out, the difference and distance between Guilbaut’s work and his 
own “concerns the way the crucial term ideology is defined.” 
For Guilbaut ideology designates an explicit, consciously held set of 
beliefs and commitments organized around a political affiliation. . . . As 
used in the present study, however, ideology has little to do with 
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consciously held beliefs or political affiliations. It is meant to designate 
rather an implicit structure of belief, assumption, and disposition—an 
array of basic propositions and attitudes about reality, self, and society 
embedded in representation and discourse and seemingly obviously true 
and natural. . . . [T]hese propositions are incessantly restated, resecured, 
and naturalized; they are woven into the fabric of experience by virtue of 
their structuring all representation, including perception, analysis, 
argument, interpretation, and explanation.22 
 
Leja’s adoption of such an expanded notion of ideology does indeed open the field to the 
extended range of material culture.23 His specific set of concerns—the construction of a 
“new form of subjectivity” during the 1940s and 1950s, the discourses of the anxious and 
angsty post-war “Modern Man” to which both “mainstream” culture and Abstract 
Expressionism contributed, and the primacy of a psychology of the primitive, 
unconscious and irrational within this new subject type—pictures precisely the deep 
reach of ideology formation.24 The older framework in which ideology is primarily 
restricted to political ideology, seen from Leja’s vantage, is misleadingly idealist in its 
tendency to view the ideological as something so cleanly compartmentalized. Leja’s 
operations through an expanded field of ideology venture very close to the tautology 
ideology-as-culture/culture-as-ideology. Although Leja sets out to perform a more 
sophisticated and subtle explication of base and superstructure mediations, as an 
improvement over reductive Marxist-inspired analyses, his method ironically also 
becomes insistently reductive. In a perversion of motives, one might even argue that 
Leja’s reduction outstrips Guilbaut’s. For in taking “ideology” so broadly and 
inclusively, Leja’s “agency” means little more than the means by which structure 
reproduces itself through the vehicles of subjects fueled on delusions of semi-autonomy. 
In Leja’s rendition ideology reduces to a single, unrelenting term. No space exists for the 
kind of subject that Guilbaut maintains despite the overall bleak political thrust of the 
latter’s work. At the very least Guilbaut held on to the notion, if with a bitter grasp, for 
something like the ability to register one’s complicity. What Leja’s account appears to 
remove is precisely the space for this kind of dialectical thought, that part of 
consciousness that would be able to think against itself, and thus, able to become self-
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critical and self-exposing. In sum, if Leja’s account, unlike Guilbaut’s, seems to produce 
far fewer fallen heroes of the Left, it is because the fabric of ideology is so tightly woven 
as to already serve as a shroud-like membrane, suffocatingly impermeable to 






A new set of related positions in this debate can be organized around the notion of a 
“third-way,” an approach which adheres neither to the older formalist orthodoxies of the 
1950s and 1960s nor to the revisionist “new orthodoxy” of the 1970s and 1980s by which 
Abstract Expressionism was a “monolithic expression of Cold War ideology.”25 To make 
some general characterizations of these third-way approaches, one notes first and most 
obviously this explicit desire to go beyond the rigid polarities that have so powerfully 
structured the field, a manner of methodological thaw between bourgeois idealist 
aesthetics and Marxist criticism, or between formalism and social history, and to temper 
some of the harshness and bleakness by which earlier revisionists (including Guilbaut and 
Leja) have pronounced the failure of revolutionary agency within the creative 
intelligentsia of the period. Although equally adamant in not subscribing to idealist and 
formalist narratives of this art, they distance themselves from their immediate social 
history forbearers in their countering of earlier arguments that held that leftist radical 
energies, or any meaningful form of dissidence or challenging of the corporate capitalist 
system were wiped out completely with the mounting tally of progressive leftism’s 
“failures.”26 A significant part of this alternative scholarship involves the careful 
maneuver of redefining political agency largely along critical-culturalist lines. Such 
accounts share a willingness to see signs of political resistance in less overt and 
traditional political forms explaining, in part, this less obvious and marked avant-garde 
resistance as an appropriate development, perhaps the only one possible given the highly 
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repressive political climate of the post-war period. Within this there is an implicit 
criticism of what might be designated as idealist notions of political agency, of which the 
1930s—the “red” decade of U.S. history—serves as standard-bearer. What this suggests 
is that acting upon thirties notions of political agency in the forties and fifties would have 
been a species of gross romanticism, a suicide mission at best.  
Below, I will describe briefly several of these third-way approaches, specifically, 
Daniel Belgrad’s The Culture of Spontaneity: Improvisation and the Arts in Postwar 
America (1998) and David Craven’s Abstract Expressionism as Cultural Critique: 
Dissent during the McCarthy Period (1999). As I believe will become apparent, a certain 
flip-side symmetry exists between the Cold War theses and these third-way approaches. 
Craven will answer Guilbaut’s work using the older senses of ideology as consciously 
held political positions; Belgrad will answer Leja’s work by taking ideology to be the 
substance and texture of everyday life.  Last, I will introduce the position held by Nancy 
Jachec in her recent study The Philosophy and Politics of Abstract Expressionism, 1940-
1960 (2000), as important work done on the trope of a “cultural turn” from political 
agency to artistic agency. 
In The Culture of Spontaneity: Improvisation and the Arts in Postwar America, 
American Studies scholar Daniel Belgrad detects political resistance in the multiple 
instances in which “spontaneity,” “the spontaneous gesture,” and “spontaneous 
improvisation” surfaced in a notable number of cultural forms in the post-war U.S.—
including jazz music, pottery, poetry, dance, and painting. Certainly one of the strengths 
of Belgrad’s work is its inclusiveness, this ability to survey a variety of art media; indeed, 
Belgrad argues that these individual artforms participated in the broader “aesthetic of 
spontaneity” to such an extent that to “study each of these media in isolation is to miss 
the general importance of the spontaneous gesture as a sign of the times.”27 The “cultural 
stance” of spontaneity and improvisation, Belgrad insists, was the means by which many 
creative individuals in the United States during the politically repressive and socially 
conformist decades of the 1940s and 1950s expressed resistance, a countercultural 
sphere, and opposition to mainstream values. What a “culture of spontaneity” amounts to 
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for Belgrad is the sign that the spirit of avant-garde negation survives. Not unexpectedly, 
control is the term to which spontaneity is opposed here and more specifically, as Belgrad 
makes explicit, a new mode of appearance for control, one far more pernicious and 
dangerous than the “‘technological control’ of industrial capitalism (exemplified by 
Henry Ford’s moving conveyor belt)” of the earlier twentieth-century.28 This newer, 
more surreptitious appearance of control Belgrad designates “bureaucratic control,” an 
increasingly interior form of control, akin to brainwashing or the internalizing of 
ideology; it becomes the advanced means of “ensuring [the] social cohesion” necessitated 
by the corporate liberal ideology of the United States’s post-war identity as a colossal 
military-industrial complex.29 Belgrad’s “bureaucratic control” is not a new item in the 
lexicon for historical characterizations of this vexed period in American history. One sees 
its close relatives in, for example, William H. Whyte, Jr.’s The Organization Man or C. 
Wright Mills’s White Collar: The American Middle Classes and The Power Elite or Paul 
Goodman’s Growing Up Absurd.30 However, the point that Belgrad is able to capitalize 
on is the one for which an aesthetics of spontaneity—as it describes an attitude of give-
and-take, the dialogical, mutuality, “democratic interaction,” lack of established 
hierarchy, non-rationalized acts, the playful, mind-body awareness, being in the 
moment—becomes a critical stance, an opposing set of values to those of the rationalized 
order and regulation embodied by the mainstream culture of corporate liberalism. 
Belgrad’s thesis takes on animation precisely when viewed as a sparring text to 
Leja’s. “[M]y empathic divergence from the perspective offered by Michael Leja,” as 
Belgrad lays it out, “will be evident throughout this work.”  
Although we treat some of the same themes, such as primitivism, myth, 
and subjectivity, he insists that abstract expressionism furthered, rather 
than challenged, the dominant post-war culture. While I distinguish 
‘highbrow’ culture, ‘middlebrow’ or mass culture, and the culture of 
spontaneity as three cultural formations engaged in a struggle for 
hegemony, Leja employs a more Foucauldian paradigm in which all 
dissent is superficial and circumscribed.31 
   
Here, once again, Leja’s image of post-war American culture and politics draws 
detractors who reject his deeply pessimistic view on the futility of cultural resistance. But 
16 
if Leja’s project is a shade past demoralized gray, Belgrad’s is a too liberally infused 
rose. Something sounds vaguely suspicious when Belgrad finds the “social significance” 
of the “aesthetic practice” of spontaneity to be a “crucial site of cultural work.”32 At its 
least convincing the culture of spontaneity argument degrades, much to the detriment of a 
third-way position in general, to a nebulous mish-mash of general humanist assertions 
posed along with what begins to sound like a reassuring satisfaction that a person’s 
natural, unconscious playfulness will prove an adequate force against pernicious systemic 
rationalization. Belgrad fails to substantially address the specific ways in which aesthetic 
spontaneity intersects more cogently with political meaning beyond a liberal pluralism in 
which cultural avant-gardes operate as the pressure valves for machinery of the status 
quo. 
The limitations of Belgrad’s politically non-explicit and non-committal aesthetic 
of spontaneity are offset in part through the rigor provided by another third-way 
approach, David Craven’s Abstract Expressionism as Cultural Critique: Dissent during 
the McCarthy Period.  Craven’s text, as its title suggests, also works on the issue of a 
Cold War cultural politics and attempts to dislodge Guilbaut’s “Stalinist” and “reductive” 
account of an alleged complicity between avant-garde art, artists and intellectuals and the 
intentions of the Cold Warriors; however, he takes a tack opposed to Belgrad’s.33 The 
political dimension, cultural critique and dissent are reasserted in Craven’s account as 
explicitly, consciously held positions. In a move that bypasses Leja and Belgrad and 
returns to the grounds laid by Guilbaut, Craven argues for a third-way position while, 
however, employing ideology in its more traditional guise as an articulate set of political 
commitments. 
Where Guilbaut sees “starting in the 1940s, U.S. conservative forces entirely 
succeed[ing] in sponsoring a ‘de-Marxization’ and capitulation of its own left-wing 
intelligentsia,” with the collapsed Left too easily and willingly accommodating itself to a 
Schlesingerian “vital center” of pro-capitalist new liberalism, Craven argues for the 
continuing presence, if reduced and altered from its 1930s appearance, of viable leftist 
positions despite political repression and the seeming victory of new liberalism in 
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winning over prominent intellectual converts.34 “The social bleakness and repressive 
politics of this period in U.S. history notwithstanding, though, there was never a total 
capitulation by the U.S. Left—whether in the art world or outside it, although there 
certainly was a ‘de-Stalinization’ (but not a de-Marxification) of the intelligentsia in the 
art world.”35 Craven is able to make the case against Abstract Expressionism’s 
identification with political conservatism in several notable ways. First, rather than taking 
Clement Greenberg as the most relevant critic for engaging the Abstract Expressionists’s 
aims and motivations, Craven points to Greenberg’s increasingly neo-liberalist, 
nationalist, McCarthyist tendencies as being simply at odds with the political orientation 
evidenced by the activities and writings of many of the Abstract Expressionist artists. In 
place of Greenberg and his “cold-war formalism,” Craven suggests instead “largely 
underappreciated” and “little understood” Meyer Schapiro as a far better critic and 
theorist for elaborating the conjoining of political and aesthetic aims of these artists. 
Schapiro, unlike Greenberg, maintained a recognizable leftist political stance his entire 
life—a stance, in Craven’s view, much more in keeping with the political orientation of 
the actual artists themselves. Furthermore, Schapiro’s criticism and scholarship actively 
problematized the relationship between social content and modernist form, a central 
concern, again, for many of the Abstract Expressionists as they attempted to work on the 
dilemma of, on the one hand, creating and sustaining serious, socially meaningful art 
without it becoming social realist or socialist realism and, on the other, of using an 
advanced visual language of abstraction without becoming mere formalism. Secondly, 
Craven rebuts Guilbaut’s thesis through elaborate detailing of the politically-inflected 
public activities the artists participated in, what kinds of manifestos and statements they 
signed, which (leftist) publications they supported. Overall, as a group portrait, they come 
out as being fairly engaged, involving themselves quite substantially in various forums of 
public dissent. And, finally, and perhaps not surprisingly, further evidence of these 
artists’s Left-leaning tendencies has surfaced in the form of secret F.B.I. files kept on 
several of their numbers: Adolph Gottlieb, Lee Krasner, Norman Lewis, Robert 
Motherwell, Ad Reinhardt and Mark Rothko. These files, recording the F.B.I. 
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surveillance of artists considered security risks during the McCarthy era, were made 
available to the public through the passing of the Freedom of Information Act in 1966. 
Craven’s access to these files has given him material proof of the inappropriateness of 
aligning certain of these artists with the political values of a more conservative-leaning 
mainstream. Clearly, at least as far as covert government agencies were concerned, they 
were the opposition. 
At any rate, the point of Craven’s fastidious gleaning of counter evidence is not 
that Guilbaut’s reading of Abstract Expressionist painting as U.S. Cold War capitalist 
imperialist propaganda is never true. For as high as these particular stakes may have 
become in twentieth-century art history, the heatedness and intensity of the scholarly 
exchanges might be suggestive of another, a second and underlying battle being fought 
here and over something even more contentious. That is, the validity of certain prominent 
methods and models of social historical art scholarship are being contested—namely 
those older, more “orthodox” Marxist methods which still interpret art as a 
superstructural element beholden to the ideological needs of the base or the dominant 
economic class. Against this explanation of art through the “dominant ideology,” Craven 
proposes a “more subtle and sophisticated conceptual framework,” a newer, more refined 
materialist methodology in which art is “dialogical”: 
[A]n artwork is not a unified whole but rather a decentered and open-
ended site of contestation wherein various cultural practices are 
temporarily combined. . . . Any visual language in the arts should thus be 
understood as a locus for competing cultural traditions along with diverse 
aesthetic concerns and divergent ideological values. Hence, any artwork, 
regardless of how much it is publicly identified with one class or society, 
also signifies not only for dominant sectors but also for dominated classes 
and different class factions. Consequently, artwork such as that by 
Abstract Expressionists should be approached as an uneasy locus—more 
or less stable but not conclusively resolved—of competing values, some of 
which are hegemonic and others subaltern, out of which broader 
signification constructed.36 
 
Another way of conceptualizing Craven’s more open-ended dialogical art, of which 
Abstract Expressionism is here Craven’s prime example, is by visualizing a gap or 
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distance existing between the superstructural domain of art and a basis of economics. As 
Craven states, 
My aim is to restore a sense of the period asymmetry [emphasis added] 
between the New York School and mainstream U.S. values of the 1950s, 
while also registering a renewed sense of the polyvalent, dissident, and 
paradoxical side of Abstract Expressionism.37 
 
So far so good. One understands that a dialogical art, as well as a dialogical conception of 
art, such as Craven proposes, is a site of polyvalence, and that this means it can contain or 
register both messages of U.S. imperialist power and the individual artists’s own often 
contrary meanings, ones beyond the Pale of State Department sanction. However, no 
more than three paragraphs later there is this:  
My aim is to restore a sense of the historical unevenness [emphasis added] 
of economic and ideological developments in this period, in relation to 
which the Abstract Expressionists produced their own tensely paradoxical 
artworks.38 
 
Is this an instance of the well-worn rhetorical device of repetitio by which repetition 
serves to underscore, to reinforce a point? Yet, one may also suspect in the proximity of 
these passages in Craven’s text and the semantic closeness of the passages not a robust 
underscoring of the author’s argument but rather an indication in tell-tale fashion the very 
spot in the text most needing reinforcement, the weak point, the place of least security. 
Indeed, a bit of nervousness becomes understandable when his carefully phrased 
“asymmetry” and “unevenness” begin to sound nothing so like Marx’s “Greek” 
question—just dusted off and nominally brought up to date.39 Methodologically, it 
appears that Craven has circled back to the same old contentious spot of materialist 
aesthetics: what is the “place and ‘special character’ of art as a social practice in 
relationship to the economic base”? What should be made of that famous gap opened up 
by the elusive notion of a “relative autonomy” of superstructures from economic bases, 
albeit one determined “in the last instance” by the basis?40 The lurking concern perhaps 
in Craven’s methodological commitments to the dialogical nature of art, to the sign as 
polyvalent and paradoxical and to base-superstructure asymmetry, is that it draws too 
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near to an attitude of liberal inclusiveness by which the playfully unruly sign or artifact 
steps over into a meaningless plurality. How much “give” can be allowed the base-
superstructure relation before a materialist analysis becomes an idealist one? 
Far from being a dismissal of Craven’s work, if anything the above discussion 
should highlight the difficulties of writing social histories informed by Left criticism and 
the serious and continuing conundrum of materialist methodologies: how to characterize 
art’s production and reception between the interpretive poles of reflection as object-
determined structure and expression as voluntarist subjective agency. Though the 
dualisms may be facilely set out—reflection vs. expression, structure vs. agency, object 
vs. subject—these pairs continue to describe high methodological stakes. Craven’s third-
way project is being written in large part in confrontation with Guilbaut, with Guilbaut 
standing as a figurehead (or strawman) for an older notion of how materialist scholarship 
is to be performed. As such it is being written against the methodological limitations 
associated with a materialist method à la Guilbaut: at its most vulgar, its lack of subtlety 
resulting from a bare-bones mechanistic model of the relationship between material basis 
and superstructural effects; an economic reduction and abstraction that turns 
paradoxically idealist and removed in its flattening of the material dimension of the sign; 
its blindness to the materiality of form. It is a viewpoint that does not allow for very 
many options, and it has the often disconcerting underlying message that revolutionary 
change and critical, meaningful engagement’s primary residence is not, in fact, the realm 
of art and literature and in its academies and salons but with a more traditionally 
conceived productive base and in the form of a class politics of mass agency and 
movement. Compared to this, Craven’s embrace of asymmetry, though problem-ridden, 
opens the field to a variety of possibilities; it freshly outfits the toolbox, so to speak, with 
a wealth of options for probing relations and studying social constructions. Indeed, he 
rehabilitates that gap between base and superstructure as the very space in which vital 
social options are preserved: riding on the question of this “gap” is the very possibility of 
critical, resistant consciousness able, at least, to think beyond the descriptive “is” to a 
normative “ought.” The challenge in all of this is to exploit the possibilities of asymmetry 
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without tempting the question: how much of a gap can occur before one effectively stops 
doing social history of a Marxian-inspired materialist variety? How much of this 
polyvalent “give” does one permit the sign before it ceases to mean very much at all?  
Finally, the last of the third-way positions I want to explore is the one argued by 
Nancy Jachec in The Philosophy and Politics of Abstract Expressionism. What 
immediately stands out in Jachec’s approach is the force of her challenge to the Cold War 
paradigm of rigid, static political polarities of Left and Right, and the care by which she 
tracks and describes ideological nuances along the political spectrum. Between the 
radical leftism of the pre-war 1930s (upholding the orthodox line on social revolution as 
total overturning of the status quo through the political activism of a collective agent in 
order to realize communism) and the official state liberalism of the post-war period 
(aligned with official government policy, upholding the dominant ideology and accepting 
of international corporate capitalism), Jachec complicates this familiar narrative by firmly 
inserting a crucial intervening episode that she labels post-war new liberalism.  
Disentangling this third-way new liberalism from state liberalism is far from splitting 
hairs; rather, Jachec insists that the persistent tendency within the field to treat liberalism 
monolithically has led to faulty constructions of cause and effect and erroneous 
ascriptions of political motive. This other “new” liberalism—which Jachec identifies by a 
number of names: new radicalism, pessimistic pragmatism, post-dialectical socialism, 
and new realism—develops out of prewar radicalism’s attempts to salvage what it could 
of socialism under the pressure of severe historical and ideological blows: namely, the 
totalitarian state, a recipe with two key ingredients, a fascist dictator (Stalin as an 
instance) and a mass-identified populace that is brainwashed and lacking any resources 
for independent thought. What emerges from the other side of this process of redefinition 
and ideological transformation, Jachec contends, is still recognizable as a critical 
“independent left,” one that has not capitulated to the Right, one that has not blatantly 
sold its soul to the Cold War State Department, but equally one that has seriously 
suspended any advocation of revolutionary activity and has weighed the possible dire 
consequences of not offering at least critical support to certain U.S. policies. It is with 
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this complex process of ideological migration from pre-war radicalism to post-war 
liberalism that Jachec identifies the Abstract Expressionists and the New York 
Intellectuals. 
What is key to Jachec’s argument is the notion of a cultural turn. To try for a 
summarizing definition, the cultural turn for Jachec signifies the “swapping of leftism’s 
political means of expression for the cultural act,” or a relinquishing of “radical political 
activity in favor of cultural critique,” in a “reconceptualization of Marxism as an 
aesthetic, utopian ideal as opposed to a theory of class struggle, and concomitantly, the 
reassigning of radical agency to the artist instead of the working class.”41 What this 
redefinition allowed for was the insurance that the “United States’ fundamentally sound 
democratic institutions would not be jeopardized by any actively political form of dissent, 
while holding open the possibility for the revival of a socialist politics at a later, 
unspecified date.”42 The aesthetic act was a “safe form of leftist dissent” because it 
substituted Marx’s traditional socialist agent—the revolutionary mass or collective 
working class taking the struggle, so to speak, to the streets—with the artist in a studio 
performing isolated “radical” acts of “creative imagination” in the process of realizing 
authentic, unique subjectivity and one potentially at odds with dominant values. It offered 
a bracketed “as if” space for staging “actions” that would in no way truly challenge the 
state or threaten its security; and that provision in itself might be a very important 
contribution towards the anti-totalitarian effort. But, as the argument goes, art still 
remained a “repository of socialist values” because it gave room to the notion of human 
activity as self-realizing acts, human creativity as an end in itself, the ideal of a non-
instrumental form of labor.43 The artist, as creative laborer, stepped in when the political 
activism of a proletarian collective was discredited, effecting the sequestering of radical 
energies into the realm of creative imaginings—a maneuver à la Trotsky whereby art as a 
creative act is taken as innately critical of reality in its very process of positing an ulterior 
reality.44 The cultural turn became a way of surviving. 
There are several key points to Jachec’s cultural turn thesis and which further 
distinguish her version of the Cold War argument. For one, Jachec argues that Abstract 
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Expressionism “emerged not only alongside but in direct dialogue with the independent 
left during the period of its ideological realignment.” She places the art of the New York 
School as intimate players in the American independent Left’s process of ideological 
transformation in the late 1940s and 1950s. In other words, Abstract Expressionism was 
not an object appropriated as a useful illustration of postdialectical socialism’s new 
culturalist stance, a posteriori, but rather it participated directly in these theoretical 
reformulations. This assertion goes a great distance in tempering tendencies within the 
Cold War argument to collapse any eventual use of Abstract Expressionism as a political 
signifier—for either Right or Left—with a do-nothing, know-nothing passivity on the 
part of the artist.  For another, Jachec researches the sources for cultural turn discourse 
from which the American independent Left drew. The relevant connection that Jachec 
makes and that others have overlooked is that the discourses of the cultural turn came 
from European socialist thought on the problems and issues of a postdialectical Marxism, 
from their own experiences of reconceptualizing radical theory in the face of their own, 
slightly earlier, experience with socialist shipwreck and revolutionary failure. Jachec 
provides persistent and thorough documentation of both the printed presence of such 
European voices as Leo Lowenthal, Hannah Arendt, Bruno Bettelheim, Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Albert Camus and the high level of American writers’s 
engagement in these European texts in the American independent Left press throughout 
the 1940s and 1950s.45 These were the significant pre-established models for rethinking 
revolutionary praxis as cultural practice, within the aesthetic realm and in the individual 
artist’s creative act.  
It is with these two refinements that Jachec is able to propose a Cold War thesis 
that can argue that Abstract Expressionism was used as a propaganda vehicle abroad but, 
importantly, for reasons at odds with the motives isolated by previous revisionist 
scholarship. In dramatic opposition to Guilbaut, Jachec argues the reasons for Abstract 
Expressionism’s promotion abroad lay precisely in its intimate connection with cultural 
turn theorization, or in its ties to revisionist socialism, and in its negationist mandate. 
Abstract Expressionism was exhibited in Europe, in other words, not for the reasons 
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upheld by the Cold War thesis—because it read as a triumphant signifier for the values of 
the American capitalist system—but for the exact opposite because it could act as a 
critical signifier of a reworked socialism. It was used as a cultural bridge to connect the 
politically nonaligned European intelligentsia to the U.S. through promoting Abstract 
Expressionism as an existential art (engaged with European philosophical developments), 
one resonant with abstract developments in Europe (i.e., Tâchisme and Art informel) and 
thus suggesting the sophistication of American culture—as one whose arts are self-
critical, reassuringly capable of standing at odds with U.S. institutions and mainstream 
values be they economic, social, political. The initial selling point, therefore, in exporting 
American Abstract Expressionism was precisely its connotations as an art critical of 
America and not as an art expressing the glory and the power of the “American Century.” 
Had it been packaged in the latter manner, as Jachec sharply points out, this art certainly 
would have failed as cultural propaganda with the targeted European audience. Jachec, in 
essence, locates in the history of Abstract Expressionism’s reception a far more subtle 
and sinister moment of its recuperation, a phase preceding and to be distinguished from 
the later overtly pro-American and vulgar promotion of Abstract Expressionism by the 
State Department in the late 1950s and into the 1960s, at a time when, Jachec explains, 
the need for subtleties had dematerialized along with any significant threat of a 
communist Europe. What made this earlier, 1940s and early to mid-1950s promotion of 
Abstract Expressionism more sinister was the precociousness with which a group of Cold 
Warriors honed in on avant-gardist “negation”—a stance of  principled refusal and 
criticism of the status quo, typically bourgeois capitalist—spotting in its style and 
rhetoric and ideological connotations a clever vehicle through which to affirm indirectly 
by negating directly. If there was a lesson to be had, or so it appears in Jachec’s account, 
it was that displays of criticality and negation feed the machine as well.  
 Thus, though by different means, Jachec ends her work by returning to the 
familiar conclusion of the Cold War argument—the post-war Left’s negligible identity 
and the recuperation of avant-garde art to the ultimate interests of the new corporate 
liberalist base. What marks her project as different from a Guilbautian complicity is her 
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scholarly care in slowing down the pace of the narrative, refining the terms of the 
dilemma, not speeding off to the dismal conclusion which is now more or less expected, 
but sustaining the difficult series of moments marking the independent Left’s attempts to 




Cultural Turn as Return 
In part it throws itself into doctrinaire experiments, exchange 
banks and workers’ associations, hence into a movement in which 
it renounces the revolutionizing of the old world by means of its 
own great, combined resources, and seeks, rather, to achieve its 
salvation behind society’s back, in private fashion, within its 
limited conditions of existence, and hence inevitably suffers 
shipwreck.   
Karl Marx46 
 
[T]he abominations of McCarthyism, the crudities of the Cold War 
were jarring to sensitive people: it seemed best to pull away and 
dig in. . . .  
What remained was culture, culture as a surrogate faith, 
enclave of sensibility, sign of distinction, refuge for the nerves. For 
sensitive people . . . culture became a secret home. They sought in 
art and literature what they were seeking in “personal relations,” 
a world more attractive (as Trotsky had once said), a realm of 




[I]t is precisely the path through the aesthetic question that we are 
obliged to take in any ultimate solution of the political question. . .  
Fredrick Schiller48 
 
In these accounts, whether Cold War or third-way, present, in one form or another, is the 
trope of the cultural turn, used to help articulate the problematic of art and politics during 
this Cold War/High Modernist period. It is used to describe the relation of aesthetic 
ideology to U.S. Cold War imperialism and political propaganda; the projects of 
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reconstructing post-war subjectivities fraught with crisis and contradiction; the positing 
of non-revolutionary practices of cultural resistance; the transformations in the socialist 
imagination and reorganizations of Left political culture in the U.S. But looming over all 
these uses of a cultural turn paradigm is the alternating fascination and worry over the 
“aestheticization of political radicalism,” to use a phrase of Jachec’s. Even in the most 
optimistic of these accounts—Belgrad’s by far—the cultural turn as an aestheticization of 
political radicalism betokens something of a twilight gesture, variously indicating, and to 
various degrees, compromise, failure, decadence, retreat, a heroic-but-doomed last stand. 
This ultimate directional valence is one turned away from the political in an “authentic” 
and older fashioned revolutionary activist sense. Indeed, aestheticization as 
depoliticization could well serve as the cultural turn’s cynical shorthand version. For 
instance, one senses this mood as early as 1936 in the pages of the New Masses in Mike 
Gold’s vigorous attack on the “Phi Beta Kappa Trotskyites in New York” who “elaborate 
projects for inner reform” in their “bookish minds” and contentedly celebrate their 
“wonderful victories on paper.”49 “It suggests,” as Eugene Lunn, a scholar with particular 
interest in the intersections of Marxism and modernism in the early twentieth century, has 
described, “a form of narrowly cultural revolt which facilitates the absorption of art, as 
fashion, into advertising or into ‘shocking’ entertainment and new consumer products for 
the well-to-do.”50 Although, as in Jachec’s argument, the cultural realm can serve as a 
place by which a Left identified by the commitments of socialism and anti-totalitarianism 
can rethink itself during periods of insecurity, this move is also a slippery slope leading to 
the degradation of political commitments to an insular, sterile and self-satisfied 
academicism or culturalism. “[W]hen cultural revolution is understood as a substitute for 
social revolution, as is frequently the Western conception,” one should worry, as Fredric 
Jameson intimates, what function is being served.51 The cultural turn, accented either 
way—whether as straight-out abnegation of Left political commitments or as the tactical 
retreat for a socialism-in-waiting—spells a crisis in revolutionary socialism. These shifts 
or ideological transformations occurring in the post-war period begin to suggest only too 
well Marx’s dour description of the frustrated course and dissipated energies of the once 
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revolutionary Paris proletariat in the aftermath of those infamous June days. Here then is 
another shipwrecked Left, now in New York, not Paris, and not in the mid-nineteenth 
century but a hundred years later, once again renouncing “revolutionizing” “by means of 
its own great, combined resources,” and seeking “to achieve its salvation behind society’s 
back, in private fashion,” in little and limited (and one should possibly add “cultural”) 
“experiments.”  
I am not arguing that this is not largely very much what happened—summarized, 
in one of its noted versions, by Clement Greenberg as “‘anti-Stalinism,’ which started out 
more or less as ‘Trotskyism,’ turn[ing] into art for art’s sake.”52 Certainly evidence of the 
bad legacy of the cultural turn can be read in those later twentieth-century rallying calls 
by cultural avant-gardes for a merging of art into life—naïve and ill-begotten, show-
casing the pentimenti of revolutionary sensibility but minus any particular concern with 
the logistics of social revolution, and dissolving, as Jameson has suggested, into the 
postmodern present as commodified hyper-culturalism. Or, as Hal Foster is apt to point 
out: “Beware of what you wish, runs one moral of modernism as seen from the present, 
because it may come true—in perverse form. . . . [T]he old project to reconnect Art and 
Life . . . was eventually accomplished, but according to the spectacular dictates of the 
culture industry, not the libratory ambitions of the avant-garde.”53 Harsh criticism has 
even been leveled at those more clever versions of the cultural turn argument that defend  
its seeming heterodoxy on the issue of base and superstructure relations with the claim, 
such as that made by André Breton, that culture is the “ideological basis of the social 
order” and thus necessarily a vitally important realm of  revolutionary effort. But, in O.K. 
Werckmeister’s sour retort, “Marxists in the twentieth century strive for a revalidation of 
culture, because they have been forced to abandon the goal of revolutionary change, and 
instead accept a politically stabilized, static socioeconomic order.”54 As Jameson recalls, 
there is an older revolutionary tradition, upheld by those who adamantly refuse the 
“utopian substitution of cultural politics for politics proper, the vocation to transform the 
world by transforming its forms, space or language.”55 The orthodox comeback 
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apparently still stands: the radical transformation of social and productive relationships 
must precede any radical transformations in culture. 
Only a species of bald denial could argue that the trope of the cultural turn simply 
gets wrong the relation between aesthetic and political discourses in the post-war period. 
In general, this figure possesses a good deal of explanatory power. Nonetheless I would 
insist on adding that something very significant indeed is overlooked in this historical 
problematic when the cultural turn is only taken as a sign of approaching decadence. 
Rather, the possibility that I would like to suggest and the sense that I would like to 
preserve are those that emerge when the cultural turn is thought out along the lines of a 
“return” as well. By this I mean to reinforce those senses of the aesthetic and dialectic 
brought up at the opening of this introduction in which they share in the conceit of 
modern revolutionary socialism. Thus, to investigate the aesthetic is to inhabit the same 
concerns of the dialectic, to structure an “ultimate Utopian instant” analogously: the 
articulation of identity, a self-realizing at that moment of interpenetration between the 
mediations of part and whole and the mediations of theory and practice: “the adequation 
of subject and object, and of the possibility of reconciliation of I and Not-I, of spirit and 
matter, or self and world.”56 It is through this sense of a cultural return that I suggest 
another possibility existing under the cultural-turn umbrella, one that was not a retreat 
from politics into merely liberal-friendly forms of cultural criticism or soft-edged cultural 
activism; not solipsism nor a facile existentialism; not a defensive holing up in ivory 
towers and reinforcing canons of elite cultures; not a form of art therapy; not a seeking of 
“individual salvation only in the midst of the collective shipwreck”; not a form of denial; 
and not a shoring up of defenses; not even a stoic bearing witness to events over which 
one is powerless. Rather, the cultural return that I will describe was an attempt to do work 
at the very heart of the matter: it was not a backing-down but an attack, head-on. It was 
radical, to paraphrase Marx, by grasping things at the root, precisely by working on the 
level of the mechanics of mediation, by riding that edge between work and labor and for 
seeing in that difference the central defining moment and meaning of both art and 
politics.57  
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  The cries prompted here are easily heard. What art or criticism in this period 
would satisfy the conditions of such a “cultural return?” Further, given that the theoretical 
object proposed by this re-worked term—that is, a substantial, coherent and dedicated 
mutuality or identity between modernist painting and socialist politics—would seem to 
answer the potent, if unspoken, desire haunting the field of post-war American art history 
for a reconciliation of the aesthetic with the political, for the identity of painting and 
politics manifested as the concrete idea—the second cry might be, why has not such a 
case been made earlier? 
My argument is that such a politically critical cultural return did exist within the 
Abstract Expressionist, post-war and Cold War milieu—that it structures and animates 
the argument described by these three individuals: Harold Rosenberg (1906-78), the 
writer and culture critic associated with the New York Intellectuals and Abstract 
Expressionism, and the two abstract painters Barnett Newman (1905-1970) and Ad 
Reinhardt (1913-1967), both affiliated to greater and lesser degrees with mid-century 
Abstract Expressionism in New York. But this is an unlikely configuration, a bizarre 
triangulation. And this in itself already provides some good indication for why such a 
case as I shall attempt has remained far from apparent. For, indeed, what organizing 
rubric could possibly make sense of all three?  
The awkwardness of this triangulation and this thesis is four-fold, and my 
argument will require that I contend with these four aspects: (1) reading Rosenberg’s 
criticism, especially his concept of Action Painting, as a Marxist-engaged aesthetic; (2) 
opening up Action Painting’s reference beyond the gesturalist painters to the color-field 
painters (such as Newman and Reinhardt); (3) making a case for pairing and comparing 
Newman and Reinhardt, two painters not usually thought to make a relevant, productive 
pairing; (4) a connecting of Newman’s and Reinhardt’s politics to their paintings, of their 
theory to their practice. 
But now let me immediately revisit these four again and in this begin suggesting 
how this triangulation of figures actually does work, how Rosenberg and Newman and 
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Reinhardt describe a historical instance of the cultural return as the dialectical co-
articulation of the aesthetic and the political.   
 Starting with Harold Rosenberg, I will consider his criticism and with this Action 
Painting, the primary term by which he is identified, as an engagement with and 
articulation of socialist theory and politics. This will be a dramatic turn indeed, especially 
in the face of Action Painting’s all-too-typical simplifications by which it becomes the 
unavailing “theory” for an inscrutable painting practice, the meaning of which, if any, is 
hermetically sealed between painter and canvas. Contrary to its usual functioning as the 
mystifying apologist for an inarticulate, incommunicable, mysterious condition of art and 
artists, it will be read as a political aesthetic borne out of Rosenberg’s larger engagement 
with Marx’s philosophy of action. The radical philosophical and political content of this 
term is what will be argued for, so that, in the end, Action Painting can be addressed as 
an aesthetic about and concieved on the problematic of revolutionary dialectics. 
Going along with this re-reading of Rosenberg’s criticism and Action Painting is 
the opening up of Action Painting’s object of reference. That is, when taken to describe 
the style of post-war American painting in which physical gesturalism, bold spontaneity, 
immediate paint handling dominate, the term would seem to be relevant to, as well as 
limited to, such artists as Jackson Pollock, Willem de Kooning and Franz Kline. Working 
with a fresh understanding of the “action” of Action Painting removes the unquestioned 
priority of precisely those painters and generates the room for considering Action 
Painting with other artists of the period, such as the color-field painters, who were once 
easily thought to be irrelevant to the term. For, as one historian has described the 
situation, the “color-field” wing of American mid-century painting was a “quiescent art 
of inaction”  whose artists were “[m]ore given to reflection than action,”  and who were 
“[m]ore systematically intellectual and certainly more literary than the Action painters.”58 
Specifically, here, Newman and Reinhardt, two typically color-field identified painters, 
can now be considered within the Action Painting rubric, and with the possibility of 
Action Painting’s offering a fresh, relevant perspective by which to comprehend these 
artists. 
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Rosenberg’s Action Painting taken as a concept of dialectical painting/painting as 
dialectic provides a framework in which to compare the projects of Newman and 
Reinhardt and in a way that facilitates questions of the political content and import of 
their art practices. Of course, given their outspoken views on politics and aesthetics alike, 
both artists would seem ideal characters for a Cold War/Third Way/Cultural Turn drama. 
If their canvases appeared to their New York School milieu most resistant to discourse 
because of the extreme pictorial reductivity, they themselves “discoursed” quite 
frequently, often elegantly, as well as polemically, as substantiated in each artist’s 
volume of collected writings. Both generated extensive bodies of writing that suggested 
that their projects were intelligently constructed engagements with political form and 
socialist ideals. The persistent stumbling block has been precisely how to determine the 
relation of their politics and their painting—that is, how to read their formal painting 
languages as the convincing embodiment of such politically meaningful content. 
Exacerbating the issue is the fact that, with Newman’s and Reinhardt’s monochromatic 
and near-monochromatic paintings, there seems pictorially so little to work with. How 
does one read a message when so little in the painting has been articulated in the first 
place?  The challenge, for layperson and art historian alike, has been to find a way in 
which their work makes sense, particularly the sort of sense that would justify the 
artists’s own claims. This situation often has the frustrating quality of either taking their 
word for it or not. What results are often stock assessments: if one takes the former 
position, the “blankness” and “nothingness” of their canvases are hastily subsumed by the 
umbrella of modernist negation, where the not-picturing of the world as it stands signifies 
as condemnatory refusal and as the defiant gestures of autonomy of a pure creativity 
unwilling to submit to any outside system, a turning one’s back. If one takes the latter 
stance,  the work means nothing, or could mean anything, and one falls into the nihilism 
of the arbitrariness of signification. With such minimal surfaces, the problem becomes all 
the more stark of how to connect the artwork and political content, the painting to the 
politics, the theory to the practice.  
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My contention is that the revolutionary problematic signed for by Rosenberg’s 
Action Painting frames a way for addressing these very problems. It highlights the terms 
and clarifies the stakes, indeed sets the arena, according to which Newman’s and 
Reinhardt’s projects can be understood in terms of a cultural return; and when understood 
in this way the artists’s theory and practice do indeed appear to form articulate, coherent 
wholes. Further, such a frame makes sense of my insistence that Newman and Reinhardt 
be viewed together, as a dialectical pair generating a critically constructive tension. Their 
mutual antagonism (among other things, attacking each other in print, refusing to speak 
to each other after 1954) highlights more the proximity than the distance between their 
positions; what they often argue over is precisely shared concerns for which they hold the 
utmost passionate commitment: the identity of their painting and politics. And it is this 
identity that a revised concept of Action Painting frames in a compelling way. Moreover, 
with Action Painting as the frame and mediator, what becomes far easier to see is the 
directness, even bluntness of Newman’s and Reinhardt’s arguments. In other words, what 
they were engaged in was not some loosely conceived aestheticization of political 
radicalism, or the bracketing of their political wishes within art world culture, or the 
exploration of exotic forms of politicality, or any overly subtle or dense academic 
theorizations of cultural and political agency. Those academicizing and aestheticizing 
refinements of political engagement and discourse were not yet part of their game. But 
neither were their arguments so stark as to be relegatable to the sheer obduracy, the 
inarticulate refusal of the blank monolith of modernist negation. Rather their arguments 
become transparent when set to the political scale and philosophical tone of classic 
socialist debates. The political content of Newman’s and Reinhardt’s paintings is self-
referentially centered on precisely their struggles with the “act” of making, and with all 
that implies—the articulation of self-identity, and all the mediations staged through the 
dialectics of theory and practice, art and labor, necessity and freedom, alienation and 
realization, individual part and communal whole. This is once again the passage of a 
cultural return from the aesthetic through the dialectic to the good politic: the artists, their 
art-making and the work of art all stand for the good dialectic, for unalienated being, and 
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as an image of the social as utopian fulfillment. Their politics, in other words, is 
configured in and through the very matter of painting’s formal articulation, as a process 
of articulating identity and as a thing of articulated identity. The politics is in the 
making—or, in other words, Action Painting. 
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Chapter One:  
 





An Introduction to Marginalization 
I’ve read a lot of his criticism and I appreciate it for what it offers, 
but I never read any of it that proved to me that he was capable of 
understanding a picture in visual terms. He always had a largely 
sociological or sociocultural orientation, which I find very useful 
and very informative, but by itself, inadequate. 
Sidney Tillim59 
 
We don’t have an ideological stand, at least I don’t feel that I have 
an ideological stand in the sense that Rosenberg had in the fifties.  
Barbara Rose60 
 
The above pair of statements come from a 1970 radio panel discussion, organized and 
moderated by Bruce Glaser, on the topic of modern art and its criticism.61 I have pulled 
these two quotations, Tillim’s and Rose’s, both of which speak in reference to Harold 
Rosenberg, not because they help illuminate directly Rosenberg’s critical project but 
rather because they instantiate typical ways of processing—and indeed faulting—
Rosenberg’s work. What appears to be happening is not real processing in the sense of 
grappling with another’s language and concepts for an eventual coming to terms, but a 
manner of pre-treatment—of the sort used on difficult, resistant, unseemly stains—in 
order to facilitate their eventual removal. For, one may ask, what better way of 
effectively dismissing an art critic than Tillim’s damaging charge that Rosenberg failed to 
see a picture in visual terms? To this Rose’s comment performs a nice extension. Seeing 
and speaking of history and social relationships in the work of art is to slide over into the 
ideological and thus the kind of critic who performs art criticism from an “ideological 
stand.” Although Rose does not elucidate the problems she finds with the ideological 
when connected to evaluations of art, in a sense she hardly need bother. The tone of 
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evolutionary superiority is difficult to miss. The ideological as a contaminant to art 
criticism has, one presumes by Rose’s statement, been safely purified out of the system. 
Tillim’s and Rose’s complaints describe more or less the basic template for the 
kind of dismissive reception given Rosenberg as the century progressed. Here is a 
sampling of that template’s earlier formulations. In 1959, responding to the publication of 
what would become Rosenberg’s first volume of collected essays, The Tradition of the 
New, Paul Goodman announced frankly in the pages of Dissent, “He is a lousy critic, for 
he does not concentrate his intelligence on the object before him.”62 This, coming from a 
somewhat sympathetic colleague (Goodman and Rosenberg were friends of sorts), and 
published in a venue also generally sympathetic to Rosenberg (who held an open 
invitation from the editors for submissions), is soft compared to the responses from his 
unsympathetic readers.63 Hilton Kramer, for one, in Arts Magazine that same year calls 
Rosenberg a “sloganizing” polemicist made of “rhetorical dough.”64 Six years later, in a 
review of The Anxious Object, Kramer repeats the earlier charges of “extravagance of 
rhetoric” and adds a jibe towards Rosenberg’s “blindness:” “But it was, of course, 
precisely on the question of form that Mr. Rosenberg had nothing to say.”65 In 1965 a 
number of other art world figures voiced similar complaints against Rosenberg’s apparent 
inadequacies in the fundamentals of visual arts criticism paired with his excessive 
“rhetoric.” Even Max Kozloff, in many ways diametrically opposed to Kramer, held that 
“one never gets the impression that his fascination for personalities and philosophical 
schemes has ever led Rosenberg to examine individual pictures, or that they exist for any 
other purpose than to illustrate a rhetorical field theory.”66 More than a decade later, in 
1979, the New York Times art writer John Russell registered the same complaint, that 
Rosenberg was unable to “focus on a single canvas.”67 As late as 1994 Paul Brach was 
repeating that “Harold . . . always want[s] to talk about the ‘situation’” and not, 
presumably, the “single canvas.”68  
From the tenor of the discussion above, one might easily supply the name of the 
person who fills Rosenberg’s lack. That, of course—the shadow figure not openly spoken 
but clearly present—is Clement Greenberg. It is Greenberg who makes good on all that is 
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found missing in Rosenberg’s variety of art criticism: it is he, Greenberg, who as a prime 
exemplar of formalist criticism is able to focus on a single canvas without getting caught 
up in the situation. Although he is not officially named as the antidote to the apparently 
noxious—ideological and rhetorical—stuff Rosenberg tries passing off as criticism, one 
might easily read back through the above and find most of it operating under this 
umbrella formulation: it is the not-Greenbergness of Rosenberg that is the real problem. It 
was probably in irritated awareness of how his own critical position was being not merely 
overshadowed but in fact damagingly deformed and misconstrued by perpetual 
comparison to Greenberg’s (Greenberg’s terms and Greenberg’s problematic), and 
thereby reduced to the negative position of “not-Greenberg,” that prompted Rosenberg, 
when speaking at a 1968 conference in Paris celebrating the hundredth anniversary of 
Charles Baudelaire’s death, to flaunt this father of modern criticism’s claim “to have 
written about the Salon of 1859 without having seen it.”69 Rosenberg’s Baudelaire 
eschews formalistic minutia because he well understands that real criticism rests not in 
the “attempt to analyze each work minutely” but rather his aims lie in “penetrat[ing] deep 
into the temperament and activating motives of each artist,” thereby discovering in and 
through art the truth of contemporary life, of the “situation.”70  
At the same time, neither has Rosenberg been the favored authority to whom to 
turn when seeking serious scholarly investigation of the “situation” of art, as in a social 
history of art. For that type of work and still drawing from the New York Intellectual 
milieu, Meyer Schapiro has typically been the choice. Indeed, this is precisely David 
Craven’s strategy for countering the hegemony enjoyed by Greenberg, modernist 
formalism and aesthetic apoliticism. “It is Schapiro’s largely underappreciated, as well as 
little understood, interpretation of Abstract Expressionism (along with his concomitant 
lifelong commitment to ‘unorthodox Marxism’) that will form the cornerstone of my own 
approach to that movement.”71 And it is largely through Schapiro’s writings on the 
relationship of art and politics, his development of a thesis on the social nature of art 
through a consequential series of essays in the 1930s and his 1957 essay on Abstract 
Expressionism, “The Liberating Quality of Avant-Garde Art,” that Craven builds his case 
37 
for the existence of a vital critical tradition butting heads with Greenbergian formalism.72 
Which is to say that Rosenberg has fallen between the cracks. Developing neither a 
highly applicable formal system of art criticism as in Greenberg’s case, nor operating 
with the full regalia and solid academic disciplinary credentials of art history as in 
Schapiro’s, Rosenberg’s work frequently has been dismissed as insubstantial, of little 
ultimate consequence and of far less seriousness. Rosenberg is the odd man out.  
 This chapter aims towards redressment. The preliminary step will be to examine 
the ways in which the case has been made against Rosenberg as a serious critic, 
specifically how readings of his work’s more provocative and very possibly radical 
political content have been side-stepped, in particular the compromising of his concept of 
Action Painting through successive generations of misreading. Just as a key performs the 
dual functions of both locking and unlocking, if Action Painting has been the primary 
tool for misreading and shutting out important aspects of Rosenberg’s project, turned in 
the opposite direction it can also open up to a critical vista. The next step will be to turn 
to the critical re-readings and reevaluations of Rosenberg already underway. By building 
on this previous work and incorporating newly available primary materials (namely the 
Harold Rosenberg Papers at the Getty Research Institute), I will further develop the thesis 
that Action Painting is a significant modeling of revolutionary dialectic within the critical 
tradition of Marxism, as well as suggest what in the past has made pursuit of this 
direction in Rosenberg’s criticism so unlikely. Indeed, the testament of the fortitude of 
these engrained readings of Rosenberg’s Action Painting concept is in the generations of 
scholars who have purveyed the field of post-war American art and its criticism without 
seeing in Action Painting an indication of the critical, emancipatory, materialist aesthetic 
for which so many of them have pined. The failure to engage Rosenberg’s thought 
through this rubric has both unnecessarily smoothed the way for the Cold War thesis and 





Mis-Reading Action Painting 
Like a venerable statue in a busy square, Harold Rosenberg 
occupies a curious spot—at once memorialized and ignored. 
J. Hoberman73 
 
Ironically, one of the biggest factors working against serious treatment of Rosenberg has 
been the popularity of Action Painting. This term, to which Rosenberg is now primarily 
identified, first officially appeared in “The American Action Painters,” an essay 
published in the December 1952 issue of ARTnews. Rosenberg’s marginality, then, is of a 
paradoxical nature: it is not due to lack of representation—he shows up regularly in the 
expected places, art history survey books, anthologies of art criticism, exhibition 
catalogues, etc. (as Phyllis Rosenzweig noted in her summarizing volume on 1950s 
painting in New York, the Action Painter’s essay was “perhaps the single most 
controversial piece of critical writing to come out of the fifties, and certainly the most 
quoted”). He suffers instead from a marginality bound to the overpopularity of his 
coinage.74 As Elaine O’Brien, who wrote her dissertation on Rosenberg and who is also 
the scholar responsible for organizing Rosenberg’s papers, remarked, “The outstanding 
paradox of Rosenberg’s reception is this tragic and comic irony of misinterpretation and 
influence that made him a force in creating the situation he condemned.”75 Though, one 
need add, had Action Painting been taken seriously, had the politically dissident and 
subversive content of the term been traced back to the Marxian well-spring of 
revolutionary dialectics from which it sprang, it certainly would not have attained its 
popular currency. Rather, the three main modes (often overlapping) by which Action 
Painting has been thought to signify are: as painting technique; as a visual style; and as 
romantic existentialist posturing.  
The identification of Action Painting with the painting technique that Jackson 
Pollock used after 1948 and that resulted in the artist’s canonical “drip” paintings was 
one persistently made but one Rosenberg fiercely and equally as persistently denied. This 
attribution, or misattribution, was the source of highly contentious debate. In one version 
Pollock is the genesis of the Action Painting idea itself. During a 1961 symposium on 
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Pollock sponsored by ARTnews, Bryan Robertson claimed that in 1949 a conversation 
had taken place between Rosenberg and the artist in which “Pollock talked of the 
supremacy of the act of painting as in itself a source of magic,” a discussion whose direct 
result was the critic’s “coin[ing] the new phrase: Action painting.”76 In 1979 Barbara 
Rose elaborated Robertson’s claim for Pollock’s centrality to Action Painting but 
suggested that Rosenberg had gotten the idea not from a discussion with the painter but 
from looking at Hans Namuth’s black-and-white photographs of Pollock at work in his 
Long Island studio. Rose unfolded the following sequence of dates as proof positive that 
Rosenberg’s idea for Action Painting directly derived from Pollock’s gesturalist painting 
technique. Namuth’s photographs first appeared in Portfolio in early 1951 and in May of 
that year also accompanied Robert Goodnough’s “Pollock Paints a Picture” in ARTnews 
(fig. 4). Just a month later the Museum of Modern Art (New York) screened Namuth’s 
35mm color film capturing the painter in his dance-like motions around the perimeter of 
his canvases.77 According to Rose, “The initial response of the art world’s reception of 
the Pollock photographs was felt in an article published the following year in ARTnews, 
Harold Rosenberg’s essay ‘The American Action Painters,’ which gained world fame as 
the manifesto of Abstract Expressionism.”78  
What the majority of viewers saw in both looking at Namuth’s photographs of 
Pollock in the act of painting and looking at Pollock’s actual paintings was the process, 
the unconventional technique by which Pollock had gotten the paint from can to surface. 
Pollock’s process and paintings when read through Rosenberg’s “The American Action 
Painters” got coded, fairly typically and quickly, as a novel type of emphatically bodily 
spontaneous painting, a brash American version of the automatism cultivated by the 
European avant-garde of Dada and Surrealism. “From the beginning Action painting has 
been more or less equated with automatist gesture and thrown paint,” O’Brien surmises 
after a long investigation of the reception of Action Painting, “Most commonly Action 
painting has been interpreted as an emotion-laden expressionism.”79 To give an example 
of how ingrained this pairing of Pollock and Rosenberg’s essay have become, April 
Kingsley, writing a layperson’s history of Abstract Expressionism in the early 1990s, 
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defined Action Painting as “another name for this movement” which spoke to “its 
physicality, its base in the process of making, rather than an intellectual esthetic position. 
The paintings have an improvised, rough-and-ready, almost haphazard look. An Abstract 
Expressionist approached the canvas head-on, in direct, unpremeditated confrontation, 
and left it strewn with drips and splatters, accidental gestures and studio debris.”80  
Indeed, it is difficult not to suspect that the author had an image of Pollock in mind when 
writing the last line; a line that almost reads as a crib of Pollock’s own description of his 
working methods: “I prefer . . . dripping fluid paint or a heavy impasto with sand, broken 
glass, and other foreign matter added.”81 Kingsley’s assessment well illustrates that little 
has changed in Action Painting’s reception. Certainly the tenacity of this sensationalist 
rendition of the “mindless” but still fully emotion-wrought painter allows one to 
sympathize more readily with this bitter complaint against the licenses permitted by 
Action Painting: “The worst excesses of self-indulgence and inept art . . . result[ing] from 
the elevation of mindless ‘action’ over self-conscious and critical deliberation were 
encouraged by [Rosenberg’s] approach. . . . It strikes me now as difficult to exaggerate 
how much art was produced under its influence.”82  
Perhaps even more irksome was how this manner of painting drifted so swiftly 
and effortlessly beyond the confines of high art production into the technique of the 
amateur painter, leisure artist or hobbyist. “Amateur Standing,” a regular column in 
ARTnews, was addressed specifically to the concerns of that part of its readership. In its 
March 1961 issue the column featured a discussion on the “Uses of spontaneity,” which 
was prefaced by the scenario of amateur art students “restrict[ing] themselves to a 
mechanical rote imposed by their teachers.” “[F]orget everything you have learned,” is 
the solution resolutely proposed, “Call it doodling if you like, but just go ahead and 
paint.” The continuation of this discussion bears quoting at length.83 
“But I don’t know what to do,” the amateur complained. He was advised 
to “go ahead and paint, with brushes, palette knife, anything. Don’t 
deliberate. Most students spoil pictures by “knowing what they are 
doing.”. . . We must penetrate to an innate sense of correctness . . . and 
reach for those areas of intuitive selection and taste where the real person 
hides.” 
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The student was thus pushed into what appeared to him a chaos of 
the inarticulate. Warned not to “think” or to remedy mistakes, nor to be 
self-conscious about results but to let the picture happen, he plunged. The 
results at first appeared chaotic—novel colors and shapes emerged and 
possibly for the first time he penetrated the restraints of convention and let 
his intuitive self take over.84 
 
What makes the “Uses of spontaneity” so unsettling—beyond its very title, apparently 
meant so earnestly here and seemingly unencumbered by cognizance of misalliance 
between the values of utility, pedagogy, and spontaneity as a purported realm of the 
unregulated—is the ghostly echo of “The American Action Painters.” The “Uses of 
spontaneity” relates to Rosenberg’s essay as in the children’s game of relaying an 
original message by whispering it ear-to-ear in a chained sequence until the last receiver 
says aloud the now highly distorted and often humorously nonsensical message. Only 
with one major difference. In the case of “The American Action Painters” and the “Uses 
of Spontaneity” the distortion of the original message occurs as a cleaning up and stream-
lining of Rosenberg’s prose: the noise is cut out. For example, those momentous, almost 
epic announcing lines in the 1952 essay such as “The big moment came when it was 
decided just to paint . . . just TO PAINT” become “just go ahead and paint.” In another 
instance, the straightforward advice to the amateurs to “forget everything you have 
learned” recalls the more wooly lines of Rosenberg’s, “The gesture on the canvas was a 
gesture of liberation, from Value—political, esthetic, moral.”85 And again, Rosenberg’s 
“exhilaration of an adventure over depths in which he [the artist] might find reflected the 
true image of his identity” becomes that reaching for the “intuitive” for where the “real 
person hides.”86 The ARTnews amateur column edits out the ambiguity, the hesitation, the 
counterpoint found in the original. Everything has become sharper, clearer, more 
functional, ready to be incorporated into curricula and taken into the classroom as neatly 
packaged, pedagogy-friendly sound-bites. 
Response to this new intuitive and spontaneous approach to art was not always as 
positive and advocatory as in the example above. To the other side, one hears in 
Katherine Kuh’s editorial in the winter 1958-59 issue of Art in America an attempt to rein 
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in the emotional and painterly anarchy let lose by action paintingist rhetoric while at the 
same time preserving the validity of the authentic Abstract Expressionist painters.87 The 
Abstract Expressionists “recognize only one reality, the validity of their own emotions 
expressed directly. The issue is confused, however, by hordes of imitators for whom the 
act is little more than cathartic. New schools of art have customarily attracted blind 
disciples, but in a movement where the initial impulse is of the utmost importance, 
imitation can become emptier than usual. For it takes more than impetuous verve to 
invent methods vital enough to merge the act of painting with the feelings which impelled 
the act.”88 If technique were divorced from “self-conscious and critical deliberation” and 
performed not with the mediation of thought but with the existential immediacy of “pure” 
emotion, then Action Painting really would reduce, and horribly so, to a mere gimmick of 
technique resulting in sublime quantities of “inept art.” Taken from either direction, 
whether from the positive and promoting stance of the “Amateur Standing” column, as a 
technique for getting in touch with one’s intuitive, naturally (unschooled) creative being, 
or the negative and deterring stance in the Art in America editorial, as an ominous de-
skilling that turns the practice of the fine arts into a free-for-all resulting in inchoate 
messes, in both cases Action Painting is rendered empty and the critical intent of 
Rosenberg’s project overlooked. 
Another major misinterpretation develops out of defining Action Painting as a 
visual style possessing specific identifying formal qualities. Given that Action Painting is 
usually half-correctly recognized as addressing “process” on some level, the presumption 
here is that the Action Painting-process should produce results that look a certain way. 
Typically it is supposed to look like a Pollock or Willem de Kooning or Franz Kline. The 
irony is this: if an Achilles’s heel of Action Painting is that its over-emphasis on free-
form process fails to give the formal elements of the painting their proper due, what sense 
does it make to think that Rosenberg’s prime art concept would then still work at a 
visually stylistic level? One runs into difficulty in arguing that Action Painting is just 
about process and the individual painter’s own act of creation (both highly unrestricted) 
but then also suppose that Action Painting works as a visually descriptive term. Indeed, 
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when reading back over those parts of “The American Action Painters” in which 
Rosenberg works out the broad parameters for Action Painting, one notes the 
conspicuous lack of formal prescriptions. “At a certain moment the canvas began to 
appear to one American painter after another as an arena in which to act—rather than as a 
space in which to reproduce, redesign, analyze or ‘express’ an object, actual or imagined. 
What was to go on the canvas was not a picture but an event.” “The painter,” Rosenberg 
continues, “no longer approached his easel with an image in his mind; he went up to it 
with material in his hand to do something to that other piece of material in front of him. 
The image would be a result of this encounter.”89 There are, however, certain assumed 
proscriptions. For instance, one might infer that Action Painting belongs to the general 
category of abstraction rather than representational painting, because the latter might 
easily involve reproducing an object and creating a “picture.”90 But that is an enormously 
broad statement and does not permit the move to something like the actual positive terms 
that would tell us what Action Painting is supposed to look like. There is a marked 
reticence in this essay (and elsewhere), where Rosenberg could have provided more 
literal clues for how one visually recognizes an “event” on canvas. Furthermore, this 
silence is highlighted by the fact that Rosenberg does not identify any Action Painters by 
name. Nor do the pages of the essay’s original publication aid in determining the proper 
look of Action Painting through accompanying reproductions. In fact the pages of 
Rosenberg’s essay are distinguished by a marked lack of illustrative matter.91 Surely this 
adds up to a considered silence on the writer’s part, though one, to be sure, that from the 
beginning was ill tolerated by the art community. If Rosenberg was not going to name 
names there were others who would: Action Painting became Pollock’s drip, the thick 
paint ooze indexing de Kooning’s gestural brush or Kline’s stark, bold calligraphy. This 
is not to argue that Pollock or de Kooning or Kline could not be Action Painters, but that 
calling them Action Painters because their paintings look like “acts” is the wrong 
criterion by which to make that judgment. It results in flat-footed and ultimately 
distorting identifications. Action Painting does not work as formalist criticism, nor was it 
ever meant to; consequently, attempts to make it work cogently and adequately as a 
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formal system will be frustrated and, in turn, will lead to the usual pronouncements of 
ineptitude in Rosenberg’s criticism and of the overall silliness of the Action Painting fad. 
In short, the disparaging clichés will persist, as in this, authored not so long ago, in the 
late 1980s, and by an art historian whose purported area of expertise is Abstract 
Expressionism: “the artists theatrically expressed their personal anguish on a blank 
canvas with little attention to form, style, and subject matter.”92 
If these two common readings of Action Painting begin the process of reducing 
the content of the term, the third reading, in purportedly giving Action Painting 
philosophical content, effectively denies it of any serious capacity to embody content, 
leaving Action Painting to become yet another cliché of artistic anarcho-romanticism. 
This is what happens when Action Painting is superficially referred to as so-called 
“existentialist” painting, in which the lone individual confronts timeless questions of 
existence, the eternal drama of an angst-ridden “self” facing the ultimate void. This was 
the kind of message reinforced by Alfred H. Barr, Jr. in his introduction to the catalogue 
essay for the Museum of Modern Art’s exhibition “The New American Painting,” in 
which he named the uniting principles for the show’s seventeen artists to be an 
uncompromising individualism, the “religion of Kierkegaard whom they honor,” and the 
“stubborn, difficult, even desperate effort to discover the ‘self’ or ‘reality’, an effort to 
which the whole personality should be recklessly committed: I paint, therefore I am.”93 
This is not, however, to argue that there are no reasons for linking Rosenberg and Action 
Painting to certain despairing attitudes in the post-war period and to existentialism. But 
careful attention need be paid to the brand of existentialism to which Rosenberg 
sympathized. In other words, if a connection can be made between Rosenberg and 
existentialism, it is to be with a French Marxian third-way existentialism associated with 
Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Simone de Beauvoir and not with refunctioned, far less 
philosophically rigorous versions popularized in mass culture. For instance, one might 
note here that de Beauvoir and Rosenberg met in 1947 during the former’s first trip to the 
United States. In her correspondence to Sartre detailing her New York experiences she 
describes a series of occasions on which she and Rosenberg discussed art, politics and 
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philosophy and all of this within the politically-charged milieu of Bernard Wolfe 
(Trotsky’s ex-secretary), Lionel Abel, Dwight Macdonald, Nicola Chiaromonte, among 
others.94 Additionally, when Sartre himself visited the United States, Rosenberg made 
efforts to befriend him.95 Perhaps most important is the long correspondence Rosenberg 
kept with Merleau-Ponty as well as Rosenberg’s publishing relationship to Les Temps 
Moderne.96 The point is this: the French Marxist existentialism contra romantic 
existentialism was politically Marxist and very much falls into the category of post-war 
revisionist socialism’s reworking of Marxist theory.97 
When one fails to distinguish popular romantic versions of existentialism from the 
socialist-political version associated with the French strain of Western Marxists (Sartre, 
Merleau-Ponty, De Beauvoir, among others) one easily loses the politically progressive 
and critical social-mindedness sustained in that body of thought. In romanticized 
existentialism, in what gets pegged as both a retreat from and a glorification in bourgeois 
individualism, the life of the emotions, psychology and its expression through  individual 
subjects become paramount, taking precedence over considerations of community or 
collective agency. In this version, what is left is the highly idealist notion of an apolitical 
and ahistorical interiority of the human subject—a timeless realm of the interior truths of 
the human psyche. In Action Painting the violent marks, slashing, and so on, of paint on 
canvas are then read as expressions of this eternal human struggle. Importantly, however, 
throughout his long career, Rosenberg insisted on distinguishing the principle of the 
Action Painter from its caricatures, from all the obscuring “clichés of art journalism.” 
“[A]n action is not a letting go, a surrender to instantaneity, except as a ruse. Painting that 
is an action is a struggle against limits, those within the artist himself, those which he 
finds in the situation of art, those which he deliberately sets up on the canvas. Mere 
stroking and slopping of paint resulted in tiresome caricatures of Action Painting that 
marked its phase of mass acceptance.”98 “[E]xistential theology,” Rosenberg complained 
in a tirade against the many manners in which Action Painting had been recuperated, was 
one of the false “[a]rtificial analogies . . . drawn between features of Action Painting and 
prestigious cultural enterprises.”99 
46 
 What is remarkable is that these “tiresome caricatures” and “artificial analogies” 
have persisted in such unquestioned form in the work of some of the field’s most 
respected scholars. Thierry de Duve, for example, in writing about the reception of Frank 
Stella’s black paintings in 1959 at the Museum of Modern Art (New York) and the 
ascendancy of Greenberg’s criticism, explains:   
it is clear that [Stella’s] show crystallized a new sensibility which had 
hitherto expressed itself only negatively, as a sheer lassitude with Abstract 
expressionism. It also offered the possibility of rereading Abstract 
Expressionism, and Pollock’s ‘all-overness’ in particular, in formal rather 
than existential terms. Harold Rosenberg’s concept of ‘Action Painting’ 
became suddenly trite and hopelessly romantic, whereas Clement 
Greenberg’s understanding of ‘American-type Painting’ in terms of formal 
results, historical conventions, and flatness of the medium gained 
momentum and credibility. . . . “Modernist Painting”. . . offered a bold yet 
simple reading of the history of modern painting, one that gave painting 
renewed intellectual credibility and the avant-garde a new sense of 
direction. In the forties and the fifties, there was a revival of the late-
romantic cliché of the artist as instinctive resource of creativity, with no 
ties to history and no cultural function beside his (never her) sacred 
vocation.100  
 
Leja as well—though certainly not in the service of promoting Greenberg—reiterates the 
familiar refrain: “Rosenberg’s later existentialist interpretation of the New York School 
action painting was rooted in Surrealist principles: emphasis on the creative process, 
attention to what the work of art reveals of the artist’s interior dynamics, and 
antiaestheticisism, to name just a few.”101 Rosenberg’s “account of Abstract 
Expressionism as action painting,” Leja continues, “made the drama of self-discovery the 
heart of its accomplishment.”102  If this last description hardly seems the grounds for 
undue fretting, one need only be reminded how easily this “drama of self-discovery” 
signed for the far from politically neutral expression of American freedom. Indeed, 
Guilbaut quite unambiguously lines up Rosenberg’s Action Painting with Schlesinger’s 
vital center liberalism. “Victorious liberalism, ideologically refashioned by Schlesinger, 
barricaded itself behind an elementary anticommunism, centered on the notion of 
freedom. . . . Individualism would become the basis for all American art that wanted to 
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represent the new era—confident and uneasy at the same time. Artistic freedom and 
experimentation became central to abstract-expressionist art.”103 Footnoting this section, 
Guilbaut remarks, “The ideology of individualism would be codified in 1952 by Harold 
Rosenberg in his well-known article ‘The American Action Painter [sic].’”104 What is 
most pernicious in this is how Rosenberg’s concept is folded into a politics with which he 
was very much at odds and how Action Painting is turned into precisely the sort of handy 
aesthetic by which to escape the political. 
This outlines the most common ways in which simplistic interpretations and 
identifications of Action Painting have misrepresented the concept, thereby effectively 
emptying the term of complexity and certainly minimizing the traces of politically radical 
content it might once have held. In its clichéd version, as Rosenberg himself was all too 
aware, it becomes a technique and style of painting to be associated with such gestural 
Abstract Expressionists painters as Pollock, de Kooning or Kline, as a way of describing 
the types of canvases they produced and their technique as the “act” of spontaneously 
spattering paint, the “act” of impassioned marking up of canvas with the result being an 
existential remainder of the artist’s performance in front of the void. The artist, according 
to this equation of release and containment, benefits from the release of pent-up feelings, 
explosive creative energies. The artist gets to “let go” on canvas, a release that signifies 
self-healing, unspecified manners and realms of personal therapy, all contained within the 
arena of the canvas, a zone safely buffered from the evils and complications of the 
outside world but also, significantly, containing the release of this explosive act by 
preventing it from reaching beyond the confines of the aesthetic and imaginary, or 
beyond the cultural institutions of the art world. In the end the personal is produced as 
inchoate expressionism through an ultimately confining rhetoric that prevents any sense 
of alignment with social content or import. Undoubtedly, when viewed in this fashion, 
Action Painting does come off badly, as a shallow vision of an all too ideologically 
suspect artistic freedom for a fashionably tortured, incoherent subject. Taken in these 
lights Action Painting is perfectly primed for deployment by the State Department as 
Cold War cultural ideology. An important question remains, however: if Action Painting 
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is taken neither as a painting technique, nor a visual style, nor a quasi-philosophical 






Recent Reinvestigations of Rosenberg 
In the recent past there has been indication of modest adjustments made in the 
appreciation of Rosenberg’s critical oeuvre. Barbara Cavaliere in the early 1980s 
protested the “imminent put-down and wipe-away of Harold Rosenberg, the ‘other’ critic 
of Abstract Expressionism.” She based her case on what she perceived as the critic’s 
poetic sensibility and the special importance of his proximity to the artists themselves. “A 
poet at heart and an art critic by association with broad cultural issues, Rosenberg offers 
many clues on the issues and his prose on Abstract Expressionism is couched in 
metaphors similar to those of the artists’ writings. . . .”105 A few years later and in 
response to the posthumous publication of Art and Other Serious Matters, a volume of 
previously uncollected and some never before published writings of Rosenberg’s, Adam 
Gopnik noted that the “anxious critic” deserved a second look: the “sheer audaciousness 
of Rosenberg’s criticism makes it significant: what he wanted to do was to wrest the 
established canon of high modernist taste away from the whole notion of ‘canon’ and 
‘taste.’”106 In the place of canon and taste (here, words flagging Greenberg’s domain) 
Gopnik asserts that Rosenberg—now more flatteringly the “Tenth Street Ruskin”—
sought morality in art and that his motive was ultimately to develop “philosophical 
criticism.”107 While these 1980s indications of reviving interest in Rosenberg deserve 
mention, it is hard not to detect a flimsiness in their belated nods. One may suspect the 
emergence here of a kind of pendular refrain: Rosenberg, Greenberg, Rosenberg, 
Greenberg. Recalling Rosenberg seems to be about fashioning a satisfying companion 
piece to the Greenberg (already so clearly set in place), thus balancing out the so-called 
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objectivity and cold empiricism provided by Greenberg with Rosenberg’s more poetic 
sensibility, his access to the creator-side and artist’s personality—the sorts of flavors that 
may have been lacking in a critical diet of strict Greenberg.  
Not until the last decade or so, starting in the 1990s, have serious reinvestigations 
and more sophisticated perspectives of Rosenberg been attempted. Possible  contributors 
to this shift have been the ever-increasing historical distance from Greenbergian 
formalism, but also, and in a complex relationship, the passing of conceptual practices, 
both of which—as the opposed framing paradigms of art object and post-object—have 
added to a sense of need for reevaluation of the major models. Also helpful for 
contextualizing Rosenberg’s work has been the increasing familiarity with Western 
Marxism as its concepts and representatives become academic commonplaces; and, 
finally, the release of Rosenberg’s papers in 1999 to the Getty Research Institute for the 
History of Art and the Humanities.108  
The new arguments, all of which reassess Rosenberg through recognition of the 
“social and political” content of his criticism, are these: Elaine O’Brien’s doctoral 
dissertation, “The Art Criticism of Harold Rosenberg: Theaters of Love and Combat”; the 
substantial role Rosenberg plays in Jachec’s The Philosophy and Politics of Abstract 
Expressionism; and Fred Orton’s short but absolutely key essay on Rosenberg, “Action, 
Revolution and Painting.”109  
The outstanding virtue of O’Brien’s dissertation is its basis in intense amounts of 
primary research, including interviews with many of Rosenberg’s friends and colleagues 
as well as his daughter (a longtime childhood friend of O’Brien’s). Most notable, 
however, is her truly unique access to a resource not formerly available to scholars: it was 
she who initially prepared Rosenberg’s papers for their present residency at the Getty.110 
Consisting of sixty-five boxes and three flat file folders, this body of material physically 
extends to thirty-three linear feet and includes, among a host of other things, journals, 
correspondence, manuscript drafts and lecture notes, ranging from the 1930s to 
Rosenberg’s death in 1978. Beyond this obvious contribution, several points should be 
noted concerning the nature of O’Brien’s reevaluation of Rosenberg. Unarguably her 
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stance is one of advocation, and this primarily in opposition to what she regards as his 
unfair evaluation with Greenberg and a shallow rejection of him made by proponents of 
sixties formalism. Describing the disjunction between Rosenberg and this younger 
generation of Greenberg adherents, she writes: “It seemed as if Rosenberg had arrived 
from another intellectual world to cause resentment and confusion”; and again, 
elsewhere, “Rosenberg and the new art critics and curators were working with 
contradictory sets of principles. . . . Rosenberg’s art criticism was constantly 
mismeasured against his opponents’ criteria.”111 Importantly, she recognizes (as does 
Orton below) that the crux of this butting of heads owes to the tenacity of the “myth” of 
Action Painting.112 In trying to break through the popularized, mythic form of 
Rosenberg’s central proposition, O’Brien makes the highly significant connections 
between Rosenberg’s notions of action and praxis, dialectic and dialectical critique.113 
That acknowledged, however, there is a marked unwillingness on O’Brien’s part to 
extend that connection much further, or towards too aggressive a political identity. In 
other words, although she flags “praxis” and “dialectic” as appropriate terms through 
which to frame Rosenberg’s interpretation and use of “action,” she appears far more 
comfortable in associating these to a general stance of criticality, of the kind signified by 
“bohemian modernism,” “cultural crisis,” battles against the “institutionalization of 
contemporary critical-creative production,” and to the defense of “independent critical 
culture in America.”114 Indeed, the overall narrative framework suggested by O’Brien’s 
dissertation, tending towards the intellectual biography, organizes Rosenberg’s life and 
work through “theaters of love and combat” in which Rosenberg’s desired object is a 
community of creative companions. The “ideal world” of “Plato’s Socratic dialogue, the 
Symposium” is the theater of love whose survival he must fight for in the theater of 
combat, where he contends with all those forces—professionalization, 
institutionalization, commodification—threatening this ideal bohemia.115 Framing 
Rosenberg’s motives this way as nostalgia for golden-era philosophizing also tends to 
cast Rosenberg’s project within the domain of a general, unspecific and inoffensive 
humanism. While one may detect, as O’Brien freely admits, a “negative dialectic” in 
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Rosenberg’s thought, it is present only by grace of Rosenberg’s desire for the 
“bonhomie” of “his intimate community of artists” (with these last—”bonhomie,” 
“intimate community of artists”—forming for O’Brien the synonyms for Rosenberg’s 
sense of socialism).116 More pointedly, O’Brien’s curbing of too intensive an 
interpretation of Rosenberg’s relation to revolutionary politics is indicated in her 
criticism of Orton’s thesis: “Orton’s conclusions (and it seems his attitude toward 
interpretation) are different from my own. I would argue, for example, that Rosenberg’s 
‘marxism’ was inextricable from his ‘existentialism’ and ‘humanism.’ And overall I 
believe that the need is to allow Rosenberg’s criticism to display its own unique shapes—
its perpetually transforming dialectics—rather than to replace one ‘ism’ with another.”117 
Caution is needed here. It is precisely through “existentialism” and “humanism” 
that one is able to place Rosenberg within the construction of a new post-war liberalism, 
as active in that “cultural turn” as a turning away from Marxist politics. This is Jachec’s 
argument. Indeed, it is an interesting exercise comparing the differences in O’Brien’s and 
Jachec’s positioning of Rosenberg. While O’Brien wants to capture Rosenberg’s 
politics—his ‘marxism’ (O’Brien always uses a lower-case “M” in reference to 
Rosenberg)—holistically, or, as she puts it, as “inextricable” from his existentialism and 
humanism, the other “ism” that she would like to avoid is “liberalism” and any 
subsequent suggestions that Rosenberg accommodated himself to its feeble post-war 
varieties. In this sticky spot, the sort of allowance O’Brien advocates for Rosenberg—
”the need is to allow Rosenberg’s criticism to display its own unique shapes—its 
perpetually transforming dialectics”—is not one to which Jachec is temperamentally 
disposed. 
Rather than allowing Rosenberg to occupy this more ideology-neutral free-form 
space, Jachec sees him playing an easily recognizable role in her cultural turn thesis: 
Rosenberg’s art writing is a prime exemplar of the transformations of the Left from 
radicalism to liberalism through the mediating discourse of culture. Jachec writes, as one 
of the “chief critical links between the independent left and the avant-garde in the mid- to 
late 1940s,” Rosenberg, along with Greenberg, “frequently used art as a tool for political 
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analysis.”118 It is Rosenberg’s penchant for existentialism and a vague humanism that 
makes him fit the “profile of the typical American independent leftist intellectual in the 
immediate postwar years.”119 For although Rosenberg “focused on the work of art as an 
act of radical critique” and “related this to Marxist theory” as part of a leftism grounded 
in avant-garde negationism, what marks him as such a key character in Jachec’s narrative 
is what she perceives as his surrender to the rising tide of existentialism, romantic 
humanism and aesthetic avant-gardism, all of which eventually drowns out his earlier 
commitment to political Marxism.120 As she views it, this shift begins as an attempt to 
define an ethical Marxism through existentialism in reaction to fears of totalitarianism, 
thus arguing for the individual agent against notions of mass agency and collective 
identity. The artist, and eventually more specifically the American Action Painter, fits 
this bill as the image of an exemplary subjectivity—the “creative, self-determining 
individual”—playing out his or her radical challenge to the system through artistic or 
cultural agency. And if this individual cultural agency appeared somewhat paltry and 
ineffectual for the task of changing social reality (to which the earlier collective political 
agency of revolutionary socialism set itself), one shrugged and pointed to the 
unfathomable depths of the interior: as Jachec writes, “recognition of the self as 
subjectivity was tantamount to assuming a tragic worldview, the ‘intrasubjective’ artist, 
Rosenberg maintained, began with this ‘nothingness,’ or this ‘void’ present in every 
individual, and developed his or her own ideas freely within it.”121 The unhappiness and 
alienation of the modern artist would be naturalized. The artist was a visionary whose 
workplace was in the imagination and whose specialized challenge was to confront the 
interior void. The artist’s role was to envision other worlds, not to change this one.  
In keeping with this general picture, Jachec reads the Action Painters essay as a 
major demonstration in the U.S. Left’s cultural turn from Marxism. Rosenberg here 
“swap[s] his concern for the survival of Marxism for the survival of the avant-garde as 
the custodian of the former’s values.”122 
The abnegation of political responsibility that Rosenberg invested in  
Abstract Expressionism in ‘The American Action Painters’ was . . . and in 
his own words, a recuperation of ‘the progressive consciousness of the 
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epoch’ via a distinctly apolitical form of existentialism, one that arrested 
agency in the creative act. . . . Rather than an example of postdialectical 
Marxist thinking, ‘American Action Painters’ can be seen more 
appropriately as a requiem for Rosenberg’s ideals of 1948.123 
 
So although Rosenberg, along with those of the “independent left in general,” might have 
started out with Marxism, or something more orthodoxly so, and only turned to 
subjectivism and existentialism as part of an attempt to redefine socialism in the face of 
crisis, what comes out the other side is “apolitical”—both a requiem for lost ideals and a 
reconciliation with the present system. 
 Finally, here now is Orton’s argument. Though Orton’s essay predates both 
O’Brien’s and Jachec’s work—and both refer to Orton’s work as well as register their 
disagreement with him—I have reserved him till last because his thesis sets the 
foundation for my own continued investigation of Rosenberg. What distinguishes Orton’s 
reading of Rosenberg, in contrast to the previous two characterizations, is the firmest 
insistence on engaging Rosenberg’s criticism and in particular Action Painting as 
operating within the problematic of revolutionary politics. “My concern,” the author 
states at the beginning, “is to offer a political reading” of the “American Action 
Painters.”124 It is a concern squarely posed as a challenge to the “triumph of a 
depoliticized art practice, apolitical painting and art for art’s sake,” though—and this is 
the crucial point—it is exactly not about recuperating Rosenberg through a “lazy 
existentialist-humanist reading” (possibly O’Brien) and certainly not as a reconciliatory 
post-war liberalism or a cultural turn away from politics (Jachec) but, rather, to look at 
Rosenberg expressly through the lens of a substantial Marxist commitment.   
The core component in Orton’s critical exhumation of the revolutionary political 
dimension of Rosenberg and Action Painting is “action.” The aspect of “action” that 
Orton must uncover is the one which is obscured when attributions of either post-war 
liberalism or neo-liberalism are applied to Rosenberg, or when “action” is taken strictly 
to mean gesturalism, bodily emphatic modes of applying paint to a surface or any such 
variant thereof. “Rosenberg’s idea of ‘action,’” Orton insists, “came out of the very 
particular way he read Marx’s writings.”125 The pedigree of Rosenberg’s “action” needs 
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to be traced back to its revolutionary source, a move that will “enabl[e] a rereading of 
‘The American Action Painters’ as a text situated in and inscribed by a particular Marxist 
tradition.”126 The effective shift of reference for Action Painting is from a “studio-act” of 
the kind classically pictured in Namuth’s “in-the-act” photographs of Jackson Pollock 
creatively applying paint to canvas to a “street-act” of the kind referred to in Leftist 
discourses of direct action. But already this points to a familiar and contentious spot: 
avant-garde studio-acts are not the same as vanguard street-acts, or are they?  
In addressing this last question, Orton importantly extends the reading of the 
“action” theme beyond the 1952 Action Painters essay, showing how Rosenberg’s earlier 
“writings on drama and the proletariat, which focus on issues of action and agency” are 
“relevant to understanding his characterizations of action painting.”127 Specifically, the 
essays Orton calls attention to are “Character Change and the Drama” (1932); “The 
Resurrected Romans” (1948); and “The Pathos of the Proletariat” (1949). This happens to 
be a remarkably prescient grouping of essays. In the Rosenberg Papers at the Getty 
Research Institute (and this is a matter to which I will return), there is strong evidence 
that Rosenberg very much wanted these essays collected into a single volume whose 
overarching theme would be Marx’s drama of history. However, when Orton was writing 
“Action, Revolution and Painting” (published in 1991), this material was not yet 
available. It stands then as a powerful endorsement of Orton’s thesis that he was able to 
arrive at this larger theme through close textual analysis of the individual essays. 
The question to return to then is what comes out of this extended understanding of 
“action”? In what way does Rosenberg’s “action” derive from Marx? As Orton would 
answer, Action Painting “was painting about the possibility of a radical change that had 
not happened in the 1930s and 1940s . . . and could not happen in the 1950s”; its politics 
“were determined by the failure of the proletarian revolution.”128 “Action,” Orton argues, 
becomes the lynchpin by which Rosenberg designs a sympathetic alignment between the 
American Action Painter and the proletariat. The painter and the prole were characters of 
the same type: embodying a stance of revolutionary negativity, both exist in situations 
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where they are forced to make themselves, in which the only identity available to them is 
the authentic one of a self-identity forged from their own direct actions. 
To unpack this a bit, Orton calls attention to two conspicuous and interrelated 
characteristics shared by Marx’s proletariat and Rosenberg’s American Action Painter. 
One is their homelessness within the social order. Pastless and without sustaining myth, 
with neither institution or ideology, what they each lack is stable, grounded identity and 
what they both verge on is being nothing. Given this, one of Orton’s tasks is to explain 
why the adverb “American” modifying the “Action Painter” is not hugely contradictory.  
“One thing which needs to be immediately established is what it is that Rosenberg 
thought was ‘American’ about ‘American action painting.’ He was obviously trying to 
write something about a kind of collective identity [emphasis added],” Orton writes, “but 
there is nothing nationalistic, patriotic or chauvinistic about his use of ‘American’ or his 
idea of what kind of person the ‘American’ action painter might be. ‘American’ has to be 
understood as meaning a kind of ethnic diversity and cosmopolitanism,” as well as 
referring to “displaced persons, immigrants, the sons and daughters of immigrants.”129 
“In ‘The American Action Painters’ the artist is figuratively and literally a pioneer and an 
immigrant.”130 Similarly (and as Rosenberg was well aware), Marx’s proletariat is 
pastless (“The proletariat, called into existence by the bourgeoisie and a product of 
modern industry, is without a past.”), is as yet contentless (“The working class is 
revolutionary or it is nothing”). Merely a personification (“called into existence by. . . ,” 
“a product of . . .”), the proletariat is nothing.131  
The second shared quality develops out of the previous. Tethered by no 
ideological stakes within the system, negatively formed by the values of the status quo, 
both the proletariat and the American Action Painter occupy a unique and potentially 
revolutionary position within the social order. To become anything, they must forge 
themselves, they must be self-creators, self-made men. They are the ones in the position 
to realize new form, to trans-form, because the form they have under present structural 
conditions is marked so negatively—as nothing. But crucially, they must enact all of this 
directly, through their direct action, without taking outside direction, orders from above, 
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or any assumed consciousness. To this end, both the proletariat and the Action Painter 
“must exercise in himself a constant No.”132 
 My own investigation of Rosenberg’s political aesthetic through the central 
concept of Action Painting will owe a considerable debt to Orton. Indeed, this applies to 
O’Brien’s and Jachec’s work on Rosenberg as well: all three excavate components that 
will be important in my own construction of Rosenberg. That said, however, there are 
several provocative extensions left to explore. What seems to remain unarticulated might 
best be described as a synthesis of aspects of Orton, O’Brien and Jachec. Beginning with 
Orton’s foundational proposition that Action Painting needs to be engaged as a concept 
seriously in dialogue with Marxism—and specifically with the problems of revolutionary 
consciousness, agency and action, reciprocating identities of the American Action Painter 
and the proletariat—what appears underdeveloped is the philosophical component of 
dialectic as praxical activity, as all those intersecting moments of theory and practice, 
mind and matter, subject and object. It is in fact O’Brien who, though in a tone resisting 
more exacting political implications, explores the parallels between Action Painting and 
praxis. This describes an interesting scenario. Orton is able to show the deep political 
dimension of Rosenberg’s “action” as a foundational attribute of the revolutionary 
proletariat and the Action Painter but does not fully explore it as signing for praxis as 
well. O’Brien, while quite comfortable in discussing Action Painting as a praxical model, 
is unwilling to extend that discussion too far towards the realm of radical politics. 
Furthermore, had Orton’s and O’Brien’s theses been synthesized what might have been 
arrived at is something like a flipped version of Jachec’s argument. The image is flipped 
or reversed because instead of Jachec’s cultural turn from politics to aesthetics it would 
be a return of politics to aesthetics. The hypothetical Orton-O’Brien synthesis is this: the 
dialectical model that Rosenberg elaborates in the concept of Action Painting is already 
figured in Marx’s meditations on the ideal dream-image of praxis as self-realizing 
activity, as a creative dialectical process, all towards the identical subject-object of 
history which itself participates in the larger dialectical composition of individual part 










Not surprisingly, confusion over the nature of Action Painting’s political content has 
been tied to confusion over its author’s own political identity. To be sure, there is a good 
deal of murkiness and conflicting opinion about the direction and depth of Rosenberg’s 
political commitments. For background the typical characterizations of Rosenberg’s 
political stance are rehearsed below but with this forewarning. Although the issue of 
Rosenberg’s political affiliation needs to be addressed, the overall fruitfulness of this type 
of inquiry is limited. Quite simply, the hard evidence that would indisputably secure 
Rosenberg’s political coordinates may not exist. Indeed, the release of the Rosenberg 
Papers is a good case in point. Searches made through this material looking for evidence 
on the order of a Party membership card are bound to disappoint. In fact, a letter from the 
archive itself explains why this order of evidence is unlikely to surface. In a 1940 letter to 
Nancy Macdonald, Dwight Macdonald’s wife, the Washington, D.C.-bound Rosenberg, 
then working as the national arts editor of the American Guides Series of the Federal 
Writers Project of the W.P.A., requested that Nancy purchase (with funds that Rosenberg 
had included) a copy of Labor Action, a leftist periodical published in New York. 
Obviously this was a roundabout way of obtaining this publication and seemingly 
senseless except that Rosenberg’s motive in this maneuver had been to avoid being added 
to Labor Action’s subscription list. He would later explain his rationale to Dwight 
Macdonald: “For all lists in their time, if not at once, fall into the hands of investigators—
and the way things are going now, with spies already reported in most divisions, a name 
on a list is as good as a hammer in the fist.”133 Given the subsequent history of 
McCarthyism it is hard not to congratulate Rosenberg for a healthy dose of paranoia at 
this relatively early date, but, more broadly, the incident warns of how cautiously people, 
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especially leftist intellectuals, could monitor their behavior. Precisely what many were 
trying to avoid was a “name on a list”—the sort of evidence that can either sit in archives 
for future scholars, or be confiscated by government agencies. What this means 
practically is that a good deal of the work for altering (or sustaining) given 
characterizations of Rosenberg’s politics will be borne by textual analysis of Rosenberg’s 
work. 
 There are two interrelated complications to Rosenberg’s political picture: the fate 
of the 1930s Old Left in U.S. history and the identification of Rosenberg as a New York 
Intellectual. Let me begin with the latter. Broadly, the New York Intellectuals can be 
described as a loose affiliation of radical writers and intellectuals, many of them from 
Jewish immigrant backgrounds, many educated at what was then the College of the City 
of New York (now City College), who came of age in the 1930s and participated in that 
decade’s dream of overcoming capitalism, realizing Communism, finally bringing to a 
close humanity’s pre-history. Neil Jumonville’s study of this group offers a generational 
breakdown of its members: 
The first generation includes members born between 1900 and 1915 who 
came to political maturity in the 1920s or early 1930s: Sidney Hook, 
Lionel Trilling, Dwight Macdonald, Philip Rahv, William Phillips, Meyer 
Schapiro, Harold Rosenberg, Lewis Coser, Clement Greenberg, and Mary 
McCarthy. The second generation was born between about 1915 and 1925 
and came to political maturity during the Depression: Irving Howe, Alfred 
Kazin, Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Irving Kristol, Seymour Martin Lipset, 
Norman Mailer, and William Barrett. A third generation arrived on the 
scene after World War II and included Norman Podhoretz, Susan Sontag, 
and Michael Walzer.134  
 
Rosenberg’s place within this group is further secured when one finds his name on the 
New York Intellectual roster provided by such diverse thinkers as Irving Howe and 
Hilton Kramer. Howe, also identified as a central member of the group, recollected that 
Rosenberg, along with Philip Rahv, William Philips, Lionel Trilling, Lionel Abel and 
Alfred Kazin, were the “leading critics” of “[t]he intellectuals of New York who began to 
appear in the thirties, most of whom were Jewish.”135 Hilton Kramer, the polar opposite 
of Howe and certainly speaking from an outsider’s point of view, also made the 
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identification of Rosenberg with the New York Intellectuals: “formidable and 
combative—in many respects the quintessential New York intellectual,” Rosenberg was 
“resourceful in polemic and sometimes dazzling in style. . . . His style, both in 
conversation and in writing, was nurtured on that special mixture of Marxism and 
modernism that came to constitute the distinct Weltanschauung of the New York 
intellectuals.”136  
But it is the political trajectory of this group generally that complicates the issue 
of Rosenberg’s politics. For the New York Intellectuals, while credited with an “early 
mastery of Marxism in the 1930s,” are then seen as abandoning “Marxism after the war, 
and adopt[ing] . . . a pluralistic liberalism,” which for some of this group delineated a 
path further to the Right, to increasingly conservative brands of Cold War liberalism and 
ending, in the most notable cases of Sidney Hook, Norman Podhoretz and Irving Kristol, 
in neo-conservatism.137 The question then has been, to what extent does Rosenberg’s 
political course flow with this general political current away from radicalism and heading 
to conservativism?  
Certainly there is plenty of evidence and a good deal of consensus that Rosenberg 
aligns with this early position of 1930s radicalism. For Rosenberg, this “red” decade, at 
least up until about 1937, was dramatically navigated by the Communist star and a potent 
dream of a socialist revolution. The early part of the 1930s Rosenberg spent in intense 
and serious study of not only Marx but other Marxist thinkers as well, including Rosa 
Luxemburg and Georg Lukács among others.138 The fruits of Rosenberg’s early study of 
Marxism—critical essays fluent in the marxian problematic alongside his own 
proletarian-inspired verse—appeared in the major Communist-oriented and -directed 
periodicals of the day. He also participated in workers’s rallies and parades; he marched; 
he wrote; he reported and he organized—all of which presents the picture of somebody 
seriously motivated by his political commitments. Even O’Brien—always wary of any 
colorations on Rosenberg’s political position that could shade into doctrinaire Marxism—
allows that during this period Rosenberg took the highly activist stance of one who 
believed Marxism to be a real possibility for world revolutionary change. “In the mid-
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thirties,” she writes, “the appeal of Marx to Rosenberg was not merely about serious 
culture critique; it was about the possibility of transforming the real conditions of life . . . 
between 1934-1937 he held almost magical hopes for a revolution.”139 
The tricky part of the task has never really been the securing this early, “youthful” 
revolutionary identity but with determining the effect on his Marxism by what happens in 
the later part of the 1930s, through the demoralizing events of the Moscow trials (1936-
38), the Russian-German Non-Aggression Pact (August 22, 1939), and the Soviet 
invasion of Finland (November 30, 1939), and on throughout the Cold War with its ever 
increasing bifurcation of “us” and “them.” The continuing problem for historians has 
been in getting a clearer picture of both the subtle and not-so-subtle political and 
ideological divisions that fractured American leftism after the disillusionment with the 
“Russian experiment,” with the increasing alarm over totalitarianism and as the United 
States came to seem ever more the sole defender against barbarism. The task of 
composing Rosenberg’s political portrait has been no exception. Take the following 
comparison as an indication. First, listen to Sidney Hook’s charges against what he took 
to be Rosenberg’s hypocritical revolutionary pretense. According to Hook, Rosenberg, 
far from being a true radical, “was a shameless political opportunist,” one always ready to 
criticize others but never himself willing to take real political “risks.” Hook found 
additional ammo for his attack by pointing out that Rosenberg “headed public relations 
for the Advertising Council of America, celebrating the virtues of American business, 
and at the same time was ‘a closet revolutionist’ or a ‘parlor social nihilist’ attacking 
everyone for selling out.”140 Of course, given that this is Sidney Hook, one of neo-
conservatism’s founding fathers, one can hardly bypass certain (admittedly ad hominine) 
ironies: it is after all Hook who will receive honorific recognition from Ronald Reagan 
during the latter’s presidency.141 But, the contrasting position to Hook’s disparaging view 
of the authenticity of Rosenberg’s political radicalism can be developed from a number 
of other reports. Take for example the one provided by Alfred Kazin in 1993. During an 
interview he spoke of a photograph of Rosenberg that he kept pinned to his bulletin 
board. Kazin said he kept it there because Rosenberg was the only one of the Old Left to 
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have remained radical his entire life. That photograph served as a daily reminder, for 
encouragement.142 Here is a grab-bag of other instances: Ben Halpern, who would 
become Rosenberg’s editor at Horizon Press, addresses Rosenberg as “Dear Comrade” in 
a postcard from 1946143; Irving Kristol in 1948 criticizes Rosenberg for his recent essay 
on Marx, “The Resurrected Romans,” in which Rosenberg is “too faithful to the 
master.”144 In 1957 Rosenberg happily boasts to Maurice Merleau-Ponty that his essay 
“Marxism: Criticism and/or Action” has been translated into Polish and distributed to 
Communist Party leaders in Poland.145  
Switching to the secondary scholarship, there is still lingering confusion over 
what to call Rosenberg’s political position and over how close that ever came to party 
politics. Belgrad, for instance, wants to call Rosenberg either a Trotskyite or former 
Trotskyite art critic; Jumonville refers to him as a “former Marxist”; Craven devises the 
appellation “democratic, non-Leninist socialist” to describe the class to which Rosenberg 
and the likes of Irving Howe and Meyer Schapiro belong; and Orton, among others, has 
suggested that Rosenberg was most probably a fellow-traveler.146 Far less likely, though 
an option that Orton does not fail to mention, is the possibility that Rosenberg had shared 
a much closer affiliation with the C.P.U.S.A. Could he not have been one of those 
unspoken, officially unrecognized members of the Party, under one of its strategic 
policies that certain party members should be unlisted, remain unofficial and thus better 
serve the Party’s interests precisely for not being openly identified as a card-carrying 
member? As Orton indicates, “Considering the secrecy which continues to surround 
membership and which was deliberately fostered by the C.P., it’s very difficult to know 
who was and who was not a member of the C.P.U.S.A.” The more likely scenario, Orton 
suggests, is that Rosenberg was not a member of the C.P. but a highly invested 
sympathizer. “It seems that being a member demanded a kind of discipline that most 
writers and artists would not be able to accept,” Orton notes. “Because it [the Party] 
could not accommodate any criticism from members at local levels of organization, it 
would not accept into its ranks any really independent figures, and they, in turn, would 
not accept its dictates.”147  
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The general thrust of more recent accounts is that Rosenberg maintained a fairly 
consistent independent Marxist position, and therefore he might better be placed with a 
minority subset of the New York Intellectuals that would include figures like C. Wright 
Mills, Howe and Schapiro, all of whom remained life-long socialists, never renounced 
Marx, but kept a critical engagement with Marxism and fought fiercely to maintain the 
integrity of their minority position against a steadily encroaching “couch liberalism” 
among their former politically socialist peers.148 Jachec, for example, although she later 
sees a lessening of this stand, describes Rosenberg as “a committed socialist since the 
1930s, and a key figure in the effort to define an ethical Marxism in the 1940s,” who 
contra Greenberg “more consistently related” his art theory and criticism to “Marxist 
theory.”149 This view fits with the political outline generated by O’Brien’s study of 
Rosenberg. According to O’Brien, the coordinates by which Rosenberg’s independent 
Marxist position can be located are: that he is an independent intellectual staunchly 
affirming the value of independent marxian critique of society; that he fought against 
anything that seemed to threaten the basic proposition of independent critique, any form 
of coercion and therefore was not a party political of either the Stalinist or Trotskyist 
camps.150 Rosenberg “never disavowed his radicalism,” insists O’Brien.151 For him 
“Marx would always be ‘the master’” and this was largely because “Rosenberg’s Marx 
was a radical democrat like himself.”152 Indeed, one could mention here a small, torn-out 
scrap of blue paper in Rosenberg’s papers. Dated from 1945, and in Rosenberg’s script, 
the author quotes Marx: “To win the fight of democracy, that is socialism.”153 It was, 
O’Brien argues, because Rosenberg took from Marx not the rigid set of historical 
prophesies developed under the name of Marxism-Leninism; rather Rosenberg’s Marx 
signified more a radical critical methodology, Marxist analysis meant a level of critical 
thinking in which values are always in question and in which the one absolute bowed to 
is the “absolute need for the tensions of dissent.”154 His admiration and use of Marx was 
lifelong, and Rosenberg “would always acknowledge his large intellectual debt to 
Marx.”155  
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To reiterate, nonetheless, I believe that a more valuable sense of the substantive 
meaning of Rosenberg’s political identity can be more compellingly worked out in close 
textual analysis of his writings. As I see it, the first and most obvious indication that 
Rosenberg had not forgotten the Marxist project is attested to by the centrality of Marx’s 






Action Painting at an Inactive Moment & The Demise of Dialectic 
         10 November 1837 
Dear Father,  
There are moments in one’s life which are like frontier 
posts marking the completion of a period but at the same time 
clearly indicating a new direction. . . . 
In accordance with my state of mind at the time, lyrical 
poetry was bound to be my first subject, at least the most pleasant 
and immediate one. But owing to my attitude and whole previous 
development it was purely idealistic. . . .  
Poetry, however, could be and had to be only an 
accompaniment; I had to study law and above all felt the urge to 
wrestle with philosophy. . . . 
When I got better I burnt all the poems and outlines of 
stories, etc., imagining that I could give them up completely, of 
which so far at any rate I have not given any proofs to the 
contrary. . . . 
Your ever loving son, 
           Karl156 
 
H was unable to play his part in life, even in an imagined life. He 
had dared to conceive the idea of certain possibilities, but he did 
nothing to carry out these possibilities; he did not even imagine 
himself carrying them out. He was neither an actor nor a novelist. 
Was it because he was too “busy”? Or was he afraid of what he 
might get himself into? On the surface it would seem that the 
actual pressed him too hard with its immediate questions, to which 
he devoted himself out of early-acquired sense of duty and without 
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any hope of reaching a relevant solution. This gave him the 
appearance of being both lazy and indifferent to real events.  
Harold Rosenberg, 1939 
 
In the passages quoted above, two relatively young men—both, at the time of their 
writing, juggling commitments to poetry, philosophy, and law—are captured in moments 
of intimate revelation: one writes a letter home to his father, the other writes an entry in 
his journal, and each reminisces on choice and resolve, on taking action or not. The 
specter haunting these two passages is not, as in Shakespeare’s tragic drama, the slain 
king of Denmark but rather that of the son, the spirit of Hamlet.157  
For all that similarity there exists a crucial difference between the two narrators. 
The first, Karl Marx, and the second, Harold Rosenberg, enact, as it were, the duality of 
Hamlet: they instantiate the structural dichotomy of the opposing halves of the drama. 
Marx’s “Hamlet” is the Hamlet of resolve and action, the Hamlet of the second half of 
the play, the Hamlet who having had already embarked on that fateful sea voyage where 
he would both confront and escape death, returns empowered. He now stands ready and 
poised to take up his duty-bound task. A biographical correlation is worth noting here as 
well. The letter young Marx, recently a student at the University of Berlin, writes to his 
father comes after a confrontation with Hegel’s philosophy and a spell of “madness” 
(“For some days my vexation made me quite incapable of thinking; I ran about madly in 
the garden by the dirty water of the Spree. . .”; as his biographers have noted, he had 
indeed been arrested for “nocturnal noisemaking”), a subsequent illness from which he 
returns to life transformed, beyond his youthful idealism and romanticism (“All the 
poems of the first three volumes I sent to Jenny are marked by attacks on our times, 
diffuse and inchoate expressions of feeling, nothing natural, everything built out of 
moonshine, complete opposition between what is and what ought to be. . . .”) and 
resolutely beyond his “first subject,” lyric poetry.158 Thus, one finds this Marx/Hamlet at 
the crucial juncture of turning away from the creative arts and of turning towards the 
realm of action (“I arrived at the point of seeking the idea in reality itself”) by committing 
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to law and philosophy, two subjects that will be important in his development of 
historical materialism, his revolutionary philosophy of action.  
If Marx can be said to exemplify this Hamlet of determined resolve and action 
then Rosenberg’s Hamlet—where “H” stands ambiguously as the initial for both 
“Harold” and “Hamlet”—appears the melancholic Hamlet of the first half of the drama, 
the one incapacitated by doubt, “unable to play his part” though instilled with—and one 
imagines tormented by—an “early-acquired sense of duty.”159 But if Rosenberg’s Hamlet 
appears excessive, burdened by even more morose futility than the title character, one 
might try to explain this in terms of the distance in revolutionary history separating 
Marx’s “commitment” and Rosenberg’s “laziness,” a distance chalked by the scar-like 
failures and disappointments of revolutionary socialism, many of them freshly incurred 
for those of Rosenberg’s 1930s generation. Indeed, to revise the image slightly, 
Rosenberg’s brooding, inactive, theory-heavy Hamlet appears paralyzed because he is 
already too familiar with the play, he knows the tragic, annihilating resolution and 
baulkingly refuses that end as a “relevant solution.” He is the repeat-performance Hamlet, 
the actor who cannot quite rally the energy to take on the second half of the play because 
he resists the reaching its blood-soaked conclusion(s). Indeed, by 1939, Rosenberg’s “H” 
unfortunately was more than qualified for the role of the damaged, disillusioned, and 
incapacitated actor: in that year the earlier blows of Stalin’s show trials, the anguish of 
the Spanish Civil War, the Soviet state’s official rejection of modern art were all 
critically compounded by the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and the Soviet invasion 
of Finland. Therefore, it is not without irony that this “H,” who designates himself unable 
to act, even to “imagine himself” doing so, should eventually come to theorize Action 
Painting.160 
I bring up this image of Hamlet and of the bifurcated structure of the title 
character and the play because it helps encapsulate the terms and relations of Rosenberg’s 
problematic as one addressing the issues of a materialist aesthetic and the cultural 
turn/return as engagements with the problems of theory and practice. Rosenberg himself 
would come to analyze more explicitly the structure of Hamlet in these very terms, as a 
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split between theory and practice: the first Hamlet who melancholically broods in 
inactivity and waxes poetically (“The time is out of joint. O cursèd spite/That ever I was 
born to set it right!”) is the Hamlet of theory; the second Hamlet who engages in a 
tragically destructive and blood-thirsty practice is the Hamlet of practice. Rosenberg 
would return to this dramatic split-image  repeatedly; indeed, it stood as an emblem of the 
problem and the stakes. 
Remarkably, what is commonly overlooked is the sharp irony and political 
poignancy in Rosenberg’s appellation “Action Painting,” for it was coined in a situation 
in which action was not only a heavily weighted term, one that in certain milieus strongly 
suggested a charged political orientation, but also came at a moment when the activity ( 
or rather inactivity) of the Left was very much at issue. In 1960 Robert Goldwater would 
at least hint at this context when he mentioned that “For the artists, at the time, the 
unspecified suggestion of political, or at least social concern contained in the word 
‘action’ had its importance,” but he leaves the subject at that.161 This is a provocative 
place to stop, for taken one step further would verge toward reanimating the political 
charge of Action Painting by acknowledging something of the perversity of its being 
offered in a milieu and time in which action was the very thing the Left felt increasingly 
most incapable of; this was the period of the Left’s post-war quieting, taken as a sign of 
Leftism’s being caught between the horns of a dilemma, a sign of lethargy, a sign of 
failure. Any way one reads this inactivity, one may be sure that Rosenberg, as a self-
proclaimed “man of the thirties,” was fully cognizant of the loaded political connotations 
of “action.”162 The explicit point here is that the political import and meaning of the 
“action” of Rosenberg’s Action Painting is revealed when examined within the context of 
a crisis of political action, at a time of inactivity. 
But inactivity is, of course, that which is furthest from one’s mind, when Action 
Painting is illustrated, as it typically is, by a Pollock-esque drip or spatter. Both O’Brien 
and Orton have observed how Action Painting’s significance is reduced to Pollock and 
that this reduction has been facilitated by decontextualizing “The American Action 
Painters” essay from Rosenberg’s larger body of writing. For indeed, and again as both 
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authors have noted, Rosenberg’s concept of action predates and exceeds what has 
become its canonical appearance in 1952. It is a sustaining and sustained theme 
developed throughout Rosenberg’s long career. As Rosenberg himself argued heatedly 
with Bryan Robertson in 1961 at a symposium on Pollock: 
The aim of this statement [Robertson’s] is, obviously, to present Pollock 
as the originator of Action painting in theory and in practice, if not in 
name. . . . The statement, is, of course, entirely false. . . . Pollock never 
spoke to Rosenberg about the “act of painting.”. . . The concept of Action 
painting was first presented in the December 1952 ARTnews . . . 
Rosenberg had published writings on the subject of action as constitutive 
of identity as far back as 1932; in 1948, a year before the alleged tip-off, 
he further elaborated the topic in an essay in The Kenyon Review entitled 
“The Resurrected Romans.”. . . Rosenberg had told Pollock, in the 
presence of a witness, that the article was not “about” him, even if he had 
played a part in it.163 
 
What makes Rosenberg’s response illuminating is not so much his denial of Pollock’s 
centrality to understanding the “action” of the Action Painter but that he has provided the 
key for breaking out of this misidentification by telling Robertson, as well as the rest of 
the audience, to look back to 1932 (which would doubtless have been to “Character 
Change and the Drama”) and to the 1948 essay “The Resurrected Romans”—an essay 
whose very title reaches deep into the Marxist dilemma of revolutionary action.164 As one 
should recall, this is precisely the tack taken by Orton in his groundbreaking work on 
Rosenberg, arguing that Action Painting is a political concept and one coming from 
Marxist discourse. However, despite the emphaticalness of Orton’s argument, the 
strength of Rosenberg’s Marxism has, for the most part, remained difficult to perceive. 
The clichés about Action Painting still stand. But since the time of Orton’s essay’s 
publication, Rosenberg’s papers have become publicly accessible, and these new primary 
materials do indeed augment Orton’s initial thesis.165  
The new material—including personal and professional correspondence, 
notebooks, annotated copies of books from Rosenberg’s personal library, and lecture 
notes—all start to suggest a different orientation for viewing Rosenberg’s problematic. 
Instead of seeing a Marxist political idea couched in the concept of Action Painting, it 
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may be that Action Painting is an aesthetic idea couched in Marxism. This prompts a 
provocative shift in perspective, one that recommends even further the need that Action 
Painting be reconceptualized to cohere with the dominant terms of Rosenberg’s larger 
project. What is made increasingly apparent by the new material is that Rosenberg’s 
central focus was not on devising art criticism for abstract expressionism, gestural, or of 
any other variety. Rather, the sustaining problematic—of which his interest in art and 
culture were expressions—was Marxism, and it was as an emblem of social praxis that 
Action Painting figured so importantly, so centrally. 
In stark contrast to the resounding success of the piquantly phrased “Action 
Painting” one finds tucked away in the Rosenberg archive, in fragments here and there, 
clues to the nature of Action Painting’s missing “other,” Rosenberg’s project on Marx’s 
drama of history. Based on the evidence of Rosenberg’s Papers this study of Marxism 
was a central project to Rosenberg that spanned from the very beginning of Rosenberg’s 
writing career to the very end. From his professional correspondence one can surmise that 
Rosenberg began to seriously push for a new volume of his previously published essays 
on Marx in the late 1940s and at least three of the essays that Rosenberg wanted collected 
in this volume were his 1932 Symposium essay “Character Change and the Drama,” his 
1948 “The Resurrected Romans,” and his 1949 “The Pathos of the Proletariat,” the latter 
two both published in The Kenyon Review.166 Although all three essays had been 
published in respected intellectual journals of the day, it is manifest from Rosenberg’s 
correspondence that he greatly desired the published appearance of all the essays 
together—and that he so strongly felt the content of the essays, their meaning as 
sustained work on “Marx’s Drama of History” (this was the title Rosenberg suggested to 
publishers for the proposed volume) was diluted, even lost, in not being read together.167 
This was an even more freighted concern for a writer of Rosenberg’s epigrammatic prose 
style, whose texts, as a number of readers have observed, easily can require multiple 
readings. Irving Howe described his writing as “not immediately transparent,” and 
certainly not “journalistically ‘clean.’”168 “As an essayist with a predilection for 
ambiguity, paradox, irony, and polemic,” O’Brien suggests, Rosenberg “clearly did not 
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aim to be universally understood.” Further, in contrast to Greenberg’s modernism, 
Rosenberg’s “did not take hold because its principles could not be so easily 
synthesized.”169 Looking at the issue from a slightly different angle, and a less generous 
one, Bernard Bergonzi criticizes the writer’s style—all of “Rosenberg’s gnomic 
words”—for leading to the troubles in understanding the Action Painting essay.170  
Given Rosenberg’s reputation as a writer of difficult prose, as well as his own 
acknowledgement of his work’s tendency to opacity, his push to collect the essays 
together—with the hopes that coherence could be arrived at through theme and 
variation—makes good sense. On this point, Rosenberg seems to have been all too 
prescient. Certainly one outcome of this project’s failure to have materialized is that 
Rosenberg’s Marxist commitments have appeared negligible. As it was, however, 
Rosenberg’s tentatively titled Marx’s Drama of History was unpalatable to publishers 
from the very start. In a 1949 letter to Rosenberg, Herbert Weinstock, of the Alfred A. 
Knopf publishing house, rejected the proposal reasoning that the subject was “too 
recondite and intellectualized to make a book for a general trade publisher.”171 However 
much disappointment this might have carried for Rosenberg, there is little surprise that 
American publishing houses at mid-century instinctively hesitated and stalled and finally 
outright rejected a volume of that topic; it never saw the light of day, or an audience 
beyond the committed few who read Rosenberg’s Marx manuscript and encouraged him 
to keep at it.  
For the record, Pantheon Books, in 1950, also rejected the same manuscript 
because the publishers were “scared” of the topic, and Beacon Press responded similarly 
to the proposed volume a year later.172 The eventual rejection is almost painfully evident 
in a Beacon Press letter to Rosenberg, one that diligently explains the press’s policy to 
seek out many outside opinions on manuscripts being considered for publication and that 
emphasizes how this was “particularly true of manuscripts that might give rise to 
controversy.”173 On the other hand, this excuse rings slightly false as it was at this very 
moment that “controversial” accounts on the subject of Marxism were quite popular and 
especially at this moment, examples being Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at Noon (1941) 
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and The Yogi and the Commissar (1945), Leslie Fiedler’s An End to Innocence (1955) 
and R. H. Crossman’s edited anthology, The God That Failed (1951).174 The telling 
distinction, however, that separates Rosenberg’s “unpublishable” Marx text from these 
other quite publishable ones, is that although all of them, more or less, treat a common 
subject—the failure of Marx’s revolutionary narrative—Rosenberg was not writing from 
the perspective of newly anointed ex-Marxism and ex-Communism. Nevertheless, if the 
commercial publishing houses were unwilling to publish material on the subject from a 
not-ex-Marxist—someone perhaps still too faithful to the “master”—there is also 
evidence, in Rosenberg’s papers, of the support of intellectual peers who repeatedly 
underscored to Rosenberg the value of his thesis, the tremendous importance of the 
volume. Among these peers, Irving Howe and Maurice Merleau-Ponty stand out for their 
unflagging moral and intellectual encouragement to Rosenberg to stick with the rejected 
Marx project.175 Paul de Man wrote encouragingly to Rosenberg in 1949, “This book of 
yours on Marxism is an event of first importance and let no publisher tell you otherwise. I 
mean it.”176 
A sharp and very telling contrast forms between the countless invitations and not 
uncommonly immodest pleas to the critic who coined Action Painting and the dry 
rejections dismissing the Marx project. Again it should come as no shock that Rosenberg 
was easily able to sell a seemingly depoliticized notion of Action Painting but ultimately 
not able to publish his ideas on Marx, a project whose realization would most certainly 
have jeopardized the marketability of Action Painting itself. There is no denying the 
damage done to Action Painting as an attempt to work out a radical political aesthetic by 
rending it from Rosenberg’s work on Marx’s drama of history. Despite all of this, 
nevertheless, the tenacity of Rosenberg’s commitment to both his doomed book project 
and to Marxist criticism is demonstrated up through his final projects. Tellingly, the last 
seminars Rosenberg taught at the University of Chicago as a professor within the 
Department of Art and the Committee on Social Thought, were on Marx, with a specific 
focus on the early writings, the texts, significantly, where Marx struggles to come to 
terms with revolutionary failure.177  
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The tragic but fitting conclusion to Rosenberg’s attempts to realize his Marx 
project came at the time of his death, when Rosenberg was working with Dick Howard 
on finally assembling and publishing the long desired collection of essays that had been 
rejected three decades earlier. That volume, once again, failed to materialize.178 All this 
forms a situation of the kind of tragic ironies and dramatic reversals that so fascinated 
Rosenberg: that Rosenberg’s failed project and the one he kept alive by persistent, almost 
dogged, reinvestigation was his work on Marxist revolutionary failure. His great success, 
Action Painting, was something that could only ever be a success with the kind of 
audience for which action could never signify more than gesturing with a brush and who 
would never dream of it taking place beyond the arena of the canvas. His great success 
marked, as well, a haunting failure.   
 What can be understood from the disparity between the reception of Action 
Painting and that of the Marxist drama of history is the conscious refusal of or 
unconscious resistance against a dialectical understanding of action. In other words, the 
conceptual equipment needed to put into play the political significance of “action,” and 
thus to see Action Painting as a serious political aesthetic, is lacking. The pivotal notion 
by which action turns either toward mindless or empty performance of activity or towards 
the dramatic act of self-realization is the dialectic. 
 The following, and particularly vicious, attack on Rosenberg makes a sharp 
example of this point. Returning to 1965, the year in which Rosenberg suffered such 
rough handling in the art press generally, Amy Goldin’s attack on the critic in the pages 
of Arts Magazine stands out particularly. Titled “Harold Rosenberg’s Magic Circle” and 
illustrated throughout with alchemical diagrams, the organizing insult of Goldin’s article 
was of Rosenberg as a deluded alchemist working with a long dead and refuted logic (fig. 
5). Goldin acidly complains that because Rosenberg lives in his own delusional cosmos, 
one which follows his own self-made logic, both of which indicate a “denial of the 
function of intelligence” and a “refusal to be fully present,” he is incapable of doing the 
work of art criticism. In fact, with his esoteric and mystifying methods, using the 
“entrails of the artist” to “divine the nature of the historical present,” he is a “menace” to 
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artists.179 Studying Goldin’s caustic metaphor one detects that familiar refrain: Rosenberg 
has made a tremendous error by mistaking the task of true art criticism. Instead of 
choosing to be “fully present” or modern—something which, in Goldin’s limited sense, 
implies properly keeping to the modern, rational, empirical methods of formalist 
criticism—Rosenberg has taken the madman’s path whereby the six key terms that 
Goldin identifies—”HISTORY, REVOLUTION, ACTION, THE NEW, THE ARTIST, 
and IDENTITY”—make interplay within a highly suspect “magic circle.”180  
What is fascinating is how these terms, when read within the context of Goldin’s 
essay—rather than suggesting the worthy and relevant (and by and large certainly not 
that exotic even within the realm of art criticism)—begin to sound like an ominous 
incantation of forbidden words. Even further, Goldin alludes to Rosenberg’s “shifty” 
methodology by which these terms interact; they are constantly transforming 
(“alchemically” as Goldin herself might have put it) into their opposite, where identities 
are not cut-and-dried but appear as the momentary outcome of a conjurer’s mystical 
processes. “[F]or all his key terms,” as Goldin warns, “have a dark underside,” forming a 
“set of satanic doubles.”181 Goldin’s admittedly colorful reactions to Rosenberg’s thought 
would hardly seem to deserve this much attention, except that she has, despite her 
obvious loathing, provided a description of Rosenberg’s methodology as a properly 
dialectical one. Thus, in a twisted way, Goldin should be given her due. What this also 
suggests is that the reason for the unavailability of the dialectical model through which to 
articulate the action principle of Action Painting was perhaps not so much that dialectical 
methods were not recognized but that they were reviled. For the record, Rosenberg’s 
correspondences reveal two additional attacks on his use of dialectic. Clyfford Still 
berated Rosenberg after the publication of “The American Action Painters,” for his 
“conspicuous dialectical slanting to collectivist premises,” something which in the 
context of Still’s letter appears to go right along with a slew of other faults: “patent 
psychological errors. . . . ignorance of even recent Art History . . . [and] unfamiliarity 
with the most common data of aesthetic and philosophic contributions.”182 In another 
instance, Irving Kristol of Encounter—not one of Rosenberg’s comrades by any means—
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reacted to what he perceived as Rosenberg’s dialectical sensibility. In a 1953 letter 
responding to one of Rosenberg’s essays Kristol complained that Rosenberg wrote 
through “counterpoint,” which Kristol continued “is alright for the frogs,” but was not 
“suitable to English.”183 This takes one back to the complaints against Rosenberg as an 
art critic: he does not focus on one “thing” but is constantly rattling off about the 
“situation.” 
It is worth noting as well that while Rosenberg’s investment in dialectics would 
hardly have raised an eyebrow in the early and middle part of the 1930s when the 
Marxian dialectic was enjoying a brief vogue in radically-inflected intellectual circles, 
starting towards the latter part of the 1930s and on up through the Cold War period, 
dialectics came increasingly under attack and from a number of directions. More and 
more suspect and shunned, dialectical methods were cast off either as a relic of the failed 
Marxist utopia or quarantined like a form of highly dangerous and especially noxious 
mental contagion. Nor does it fail to make sense that “dialectic” and “dialectical 
methods” would get swept aside as Marxism itself was vilified at the onset of the Cold 
War. Dialectic was marked negatively by a Marxism now irremediably linked to the 
dread threat of Communism: the totalitarian nightmare of Stalin’s dictatorship; the Soviet 
Union as the incomprehensible and reprehensible other to the democracy, freedom, 
enlightenment and general humanity of the United States and the rest of the civilized 
Western world; and Marxist theory as the pernicious body of dogma used for 
brainwashing and mystifying otherwise reasonable human beings. What accounts for 
some of this reaction is the eliding of the crucial distinction between Marx’s “historical 
materialism” and a Leninist “dialectical materialism”—an elusion out of which both now 
signify devastating hocus-pocus acts with History. As testament to how powerfully 
“dialectic” still connotes the sense of an erroneous path or a substance to be shunned and 
the seriousness of the degree to which this term is under erasure, note Jachec’s strict and 
insistent qualification of the independent Left’s redefinition of Marxism as a “variant of 
postdialectical [emphasis added] socialist thought.”184  
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In all fairness, however, one should add that the negative reception of dialectics 
was not limited to the specifics of the outcome of the Soviet Union. The demise of 
dialectic was far more general. For, admittedly, even those mostly sympathetic to 
Marxism had difficulty with this mysterious notion said to be at the core of Marxist 
theory. “[T]he art of reconciling opposites through hocus pocus” was how George Sorel 
famously described it in 1950.185 Earlier, in a fiery exchange that took place 1938 in the 
pages of Partisan Review, Edmund Wilson and William Phillips dueled over the “myth” 
and “devil theory” of Marxist dialectic.186 Wilson’s contention in the “The Myth of the 
Marxist Dialectic” was that Marxist socialism suffered a fundamental flaw by the 
presence of the dialectic. “From the moment that they [Marx and Engels] admitted the 
Dialectic into their semi-materialistic system, they had admitted an element of 
mysticism.”187 In various other places in the essay Wilson indicts the dialectic as “pure 
incantation,” as “religious myth” and as one of those “abstractions of German 
philosophy” which Marx and Engels, however “materialist” they tried to be, never shook. 
Wilson’s charge recalls the academic commonplace that Anglo-American thought, 
preferring the empiricist’s hard facts, the social scientist’s chart of statistics and clean 
categories all around, has never been particularly hospitable grounds for dialectical 
conceptualizations and Germanic idealist philosophy in general.188 In another example, 
Wolfgang Paalen, in his March 1942 “Inquiry on Dialectical Materialism” issue of the 
magazine Dyn, asked “Is Dialectical Materialism the science of a verifiable ‘dialectic’ 
process.”189  Last, but not least, Claude Lévi-Strauss and Sartre heatedly debated the 
contentious issue of dialectics. The concluding chapter to the former’s The Savage Mind 
aggressively posed analytic reason against Sartrean dialectical reason. All of this seems 
to corroborate the reflection Bertell Ollman, a noted scholar of Marx’s dialectical 
methodology, made on the supreme unfashionable-ness of dialectics: “Is there any part of 
Marxism that has received more abuse than his dialectical method?”190   
In light of the historical reasoning that the demise of dialectic is interwoven with 
the failure of the “Russian Experiment,” as well as the essentialist reasoning that 
dialectical thought simply has never been at home with the Anglo-American 
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commonsense nature and analytic mind, it might be constructive to briefly indicate what 
which would stand opposed to dialectics, as well as to discuss the kinds of political 
alignments made with non-dialectical approaches. In the commonsense approach (or, 
what Ollman also refers to as the “social science view”), the basic category is the 
“thing”—static, independent, immediate—the “supposedly independent part.” As Ollman 
explains, “things exist and undergo change. The two are logically distinct. History is 
something that happens to things; it is not part of their nature.”191 These are the 
conceptual groundings of formal logic and analytic reason, the basis for the 
commonsense approach. On the one hand, there are discrete things or units, commodities 
or atomized individuals and, on the other, discrete acts and processes. Hailed as a return 
to rationality and clear-headed thinking, the political alignments of this approach—as 
they were delineated in the Cold War period—was with piece-meal liberalism and 
“postsystematic theory” as against dialectical totality.192 
Certainly this puts an interesting spin on Rosenberg’s rejection of liberalism and 
his outspoken contempt for couch liberals. It hints that his irritation with liberals and with 
that phenomenon that he linked with liberalism, professionalization (another version of 
the piece-meal), went far deeper than hostility towards old comrades whom he suspected 
of selling out or that his tirades against professionalization were simply the complaints of 
an older generation generalist who turns bitter as he finds himself without a place in a 
system of specialization. Rather, his antagonism stemmed from a very deep source: his 
overarching commitment to a dialectical methodology.  
And, in a way, Rosenberg could assume this admittedly unpopular method in no 
less obvious form than by fashioning Action Painting as his subject. The ur-mechanism 
of Action Painting is the dialectic as the active mediations between subject and object 
through which identifying forms are realized. It is, most emphatically, through the 
framework of dialectic that Action Painting makes sense within the larger picture of 
Rosenberg’s critical political project; by the same token, it is when action is taken 
undialectically—that is, as mere activity—that Action Painting is misread.  
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While versions of this point surface in both O’Brien’s and Orton’s work, what I  
want to add more explicitly to such accounts is this. There are two primary abstractions 
of dialectic, or, two primary ways in which the mediations of subject and object operate 
in Rosenberg’s problematic. One aspect is the structural sense of parts and wholes and 
their interactive relation. This dialectical aspect captures systemic qualities, the identity 
of parts based on their location within a larger context. It fashions the individual and 
social as relational moments of totality. A second aspect is that of process, of activity, of 
theory and practice unity, of individual praxis. It focuses on the sense of making, and 
indeed changing, identity. Though both abstractions of dialectic are evident in O’Brien’s 
and Orton’s work, the important qualification is that O’Brien’s determination of 
Rosenberg as a dialectical thinker has been made primarily in this latter sense, as a matter 
of individual confrontation between subject and object; and that Orton’s work, on the 
other hand, has focused primarily on Rosenberg as a dialectical thinker in the former 
sense, in the sense of structure, and part and whole relations.  
Consciously or not, have both thinkers here downplayed that “other” aspect of 
dialectic in order to avoid determinations of Rosenberg that they felt improper or 
irrelevant in the overall characterization of what his work was about, its real content? For 
O’Brien the “other” dialectic, that of part and whole relations and the construction of 
social totality, too strongly suggested a militant, dogmatic, unreconstructed political 
identity for Rosenberg. For Orton the “other” dialectic, that of the subject-object 
encounter, too easily smacks of the kind of “naïve, romantic, quasi-philosophical, 
theatrical,” and “lazy existentialist-humanist” paradigm in which Rosenberg gets trapped. 
In continuing the task of Rosenberg’s re-reading, then, I will insist on this 
addendum: Rosenberg’s project needs to be read in light of dialectics but, critically, with 
a dialectical dialectics jointly articulating the two axes of dialectic described above. What 
remains is to make explicit how these two senses of dialectic work within and work 





Marx’s Revolutionary Drama: Act, Actor & The Question of Agency 




The above comes from a note written sometime in 1939 by a Rosenberg deep in the study 
of Marx, in the middle of working out the structural-dynamic drama which will serve as 
the critical scaffolding for his assimilation of Marx. As Orton draws one’s attention to, 
his was a particular (and, at moments, a seemingly peculiar) way of reading Marx but, 
nevertheless, it was a consistently held one as well, dating as far back as Rosenberg’s 
initial encounter with Marx in the 1930s and extending through his last seminars at the 
University of Chicago in the 1970s. There is ample evidence of the long-standing 
importance of this model to Rosenberg’s understanding of Marx. For instance, in a 1936 
letter to Harriet Monroe, then the editor of the Chicago-based Poetry magazine to which 
he contributed, Rosenberg defended his engagement with Marx precisely on this issue: “I 
could name a long list of writers who have acquired through marxism an understanding 
of social forces, whereas before they became aware of marxism they were completely 
innocent of what caused movement in society.”194 Or later, in 1957, in a reflection back 
on the 1930s and the popularity at that time of Marxism with the bohemian intelligentsia, 
he offered this: “Like everyone else, I became involved in Marxism, but from the start 
my Marxism was out of date. I was interested in Marx for the sake of something else. . . .  
I found in his writings an image of the drama of the individual and the mass. . . .”195  
A problem Rosenberg would encounter was in the troubling lack of distinction 
made between drama and theater. All too typically, Rosenberg’s drama would be allowed 
to slide into mere and artificial theatrics. For certainly “drama” locates another of those 
clichéd handles by which Rosenberg is all too easily understood for espousing art as 
theatrical performance. As Hilton Kramer complained, Rosenberg is a “writer who tends 
to see everything . . . as ‘drama’,” and thus Action Painting turns into theatrics on 
canvas.196 The distinction that needs to be reinforced is that of the theatrical and the 
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dramatic. The theatrical is performance in the sense of superficial acting, in the sense of 
acting as untruth, a false immediacy, a false sense of the concrete. It is all surface and 
surface effects. By drama, however, Rosenberg refers to something markedly different, 
indeed something opposed to the theatrical, that negates it as superficial appearance. 
Drama is a device for critical abstraction, for perceiving the underlying structural logic, 
for seeing abstract relation. Drama operates, for Rosenberg, as a dialectical schema for 
mapping relations of part and whole, individual and social. Finally, drama is Rosenberg’s 
metaphor for totality. 
To reiterate, Rosenberg’s work takes on the appearance of being undialectical and 
lacking in critical clout when perceived as being constructed around the metaphor of 
theater rather than drama. The displacement of drama by theater has been the central 
route by which Rosenberg’s thought is reduced to a mushy, romantic, naïve proposal for 
hyper-individualism. Rosenberg’s irritation at being mistaken for actually advocating 
theatrical displays of the artist’s personality is heard in the following complaints. “In 
contrast to the meagerness of art, the artist is blown up to gigantic proportions,” 
Rosenberg chaffed in 1971, “The artist has become, as it were, too big for art.”197 And, in 
the draft-notes for a letter to Lionel Trilling in 1974, Rosenberg proclaimed, “I have 
never wanted to argue for individualism as a value.”198 As another example, in the 
contentious exchange between Rosenberg and his interviewer, a Mr. Hole, Rosenberg 
hotly refuses the interviewer’s reductions of his work. Mr. Hole has Rosenberg pegged as 
a critic invested in “ideology, social influences,” and “psychic processes,” all of which 
apparently means that Rosenberg is advocating the position of the art critic as some kind 
of “psychoanalyst,” concerned with “private dream activities, his [the artist’s] 
affirmations of will, his psychic activities.”199 It is at this point, with the most blatant of 
Mr. Hole’s blurring of critique of ideology and social influence with some manner of 
popular, unschooled psychoanalyzing of the artist, that Rosenberg cuts in to make a “very 
important . . . distinction.” “[W]hat we’re interested in is not the personality of the artist. . 
. . It has nothing to do with his divorcees or his sex habits.”200 Rather, Rosenberg asserts 
the interest in the artist is not in and for the idiosyncrasies of his personality—something 
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which Rosenberg elsewhere noted were increasingly used as marketing ploys for artists—
but far more structurally, in terms of the artist as a “model . . . of the creator.”201 Or 
again, Rosenberg insists: “For Marx the actor is not a ‘pure’ creator whose difficulty is a 
subjective one only. For Marx the actor is an intermediary between a reality that is both 
changing yet resistant to change. . . .”202 O’Brien has also cautioned against easy readings 
of Action Painting as an art espousing uncritical individualism. Returning to Rosenberg’s 
political roots in the 1930s she finds evidence of Rosenberg’s opposition towards 
“bourgeois individualism,” which accompanies the “self-fascination of personality” and 
usually means nothing more than the limited bourgeois notion of individual freedom 
mapped solely by the coordinates of money, property and career with little or no concern 
for the social totality.203 As O’Brien maintains, Rosenberg’s wary attitude toward 
conceptions of the individual posited within capitalism and by the bourgeoisie remained 
with him up through and beyond his writing of “The American Action Painters,” leaving 
him troubled with misgivings that the essay might be misread as an argument for 
“solipsistic bourgeois individualism.”204 
Returning again to de Beauvoir’s accounts of her stay in New York one finds a 
highly interesting description of a dinner party that took place on May 7, 1948, hosted by 
Bernard Wolfe. Rosenberg (here referred to as S. K.) was in attendance and evidently 
quite vocal on the subject of action. De Beauvoir writes: 
An intense discussion on the question of action is under way, and it lasts 
well into the night. This subject is of great interest to me, since among 
young people at universities and New York intellectuals. . . . I have 
consistently observed a penchant for inertia, which at first stunned me. By 
contrast S. K. is stunned by what he calls our “action complex.” He thinks 
Saint-Exupery, Malraux, and Koestler suffer from this malady, among 
with Camus and Sartre, to say nothing of Louis Aragon. Of course, he’s 
not preaching a yogi’s attitude. Throughout history, there have been 
moments when action has been possible. Lenin is an example of this. But 
today, the objective situation allows no effective individual intervention in 
France or in America either. The will to action is not just a subjective 
attitude, a maladjusted attitude that begs to be psychoanalyzed—especially 
among intellectuals, given that, for the moment, they have no role to play. 
. . . Certainly, there is always a gap between the subjective truth and the 
objective reality of an action; every agent is also an actor, and he cannot 
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know what kind of figure he is cutting in the world of other men through 
the role he is playing on his private stage. To the extent that this is what S. 
K. maintains, I agree.205 
 
What De Beauvoir’s account underscores is how “action” thought of as a possibility 
situated structurally—at the intersection of personal “subjective truth” of the individual 
agents and social totality. It further draws attention to the serious sense of qualification 
surrounding “action” for Rosenberg. He is no voluntarist, he is not preaching 
revolutionary action, he is not attempting to rouse to arms through fiery rhetoric, he is not 
caught up in an “action complex.” And why? Because the underlying qualification is this: 
one must locate the individual, its possibility and its limitation, within the “objective 
situation.” Or, to rehearse the lines Rosenberg frequently called upon: “Men make their 
own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under 
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and 
transmitted from the past.”206  
A concrete example of Rosenberg’s adherence to this position can be drawn from 
an argument he had with Paul Goodman, a longtime peer and colleague. The argument 
took place in 1962 over Rosenberg’s monograph on Arshile Gorky and Goodman’s 
highly critical review of that book.207 Rebutting that review, Rosenberg promptly 
attacked Goodman’s flippant dismissal of history: Goodman’s criticism of Rosenberg’s 
work was that the picture of Gorky, the man, the artist, becomes too caught up in the 
historical situation. The monograph, according to Goodman, faltered on the point of not 
being able to keep the artist and history separate. For Rosenberg, the so-called criticism 
of not keeping the artist and history separate worked like a red flag: “I wrote of Gorky as 
a man stuck with the history and the art of our time and conscious of being stuck.”208 
“Gorky was responding to historical actuality with historical consciousness and 
intention.”209 The very indication that artists and history were things that could be kept 
separate, that objective history had no effect on art and/or artists, were signs of 
Goodman’s utopian, anti-historical delusion. History was not an optional ingredient to be 
added or abstained from based on one’s personal tastes; treating it so lead to some 
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alarming consequences. “He [Goodman] wishes to deny as unreal any power not 
emanating from within the individual and which cannot be controlled by inner 
movements—you relax and things relax. This assumption of total freedom is not only 
Utopian, it leads a daring soul to primitive magic.”210 Pointedly, it is precisely the 
popular romantic existentialistic stance of Goodman, of the kind that is typically assigned 
to the author of Action Painting, that Rosenberg so vigorously attacks. “They [artists] live 
in situations made up of details, including the nutty ones. They—dammit—live in 
determinism; they have to fight it out with imposed limitations.”211 Rosenberg’s 
individual, Rosenberg’s actor is the dialectically fashioned one, existing in a “personal-
historical complex.”212 For Rosenberg actions, of necessity, take place in situations and 
situations are always historical: artists can not but act in historical situations. In this 
argument Rosenberg attempted to extricate his version of artistic agency as very much 
lived within and limited by the objective situation from that variety of agency suggested 
by Goodman which—and increasingly so as the 1960s progressed—appeared to suggest 
subjective autonomy and support a definition of freedom as an anarchistic “letting go.” 
Indeed a rather remarkable passage from an article titled “Life and Death of the 
Amorous Umbrella,” published in 1942 in the American surrealist magazine VVV, serves 
as a prescient indication of Rosenberg’s wariness of the creative anarchism Goodman 
would later advocate. 
This ability to combine spontaneously has been taken as a sign of 
dermal alertness characteristic of those born of the spirit who, like the 
wind, blow where they list. The embrace of the umbrella and the sewing 
machine has thus become the device on the banner of absolute freedom.  
In our admiration for the free, pure, beautiful and revolutionary, 
we must take care not to overlook the pathos of the umbrella’s quick-fire 
romance. Though his act is perfect in its moment, a distinct psychological 
malady is implied by his unpremeditated leap. . . . Everything points to 
frantic impulses and the absence of critical spirit. 
The anarchism of the amorous umbrella does not change the 
conditions of his existence. . . . He is still himself, the slave that society 
made of him, and the force and duration of his embrace are not really as 
unconditioned as they seem.213 
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The above could almost stand in for a description of the aspirations and problems that 
Action Painting would later accrue when taken in the “absence of critical spirit.” The 
language and images of this passage—the “dermal alertness,” of “free, pure, beautiful 
and revolutionary” spirits who “blow where they list” and who risk taking that 
“unpremeditated leap,” in an “act” which “is perfect in its moment”—eerily prefigure the 
Action Painter. And from this one can surmise that whatever Rosenberg’s notion of 
Action Painting would eventually be (and not publicly and in print at least for another ten 
years)—because it is by his own definition, a critical form and process—it could not be 
pure anarchism or uncritical spontaneity. As Rosenberg makes very clear the Action 
Painter, or any other revolutionary vanguard artist, would need to do something other 
than merely blow where he or she listed if “absolute freedom” was to be more than a 
mere banner. For, to slightly rephrase Rosenberg here, mere anarchism—that breed of 
free spirit minus critical spirit—does not tally up, in the end, to revolutionary spirit. It is 
possible for one to be supremely dermally alert, aware of every slightest nuance of body 
and mind, in connection with one’s interior and allowing one’s creative spontaneous 
juices to flow, without changing an iota the conditions of existence, still being the “slave 
that society made of him.” To make that kind of assumption is “a distinct psychological 
malady,” delusion. Ominously, Rosenberg warns that spontaneity, the miscellany that 
falls into the category of the free, unconscious, anarchistic, is “not really as 
unconditioned as [it] seem[s].” 
The displacements that Rosenberg sees happening in stances of creative 
anarchism, both in his 1962 disagreement with Goodman and in his 1942 wariness of 
surrealism, are those which interiorize crisis, keeping it squarely in the non-rational, 
merely inexplicable realm of the artist’s creative personality. The force of Rosenberg’s 
irritation even led him to sympathize with the anti-modernist Georg Lukács. “In the 
postwar novel and theater, despair, the ‘void,’ ‘loss of self,’ have become clichés used to 
organize episodes, language, images. One can hardly help sharing Lukács’ impatience 
with glib intimations of an underlying ‘human condition’ that turns real events into mere 
illustrations of an irresistible sickness.”214 As Rosenberg will insist on a number of 
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occasions, Action Painting was situated at a crisis point—one should not dismiss the 
“crisis-nature of Action Painting.” “To forget the crisis—individual, social, esthetic—that 
brought Action Painting into being, or to bury it out of sight (it cannot really be 
forgotten), is to distort fantastically the reality of postwar American art.”215 The mistake 
is made by linking up Rosenberg’s Action Painting to a narcissistic version of crisis in 
which the nature and shape of the crisis experienced is confined to the minuscule scale of 
one’s private emotional ailments, leaving unaddressed any connection between the crisis-
ridden individual and the objective crisis-ridden social whole. In other words, 
Rosenberg’s sense of crisis was not abstract; it was crisis understood as explicitly defined 
and informed by history. The crisis—the “social [emphasis added] crisis”—that Action 
Painting was responding to was that of figuring a way to act, to formulate a praxis, or an 
“opportunity for a doing that would not be seized upon in mid-motion by the 
depersonalizing machine of capitalist society, or by the depersonalizing machine of the 
world-wide opposition to that society.”216   
But how then did this play out? What is the drama? How is it revolutionary? How 
are structure and agency reconciled? And how can the act of Action Painting be said to fit 
this provocatively grand bill? To answer these questions I will return to Orton’s 
argument. Specifically, Orton has begun the process of highlighting “personality” and 
“identity” as the two key poles by which Rosenberg’s dramatic metaphor operates. First 
articulated in 1932 in “Character Change and the Drama”—an essay whose importance is 
further corroborated by O’Brien: “Rosenberg always pointed to [that essay] as the ‘basic 
piece’ that identified his lifelong critical position”—here Rosenberg sets up the structure 
of personality and identity as the two primary terms through which to conceptualize 
dramatic character change.217  
The vantage point of personality, or the “organic point of view,” brings into focus 
the individual specificity of the “felt.” It is about an “entity enduring in time,” a 
continuity of being: it is “naturalistic,” “biological,” and the changes that occur—its 
personality development—are part of this fabric of continual psychological 
transformation and mutation, of organic unfolding.218 Its actions are read within a 
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narrative of development as expressions of individual psychology. These observable 
overt acts, however, are merely clues, the “excess” spilling over from the subjective 
interior. Attempting to grasp individuals as personalities means accepting a concrete, 
lived specificity that “can be grasped only by a non-rational operation.”219 Rosenberg 
associates biographies and the modern novel, with a finger pointing to Marcel Proust’s 
Remembrance of Things Past, Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain and James Joyce’s 
Finnegans Wake, with the organic point of view, the naturalistic personality. But this 
richness of being found in the personality also has to be acknowledged as a sort of 
unbounded concreteness and specificity of being that as such is formless and 
nonconceptual. Personalities are essentially unworkable. They quite literally cannot get 
out of themselves. They are immediate. Certainly they feel, they suffer deeply, but they 
simply cannot act on the level of the world-historical, of the epic. The nerve endings are 
too close to the surface. Personalities are unable to abstract enough to get a sense of the 
larger picture, totality, or get a grip on the social articulation of their situation, or 
recognize shared commonality with others. How could, after all, the concrete specificity 
of an individual’s interface with experience be reduced to any common denominator? 
Personalities tend towards the incommunicable and the asocial, and what personalities 
lack is the quality of self-consciousness that would allow them to recognize themselves 
as inhabiting positions within a larger system. They fail as signs because they resist 
abstraction, they are all extension. Personalities, in a sense, have too much presence, 
there can be no structure and no sign-operation because there is no absence, no 
structuring absence. In short, personalities fail to grasp themselves as objects.  
Identities, in contrast, are abstract ordering constructs, attempts to rationalize the 
chaotic and endless specificity of personalities into a “thing,” something identifiable 
because bounded, possessing outline, delineated in those ways that makes matter 
graspable. As Rosenberg explains, it is by reduction to an identity that legal and other 
social systems define the human being. The legalistic identity is measurable, comparable, 
classifiable, rational. It is concerned with “overt acts,” with the exterior as that which can 
be processed by the system, and therefore judged; and not as clues to the person’s 
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interior, his or her realm of feeling and emotions. Systems of law, social institutions, 
drama and religious fabula are concerned with individuals as identities. Identities belong 
to the social, the communicable and the recognizable. This is the law, the name, the 
Logos.  
The emblematic figure that Rosenberg will come back to again and again is 
Hamlet. It is in the figure of Hamlet that Rosenberg sees his two terms, personality and 
identity, played out. The Hamlet of the first half of Shakespeare’s tragedy is presented as 
a personality: the organic, naturalistic self, the nebulous singularity of an existence. 
Hamlet’s suffering is very much that of a personality. He is emotion-wrought, he whines, 
he mopes, his narcissism is evidenced by his inability to take Ophelia (though fully 
available to Hamlet) as a love object; what the audience witnesses is the nearly 
schizophrenic texture of his mood swings, of his emotional interior. The problems with 
this first Hamlet are easily evident; he lacks suitable or stable form. “The argumentative, 
self-analytical, naturalistic Hamlet of ‘non-action,’ describing himself in every speech he 
utters and using speech as a substitute for deed, is very much the figure of a personality, 
of a being insufficient for, because irrelevant to, the dramatic rôle offered him.”220 His 
formlessness, his being a/as personality, means he cannot act—he cannot perform his 
role, respond adequately to the situation, honorably (or heroically) answer the call to 
duty. 
All this reverses in the second half of the play. Hamlet transforms from a 
personality to an identity. This second Hamlet, possessing a keen sense of form, a grasp 
of the larger picture, a “new self-assured identity,” also possesses something 
“dangerous”—”an ability to act.”221 He becomes in Orton’s words “a character relevant 
to and able to perform the role required by the plot in which he is located.”222 This second 
Hamlet, with a strong sense of identity (“This is I, Hamlet the Dane!”) knows what he 
must do; he takes up his sword. As Rosenberg observed, “His action hustles the play to 
its tragic close, and the apparently accidental character of his revenge merely serves to 
emphasize that he is controlled at the end not by the limits of his person but by the forces 
of dramatic movement. Transformed from the image of a personality into a dramatic 
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identity, he has found at last his proper place in the drama.”223 But the crucial question to 
be asked is what has happened to Hamlet between the third and fourth acts? What has 
effected the transformation of Hamlet from the emotionally excessive, narcissistic, 
formless and incapacitated personality to “Hamlet the Dane,” the distilled, defined, active 
identity to whom all becomes crystal clear? One way of describing the change is to say 
that Hamlet has gained consciousness, even revolutionary self-consciousness—”active 
character shaping spirit”—and this happens through a confrontation with death. Let me 
clarify by situating this narratively. The bifurcation of Hamlet (Hamlet as personality in 
the beginning and Hamlet as identity at the ending) occurs when he is ordered abroad and 
is forced to defend his life against the assassins his uncle/step-father has hired. The 
transformation from personality to identity comes from the consciousness gained through 
the ultimate confrontation with the limits of one’s subjectivity (and dialectically 
interwoven with that a sense of one’s objectivity as well): an encounter with death, with 
that absolute structural limitation of being. From this symbolic death he is reborn into an 
identity. “[T]he multiple incidents in the life of an individual may be synthesized,” 
Rosenberg explains, “by the choice of the individual himself or by the decision of others, 
into a scheme that pivots on a single fact central to the individual’s existence and which, 
controlling his behavior and deciding his fate, becomes his visible definition. Here unity 
of the ‘plot’ becomes one with unity of being and through the fixity of identity change 
becomes synonymous with revolution.”224   
These last lines reengage with Orton’s argument, and this particularly so on the 
issue of what becomes “synonymous with revolution.” To remember back, a key 
component to Orton’s argument was the alignment of Marx’s proletariat with 
Rosenberg’s Action Painter. More precisely, Orton sees the distinction of personality and 
identity introduced in the 1932 essay carried through to and further developed in 
Rosenberg’s 1948 essay, “The Pathos of the Proletariat.” Like Hamlet, the proletarian 
actor must somehow become one with his role, must realize his place within the plot, the 
logic and law of the reigning social structure. “[T]here will come a moment,” Orton 
writes, “when the proletariat, as the first condition of historical action, must surrender its 
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given character and function under capitalism. It will then act to fulfill its historical role, 
develop a form of revolutionary consciousness and ‘identity’, and come to exist at the 
level of political struggle.”225 Once again, as with Hamlet, the moment that separates 
Hamlet the personality and Hamlet the Dane, also separates the proletariat as the 
industrial slave army of capital who suffer in their “daily and hourly thralldom to the 
machine” from the proletariat as revolutionary hero who will realize equality for all 
humanity.226 The moment is that confrontation with nothingness, death, that liminality of 
subjectivity/objectivity.  
I follow Orton’s arguments in essentials. However, I believe that a third 
coordinate in the personality-identity model needs to be explored. As a way of 
approaching this third coordinate let me begin by laying stress on an ambiguity and 
limitation in the personality-identity model. “Identity” occupies a highly awkward 
situation. For although “identity”—as one learns from Rosenberg’s writing as well as 
Orton’s retelling of it—is necessary for “action,” this is not an unqualified good. For 
Rosenberg, in 1932, Hamlet’s rebirth into his second role as an identity possessing 
single-minded determination (alternatively one-dimensional fanaticism) to take action is 
also what makes the play a tragedy. The ending is, after all, a bloody massacre, and the 
hero is sacrificed. Nor is Rosenberg unsympathetic to the first Hamlet. For it was this 
first Hamlet that Rosenberg mimed in 1939 in his journal pages when he bemoaned his 
own inability to act. The sense of hesitation and qualification that remains in Rosenberg’s 
text, and that is somewhat lost in Orton’s reading of it, is an accounting for the violence 
involved in the formation of identities, a bleak reckoning with the costs. For example, at 
the beginning of “Character Change and the Drama,” Rosenberg emphasizes the nature of 
identity as an abstraction and thus as a sort of violence. He calls the law (social) as 
“shaping personae with a hatchet.”227 The abstraction is always a reduction, something is 
cut out, parts are amputated, the focus must be keen in order for a clear picture to emerge, 
for the figuring of an “emblem” as Rosenberg puts it.228 The organic tendril-like 
extensions must be eliminated. The law, operating as an ultimate signifier of social order, 
“stands ready with its systematic chopping-block to execute come who may on the basis 
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of his most easily definable acts and without consideration of the finer points of his 
feeling or motive. . . . The law is forever fixed to that last edge of individuality where the 
particular is caught in the web of the abstract and is shifted against its will into a position 
where it can only suffer and be tortured by the contradiction between its own direction 
and the rules of the place in which it finds itself.”229 
One is tempted to dramatize the point by adding that Rosenberg is, in quite noted 
ways, anti-identitarian. Some of his most willful, heated tirades against contemporary 
society and culture came in the form of condemning the system of rationalized identities 
of technological and bureaucratic modernism. He was against identity as packaging, as 
formula, as “institutional formatting.”230 So, indeed, while Rosenberg may have criticized 
the formlessness of personality he was also and perhaps better known as the anti-
formalist, despising formalisms in both politics and art. The ambiguous status of 
“identity” in Rosenberg’s criticism therefore needs to be addressed. Or, put another way, 
what needs to be developed is the semantic space that would allow “identity” to operate 
more complexly and ambiguously (which it cannot do in the personality-identity dualistic 
model). This can be achieved by elaborating the model to include “personification” as a 
location to the right of “identity.” 
The term “personification” surfaces briefly but is left unexplored in Orton’s 
discussion of the proletariat and his analysis of the common mechanism by which 
“character change”—the assumption of an “identity”—occurs both for Hamlet and for the 
proletariat. The point worth underscoring is that while both Hamlet and the proletariat 
may be trying to arrive at a similar destination of the full, authentic identity of a self-
conscious actor/agent, they certainly do not start from the same place. Schematically, 
Hamlet is the personality trying to realize identity; the proletariat is a personification 
trying to realize identity—and this is a highly significant difference, one that asks for a 
more complex rendering of the personality-identity dualism. 
Hamlet as a personality, as witnessed above, is, in a manner of speaking, 
weighted with too much “subject.” Narcissistically taking himself as his object 
(“describing himself in every speech he utters”), he thus fails to get out of himself, is 
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unable to objectify himself, to assume meaningful, social form, to play his part. The 
proletariat as personification, quite in contrast to the romantically incapacitated Hamlet, 
marks the other extreme. It is weighted with too much objectness and thus also fails at a 
good dialectical identity. Its problem is not the excessive fullness of its organic and 
psychological being but its emptiness, its lacking an interior. Although it objectifies it is 
always engaged in the process of objectifying something else, not one’s own self; its 
form is always given from without, imposed. It exists as a structural possibility and 
structurally necessary component within modern economies of capitalist production, as 
the personification of capital, or, as things and as objects who make other objects. 
Rosenberg’s description in 1955 is apt: he describes “the utter futility of the daily acts of 
the factory laborers in conferring individuality upon themselves. They exist as an 
incorporation of generality. . . . [H]is product [is] not a self but an interchangeable 
commodity.”231 
 What the added component of “personification” gives room to is some interesting 
shifting in the emerging schematic. “Personality” and “personification” now locate the 
extreme, undialectical poles of subject and object, and “identity” assumes a middle 
position, and as a complex term possessing both good and bad aspects. To summarize: 
the hyper-subjective Hamlet, the narcissistic personality as the sheer run of 
unaccountable organic process, is a bad non-identity; the hyper-objective proletariat, the 
alienated personification of capital as the rationalization of things, is bad identity. The 
synthesis would be the identity of identity and non-identity, the realization of the 







Revolutionary Conundrum: Between Identity and Non-Identity 
What, if not the absolute elaboration of his creative dispositions, 
without any preconditions other than antecedent historical 
evolution which makes the totality of this evolution—i.e., the 
evolution of all human powers as such, unmeasured by any 
previously established yardstick—an end in itself? What is this, if 
not a situation where man does not reproduce himself in any 
determined form, but produces his totality? Where he does not seek 
to remain something formed by the past, but is in the absolute 
movement of becoming? 
Karl Marx232 
 
The new wants nonidentity, yet intention reduces it to identity; 
modern art constantly works at the Münchhausean trick of 
carrying out the identification of the nonidentical. 
Theodor Adorno233 
 
The revolutionary conundrum: how to stop repeating oneself, repeating history, falling 
into the old patterns, the fixed habit or the familiar routine, saying and doing the same 
thing over and over again? This is to be limited forever by what has been, never 
glimpsing a moment of the new, of the completely unprecedented. By the same token, it 
is the very nature of repetition, an “again,” the repeat performance and a return, that turns 
stuff into recognizable things, that lays the ground for the transformation from cognition 
to recognition, all the figuring in and of consciousness, for language, communication, 
shared meanings. It is therefore also the primary operation for positing self and social 
identity.  
Within modern socialist thought, the revolutionary new has been gestured to as 
that never before realized state of radical social equality, a new phase of human history 
completely unmarked by class power hierarchies, indeed, the end of pre-history. “The 
history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles,” as Marx and 
Engels famously wrote in the “Manifesto of the Communist Party.” “Freeman and slave, 
patrician and plebian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor 
and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, 
now hidden, now open fight. . . .”234 The negation of class society would be the non-
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identical of classless existence, something presumed never to have before existed in 
human society, and a state of being that so many social revolutionaries have named the 
true identity of humanity, humanity’s moment of redemptive reconciliation with itself. 
This is the social revolutionary new, the non-identical to all previous social identities. 
But Marx himself, writing in the bleak aftermath of 1848, began to register the 
seeming impossibility of such a feat. In a text that was focal for Rosenberg, here is Marx 
in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte describing the returns and repetitions that 
haunt the revolution. 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; 
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past. The 
tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain 
of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing 
themselves and things, in creating something entirely new, precisely in 
such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of 
the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle slogans and 
costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-
honoured disguise and this borrowed language.  
 
Slightly farther in this same paragraph, Marx concludes, “In like manner the beginner 
who has learnt a new language always translates it back into his other tongue, but he has 
assimilated the spirit of the new language and can produce freely in it only when he 
moves in it without remembering the old and forgets in it his ancestral tongue.”235 These 
two potent images described the painful, maddening relationship between revolution 
(towards the non-identical, the new, the unknown) and repetition (return to identity, 
tradition, the known), something that Jeffrey Mehlman pointedly calls attention to 
through “an elementary bit of philology: the primary meaning of ‘revolution,’ our term 
for inaugural change, is astronomical—’the action . . . of moving around in an orbit or 
circular course; the return or recurrence of a point or period of time.’”236 How did one 
forget the old languages, stop the process of translating everything back into the familiar 
forms; how did one learn articulations on a whole other order? The double movement 
possesses inescapable cruelty, a punishment for one’s efforts. For the very energies that 
reach out, striving to exceed the present and articulate a new, the non-identical, are the 
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precise energies that process everything one manages to grasp back into the same old 
identities. If ones strives to articulate the non-identical how does one keep it 
revolutionary, new, with an emancipatory content that both elicits the recognition of 
others and yet also escapes the fate of being just a repetition of language, falling into the 
abyss of mindless, ever-same identity? In this section I want to work once again at 
describing Rosenberg’s dialectic, extend upon the personality-identity-personification 
model and hopefully unpack what was left earlier as the very Hegelian proposition for the 
identity of identity and non-identity.  
In approaching this task, however, it might be provident to first supply a little 
more flesh to this rather stark theoretical model, and in doing this, possibly as well, give 
some grounds for invoking it with Rosenberg’s criticism. The text of the period in which 
the terms of identity and non-identity were most dramatically and importantly put 
forefront is The Dialectic of Enlightenment. Co-written in 1947 by the two Frankfurt 
School intellectuals Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno during their exile from 
Germany in New York and later, in California, this volume damningly analyzed the 
failure of Western modernity. The two authors of this text shared with Rosenberg similar 
sets of concerns, addressed the same problematic encompassing the issues of 
revolutionary failure, the totalitarian threat, the relation of art and politics, and the 
viability of critical dialectical methods.237 They were working, as well, in the same time 
frame, writing within similar intellectual milieus, and even appropriated each other’s 
terms: Rosenberg will write of the “culture industry” and Adorno will write of “action 
painting.”238 The advantage of indicating Horkheimer and Adorno’s use this theoretical 
model is that it provides an illuminating example of this dialectic in play and helps 
prepare the way for seeing this dialectic in Rosenberg’s own criticism.  
The identity principle operates in formal logic, and formal logic, Horkheimer and 
Adorno state, “provide[s] the Enlightenment thinkers with the schema of the calculability 
of the world.” “Bourgeois society is ruled by equivalence. It makes the dissimilar 
comparable by reducing it to abstract quantities.”239 It is fungibility, “universal 
interchangeability,” and “universal mediation” that Horkheimer and Adorno sum up in 
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the concept of the ratio. It is abstraction that “tool of enlightenment,” wielding the 
“power of repetition over reality,” and thus producing the return of the ever-same.240 
What principles of identity work upon, level or liquidate is difference, non-identity, 
nature as that which initially seems other and impregnable and “terrifying” to the subject. 
Enlightenment as rationalizing civilization tames primitive chaos with the imposition of 
its universal law—”[t]he identity of everything with everything else”—so that, in the end, 
“[w]hat was different is equalized.”241 In the realm of the primitive and mythic, those 
“earliest known stages of humanity” in which Horkheimer and Adorno situate their vision 
of the unfolding of the dialectic of Enlightenment, non-identity is mana. “Everything 
unknown and alien is primary and undifferentiated: that which transcends the confines of 
experiences; whatever in things is more than their previously known reality.”242 
Horkheimer and Adorno make clear that from very early on, this relation between 
identity and non-identity is one tensely mediated, marked and powered by fear or terror. 
The intensity of the subject’s will to dominate, to control utterly Nature and to allow 
nothing to escape or stand beyond the grid of its system of recognitions and relays—
”Nothing at all may remain outside, because the mere idea of outsideness is the very 
source of fear”—is generated from the subject’s fear of losing itself, its identity, the 
“primordial fear of losing one’s own name.”243 The subject must constantly rearticulate 
itself and retrace its boundaries. It abstracts—from the word abstrahere, “to pull from”—
from the non-identity of Nature, and this process of abstraction is the active assertion of 
figure from ground, a perpetual resistance against disintegration into a nameless, 
terrifying whole, by vigilantly drawing and re-drawing the line.244 “For civilization, pure 
natural existence, animal and vegetative, was the absolute danger.”245 
Men had to do fearful things to themselves before the self, the identical, 
purposive, and virile nature of man, was formed, and something of that 
recurs in every childhood. The strain of holding the I together adheres to 
the I in all stages; and the temptation to lose it has always been there with 
the blind determination to maintain it. The narcotic intoxication which 
permits the atonement of deathlike sleep for the euphoria in which the self 
is suspended, is one of the oldest social arrangements which mediate 




Identitarian thinking uses categories, concepts, ideas, generalizations, language, systems, 
representation, processes of abstraction, rationalization, equivalence, reproduction, 
recurrence, repetition to create closed, stable meanings and to organize experience. 
“Meaning” is cognitively available, or recognizable, because of sameness, returns, 
repetition, a trajectory—as the authors of The Dialectic of Enlightenment suggest—that 
degenerates into the pursuit of meaning as a truly pointless counting game, where 
rationalization becomes the supreme rule and a value in itself, where quality is lost in the 
systems, regimes, languages that can only ever process the homogenized, the already 
familiar and readily identifiable. Adorno’s protest against the identitarian is against this 
violent circumscription of existence in which the potential new is extinguished at its very 
moment of conception and made over into “identities,” as it is brought in line, set into 
preformed categories, aligned with preexisting ideas. 
But the fullness, the promise of richly qualitative meaning more than evades one 
on the other side, too. As identity’s “counter-image,” non-identity (the Real, Other, 
otherness, heterogeneity, radical particularity, non-stop change, that which is beyond 
representation, conceptualization and language, an openness designating that without 
borders, frames, outline or form) ends up offering everything but meaning nothing, 
lacking the social dimension by which any sort of exchange or recognition would be 
possible. For without identity’s “markers or signposts” the radical particularity of sheer 
quality is, quite literally, beyond the possibility of cognition.247 Alas, despite such wealth 
of quality, these riches will never “count” for anything.  
There are a number of places in Rosenberg’s work to see this dialectically posed 
opposition of identity and non-identity (and now given more bearing through an 
elaboration via Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment) operating as the 
theoretical template for his critical project. One is in a 1950 introduction Rosenberg 
wrote to Marcel Raymond’s From Baudelaire to Surrealism.248 Although the title of 
Rosenberg’s contribution, “French Silence and American Poetry,” suggests only two 
entities or positions—one, French, the other American—there are in fact three; and this 
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third is occupied by the English. To lay this out quickly and schematically, America lines 
up with “silence,” the French with “poetry,” and the English with the worst aspects of 
“tradition” as cliché, doctrine, academicism. The two extremes are the American and 
English positions. American silence, as Rosenberg illustrates, is the silence of the 
“Kansas farmhand.” Existing without culture, without tradition, the Kansas farmhand just 
sits “on a rail and wait[s] for something to show up. Whatever it is, it will be something 
totally real.” His “silence just is, an emptiness coming from American space and time.”249 
To translate this through the Adornian metaphor, the Kansas farmhand is non-identity—
everything is new and totally real but both incomprehensible and uneventful as well. 
Opposing the Kansas silence is the tradition of the “English,” or identity in its worst, 
most confining aspects. It is the “commonplace,” the given formulas for processing and 
production; it means always having language spoken for one, never finding oneself 
occupying uncharted semantic space but instead always “held by a web of 
vocabulary.”250 As if to indicate that these modes were not nationalistic, Rosenberg uses 
not just the Missouri-born Eliot but also the French poet Paul Claudel as his two 
examples of “English” identity. Claudel’s poetry fails because he begins with the idea: 
“His doctrine tells him that God and His universe are on the side of man, and he tries to 
feel and express this in poetry. But there is no verbal alchemy. . . .”251 And it is precisely 
this alchemical moment that is important. “Alchemy”—or the “great leap”—is 
Rosenberg’s term for the dialectical movement that achieves the level of poetry and thus 
to the “French” position. French poetry and poetic alchemy occur when the “belt-line of 
rhetoric that keeps automatically pounding away in his [the poet’s] brain twenty-four 
hours a day” is “turn[ed] off,” when the “cultural clatter” is stopped. It is struggle, 
conflict, experimentation and risk. It is all the activities that keep something alive, truly 
responsive. “Lifting up a word and putting a space around it has been the conscious 
enterprise of serious French poetry since Baudelaire and Rimbaud. With this ‘alchemy’ 
poetry dissolves traditional preconceptions and brings one face to face with existence and 
with inspiration as a fact. Or it re-makes the preconceptions and changes the known 
world.”252 Poetic alchemy is that which forges new language. Creation at this level means 
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“getting along without the guidance of generalizations,” which, as Rosenberg adds, “is 
the most difficult thing in the world.” “The Frenchman has to will his silence, he 
struggles for it, in it he purifies himself of the past, makes himself ready for a new word, 
a round word, that can be his own and which will open to him a continent of things.” By 
this the old identities, the commonplaces are turned to “dust” as the “acid of poetry . . . 
burns each word away from the old links,” leaving the “not-to-be-duplicated word 
emerging from the unknown.”253 Although Rosenberg does not spell it out explicitly, the 
understanding is that it is not the silence of the Kansas farmhand Rosenberg is after but 
rather the dialectically wrought experience of French poetry. The obvious antagonist is 
English tradition; but perhaps the less obvious failure is silence, for the Kansas 
farmhand’s silence could just as easily be taken for “dumbness,” having nothing to say, 
the inarticulate and asocial, which is something probably safely discounted as a 
Rosenbergian ideal. On the other hand, French silence has all the pathos of being a 
determinate, willed negation, of being a silence or space made within language, and by 
that also made within the social. There is an important difference for Rosenberg, in other 
words, between being an inarticulate blank (a nothing) and being a word with space 
around it (a negation). 
Moving four years forward, to 1954, Rosenberg’s oppositional terms were laid 
out not as the tripartite of English tradition, American silence and French poetry but as 
redcoatism and coonskinism in the “Parable for American Painters.” Again, though the 
terms were slightly changed, the tale was one of difference and repetition, about the 
adventure of forging new expressive identities and the danger of identities established on 
self-repeating patterns.254 Redcoatism represents high formal training and regimentation. 
The redcoats possess disciplined technique, they know how to follow orders and obey 
rules, they have superb “military art,” refined style, they are, in a word, professionals of 
their craft, infused with its Tradition. Their antithesis are the coonskins; individual, 
untrained, following no previously set order or organization or regimented way of seeing 
things, they adapt—”improvise”—moment-to-moment to changed situations, to the 
rawness of the new. The redcoats suffer defeat because they cannot experience the new or 
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difference. Their “eye sees through a gridiron of style and memory,” they “hallucinate” 
known identities, projecting their canons of craft and their traditional principles of 
intelligibility onto the New World wilderness. Interestingly, rather than let this settle 
easily into a form of adulation for the sharpshooting coonskinism of post-war American 
Abstract Expressionism, Rosenberg indicates that coonskinism has already become 
redcoatism. “Today, Coonskinism itself in the form of ‘free’ abstract expression is in 
danger of becoming a style . . . the new man does not automatically stay that way. With 
most of the pioneers of 1946, the transformation of the Coonskinner into a Redcoat has 
already taken place.”255 This parable and warning for American painters—”the new man 
does not automatically stay that way”—lays out, with remarkable clarity, the very 
dilemma of identity and non-identity, of how the new (identities forged out of non-
identity and in resistance to previous forms of identity) is easily recuperated or 
rationalized back into tradition. The coonskinner is transformed into a redcoat, 
coonskinism becomes a form of redcoatism, the good new identity turns into the bad old 
identity, which in a dizzying twist becomes a form of bad non-identity—the state of 
identitylessness, of everything being the same, which finds its modern expression in mass 
identity. One can take this type of thinking about the paradoxical dialectic between 
identity and non-identity and reasonably hear its resonance in the title for Rosenberg’s 
1959 collection of essays, The Tradition of the New. The title itself can be interpreted as 
hopeful, evoking a sustained, remembered practice of battling through systems of false 
identities; the continued fight and the perhaps reassuring idea of a critical presence in 
history and society, one able to think itself to the second degree where identity indicates 
the self-conscious and self-critical. Oppositely, it could also be taken as the sign that 
vanguardism is already defeated, since as with the coonskin once the name was applied 






Marxist Praxis: Action Painting as Dialectic 
Communism . . . is the genuine resolution of the conflict between . . . 
objectification and self-confirmation. . . . 
Karl Marx256 
 
The act . . . is the outstanding riddle of the twentieth century. 
Harold Rosenberg257 
 
The dilemma of identity and non-identity, its triple articulation through personality-
identity-personification, the possibility of the new subject, Marx’s “new men,” the 
identity of identity and non-identity, the identical subject-object—these were scenarios 
Rosenberg persistently engaged. The crucial problem, as Rosenberg points out, has rested 
on the figure of the revolutionary actor/hero as the fulcrum between the old and new, the 
being that exists as that impossible “moment” between past and future, that bridge 
between identity and non-identity, who acts as the social bearer of a consciousness of 
difference existing within sameness, “an inverted mental image,” and “a dream living-in-
the-present.”258 This section will look at  why action, activity and the “act” are given such 
prominent, indeed, defining places within Rosenberg’s aesthetic, as the key motion by 
which the radical new could emerge, the great leap occur or the lightning of thought 
strike. This will entail an analysis of Rosenberg’s concept of Action Painting through the 
other abstraction of dialectics, where the identity of subject and object is not mapped 
spatially as part and whole relations, but where the identical subject-object is located in 
the interactive process of theory and practice, mind and matter. Reinforced in all of this is 
the connection between Rosenberg’s meaning of action and Marx’s use of the term, thus 
securing the political dimension of Rosenberg’s aesthetic. 
To start at the obvious place, action, was, of course the central term by which 
Marx meant to distinguish his project of political emancipation in method and content 
from all previous contemplative (and thus complacent) philosophies.259 Indeed, as a 
number of commentators would insist, failing to recognize the pivotal status accorded 
this term in Marx’s system is to grossly misunderstand Marxism. As one writer remarked, 
“Praxis is the central concept in Marx’s outlook—the key to understanding his early 
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philosophic speculations and his detailed analysis of the structure of capitalism. It 
provides the perspective for grasping Marx’s conception of man as ‘the ensemble of 
social relationships’ and his emphasis on production; it is the basis for comprehending 
what Marx meant by ‘revolutionary practice.’”260 Perhaps most famously the eleventh of 
the “Theses on Feuerbach” voiced Marx’s outstanding criticism: previous philosophies 
had “only interpreted the world, in various ways,” when in fact the real “point is to 
change it.”261 Criticism had to become active. The revolutionary imperative was for 
theory to become a material force. His own aptly called philosophy of action was radical 
because it got to the root of the problem, to man (“the root of man is man”) and to man’s 
defining essence, self-activity or praxis. Praxis as the “unifier of the dialectical terms” 
consciousness and nature was the heart of Marx’s dialectic. It was the essential mediator, 
the dynamic structure “underlying all history and knowledge.”262 Human activity was the 
creative act by which the subject creates itself (self-realization or self-realizing activity) 
through its dialectical relation/opposition to nature. Praxis is the term that describes the 
interdependent join and mutual articulation of subject and object, of consciousness and 
materiality. It is the double transformation through which both subject and object become 
identities, take on social form as bearers of human meanings. Through work, praxis, or 
“conscious life-activity,” as Marx argued in Capital, humans develop both the world and 
themselves: in this “process between man and nature . . . man, through his own actions, 
mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and nature. He 
confronts the materials of nature as a force of nature. . . . Through this movement he acts 
upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own 
nature. He develops the potentialities slumbering within nature, and subjects the play of 
its forces to his own sovereign power.”263 It is the image of the self-creator. 
The primary complication to this Marx laid out schematically: in order to realize 
oneself as a human subject one must of necessity objectify; however, objectification is 
bifurcated. The process of objectifying can go in two directions: towards (self-) 
realization (transformation) or (self-) alienation (deformation). It was in the Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 that Marx made the clearest distinction between 
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these two modes of objectification. Praxis, in its good or positive form, as self-realization 
or eupraxia, meant quite a bit more than what commonly is designated in the word 
“activity.”264 Far from mindless action or a mere doing, in the stronger sense of the word 
praxis means total interaction of theory/ideality/subject and practice/materiality/object. 
“[F]ree, conscious activity,” Marx asserted, was more than just a component of human 
life, it was the outstanding feature of humanity, it was “man’s species character.”265 “[I]t 
is only when the objective world becomes everywhere for man in society the world of 
man’s essential powers—human reality, and for that reason the reality of his own 
essential powers—that all objects become for him the objectification of himself, become 
objects which confirm and realize his individuality, become his object: that is, man 
himself becomes the object.”266 And here, slightly later, is Marx in Capital:  
Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by 
which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the 
metabolism between himself and nature. He confronts the materials of 
nature as a force of nature. He sets in motion the natural forces which 
belong to his own body, his arms, legs, head and hands, in order to 
appropriate the materials of nature in a form adapted to his own needs. 
Through this movement he acts upon external nature and changes it, and 
in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature.267  
 
Praxis, “man’s essential powers” or free, conscious life-activity was the dialectical 
generator by which an alien reality, an exterior nature was transformed into a humanized, 
hospitable environment. This was, as Marx asserted, the “real mode of affirmation” of 
the subject. Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, the Mexican Marxist theorist, concisely 
summarizes Marx’s discussion of praxis in the 1844 manuscripts as the double 
articulation by which the subject is objectified and the object subjectified: “Man becomes 
man only by objectifying himself, by creating objects through which he externalizes 
himself. We can thus say that man is subject and object at the same time, and that he 
becomes a human subject only to the extent that he objectifies himself. This 
objectification, far from depleting the subject, as Hegel believed, is precisely what 
humanizes man.”268  
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What Marx recognized as well, nevertheless, was that this creative, transformative 
mechanism, when flipped, became dyspraxia, an alienating mode of activity destroying, 
deforming, and dehumanizing the subject—a condition in the foreground of modern 
capitalist production. For Marx, needless to say, the distinction between good and bad 
praxis was a monumental one that meant the difference between freedom and the creative 
development of human possibility or its bleak opposite in unfreedom, barbarism, 
oppressive limitation, inhumanity. Marx’s discussion of estranged labor in the 1844 
manuscripts describes this form of alienating activity in mortifying terms:  
[T]he object which labour produces—labour’s product—confronts it as 
something alien, as a power independent of the producer. The product of 
labour is labour which has been congealed in an object, which has become 
material: it is the objectification of labour. Labour’s realization is its 
objectification. In the conditions dealt with by political economy this 
realization of labour appears as loss of reality for the workers; 
objectification as loss of the object and object-bondage; appropriation as 
estrangement, as alienation.269  
 
And later, in Capital, the image of the damaged worker is just as vivid. “Within the 
capitalist system, 
all methods for raising the social productivity of labour are put into effect 
at the cost of the individual worker; that all means for the development of 
production undergo a dialectical inversion so that they become means of 
domination and exploitation of the producers; they distort the worker into 
a fragment of a man, they degrade him to the level of an appendage of a 
machine, they destroy the actual content of his labour by turning it into a 
torment; they alienate from him the intellectual potentialities of the labour 
process . . . they deform the conditions under which he works, subject him 
during the labour process to a despotism the more hateful for its meanness; 
they transform his life-time into working-time.”270  
 
The question to ask is what was the crucial determinant between activity that is self-
realizing and self-affirming and that which is alienating and self-negating? How could 
one resolve the conflict between “objectification and self-confirmation”? 
“Free” and “conscious,” Marx’s own frequent descriptors, offer a place to begin. 
Praxis is activity that is both free and conscious. First, as free activity, it is not forced 
labor responding merely to the crudest manifestation of necessity. It is a production 
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beyond bare physical necessity, beyond the simple reproduction of daily existence; it is 
the excess of activity that Marx pointed to when he stated, “man produces even when he 
is free from physical need.” But Marx extended this reflection—the line continues—”and 
only truly produces in freedom therefrom,” thus defining unnecessary labor as not simply 
a curious and irrational “excess” but in fact the only true production. What might at first 
seem marginal is shown to be central, marking the point where genuine human possibility 
begins.271 Free activity is antithetical to forced production in which one follows orders, 
implements rules, does as one is told. Free activity is not controlled by theory (or any 
directives) given from above. 
The second qualifier, beyond free activity, is that this activity be conscious. The 
element of consciousness in praxis can be read in several related ways. In the first sense, 
consciousness is the product or is generated out of the connective activity between 
subject and object. Subjects possess consciousness only by having “consciousness of” 
something, or, having an object of consciousness. In the second sense, conscious activity 
is activity propelled by theory, ideas, mental images. This was how Marx distinguished 
human activity as different from animal activity. Marx’s discussion of the labor process 
in Capital explains what stamps labour as “exclusively human”: “A spider conducts 
operations which resemble those of a weaver, and a bee would put many a human 
architect to shame by the construction of its honeycomb cells. But what distinguishes the 
worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before 
he constructs it in wax. At the end of every labour process, a result emerges which had 
already been conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed ideally.”272 
In other words activity of a mindless, automatic, repetitive type, as endless process with 
no beginning, middle or end, without the imaginative moment of attempting to realize an 
idea substantively does not count as praxis. A totally immediate labor in which an 
activity is either forced or unthinking does not allow for the possibility of change, or 
realizing something new, of creative transformation, of exceeding the present limits of 
knowledge, consciousness or society. In sum, what distinguished Marx’s sense of good 
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praxis was that it was the unity between theory and practice, the free mutual realization of 
thinking and doing. 
What is of primary interest here is how the modern artist is cast as a model for 
praxis. For the answer to the problem of objectification-as-realization opposed to 
objectification-as-alienation is suggested in some of Marx’s comments on the figures of 
the artist and the artwork. That is, they can be said to serve as the complementary halves 
of a model act for unalienated labor. The modern artist’s work or “creation” is the very 
expression of the subject’s ability to transform objects from a mute, passive, alien other 
into something which appears to communicate to the subject, affirm the subject as its 
recognizable exteriorizations. The world is made habitable. The senses of fulfillment and 
happiness then result from this putting into effect one’s creative powers, this supreme 
experience of having something outside confirm oneself. Louis Dupré, one of Marx’s 
twentieth century commentators, has summarized it thus in his description of the 
“positive transcendence of private property”: “the object of man’s activity again becomes 
a human object. Man appropriates the world in a human way: his relation to it is no 
longer one of having but of being. His work is no longer a means to an end outside 
himself but an expression of his entire being, in which he objectifies himself without 
losing himself.”273 Posited at the center of Marx’s project, as the utopian dream image of 
dialectical praxis one finds the model of the artist’s creative act: self-realizing, self-
affirming, self-objectifying. 
This was not a point lost on Rosenberg. Quite the contrary, the artist as a model of 
praxis, as a plenipotentiary of what unalienated activity might be like, was precisely what 
Rosenberg took up in his figure of the artist, in his Action Painter. The Marxist grounding 
to Rosenberg’s definition of an artist came out particularly in those situations—of which 
there were quite a few—in which Rosenberg found himself needing to explain the 
paradoxical situation of the artist’s “alienation” in modern society. Yes, the modern artist 
is alienated, Rosenberg acknowledged, but the layperson mistook the cause of that 
alienation as stemming from some psychological malady accompanying “creative” 
types—the popularized archetype of the tormented creative soul—or as some quirk of 
104 
personality. “[T]he psychological dimension of alienation,” as Richard Bernstein has 
pointed out, used “to designate some sort of psychological condition in which the 
individual feels frustrated, unsatisfied, and fulfilled. . . . is not primary for Marx, it is 
secondary and derivative.”274 This was a point that Rosenberg followed. “The artist,” he 
explains, “is the only figure in this society who is able not to be alienated, because he 
works directly with the materials of his own experience and transforms them.” 
Accordingly, if one were to talk about the modern artist’s alienation, it would have little 
to do with exotic, bohemian personalities, alternative life-styles, or theatrical acting out 
against bourgeois cultural norms. Rather this alienated state originates from the artist’s 
insistence upon the performance of a kind of work in which he is not actively alienating 
himself. “Art alone,” Rosenberg asserted, “has been in the realm of the free act.” Or, 
more cautiously, art “contains the outline of a free act” because “the composition of a 
work of art . . . contain[s] a point of beginning and an interval of choice.”275 In 1968, 
when returning late in his career to the concept of “action in painting,” Rosenberg wrote: 
“The outlines of art as action began to emerge in the nineteenth century. Marx speaks of 
the liberation of work, and defines free work as work for the sake of the worker, as 
distinguished from work for the sake of the product. In this idea, which puts creation 
above the object, whether artifact or commodity, Marx anticipates the thought of . . . the 
Action Painter.”276 Just a year later in 1969 during the question-and-answer period of a 
seminar of the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago, Rosenberg 
continued along these same lines with observations on the artist as a figure with the 
“possibility of being a whole man” and thus as a model for a full and emancipated 
humanity: “This is the idea that Marx had too, that the model of the whole man was the 
artist, and therefore we could always see him as a kind of ideal.”277 Again, because the 
artist’s mode of working was self-affirming, Rosenberg explained, “Marx therefore 
conceives the artist as the model of the man of the future,” or, one might deign to 
translate, one of the “new men” of communism.278 Thus, like Marx, Rosenberg argued 
that artistic production was the place to look for models of free, unalienated production. 
With the artist, “work has passed over into its most intense form—into creation.”279 Nor 
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was this a point to take lightly. Again, this “excess,” that which is displaced to the 
margins, or taken as the frosting on the cake of human society, so to speak, ends up 
locating the vital essence of humanity. For as Marx did in the nineteenth century, so in 
the twentieth century did Rosenberg see the explanation to “our present crisis” centered 
on the denial or affirmation of human self-definition through praxis. This is a point 
Rosenberg bore down on in a 1964 lecture: “the practice of the crafts is the activity by 
which the human creature is defined. Man is a maker, homo faber, an artist. Put this 
proposition in reverse—when man ceases to be a maker he is no longer man—and our 
present crisis is explained.”280   
  To extend the point, Rosenberg did not simply acknowledge his awareness of this 
aesthetic interpretative possibility in Marx but actively engaged it by seeking to maintain 
and elaborate that dialectical image in his own concept of Action Painting: it formed the 
core notion of his critical aesthetic. As in Marx’s good form of labor, “conscious life-
activity” or praxis, the act in Rosenberg’s Action Painting participates in the dialectical 
motions of locating a self—self-identity—at the intersecting relay of the poles of subject-





Action Painting as Event 
“You cannot hang an event on the wall, only a picture.”281 So went Mary McCarthy’s 
wry pronouncement in her book review of The Tradition of the New. Rosenberg, 
nonetheless, took McCarthy’s “admonishment” with apparent good humor. If the line had 
been intended as a point of criticism, Rosenberg still considered the review overall a 
“generous” one (certainly by no means had she been alone in posing such a criticism—
”One or two other friendly critics sounded related objections,” Rosenberg admitted).282 
Even so, what should be taken note of is perhaps not only the genial manner in which 
Rosenberg responded to his critics but the prominence with which he displayed this 
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particular opinion. For, in fact, Rosenberg appropriated McCarthy’s lines to serve as the 
lead into his preface for the 1960 Da Capo edition of The Tradition of the New. I think 
the flagrant display of McCarthy’s quip has much to do with setting out certain 
methodological ground-rules. When turned into the question, “the thing on the wall—is it 
a picture or an event?”—the criticism operates like the Sphinx’s riddle, making fatally 
clear who is in and who is out. One’s answer to the question determined one’s affiliation 
with either the dialectical—with reality as “event,” as the interactive relation and mutual 
identity of process and thing—or the commonplace—reality made up of separate 
processes and things, fitted out to the ontologically autonomous categories of verbs and 
nouns. By McCarthy’s admonishment one already knows her fate. She is incapable of 
passing through for hers is the commonsense reaction par excellence: a picture is a thing, 
it hangs on walls. 
The identity of a thing could never be this clear-cut in Rosenberg’s dialectical 
conception of painting as an event. Indeed, what stands out, over the years, in 
Rosenberg’s descriptions of Action Painting is the constant drive to emphasize the 
dialectical quality of his aesthetic. “What matters always is the revelation contained in the 
act. It is to be taken for granted that in the final effect, the image, whatever be or be not in 
it, will be a tension.”283 The tension was the tension of dialectic, and the revelation 
contained in the act was that dialectically forged identity, a moment of the “trans-
formal.”  
This identity was dialectically forged between ideas and materials. For instance, 
listen to Rosenberg in 1967 insisting on this vital relationship between ideas and their 
working out. While “[t]he idea has no existence apart from the mode of working,” 
equally, “the mode of working without the idea is a mere cliché or routine.”284 Again in 
1969, Rosenberg explained, “In art, ideas are materialized, and materials are manipulated 
as if they were meanings. This is the intellectual advantage of art as against disembodied 
modes of thought, such as metaphysics.”285 Four years later in a 1973 interview with Lee 
Hall, Rosenberg put it this way: “Intellectually, art is a very strange thing, and today all 
art is intellectual. . . . It is a situation in which the activity of the hand is part of the 
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thinking, and you cannot think a particular idea without doing it. Nor can you do it in 
more than a mediocre manner without having an idea that transcends the mere activity. 
This dialectic is very difficult for artists to grasp.”286 And then finally two years later in 
an interview with James and Caryn Walker, Rosenberg formalized his basic ideas again, 
“There’s a reciprocal, or dialectical activity that takes place in regard to all valid 
responses to painting,” he wrote. “That’s the trouble with pure conceptualism—that there 
is no backward play from the object to the ideas, and ideas very often need a manual 
confirmation, because when we use a medium, we add to our thinking.”287 In another 
interview of the same year, in which he was asked what the basic issues in art are, 
Rosenberg answers, “The basic issue in art in the 20th century continues to be the relation 
between doing and thinking, between the ideas in art and the practice of art, or the 
making of objects. All developments in art since the war have revolved around this issue. 
A desirable balance has been reached by certain artists between thinking and doing, or 
thinking and action, as I have called it. . . .The tendency, however, is for this balance to 
be lost. Artists begin to overemphasize the conceptual aspect of art.”288  
Painting for Rosenberg worked in an immanently dialectical fashion and it was a 
form of concrete thinking. The centrality of a dialectic between mind and matter is one 
that O’Brien further emphasizes. “[T]he creative dialectics between making and 
thinking” she calls the “sine qua non of Rosenberg’s art theory.”289 “Only the dialectical 
tension between ideas and materials—the creative process itself—could mature the mind 
as it simultaneously discovers and creates itself.” Further, as O’Brien writes, “thinking 
must be realized in a concrete art making process. . . . The dialectical necessity of the 
material object is at the crux of Rosenberg’s art criticism, and the basis of his idea of 
Action painting.”290  
Rosenberg also indicated how thoroughly this balance between thinking and 
doing was interwoven in the dialectic of artist and artwork. “By fixing his idea in matter,” 
the artist, Rosenberg argued, “exposes either the crudeness of his thought or the 
clumsiness of his art; thus he is led to experiment and refinement. In time, he becomes so 
adept in materializing his hypotheses, and in manipulating his materials as if they were 
108 
meanings, that the problem itself is transformed. He has translated it into a unique set of 
terms; besides, he, the investigator, has through his efforts remade himself into a different 
man.”291 Here emerges a second major aspect of this dialectical approach, which further 
underlines how explicitly, and one might add simply, Rosenberg’s concept of Action 
Painting falls in line with Marx’s notion of praxis, as the defining characteristic, the 
essential component, of one’s species being. The revelation contained in the act, or the 
tension or dynamic interaction occurring between subject and object, had the “aims of 
penetrating reality or changing the artist’s self.” By Rosenberg’s definition, Action 
Painting, that is, “serious” and “good” painting, must be dialectical, and thus it “leaves no 
doubt concerning its reality as an action and its relation to a transforming process in the 
artist. The canvas has ‘talked back’ to the artist . . . to provoke him into a dramatic 
dialogue. Each stroke had to be a decision and was answered by a new question.”292 The 
point is one he repeated often. “Whoever undertakes to create soon finds himself engaged 
in creating himself.”293 “[I]n the course of engagement a mind is created. Apart from that, 
every kind of excellence can be copied.”294 “A painting that is an act is inseparable from 
the biography of the artist. The painting itself is a ‘moment’ in the adulterated mixture of 
his life—whether ‘moment’ means the actual minutes taken up with spotting the canvas 
or the entire duration of a lucid drama conducted in sign language. The act-painting is of 
the same metaphysical substance as the artist’s existence. The new painting has broken 
down every distinction between art and life.”295 The canvas was “an arena in which to 
act,” a sort of stage set for the dialectical intercourse between artist-subject and materials-
object, process and thing. This is the concrete thought, the noun-verb. 
Discussing Rosenberg’s assimilation of Marx’s philosophy of action and of 
Marxist praxis through the concept of Action Painting, and suggesting that Rosenberg 
transposed Marx’s revolutionary subject-object of history to the Action Painter, is to open 
Rosenberg’s project up to the attendant criticisms made of any perceived aestheticizing of 
radicalism. One is back at the contentious issue of a cultural turn taken in Marxist 
theorization (usually said to have been undertaken by “Western” and non-Soviet 
Marxists) and the suspicions over the intent and commitment of cultural critics who, 
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while professing sympathy with Marxism, apparently remained whether from armchair, 
university, museum or art gallery, loftily superstructural in their concerns. In Rosenberg’s 
case the added insult is that the type of artwork he appeared to champion (modernist) 
seemed the farthest cry from anything with recognizable significance to the worker’s 
movement.  
The objections might be phrased like this: Action Painting might well be named a 
site of good dialectical interaction (the authenticity of the Action Painter in his studio 
working out his free expression) but this stands in contrast to the other dialectical sense 
of part and whole relations. The “event” has to be fed back into the overall drama. The 
sense of dialectic as process has to be coordinated with the structural sense of dialectic. 
Or, it might be put like this: can art possess any critical, emancipatory potential when it is 
a luxury form whose very conditions of possibility are established by the productive 
excess generated out of capitalist modes of exploitation? How can one talk of art as a 
free, self-realizing and genuinely self-expressive form of work when it exists by the 
graces of a system of unfree labor? How can a cultural expression tied both historically 
and materially to the elite classes of social hierarchy ever be said to speak for or express 
the revolutionary desires of the underclasses? With the division of labor, the severing of 
mind and hand, of mental and manual labor, and especially with the intensification of this 
in the modern bourgeois period through rabid professionalization of all activity, Marx 
argued that “From this moment onwards consciousness can really flatter itself that it is 
something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents 
something without representing something real; from now on consciousness is in a 
position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of ‘pure’ 
theory.”296 With mind/theory so etherealized, on what grounds can one posit art as 
possessing the possibility, the likelihood, even the desire, of this radical re-membering of 
mind and hand, theory and practice? Provided one were even aware of the contradiction 
posed by labor, would not one still be more likely to take an easier path, to be lulled by 
the comforts of this reified form of practice (the safety of one’s tidily circumscribed 
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“projects” and “investigations”) rather than taking up arms and actively negating one’s 
own historical and material basis? 
One way of addressing this brutal contradiction has been to posit art as inhabiting 
a special situation. Such thinkers as Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and Ernest Bloch, and I 
would add Rosenberg here, speak of the truth and untruth of art’s situation in capitalist 
society. “Artworks detach themselves from the empirical world and bring forth another 
world, one opposed to the empirical world,” Adorno writes in Aesthetic Theory; but at the 
same time art “is the social [emphasis added] antithesis of society,” meaning it is 
indelibly constituted by that to which it opposes itself. “It exists only in relation to its 
other.”297 On the one hand, artworks are a moment of truth, they speak to the 
emancipatory, to the liberation of the human subject, but they themselves are not it. As 
Rosenberg described the “International” of the Paris Modern: “It was an inverted mental 
image, this Modern, with all the transitoriness and freedom from necessity of imagined 
things. A dream living-in-the-present and a dream world citizenship—resting not upon a 
real triumph, but upon a willingness to go as far as was necessary into nothingness in 
order to shake off what was dead in the real. A negation of the negative.”298 The moment 
of truth in artworks is a reminder, a sidelong glimpse of the basis in human activity or 
praxis understood as dialectical engagement of mind and matter. As such it outlines 
Marx’s utopian dream-image of human creativity self-consciously transcending the 
limitations of its old forms, extending its possibility, realizing new human content.  
The untruth of things like artworks, on the other hand, lies in the fact that it is 
built from the possibilities and sufferings developed and produced out of the sundering 
apart of praxical creativity—of theory and practice, of mind and matter, of intellectual 
and physical labor, out of the excess afforded by alienated production. “With the 
increasingly sharp division of labor,” as Sánchez Vázquez summarizes, “the mind and the 
hand draw further apart, as do the project and the execution, the goal and its realization. 
In this way, labor loses its creative character while art becomes a distinct, substantive 
activity, an impregnable stronghold of the creative capacity for man, and forgets its 
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remote and humble origins. What is forgotten is that work, the conscious activity through 
which man transforms and humanizes matter, has made artistic creation possible.”299   
Far from being blind to or dismissive of the issues and contradictions involved in 
the positing of art as self-realizing praxis existing within its opposed member and 
supported by a larger productive realm of alienated labor, Rosenberg counted authentic 
art as that which self-consciously bore witness to its contradictions. Indeed, one might 
even argue that the very formulation of an “action” (or indeed “praxis”) painting at this 
moment was the most obvious sign of this bearing witness, not forgetting the ghastly 
price at which its “free” self-realizing acts had come, that its sense of good praxical unity 
was secured through the very division of theory and practice in social reality. In a 1973 
interview Rosenberg made clear that the realm of artistic production was not some 
pristinely untouched realm separate from the realities of capitalist commerce. The artist’s 
“role is to be unhappy. He is obliged to think how awful it is that the moment the work 
leaves the studio it is falsified by the milieu in which it finds itself. . . . The situation of 
the art work vis-à-vis the artist and his public is one that goes to the root of modern 
culture and that is not going to be improved until a new set of relationships are 
established throughout the whole of society.”300 Rosenberg designated “anxiety” and the 
“anxious object” as the terms indicating the artist’s and the artwork’s full registration of 
its real predicament. “The anxiety of art is a philosophical quality perceived by artists to 
be inherent in acts of creation in our time. It manifests itself, first of all, in the 
questioning of art itself,” Rosenberg wrote in the foreword (titled “Toward an Unanxious 
Profession”) to his 1966 collection of essays in a volume aptly titled The Anxious Object. 
“Anxiety is thus the form in which modern art raises itself to the level of human 
history.”301 Authentic art for Rosenberg was not some craftsman’s contentment of 
playing around with art materials—of a kind that exhausts or extinguishes its 
consciousness through its mere activity and mere materiality—but was art that bore 
witness to its moments of truth and untruth as they unfolded within the social totality.  
The anxiety of art is a peculiar kind of insight. It arises, not as a reflex to 
the condition of artists, but from their reflection upon the role of art 
among other human activities [emphasis added]. Where this anxiety is 
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absent, nothing that befalls the artist as a person, not even the threat of 
physical extinction, will bring it into being. There is a craftsman’s 
pleasure in doing, and delight in the work of one’s hands, that some 
people find entirely adequate to satisfy their minds. The world may fall 
apart, it will interest them less than the discovery of a new brand of 
crayon.302  
 
This delight in new brands of crayons or art supply what-not may appear insignificant, or 
at least harmless, but for the particular example Rosenberg draws up to illustrate the 
“craftsman’s pleasure.” The example is Josef Albers. Towards the beginning part of the 
essay from which these passages come, Rosenberg had, half-humorously, quoted a 
message the artist had sent to him. The message read, “Angst is dead.”303 One gets the 
joke, which Albers, “the master of painting conceived as calculated sheets of color,” has 
written well into the sixties to Rosenberg, the popularly identified critic and defender of 
all those angtsy Abstract Expressionists. The tone becomes sharper as Rosenberg begins 
to delineate the real implications of Albers’ “faith in the self-sufficiency of art that 
excludes from painting everything but the statement and solution of its own technical 
problems.” “In a recent interview in ARTnews,” Rosenberg recounts, “Albers was asked 
about his frame of mind during the rise of the Nazis—did he, for example, feel impelled 
to join in the demonstrations of his fellow artists in Germany? “Nein,” exclaimed Albers. 
“I was determined not to follow anything. For me it was glass [the material he was then 
working with]. I was completely one-sided. I never went when the Constructivists and 
Surrealists assembled. It was for me just glass.”304 It seems likely that this anecdote 
served for Rosenberg as a painful sign of how fully art could forget its exalted status as a 
mode of genuine praxis, how easily this privilege degenerated into the thoughtless, 
asocial and ahistorical. Such fetishization of craft-like, non-industrial activity, as 
somehow inherently more wholesome, was very far from what Rosenberg had in mind in 
discussing a nonalienated form of work. There needed to be a distinction between the 
craftsman’s “pleasure in doing,” the “delight in work of one’s hands,” and the Action 
Painter’s going up to the easel “with material in his hand to do something to that other 
piece of material in front of him.”305 
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One way of addressing this, if from an oblique angle, is by returning once again to 
Rosenberg in the 1930s and thinking about the sort of context in which his radicalism 
developed. What stands out is the coordination of these two elements: (1) the particular 
milieu in which Rosenberg interacted at this moment—radicalized intellectuals, 
unionized artists; (2) the kinds of activities he was engaged in—critical-creative work as 
well as wage labor. Out of this coordination one could put forth the probability that this 
condition provided a special vantage onto the social revolutionary problematic described 
by the relations of labor and art and politics and revolutionary possibility. It is this 
vantage onto those relations that is sustained in Action Painting, and sustained precisely 
as a re-membering of creative artistic work and alienated production, a re-membering of 
the artist and laborer.  
What this moment offered Rosenberg was the opportunity to engage in what 
might be called art-labor politics: it was a particular historical formation in which there 
was a marked closeness between what, at least in the modern period, are the traditionally 
segregated realms of art and labor, and this was something broadly recognized by the 
government, by artists and writers, by social critics at large and party politicians as well. 
This period in the thirties was characterized by a deeply and widely felt awareness of a 
crisis in capitalism, a crisis vividly marked by all the ways in which labor seemed to 
become more and more, and alarmingly, visible—through the sheer mass of the 
unemployed, the increasingly aggressive movements to organize labor as a unified body, 
the growing consciousness of capitalist naturalizations of labor and worker exploitation. 
Further, a commonality between the laborer and the artist was glimpsed: the artist and the 
laborer became, to an extent, transparent onto each other and in this sense there was not 
the need to theorize “Action” Painting per se. This can be heard, for instance, in the 
pages of Art Digest, in 1936, when the painter and illustrator Rockwell Kent aligned the 
artist with the worker in the language of revolutionary incendiarism: “Since the artists as 
a class are propertyless, their basic interests are very closely allied with the workers in 
general.”306 And in the pages of Art in America several decades later in the 1970s Abe 
Ajay reminisced about the W.P.A./F.A.P. days as ones in which the experience of 
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economic leveling was accompanied by an unprecedented camaraderie. Although Ajay 
warns, “Nostalgia is a specious editor,” he recalls the period as one in which “artists of 
such mixed persuasion were . . . gentle and generous with each other on so many levels.” 
This quality of unity, Ajay continues, was in part the result of “everyone receiv[ing] the 
same paycheck twice each month.”307  
This was Rosenberg’s milieu as well. In the mid-thirties Rosenberg joined the 
Mural Division of the Federal Art Project of the Works Progress Administration. During 
this time he worked, along with Lee Krasner, as a studio assistant to the openly 
Communist artist and political organizer-activist Max Spivak. The charged political 
environment of Spivak’s studio has been duly recounted by Krasner as one in which 
Rosenberg would frequently read aloud political tracts or argue the differences between 
Stalin and Trotsky with her and Spivak. According to some accounts it was during this 
time shared with Rosenberg in Spivak’s studio that Krasner became radicalized, coming 
to embrace Trotsky’s views on art and politics and eventually taking up an active 
leadership role in the Artists’ Union.308 This tableau is an historically fascinating one in 
which a number of interesting components come together in the “artist’s” 
studio/workshop: a Communist activist, a Marxist socialist theorist and critic, a modernist 
painter, and all at a moment when many thought the capitalist system was on the verge of 
irremediable failure. Art and politics were converging, and the language of that 
convergence appeared to be labor, both organized labor and artistic labors.  
While working on the Project Rosenberg became active in the Artists’ Union, a 
unionizing effort begun in 1933 as the Unemployed Artists Group meant to organize 
artists on the model of the modern laborer and known for its aggressive direct action 
tactics in the fight for government recognition of artistic labor.309 Indeed the Artists’ 
Union itself had been very active in the fight to establish the Works Progress 
Administration in the first place. That the Artists’ Union and its organ, Art Front, which 
ran for three years (1934-37), was by most accounts closely influenced, possibly even 
controlled, by the Communist Party, and yet this unionizing effort worked directly with 
the U.S. government to provide “stopgap” relief measures for “starving” artists, the kind 
115 
of historical anomaly that can only be written off as one of those bizarre congruencies 
produced by the Popular Front.310 However, Rosenberg was very much at the forefront of 
this strange mixture. In December 1935, not long after the establishment of Art Front, 
Rosenberg joined the communist-dominated editorial board.311  
There have been a number discussions about the nature and importance of this 
publication. Gerald Monroe, a scholar specializing in the relationship in the 1930s 
between Left politics and the arts, has called Art Front “probably the liveliest art 
periodical of the time.”312 This is an opinion that has been fervently seconded by Patricia 
Hills. Listing off the frequent contributors and staff writers and editors, including Meyer 
Schapiro, Charmion von Wiegand, Clarence Weinstock, Louis Lozowick and Rosenberg, 
Hills proclaims, “Art Front the most intellectually stimulating magazine of art and 
politics in the mid-1930s.”313 Orton, too, has emphasized the singularity of this 
publication: “Art Front was the New York communist and left art community’s public 
conversation about art and politics. Moreover, it was at that time the only periodical in 
the United States which was primarily concerned with art and politics.”314  
The above biographical summary presents Rosenberg with solid thirties 
credentials. As a way of weaving together the concerns described above I want to draw 
attention to a short piece of writing Rosenberg did during his spell in Washington, D.C. 
while working for the Works Progress Projects Administration. In 1941 Rosenberg 
served as editor for the small volume Men at Work: Stories of People at Their Jobs in 
America produced by the Works Projects Administration as part of its American Life 
series.315 This series and many other projects instigated by the Works Projects 
Administration (especially through the Federal Writers’ Project) aimed at documentary 
production, resulting in hundreds of books and pamphlets recording aspects of American 
life, a great historical archive and cultural inventory of America’s past and present. 
Fitting into this larger mandate, the theme of Rosenberg’s particular volume—almost 
certainly inspired by the over-a-decade-long crisis in American labor and economics—is 
the variety of types of labor performed by the American worker, spanning a range from 
traditional domestic handicrafts to the modern industrial assembly-line. Rosenberg 
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organized this volume in a format according to which a different type of labor was taken 
as the subject for both a writer of the Writers’s Program and a photographer from the Art 
Program. Rosenberg also authored the volume’s preface, simply and appropriately titled 
“Men at Work.”316 Though short and virtually unknown, this statement of Rosenberg’s 
provides a provocative indication of how the critic was formulating the relation of art and 
labor and Marxist praxis.  
This piece begins and ends on dramatically different notes. No doubt in a manner 
and tone befitting the interests of the government agency from which the author drew his 
paycheck, Rosenberg opens the essay on a positive and fairly innocuous note by first 
drawing attention to the side-by-side appearance of very old methods of labor and very 
new, “completely revolutionized” labor in the United States. “[B]y the side of the most 
advanced techniques of the twentieth century, men still work in ways that have descended 
from the beginnings of human history.” This is, Rosenberg affirms, “[o]ne great source of 
America’s social and cultural variety,” to which the newer professions, in management, 
advertising and in radio and the movies, have contributed significantly. In contrast to this 
fairly idyllic picture of the multitude of types of human labor, both the age-old and the 
new-fangled, creating positive possibilities for individual fulfillment and promisingly 
expansive “creative life,” Rosenberg turns quickly and harshly to the much more 
prevalent regressive quality in the mass of industrial forms of labor which he calls a 
“historic trend towards simplification and automatism,” where “some small portion of the 
human organism moves in tight fidelity to the pace and turnings of a machine, whose 
process it helps to complete,” and “away from the skillful self-sufficiency of the shepherd 
or artisan.”317 To make his point Rosenberg thumbs through the U.S. Department of 
Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles from 1939. He quotes at length the entry given 
for “Key-Crimping-Machine Operator.” “Attaches can-opening keys to metal containers 
of preserved foods by means of an automatic or pedal operated key-crimping machine: 
feeds cans one at a time into machine; presses pedal to actuate crimping mechanism; 
removes cans with keys attached; loads key magazine at regular intervals.”318 Indeed, at 
this point it becomes apparent that Rosenberg conceives of his project as the direct 
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antithesis to the Labor Department’s rationalizing and lifeless Dictionary. The writing 
selections in Rosenberg’s volume describe forms of labor and laborers with specificity, 
with eyes open to the “worker’s delight in touching things and changing them handily,” 
as well as to the “special kind of suffering and crippling that comes from toil that is 
tiresome and infinitely repetitious, and in which the instinct to workmanship is reduced to 
beggary.”  
With a touch of cruelty for its pointed contrast, Rosenberg inserts a description of 
ideal praxis: “A man’s work, say the philosophers, is the means by which he stamps his 
image on nature, and also gives form to his own character.” But of course the image still 
lingering is that of the key-crimping-machine operator who far from stamping his image 
on nature suffers rather the reverse, the machine’s image and process and necessity 
stamped on him. Rosenberg here tells us to take heed, because the “manner of his [the 
worker’s] daily doing is an influence interacting deeply with the future of society and 
with political ideas and social theories.”319 After a brief pause, Rosenberg then comes 
back to the poverty of the representation of labor itself. The stuff of the Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles, “statistical tables, vocational surveys,” all take part in a kind of 
blindness to labor, functioning as part of an inability to actually see it. These rationalized 
forms for representing labor, “cannot convey the immediate living quality, the human 
‘tone,’ of the individual at work.”  
It is the realm of art that Rosenberg next proposes as the “representer” of labor. 
“This [labor] can find full expression only in the arts, which concern themselves with 
such values as the skill used in the task, its tensions, color, and formal and dramatic 
appeal. . . .” However, although the arts are equipped with the right material sensibility to 
capture a true representation of labor, up till now, Rosenberg reflects, they have left this 
subject sadly neglected. “Literature and painting, however, are not rich in descriptions of 
modern work. Passages crop up in a few great novels and poems, but these usually 
introduce the labor process as an incident in some moral or social argument, or as a detail 
in the landscape, rarely for itself, as human action worth looking at. . . .”320 Rosenberg is 
getting closer to the heart of it, but he first criticizes the “work tradition” found in 
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American literature, or that which would appear to come closest to answering his call for 
an authentic representation of modern labor.  
Even writers who deal with contemporary social problems often ignore the 
basic relation a man’s work bears to his being as a whole. Concentrating 
on the conditions surrounding his labor and his emotional life, they 
commonly neglect his acts in making things. “Social” novels of the past 
few years have shown the worker’s home life, his food, his clothing, his 
struggle to meet his needs, his organizations, and his friends, but rarely the 
productive and hence powerful and dynamic core of his existence.321 
 
But Rosenberg is not blaming literature for its apparent blindness or neglect. Modern 
labor, as Rosenberg surmises, is almost invisible.  
One reason, of course, that actual work has frequently played so small a 
part in those writings most zealously dedicated to the modern workingman 
is that the operations performed in the factory appear to be so minute and 
trivial as to offer very little to the writer. The labor activity can be 
described in a few sentences, and the same task is performed day after day 
until broken up by unemployment. To the extent that the action has lost its 
personality, it cease to have meaning for the onlooker. The writer turns 
aside from the monotony of his subject’s labor, thus rendering a negative 
verdict on his creative life.322 
 
But the difficulty of this representation goes beyond the fact that modern labor is almost 
invisible because monotonous, and beyond the problem that a language and technique has 
not yet been found for “dealing with the new men and women who each day stand 
emptily alert for hours within a rigid construction through which incomplete and 
changing objects keep streaming.” The further problem is that writers and artists—
makers of representations—are themselves often unfamiliar with physical labor. Authors, 
“[i]n the main,” Rosenberg writes, “have belonged to aristocratic or commercial milieus.” 
Even the realist Zola is criticized for “superficial” reporting. He only “paid flying visits 
to the scene for the purpose of gathering material, but did not stay long enough to learn 
labor from the inside.” 
Ostensibly, the volume that Rosenberg is introducing and which he has organized 
and edited will try to redress this problem of seeing modern “Men at Work.” The writers 
and artists working on this project presumably did more than the flying visit—they 
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attempted to learn labor from the inside. However, despite this care, this conscious goal 
of rendering authentic images of modern labor, and despite the opportunity this project 
afforded for bringing creative laborers side by side with industrial and craft laborers, 
Rosenberg ends by summarizing the experience and volume as a “negative judgment on 
labor.” Despite the title and aim of the project, “men at work” was precisely what eluded 
representation. His concluding line reads: “In the pictures of large industrial plants there 
were rarely to be seen any men working, and when human figures did appear, they were 
too small to be reproduced.”323 
I have analyzed this short essay at length because it offers a highly important clue 
to how Rosenberg begins thinking through the problematic of art and labor. It is 
especially significant in framing this problematic through the issue of labor’s 
representability. The problems of representing labor—taken in a variety of senses, 
whether in union representation of labor, the Communist Party’s claim to represent it, the 
commodity as a (failed) representation of it, and also the debates surrounding socialist 
realism in the visual and literary arts as representations of labor—was a salient theme at 
the time. As part of this project Rosenberg had engaged in his own quest to represent 
labor, but what he located instead was a lack, an impoverishment—to repeat, a negative 
judgment on labor. Significantly, this impoverishment is registered in the two aspects of a 
dialectic. The sense of dialectic as process is given its negative judgment when 
Rosenberg quotes from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. This is a description of 
completely rationalized labor, of formulaic process, of commodity production and 
alienating activity. This certainly could not be taken as a vision of labor from the inside. 
But the structural sense of dialectic is equally thwarted as well. He had wanted a picture 
of men at work, men working, but he came away empty-handed. It had been impossible 
to see men working in the “large industrial plants,” to get an adequate picture of the part 
working within the whole.  
There is a sense, however, in which Rosenberg had set himself an awesome, even 
philosophically impossible, task. How does one picture (and thus capture) the relation 
between process and thing? How could any representation succeed in capturing this 
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dialectical relation without also, as an act of representation, violently splitting and re-
abstracting it back into rational process and separate thing? But had not Marx, in a sense, 
called for this very procedure, required this impossible task? For was not the unveiling of 
labor, grasping its condition, seeing labor from the inside also fundamental to the critical 
consciousness that is able to break out of reification, penetrate through mystifications, the 
primary one being the commodity form—that “very strange thing”—that is the 
embodiment of a labor that perpetually and tragically misrecognizes itself?324 
The theorization of Action Painting can be taken as Rosenberg’s answer to the 
problem posed by “Men at Work.” Action Painting located a way of representing the 
dialectical complexity of process and thing—a picture of the dialectic—and in such a 
way that the differing outcomes of activity, the unified process-thing or the disarticulated 
process versus thing, or art and labor, are shown as implicated in each other’s 
representations. A clear indication of this is found in a statement Rosenberg wrote in 
1957: 
If the ultimate subject matter of all art is the artist’s state or tension . . . 
that state may be represented either through the image of a thing or 
through an abstract sign. The innovation of Action Painting was to 
dispense with the representation of the state in favour of enacting it in 
physical movement. The action on the canvas became its own 
representation. This was possible because an action, being made of both 
the psychic and the material, is by its nature a sign—it is the trace of a 
movement whose beginning and character it does not in itself ever 
altogether reveal . . . yet the action also exists as a ‘thing’ in that it touches 
other things and affects them.325  
 
This would be the concrete thought, the event, the vantage point that would be able to see 






Dialectics at a Standstill: The Identity of Personality and Personification 
Action Painting was the last “moment” in art on the plane of 
dramatic and intellectual seriousness. 
Harold Rosenberg326 
 
One learns a good deal about the nature of Rosenberg’s commitments, the structure of his 
sustained and sustaining problematic, from finding woven throughout his late projects the 
return to the revolutionary dilemma—how to bring together consciousness and 
materiality, how to make the leap into emancipatory identity. In 1970, for instance, 
Rosenberg was invited by Paul de Man and Clifford Geertz on the behalf of Daedalus, 
the journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, to attend a conference and 
planning session for a future issue on the “Structures of Meaning” that would address 
“the systematic study of meaningful forms” in the humanities and social sciences.327 
Although Rosenberg ultimately was unable to attend the three day conference in Paris he 
had prepared for the event and written a “Preliminary Memo,” a short document 
sketching out his intended contribution to the discussion. The key terms in Rosenberg’s 
text are, once again, duality, hybridism, the transformal, and the material and imaginative 
modes. And, once again, the setting for these terms is Marx. Rosenberg points to Marx’s 
discussion of class as a “complex example of this duality,” where a class is both a “socio-
economic abstraction representing persons who perform specific functions within a given 
system of production” but also “something else,” a “collective actor in the drama of 
history,” “a living agent that changes [emphasis added].” The “something else” has to do 
with the imaginative moment of this dualism—it is the great leap, that spark of 
imaginative “self-delusion” that allows the historical actor to think beyond the flat-footed 
materialism of objective existence, of the given situation. While Marx had roughly 
described the ingredients needed for concocting this new reality, Rosenberg reflected, the 
great aporia in contemporary Marxism was the result of Marx’s failure to explain how to 
combine them. “Marx failed to develop a theory of the class as collective actor,” 
Rosenberg writes in the “Preliminary Memo,” 
Volume III of Capital breaks off at the point where he was about to begin 
this analysis. The problem of the transformation of a class from a socio-
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economic abstraction into a fighting collectivity—a “mass-I,” as Rosa 
Luxemburg called it—is the problem of revolutionary class-consciousness, 
which has divided Marxists for the past hundred years. From Marx’s own 
belief in the spontaneous generation of class consciousness through the 
pressure of material conditions, through Sorel’s theory of the proletarian 
myth, the revisionist notion of Socialist education, to Lenin’s conviction 
of the inherent limitations of proletarian revolutionary consciousness, and 
therefore of the need to superimpose upon the class the party of 
“professional revolutionists,” the origins of class self-identification have 
remained indistinct. This is another way of saying that the gap between the 
findings of Marx’s sociology and the vision of Marx’s drama of history 
has not been bridged.328 
 
And in this one hears the echoes of all the old questions: what is to be done? where to 
begin? how does one stop repeating oneself? How does one start enacting the 
revolutionary movement towards the richness of self-identity without always performing 
a circular motion of repetition, of coming back to the self-same, the status quo, the 
unnerving stasis of formal identity, of A = A, but instead progressing towards genuinely 
new identity, to what Marx famously described as “the absolute elaboration of his 
[man’s] creative dispositions . . . unmeasured by any previously established yardstick. . . . 
Where he does not seek to remain something formed by the past, but is in the absolute 
movement of becoming?”329 How does one trans-form? 
The cast of the question was a shade different in Rosenberg’s thinking about 
revolutionary dialectic later in his career, not so much how does one transform but what 
is it that persistently keeps this from happening in the revolutionary socialist sense? Why 
does the revolutionary dialectic fail? The problem, as Rosenberg would develop in the 
1970s, stemmed from Marx’s picturing the proletariat as a blank, a void, a mere 
personification of abstract forces, and thus occupying a place of special possibilities, in a 
position to recognize itself for what it was—nothing. In the Marxist narrative the result of 
this encounter, the shock of recognition, was the “lightning of thought” which would 
power the proletariat to action. For, as Marx had vividly described a number of times, the 
nineteenth century industrial proletariat was the negative of humanity.330 “His time is a 
wage-rate, his product not a self but an interchangeable commodity.” “Since his work 
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assumes the form of capital which is taken away from him, he is constantly drained of his 
‘life content’; his acts produce no accretion of individuality, not even an illusory one.” 
“In the proletariat capitalism has created the very personification of self-loss. . . .”331 The 
key to revolutionary consciousness and agency as Rosenberg read in Marx is precisely 
this lack of content. “Only the proletariat of the present day, who are completely shut off 
from all self-activity,” Marx wrote of how the dramatic and unexpected reversal appears, 
“are in position to achieve a complete and no longer restricted self-activity.”332 For unlike 
the members of the bourgeois class, the proletariat does not have a “socially constructed 
self” that might obstruct or soften its direct confrontation with the reality of its lack, the 
true poverty of its existence. For Rosenberg this meant a profound ability to feel one’s 
own alienation, to be present to it, to witness it, to suffer the recognition of one’s 
“vacuity,” to feel “revulsion against the void within.” It was this defining/identifying 
moment when one becomes truly self-conscious, taking oneself dialectically as both 
subject and object, that was the lightening of thought. It meant finding a way through 
these two lines: “The working class is either revolutionary or it is nothing” and “I am 
nothing and I should be everything.”333  
However, the problem, as Rosenberg increasingly saw it, was that this 
revolutionary “nothing” was being filled with specious content, the easy, illusory, pre-
packaged identities of a mass culture industry. Not surprisingly the text that Rosenberg 
will return to is Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. In the lecture notes for 
a seminar he taught in the early 1970s on this text at the University of Chicago, he 
explains: 
Now, you could say that what has happened is the proletarianization 
culturally of the entire society; that is, everybody is turned into a 
proletariat by means of mass media. The only trouble with that is that 
there’s no emptiness, you know, there’s the Marx thing about the 
appendage of the machine like some Bauhaus creation, but you think of 
the mass media—it may be full of garbage, but it’s certainly full, you can’t 
stop it for a minute. It keeps going on and on.334 
 
In another place in these notes Rosenberg comes back to the idea with some 
modifications and additions. 
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But when the worker doesn’t become revolutionary Marx says he is 
nothing. Well, this of course is not true. This is a very basic idea of Marx, 
that a working man is simply an appendage of the machine—until he 
becomes revolutionary. Therefore, in order to be a human being you had 
to be a revolutionary, otherwise you’re just an attachment or another 
wheel, or a lever or something; the machine can easily be replaced by a 
computer. He’s nothing, he’s simply an organ of production, machine 
production. This is one of the really crucial points with which Marx goes 
over the edge; because—he goes over the edge and he doesn’t go over the 
edge—because obviously the working class is not that empty. And this has 
been the cause of great problems for Marxism, that not only that the 
working man gets ideas about himself from socialist literature, from 
unions, from all sorts of sources, and it’s never that empty.335 
 
To summarize, Rosenberg started realizing a problem—possibly the enormity of the 
challenge, to paraphrase the author from 1952—of exercising a constant No.336 On what 
should have been the revolutionary path from “nothing” to “everything,” the 
revolutionary actor had stalled out somewhere in-between, at “something.” 
Significantly this failure in revolutionary dialectic had happened on two fronts, with the 
worker in the Soviet Union and the artist in the United States: both had been turned into 
“something.” What stood in the wake of this failed dialectic was the professional and 
performance. 
The failure in the case of the political development of the Soviet Union and the 
revolutionary worker was easy to see, and this happened fairly early for Rosenberg in his 
references to Leninism.337 The key to Rosenberg’s criticism of Leninism is that it installs 
a division between theory and practice as the very possibility of any communist future. 
Consciousness is brought in from the outside (a “vanguard . . . guided by an advanced 
theory”); the worker, now, is filled with revolutionary content, a content dispensed 
through a bureaucratic agency and agenda.338 Lenin professionalizes the revolution 
through the “leadership” role his elite band of Party theorists assumes, becoming the 
consciousness, the brain, the thinking organ for the worker’s revolution, which thus 
reinscribed the division of labor between intellectual and worker within a social doctrine 
and movement, albeit with a professed goal of healing this rift. In an essay written in 
1956, aptly titled “Marxism: Criticism and/or Action,” Rosenberg acknowledged, “In 
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place of resistance to deprivation converting itself into political action through an 
expansion in self-consciousness, inter-communication and comprehensiveness of 
program, acceptance of the Party leaders’ decisions by individual workers becomes the 
basis of working class unity. With the lifeless discipline of the machine and the 
appropriation of his action extended into the political realm, the worker remains set fast 
in his abstractness, a personification of nullity with Marxist slogans as his ideal 
content.”339 Thus to Rosenberg’s understanding the attempt to bring the proletariat to 
“correct” consciousness by cattle-herding it through the teleologically appropriate next 
step was a gross deformation of Marx. Where the revolutionary “repulse from the unreal” 
was to free the proletariat from the “lifeless discipline of the machine,” to create the 
conditions through which it could possess its own actions, achieve praxis, and transcend 
itself as an abstract personification, here the Communist Party commandeers the 
revolutionary “act” and bifurcates it into theory versus practice.  
An interesting indication of how Rosenberg was processing the Leninist model of 
revolutionary action can be found in the marginal notations in Rosenberg’s copy of What 
Is To Be Done?: Burning Questions of Our Movement, a short and important volume of 
Lenin’s addressing the issue of organization versus spontaneity.340 “Action” is a term that 
keeps surfacing in these notes. Towards the end of a longish note on the relationship of 
consciousness to material conditions, Rosenberg writes of “Action as a form of discovery 
and self-discovery,” and a little further on he describes Marx’s notion of action as 
specifically opposed to an acting that was a carrying out of formulas. Forms of action that 
carried out formulas were “Utopian” and, in Rosenberg’s words, “Opposed to Marxism,” 
and not the kind of action that would be truly revolutionary. “No putting of idea into 
effect. Action-and-idea arise out of living. Consc[iousness] springs out of material 
conditions—Becomes a human power.”341 Form and content have to come together at 
once, and denying this was the grievous flaw of Leninism. “The mold of man is to be set 
from above rather than be the product of man’s own actions,” and this failed Marx’s own 
definition of praxis; it was merely following commands, carrying out a formula.342 This 
was not the free act, this was mere performance. And as Rosenberg warned, “you must be 
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able to recognize the difference between a genuine uprising and a simulated uprising, that 
is, one fabricated according to the revolutionary ‘craft’ by professionals who deliberately 
design it to resemble a spontaneous upheaval.”343 
This last line, though written with social revolutionary failure in mind, could be 
put to art as well. For possibly even more alarming to Rosenberg was that the modern 
artist’s “opportunity” to realize the free act/”free labor” had also faltered. As Rosenberg 
was all too aware, it was not the dialectical concept of Action Painting that animated the 
art world of the 1960s and later, but rather one-dimensional abstractions of art—as pure 
form in formalism, as pure process in happenings, as pure idea in conceptualism and 
“dematerialized” practices. The dialectically achieved self-identity that the Action Painter 
modeled was circumvented, perverted egregiously, with the rise of the artist as superstar, 
a figure that functioned in the system as a personality. Such an artist had become the 
personification of personality. Rosenberg related the value invested in personality as 
consistent with a society concerned with the loss of individuality. “In this age so often 
felt to be one of deindividualization, there is a great tendency to make an ideal of ‘the 
individual.’ Such an ideal is no less abstract and unreal than any other ideal and the living 
individual can only be reduced by it.”344 The problem with the artist as personality was 
that it was the formation of a bad identity, an ill-begotten subject-object by which the two 
poles join—as formless irrationality (personality) is given form and rationalized 
(personification)—to create the sign of authentic identity. The narcissistic subjectivity of 
personalities took on form and social being not through a dialectically wrought process, 
the “dialectical tension of the genuine act”—an act that necessarily entailed a real 
defining encounter with the world, with the materiality of the given, with objects and 
limits (death)—but rather through the rationalization of the “formless” personality into 
the pre-formed personification of free, creative subjectivity. What was being performed 
was the personality of the artist, or the artist-as-personality, a theatricalized persona.  
As Rosenberg wrote in 1971, “In contrast to the meagerness of art, the artist is 
blown up to gigantic proportions. . . . The artist has become, as it were, too big for art.”345 
The artist as persona is fashioned not through the labor of historical dialectic but through 
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costume change and fashionable attitudes. As Rosenberg complained with some 
bitterness, “Must one remind budding art historians that the uneasiness of art in the face 
of its own situation was not adopted by artists as a manner, in the way that one adopts a 
leather jacket or a hair-do that covers the eyes. Anxiety was forced upon art as the 
experience that accompanies the rejection of shallow or fraudulent solutions.”346 As in 
Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire, this was about revolutionary activity taken as performance, 
become inanely repetitious. There was a tremendous difference between action as 
transformation on the one hand—an enacting realization of self through the tension 
between “nothing” and “everything,” achieving at last the revolutionary new—and, on 
the other, action as process, as the performance of the pre-formed, as the disjunctive 
falsity of mere acting a part or the mindlessness of repetitious activity, the tensionless 
repetition of “something” again and again.   
 The following chapters begin to address how this reading of Rosenberg and 
Action Painting might relevantly apply to actual art practices. However, before venturing 
towards this more practical application, I offer as a concluding image for this chapter one 
last return to Hamlet as an articulating structure for highly loaded discussions of theory 
and practice relations. And, once again, the most obviously critical moment (though one 
occurring “off-stage”) is Hamlet’s encounter with death. It is the turning point in the play, 
the bridge between Hamlet the personality and Hamlet the identity, between Hamlet the 
theoretician and Hamlet the practitioner. There is, nonetheless, another mediating device 
between theory and practice in Shakespeare’s drama. The device is the play within the 
play; and within Shakespeare’s tragedy this device appears when Hamlet himself authors 
a drama to be performed to the audience of his mother, Queen Gertrude and his uncle, 
newly become step-father and usurper King of Denmark, Claudius. To this unsuspecting 
audience, what is performed is a representation of the murderous and incestuous acts of 
the King and Queen—it is a representation of the truth of the their crimes. Indeed, 
Hamlet could not have asked for a more appropriate reception of his work: the Queen and 
new King receive this representation with due conscience and horror—the villain 
becomes sick and is unable to continue to face his representation. The play within the 
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play would appear then to figure and perform some manner and degree of joining theory 
and practice. The limitation of these mediations of the imagination and the aesthetic is 
that they are situated on the side of theory: it is the dream-image of theory imagining 
itself having become practice. The problem lies precisely in it being an ideal resolution 
and an ideal one only. This was a matter Rosenberg summed up concisely when he wrote: 
“No substantial problem of art is soluble by art alone.”347 The danger posed by the play 
within the play (and art for art’s sake) was that of the fatal mistaking of theater for the 
actual drama, of operating only on the plane of theatrical performance and never passing 
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The Judgment of Harold 
   identity 
[ad. F. identité (Oresme, 14th c.), ad. late L. identitās 
(Martianus Capella, c425), peculiarly formed from ident(i)-, for L. 
idem ‘same’ + -tās, -tātem: see -TY. 
Various suggestions have been offered as to the formation. 
Need was evidently felt of a noun of condition or quality from idem 
to express the notion of ‘sameness’, side by side with those of 
‘likeness’ and ‘oneness’ expressed by similitās and ūnitās; hence 
the form of the suffix. But idem had no combining stem. Some have 
thought that ident(i)- was taken from the L. adv. identidem ‘over 
and over again, repeatedly’, connexion with which appears to be 
suggested by Du Cange’s explanation of identitās as “quævis actio 
repetita”. Meyer-Lübke suggests that in the formation there was 
present some association between idem and id ens ‘that being’, 
whence identitās like entitās. But assimilation to entitās may have 
been merely to avoid the solecism of *idemitās or *idemtās. 
However originated, ident(i)- became the combining stem of idem, 
and the series ūnitās, ūnicus, ūnificus, ūnificāre, was paralleled by 
identitās, identicus, identificus, identificāre: see identic, identific, 
identity above.]348 
 
Here is an obvious question to begin with: why choose the painters Barnett Newman and 
Ad Reinhardt to think through the meaning and implications of Rosenberg’s “Action 
Painting”? What relation could link Newman’s and Reinhardt’s minimally incidental 
expanses of canvas to painting as action, as embodied gesture willfully asserting its 
nature as such? As general opinion would have it, this role should have been properly 
assigned to Willem de Kooning, an Action Painting exemplar, as its star performer. 
Indeed, in 1975, Lawrence Alloway made explicit this very point when he boldly 
presumed that the “artist central to the article [“The American Action Painters”], though 
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unnamed was de Kooning.” Needless to say, Alloway was far from alone in insisting on 
this identification.349  
Demonstrated in the previous chapter, however, was a nuancing of Rosenberg’s 
critical project for painting that begins to suggest why an out-of-hand identification of de 
Kooning as the “artist central” to Action Painting potentially bleeds the concept of its 
richness. The point is that de Kooning’s work is not the place where Action Painting 
becomes most profitably dissonant. Rather, the critical complexity that belied 
Rosenberg’s concept emerges with figures ostensibly marginal to Action Painting. As I 
argue in this chapter, Action Painting is made explicit as critical praxis not by seeing the 
drama performed with the familiar cast—de Kooning, or Pollock, or Franz Kline—but 
rather, through Newman and Reinhardt, the most unlikely of players. With the revision of 
Action Painting that was outlined in my previous chapter, one can return productively to 
a question long presumed answered: who exactly counts as an Action Painter? and on 
what grounds? Not only will the process of mapping the relationship of Newman and 
Reinhardt to Action Painting help illuminate key issues of Action Painting and of 
Rosenberg’s project in general but, as with any triangulation device, the enigmatic 
relationship between Newman and Reinhardt will be clarified as well.  
In 1952 Rosenberg named no names. Although titled “The American Action 
Painters,” not a single one of these newfangled Action Painters is designated by proper 
name. One may speculate on this curious point: had the author simply switched out the 
plural noun for the gerund-noun, this absence might have registered less. But Rosenberg 
did not make this change and “Painters” stands in the title to an essay markedly devoid of 
the names of specific painters. Already, however, this requires some qualification. For 
indeed, in one spot, the author almost gives away a name and, significantly, this happens 
at the very point in the essay in which questions of parameters, the defining limits 
clarifying who is in and who is out, are raised. Rosenberg recounts, “One of the leaders 
of this mode said to me, ‘B— is not modern.’” Why? “‘He works from sketches. That 
makes him Renaissance.’”350 From here, Rosenberg goes on to defend this enigmatic 
“B—” against the Action Painter’s charges. The critic’s defense is drawn from 
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discriminating between working from sketches in the old conception (preliminary plan 
and then execution on canvas) and sketching as an activity in itself. He explains: “If a 
painting is an action the sketch is one action, the painting that follows it another.”  
Overall, this is a peculiar moment in Rosenberg’s text, one that almost feels like a 
detour—or at least a point strangely drawn out, and verging as close as Rosenberg ever 
gets in this essay to stuff that sounds like Tenth Street shop-talk. He ends his discussion 
of sketches with what has the tone of a counter-reprimand against the accusations of the 
Action Painting “leader.” “Of course, the painter who spoke had no right to assume that 
his friend had the old mental conception of a sketch. There is no reason why an act 
cannot be prolonged from a piece of paper to a canvas. Or repeated on another scale and 
with more control. A sketch can have the function of a skirmish.”351 
What these passages indicate is that the contest over Action Painting had surfaced 
already in 1952. Already Rosenberg is struggling to disrupt the emerging Action Painting 
formula. When the Action Painting “leader” accuses “B—” of failing to be modern, 
Rosenberg sees “the principle, and the difference from the old painting . . . made into a 
formula.”352 Still, the issue of sketches is an odd place for Rosenberg to carry out the task 
of defining Action Painting. One might even be more ready to assume, like the 
reprimanded Action Painting leader, that sketches and the activity of sketching form the 
obvious antithesis of Action Painting. For could one not assume the difference between 
the sketch and the canvas was one that signified the division of action into separated 
theory (“A sketch is the preliminary form of an image the mind is trying to grasp”) and 
practice (“nothing would get in the way of the act of painting”).353 The sketch—as mind, 
plan, or pre-existing theory—should surely be that thing most recognizably outside 
Action Painting, yet this is precisely the reasoning that is thwarted by Rosenberg’s 
championing of “B—,” and what in turn makes the identification of the Action Painter a 
complex task. Indeed, this difficulty is markedly present from the essay’s very first lines. 
“What makes any definition of a movement in art dubious is that it never fits the deepest 
artists in the movement—certainly not as well as, if successful, it does the others. Yet 
without the definition something essential in those best is bound to be missed.”354 
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Rosenberg is well aware of the trouble brewing ahead for “Action Painting,” but this is a 
battle he is prepared to engage.  
What would happen if Newman (and by extension the difference between 
Newman’s and Reinhardt’s abstractions) were nominated as that very figure who 
challenges Action Painting’s limits and simultaneously establishes them; who 
paradoxically escapes the definition best and yet is at the same time one of its “deepest” 
members. For if one were allowed to draw out the essay’s single tempting clue to a 
proper name, that unknown “B—,” and extend it into “Barney,” would this not illuminate 
profoundly the complexity of the Action Painting concept and, as well, identify “B—,” 
“Barney,” as finally belonging? 
It is tempting to read this incident as Rosenberg’s coming to the defense of a 
beleaguered friend. Certainly, in 1952, the year the essay was published, Newman would 
have felt very much on the outs of the emerging New York art world. Things had begun 
to look up generally for the Abstract Expressionists—as de Kooning told it, Pollock had 
“broken the ice” with his November 1949 show at the Betty Parsons Gallery, so that (as 
Rosalind Krauss later described it) “collectors and museum people formerly known only 
for snubbing American painters now flocked to his [Pollock’s] openings,” and began to 
attend the openings of others of his milieu. But 1952 was a year in Newman’s 
professional chronology that has been called the “sensitive point.” It marked the 
beginning of the eight-year hiatus (1952-1959) during which he did not exhibit in New 
York City.355  
Just two years earlier the picture had looked brighter for Newman. In January, 
1950, the artist held his first solo exhibition at the Betty Parsons Gallery where the public 
got its first taste of his radically reduced “zip” paintings. By most accounts the reception 
was cool; some viewers were hostile and many more were dismissive. Not to be deterred 
by just a single attempt, Newman tried once more the following spring, in 1951. His 
second solo exhibition was again at Parsons’s gallery, and again the reception was cool, 
hostile, dismissive. The exhibited works in the second show, as Anne Temkin has 
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suggested, “heightened the austere effect that had flabbergasted viewers the year before, 
leaving them to wonder if he was truly incompetent or just pulling their leg.”356  
The second show surely acted as confirmation. Newman had “repeated” himself 
in order to make sure that he was being clear. Indeed, he had even gone so far as to 
heighten the “austere effect”—for more clarity. After all, one of the promises of the 
second Parsons’s exhibition was in its doubling of the first (in being the second it could 
no longer have the startling effect of the totally new and unfamiliar). It now had, although 
only recent, a precedent. Presumably, the works were in a position to be looked at 
seriously, beyond the shock of the startlingly and possibly blindingly new. But this 
doubling went both ways. If Newman made sure he got his point across, so did the 
audience, by repeating its first reactions, rejecting, in David Sylvester’s clever 
designation, the “ugly duckling.”357 Thus, by 1952, Newman’s rejection had been doubly 
confirmed. He had gotten the message. And so the poetic allowance of extending “B—” 
into “Barney” opens up “The American Action Painters” to an uncharacteristic 
perspective: as an inclusion, a “yes” sounded in Newman’s direction at the very moment 
when many others failed to see him as an artist, let alone imagine him as an American 
Action Painter.   
Yes and no. The incident of “B—” and the issue of sketches stands out for other 
reasons too. It is a relatively affirmative moment in Rosenberg’s 1952 essay, a piece of 
writing otherwise given to fierce negatives. The rhetoric of modernist negation permeates 
its frequently referenced lines: “To maintain the force to refrain from settling anything, 
he [the artist, the Action Painter] must exercise in himself a constant No.”358 Action 
Painting is a series of refusals—of tradition, of taste, of easy solutions, of markets and 
cashing in on the new cultural fad of Modern Art on North American shores, of Art and 
of Society. Or, as in one of the essay’s emphatic subtitles, “It’s Not That, It’s Not That, 
It’s Not That.”359 
This pattern of insistent repetition of negative mandates in Rosenberg’s 
“American Action Painters” also evokes a second artist, Ad Reinhardt. For it is Reinhardt 
who fits, at least on the face of things, this stance of refusal identifying the Action 
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Painter. It is Reinhardt who will most literally take up this exacting ascesis of exercising 
in his work a constant “No.” Indeed, 1952 was the very same year that saw the first 
public and published version of what would become Reinhardt’s signature lists of 
negative imperatives. In Reinhardt’s aptly titled “Abstract Art Refuses,” submitted as his 
artist’s statement for the catalogue accompanying a group exhibition of contemporary 
painting at the University of Illinois, Urbana, he initiated the negativist style and stance 
that he would elaborate over the next fourteen years in writings, interviews, and in the 
art-as-art statements.360 “In painting, for me,” the artist demanded, “no fooling-the-eye, 
no window-hole-in-the-wall, no illusions, no representations, no associations, no 
distortions, no paint-caricaturing, no cream pictures or drippings, no delirium trimmings . 
. . no gallery gimmicks . . . no entertainment business, no vested interests, no Sunday 
hobby in America of ashcan-regional-WPA-Pepsi-Cola styles. . . .”361 Fittingly this 1952 
published record of refusal was matched in his painting practice of this time, as the artist 
seriously began paring down the elements of his formal language, “making geometrically 
composed, symmetrical, monochrome paintings in either red or blue.”362 Nevertheless, 
however much Reinhardt might seem to literalize one of the outstanding characterizations 
of Action Painting—exercising that constant No—it is precisely Reinhardt whom 
Rosenberg rejects. Reinhardt’s negation was not Action Painting’s negation. Increasingly, 
as Reinhardt’s work became ever-more minimalist in its negationist pose, it became for 
Rosenberg the ominous emblem of something terribly wrong with the project of serious 
painting (and art in general) in the aftermath of Abstract Expressionism of the 1940s and 
1950s. 
The year 1963 offers a tidy historical marker for illustrating this critical fork in 
Rosenberg’s judgment pro Newman and contra Reinhardt. In this year Rosenberg wrote 
and published pieces about both artists which were tellingly different in tone. In a New 
Yorker review of the Museum of Modern Art’s “Americans 1963” (which included 
Reinhardt and not Newman) and the Jewish Museum’s “Towards a New Abstraction” 
Rosenberg condemned the assortment of new anti-Abstract Expressionists, the producers 
of mahler-frei paintings, all the “emblem-makers” represented in the exhibitions. This 
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included the Pop variety represented at the Museum of Modern Art—Richard 
Anuszkiewics, Sally Hazelet Drummand, David Simpson, Chryssa and Robert Indiana 
among others—and the formalist/purist variety at the Jewish Museum—Kenneth Noland, 
Morris Louis, Frank Stella, Ellsworth Kelly, George Ortman and Paul Brach, among 
others.363 The brunt of the attack was directed significantly towards Ad Reinhardt, the 
sometimes member of the Abstract Expressionist generation, whom Rosenberg describes 
in almost turncoat language as the “intellectual pivot of the new art offered as a 
replacement for Abstract Expressionism.”364 Scanning through Rosenberg’s review one 
can string together a whole list of highly unflattering phrases directed at Reinhardt. 
Reinhardt is the “dogma-ridden” “neo-esthete” who carries on with “fanatical persistence 
and moral malevolence a program of exorcising the artist from his work and destroying 
the social and intellectual communion among artists,” the “would-be executioner of 
Abstract Expressionism,” the most extreme representative of “art dominated by ideology” 
and ruled by the “spirit of absolutism.” By Rosenberg’s analogy, he is the Lenin of the art 
world.   
Contrast this to Rosenberg’s treatment of Newman. If Rosenberg by 1963 had 
come to see Reinhardt as a bogus claimant to serious art, locating in him the evil seeds of 
the new art, Newman in that same year basks in the critic’s high praise. Rosenberg’s 
Vogue feature, tellingly entitled “Barnett Newman: A Man of Controversy and Spiritual 
Grandeur,” speaks of Newman’s paintings as living rectangles, “real and living shapes,” 
vehicles of the metaphysical and of “cosmic emotions.”365 The powerful impact of this 
essay on the artist can be heard in Newman’s personal response written back to 
Rosenberg.  
Dear Harold: 
Now that I have overcome the embarrassment of reading about 
myself I want to tell you how deeply moved I am by your article.  
Not only have you presented my work with succinct clarity and on 
the highest level, but you have moved from my work to me with great 
style to show that I and my work are one. . . . 
What touches me most is the feeling that I get that you wrote the 
article with some affection for me personally—and that you enjoyed, that 
you had fun in the writing. 
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Nothing I shall ever read about myself will, I am certain, move me 
any more deeply.366 
 
This indicates a rather special sympathy between the artist and critic. The 1963 Vogue 
essay was only one of a number of pieces (along with a substantive monograph) 
Rosenberg devoted to Newman.367 Seven years later, Rosenberg eulogized “Barney,” his 
“old friend,” naming him as equally “indispensable to his friends” as he was to American 
art. He was the artist who had continued the project of “metaphysical effort” in painting, 
who had the courage to keep the stakes up at the level of seriousness designated by the 
will to attain the sublimity of reality, to make and re-make in “metaphysical 
substance.”368 Rosenberg’s eulogy marked the conclusion of a very close friendship 
between the artist and the critic, one that had spanned from the early years of the 1930s 
and one whose depth Annalee Newman, the artist’s widow, attested to when she told an 
interviewer, “It would be right to say they loved each other.”369  
Before moving forward I want to caution against a facile reduction of 
Rosenberg’s acceptance of Newman and rejection of Reinhardt as a judgment stemming 
from personal history alone, explainable by the circumstance that Newman and 
Rosenberg shared a particularly close friendship and that Reinhardt and Rosenberg did 
not. Dismissing the significance of the difference Rosenberg read between Newman and 
Reinhardt in this way, simply does not work. Although Rosenberg and Newman may 
have been very close friends this did not translate into automatic and uncritical support of 
each other’s work. Annalee Newman provides an animated illustration: “Harold and 
Barnett Newman talked a lot. Both of them were great talkers. Barnett would say, ‘Well, 
I met Harold. We disagreed a lot but what a lot of action!”370 This is complemented by 
the anecdote recounted by many (including Annalee Newman) of an “endless” discussion 
the critic and the artist got into one time at a dinner party. Here is O’Brien summarizing 
the incident as told to her by Annalee Newman.  
The Newmans had been to a dinner party at the Rosenberg’s on Tenth 
Street. It got late and time to go, but Barnett Newman and Rosenberg were 
too deeply into a discussion to stop, so Rosenberg walked the Newmans 
home. The verbal exchange as they walked the eight blocks or so to the 
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Newman’s place was noisy and impassioned, and far from over when they 
got to the Newmans’. So Newman walked Rosenberg back to Tenth 
Street. Unable to end their possibly interminable dispute, they continued to 
walk each other home—back and forth—for hours longer; there are those 
who say it continued throughout the entire night. Finally, someone along 
the route, obviously exasperated with the ceaseless peripatetic polemic, 
opened a high window and threw a pail of water on their heads.371  
 
These incidents suggest that the friendship between Rosenberg and Newman, though an 
obviously close one, did not mean the unquestioning acceptance of the other’s ideas.  
Far less considered, however, is the relationship between Rosenberg and 
Reinhardt. The reigning assumption that they were hostile to each other is not altogether 
incorrect, but the private correspondence between them suggests a relationship far more 
complex than merely antagonistic. In the Rosenberg Papers at the Getty, the two years 
just before Rosenberg’s damning 1963 pronouncement on Reinhardt are represented by a 
high volume of postcards from Reinhardt to Rosenberg, the contents of which provide a 
more nuanced picture of their interaction.372 One gleans from the tone and the subjects 
broached a sense of familiarity, of shared histories, and even camaraderie. In one letter 
Reinhardt fills Rosenberg in on what occurred at a Friday evening at the Club.  
Great stuff at the club last Friday, you don’t know what you missed, social 
tension in the air, angry old men, shouting attacks, bitter beatniks, 
screeching idiots, sober exchanges, wild togetherness, good jokes, corny 
questions, young blood, bad taste in the mouth afterward, Sidney Janis 
yelling in the New Yorker “Why fight it,” Larry Rivers crying “We’re just 
creatures of fate,” Nick Marsicano (after Kiesler) “We’re all in this 
together, onward, upward” (to victory?), Carl Holty outbeating the Beats, 
Resnick and Reinhardt from the floor, holy cats, like the good old days, 
were was you?373  
 
Other correspondence also suggests a far easier, more homey acquaintance, with more 
frequent social interaction than is usually imagined for these two. For instance, writing in 
the summer of 1961 to “Harold and Mae” while traveling abroad, Reinhardt expresses his 
personal concern over Rosenberg’s health after a leg operation and wishes the couple the 
best, hoping they get back into the “Baroque swing of things.”374 Perhaps more surprising 
(because written after 1963, and thus after Rosenberg’s highly critical assessments of 
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Reinhardt) one finds Reinhardt’s reply to Horizon Press’s publication party for The 
Anxious Object, to which Reinhardt jestingly answers: “I’ll wear a good shirt and suit but 
I’ll be damned if I’ll shave for it.”375  
Thus, although there was solidarity in their relationship, this in no way precluded 
criticism of each other. For example, a 1961 postcard from Reinhardt reprimands 
Rosenberg for not attending various activist events and protests such as two Y.P.S.L. 
(Young People’s Socialist League) events, asking “Don’t you like folk-singing and the 
Cuban Revolution?” and “Are you still dancing in the streets all night with abstract-
expressionists, shirking all responsibilities?”376 A more pointed message to Rosenberg, 
postmarked October 23, 1962, is addressed to “Harold Mr. Hairstylist”; accusations of 
coiffed decadence and complacency are made in the terse three sentences that follow: 
You’re beginning to sound like an old N.Y. Times-Book-Section 
Reviewer. 
What happened to the old jokes and slogans? 
You need orders from headquarters to sound off?377 
 
If a pattern can be detected in Reinhardt’s more critical correspondences to Rosenberg, it 
is this. Reinhardt sharply criticizes what he perceives as the new cozy alliance between 
the critic and the “establishment,” the art world “millionaire and analyst collectors.” In 
one letter, he lumps Rosenberg with Thomas Hess and Clement Greenberg: “I’d like to 
haul in my criticisms of Hess and Greenberg too, you guys are all alike you know, all you 
fellows.”378 Alternatively, Reinhardt makes an exception for Rosenberg (as distinguished 
from Hess and Greenberg), professing kinship with Rosenberg because they still shared 
the bond of 1930s commitments. “[Y]ou belong to the slicks now,” Reinhardt 
acknowledged, “yet you still talk to working class stiffs like me, you’re ok.”379 
One may or may not call this friendship. By no means did it come close to the 
intimacy between Rosenberg and Newman, but it is also a good distance from a blind 
hostility that would disallow communication or that could fuel the critic vindictively to 
reject Reinhardt. Indeed, if anything, Rosenberg appeared an ideal receiver for 
Reinhardt’s edgy banter. Certainly he could give as well as he could take, and he took 
most of Reinhardt’s jabs with humor and the proverbial grain of salt. “Dear Conscience” 
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was how Rosenberg addressed a response to one of the artist’s more haranguing 
missives.380 Finally, Rosenberg’s homage to Reinhardt after his death suggests that 
beyond their differences Rosenberg still regarded Reinhardt’s efforts as highly important. 
He was, as Rosenberg writes, “the negative space in the composition of American art 
since the war. . . . His bellicose postcards were an affectionate reminder to his friends of 
his constantly hostile presence. They will be missed.”381 Ultimately, he was a presence to 
be missed. 
One comes back, then, to the question of Rosenberg’s judgment, one informed by 
something more than mere personal like and dislike. Newman belonged—more rather 
than less—to the Action Painting concept. In a 1960 essay titled “Icon Maker,” 
Rosenberg indicates that Newman’s conception of the “rectangle of the canvas as an 
active entity to wrestle with has led him to rank himself among the Action painters.”382 
Eight years later, in 1968 and in “The Concept of Action Painting,” Rosenberg’s 
description remains much the same: “Jackson Pollock was an Action painter, and so was 
Hans Hofmann, and so is Willem de Kooning. But so also, or very close to being one, is, 
in his own view, Barnett Newman.”383 Reinhardt, by contrast, as the emblem of the 
emblem-makers, was excluded from Action Painting; indeed, he stood for the very thing 
working in opposition to Action Painting’s principles. Reinhardt was, in Rosenberg’s 
phrase, the “would-be executioner of Abstract Expressionism.”384 But what was the 
difference Rosenberg saw between Newman’s and Reinhardt’s projects that allowed him 
to draw such an exactingly fine line?  
Hilton Kramer more or less posed the same question when, in 1965, he criticized 
Rosenberg on what he took as both a glaring contradiction and troubling instance of a 
critic playing blatant favorites. How could Rosenberg’s aesthetic stance, his Action 
Painting, have any meaningful coherence if it could accommodate both gestural painting 
(like de Kooning’s or early Guston’s) and the reductive fields of color and minimal 
gesture of Newman’s painting? If Newman was to be accepted, Kramer argued, what 
made his reductive abstractions so fundamentally different from the younger 1960s 
generation of color field painters—the “emblem-makers” (and, of course, their precursor, 
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Reinhardt)—that Rosenberg so adamantly rejected? Kramer marks the breakdown of any 
pretence to coherence in Action Painting precisely by Rosenberg’s inclusion of Newman. 
Reading the chapter on Newman in The Anxious Object, Kramer discovers the most 
“flagrant” evidence of the critic’s spurious “reliance on non-visual, non-formal, extra-
artistic criteria. “[T]his evasion of pictorial analysis clearly has its uses,” Kramer 
continues, 
it enables the critic to accept Newman—he belongs, after all, to the 
beloved fifties—and reject the artists favored by Mr. Greenberg without 
confronting a single one of the concrete artistic issues that unite them. . . . 
The ease with which Mr. Rosenberg accommodates Newman’s art to his 
Existentialist outlook, and the vehemence with which he bans younger 
artists pursuing similar—and, in my view, more interesting—objectives, 
betrays his criticism as being, essentially the performance of a 
rhetorician.385  
 
Much of what follows in this chapter is premised on a fundamental disagreement with 
Kramer’s charge. Nevertheless, his diatribe serves as an excellent expectorant for the 
nagging problems lodged within Rosenberg’s judgment, problems that are typically too 
quickly written off, like Kramer does here, as simply meaningless contradiction, as a 
failure to confront “concrete artistic issues,” as rhetorical performance, and as blunt 
favoritism. 
Working against these dismissals, I will argue that Rosenberg’s judgment does 
work well within the substantive logic of Action Painting, and that the dividing line 
generated in Rosenberg’s act of including Newman and excluding Reinhardt both 
captures the vitally defining issues of Action Painting and confronts dead-on the concrete 
artistic issues of both Newman’s and Reinhardt’s projects. Keeping in mind the argument 
made in the previous chapter concerning Action Painting, and now carried over into 
Rosenberg’s reception of these two artists, it follows that Newman’s alignment with 
Action Painting means also that his project is an instantiation of good praxis, of healthy 
subject-object dialectics and is thus about forging authentic identity and revolutionary 
possibility. By the same token, Reinhardt’s misalignment with Action Painting—in fact, 
his identification by Rosenberg as that which directly opposes it—means his project is 
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one of bad praxis, of ailing dialectic, of inauthentic identity, as that which makes 
authentic revolution impossible.  
The relevant questions are: What exactly did Newman’s abstractions possess in 
Rosenberg’s eyes that made them radical, an evocation “out of nothing” that cleared the 
space for new possibilities of being and thus answered the critic’s call to revolutionary 
practice? What fine line is Rosenberg drawing between Newman and Reinhardt, 
according to which Newman’s reductive abstraction points to utopia and Reinhardt’s 
“doctrine of great emptiness” leads to dystopian “apocalyptic wallpaper?”386 
What heightens the quality of suspense in this question—why Newman, why not 
Reinhardt, and why these two for the critical delineation of Action Painting—is that for 
many, and not just laypeople viewers but for art world professionals as well, there has 
seemed so very little by which to distinguish them. In certain lights, Newman and 





A Paradoxical Pair: The Two Fathers of the Sixties 
[We] spent all day looking at art. . . . I saw Ad Reinhardt’s black 
canvases, the blacks and the blues. Then I went on down the ramp 
and rounded the corner and . . . saw the paintings of Barnett 
Newman. 
 
I looked at them, and from that point on I was home free.\ 
Anne Truitt387 
 
Could it be that simple? Merely down a ramp and around a corner to locate Reinhardt and 
Newman. Then home at last? And free? The Minimalist painter and sculptor Anne 
Truitt’s account of a day in 1977 spent looking at art in the National Gallery contains 
shades of Dorothy in Oz—of having followed a proverbial Yellow Brick Road, 
unmasked a wizard (or rather two) and found one’s way gloriously home. But, as a 
number of accounts of 1960s post-Abstract Expressionist art developments relate, 
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looking to and finding something in Newman and Reinhardt was not Truitt’s artistic 
narrative alone. After 1959–a year useful as marking a turning point against the “new 
academy” of the gesturalism, existentialism, romanticism and “hot” emotions associated 
with de Kooning and the artistic currents of the preceding two decades—both Newman 
and Reinhardt entered into a period of much altered and improved reception.   
The story, as it gets told again and again, is this. Both are viewed as outside the 
primary artistic currents during the heyday of Abstract Expressionism in the 1940s and 
1950s, at a time when painterly gesturalism—canvases “buried under an avalanche of 
furiously slathered oil”—were taken by the advanced crowd as authentic expression.388 
Later critics will peg Newman and Reinhardt as “before their time”—usually implying 
that they suffered doubt, rejection and neglect in their own day, only to be redeemed 
Cassandra-like by the next generation of artists—modernist color-field painters, 
minimalists, and conceptualists—who will trace in varying degrees and means, and some 
by quite perverse routes, their artistic lineage back to them.  
So do Newman and Reinhardt belong to the 1940s-50s or to the 1960s-70s? 
Problems adhere to either claim. To be called a symbolic father figure to the 1960s 
artistic generation is not the same as being “in” it.389 This designation, as much as it 
gestures at an inclusion and connection, also signifies an outside-ness, existing at some 
remove, namely, a generational one. And for all of Newman’s and Reinhardt’s being on 
the “outs” with Abstract Expressionism they showed up far too frequently “in” it to be 
considered uncomplicatedly outré.  
There are two points of emphasis I want to develop here. The first is the trouble 
over Newman’s and Reinhardt’s placement: where do they belong or not belong based on 
their aesthetic commitments? Second, this difficulty over their identity is a shared 
condition: pointedly similar narratives of reception can be told for both. 
From the perspective of the 1940s-50s, several instances thwart both artists’ 
placement firmly and confidently inside or outside Abstract Expressionism. An iconic 
moment is the famous 1950 Life magazine group photograph taken by Nina Leen of the 
“Irascibles” (fig. 6)—the name given to the eighteen artist signatories protesting the 
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conservative “regional” exhibition policies of the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s show 
“American Painting Today—1950.”390 Both Newman and Reinhardt are most definitely 
present in this photograph, which has subsequently—and perhaps inaccurately, as some 
scholars have hinted—served like a yearbook picture of the Abstract Expressionists.391 At 
any rate, one hardly need rely solely on it for making a case for Newman’s and 
Reinhardt’s inclusion in the movement. Both lectured at the short-lived “Subjects of the 
Artist” school and then at its successor, “Studio 35.”392 Both of them were vocal 
participants in the three-day closed artists’s sessions held in April 1950, the transcript of 
which was published two years later as the volume Modern Artists in America, edited by 
Motherwell and Reinhardt. They both, as well, were represented by the increasingly 
consequential Betty Parsons Gallery. These moments, for better or worse, serve as key 
markers of an Abstract Expressionist “identity,” and one finds Newman and Reinhardt 
not only prominently placed in them, but at times centrally so.  
There are other places to look as well for support of Newman’s and Reinhardt’s 
belonging with Abstract Expressionism. In 1971, in a commemorative article published 
just a year after Newman’s death, Barbara Rose affirmed his status as one of the “New 
York School.”393 Likewise, in 1977, Kenworth Moffett had no difficulty categorizing 
Newman as an Abstract Expressionist who sat among the ranks of Adolph Gottlieb, Mark 
Rothko and Clyfford Still.394 A slightly more complicated attempt to rope Newman’s 
identity firmly to that of the 1940s-50s generation occurs in a 1962 typed dialogue 
between Hollis Frampton and Carl Andre. The discussion centers around the “Newman-
De Kooning” exhibition at the new Allan Stone Gallery—an exhibition whose theme was 
to provocatively juxtapose the two stylistically divergent painters as the founding fathers 
of Abstract Expressionism.395 Frampton argues for the appropriateness of the pairing: 
“Newman is an Abstract-Expressionist painter because his work subsists as significant 
painting largely in an Ab-Ex-context.” Andre, however, argues in the opposite direction, 
attempting to counter-position Newman towards the 1960s and to make analogies 
between the older painter and Frank Stella, both of whom are “stripe painters, neither is 
an Expressionist.”396 My sense is that the majority opinion of art critics, historians and 
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curators invested in the period have tended to lean more heavily towards Frampton’s 
view—that is, Newman as stripes with symbolism, within an expressionist tradition and 
not, as Andre would have liked, as just stripes. Indeed, looking at a Nation review of the 
most recent exhibition of Newman paintings, the 2002 Philadelphia Museum of Art 
show, one finds Arthur Danto calling him simply and unequivocally the “Abstract 
Expressionist Barnett Newman.”397  
Admittedly, in Reinhardt’s case, the search is much harder for anything 
approximating such boldly assured designation. Some of the resistance towards calling 
Reinhardt an Abstract Expressionist no doubt stems from the artist’s own well-known 
diatribes against the movement.398 Expression, autobiography, “laying bare of oneself” 
was “obscene,” and those artists “who peddle wiggly lines and colors as representing 
emotion should be run off the streets.”399 As Yve-Alain Bois remarks, “One of the critical 
labels that stuck to Reinhardt for a while (although it was dropped after his final show) 
was that of ‘Abstract Expressionist.’ As is extremely well known, he resented this 
affiliation immensely. He became more and more virulent, from 1954 on . . . against the 
histrionic poses assumed by his alleged colleagues (he was disgusted by the action 
painting mythology), but also by the grandiose claims regarding ‘subject matter.’”400 
This, however, should be tempered with a far more level evaluation Reinhardt made in 
1966. “Even though socially I was extremely friendly with people like Clyff Still and 
Rothko and [Robert] Motherwell and others, I was, I guess, a little uncomfortable with 
the mixture of both abstraction and expressionism.”401 Yet even this more moderate 
assignation of distance between Reinhardt and Still, Rothko and Motherwell, belies the 
fact that in the late 1940s and early 1950s he was making paintings that very much 
appeared to mix both abstraction and expressionism, works, “so explicitly calligraphic,” 
in one curator’s opinion, “as to be almost paradigms for a painting of gestural signs” 
(figs. 7 and 8).402 Even more fascinating is a journal entry Reinhardt made sometime in 
the early 1940s which suggests that this was not merely a formal “phase” his work went 
through. “Of painting, at present, abstract expressionism alone, it seems to me, indicates 
an aesthetic potential of a free future. It is a direct and profound challenge to disorder and 
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insensitivity everywhere.”403 Furthermore, during the 1940s and the early 1950s, 
according to Thomas Hess, “Reinhardt was devoted to de Kooning,” helping the 
struggling painter and Abstract Expressionist par excellence by offering his studio and 
using some of de Kooning’s paintings for P.M.404 To Lynn Zelevansky, a scholar who 
has explored the tricky issue of locating Reinhardt’s artistic affiliations in the post-war 
period, Reinhardt is the “active if dissident member of the Abstract Expressionist circle,” 
whose work ended up receiving “less attention than that of many of his New York School 
colleagues” because in the 1950s he chose to follow a “course independent of Abstract 
Expressionist concerns.”405 Even Rosenberg could not get away from admitting that 
Reinhardt possessed features that aligned him with Abstract Expressionism. “Like 
Rothko or Newman, Reinhardt conceives an art of one idea, which may be repeated with 
miniscule variations from painting to painting. . . . In this respect, Reinhardt is an 
Abstract Expressionist, and the fact is that his work has been appreciated in the Abstract 
Expressionist context.”406 The inclusions are not always as cautious as those of 
Zelevansky nor as resistant as Rosenberg’s. In contrast, for Gilbert H. Kinney’s—an 
important collector of Reinhardt’s work—Reinhardt stands as “central to that creative 
generation known as the New York School,” as “a member of one of the greatest art 
movements of all time.”407  
For all that, one need not dig too deep into period accounts to understand why that 
too sounds off, offering equally as strange a fit as that of placing Newman and Reinhardt 
simply and indisputably outside the movement. Indeed, one of the strongest themes of 
Rose’s article cited earlier is that of Newman’s awkward placement. He was “always part 
of the New York art scene,” yet “he was not taken seriously as an artist for the most 
part.”408 He was both there and not there: at the center of things but in a blind spot. One 
senses—both reading between the lines and in other cases not needing to—that the 
difficulty and level of tension surrounding the placement of Newman and Reinhardt in 
relationship to something approximating a 1940s-50s artistic identity became even more 
attenuated and pronounced as Abstract Expressionism took off on the cultural market of 
the post-war art boom.  
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“While the fifties brought fame and fortune to many pioneer New York artists,” 
Rose laments, “it was largely a depressing and discouraging decade for Newman, who 
was, for the moment, left out of the winner’s circle.”409 Another critic, writing in 1991, 
hints at Newman’s contradictory status when he describes the artist as both “well-
known,” but also “much ridiculed.”410 For Peter Schjeldahl he was the “late bloomer . . . . 
not promptly recognized.”411 For David Sylvester, Newman was “generally ridiculed or 
ignored until the end of the 1950s,” which Sylvester thinks may explain Newman’s 
central position in the Irascibles photograph. “[H]is [Newman’s] published writings had 
given him the role of the group’s spokesperson or guru or fool. One thing is certain: he 
was not put in the center because he was thought to have a central position as an artist. As 
an artist he was deemed by his peers—Pollock apart—to be a dud.”412 The dud, as such, 
was not included in the Museum of Modern Art’s highly important “Fifteen Americans” 
exhibition in 1952, a show with particular historical importance for the labeling and 
identifying of Abstract Expressionism. As Hess (who himself several decades earlier had 
followed the majority opinion in ousting Newman from the ranks of serious painting), 
noted in the 1970s, Newman’s omission from this exhibition had “hurt him deeply; he 
felt he had been excluded with the consent if not the advice of his friends: he had been 
betrayed.”413 “In short,” as Newman himself reflected on his unaligned, and sometimes 
problematically so, position, “they find me too abstract for the abstract expressionists and 
too expressionist for the abstract purists.”414 
The other “dud” of the generation, also smarting from the indignity of being 
outside the winner’s circle, was Reinhardt, the “black monk,” the “conscience of the art 
world.” “In the context of developing Abstract Expressionism in the 1940s and 1950s,” 
the critic Richard Martin in 1974 put frankly, “Reinhardt, of course, stood in isolation. . . 
.”415 He was, Hess wrote, “[o]ne of the last artists of his generation to receive the 
recognition he deserved (sales, exhibitions, articles),” whose peers “used to say bitchily, 
if only Ad could sell one small painting and two watercolors a year, he’d be happy.”416 
But whereas Newman’s marginalized importance to the group was marked by his role as 
spokesperson and advocate, Reinhardt’s was frequently marked, as Lippard describes, as 
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that of an “irritant.”417 His highly outspoken antipathy toward many of the attitudes 
associated with Abstract Expressionism and his personal antagonism to quite a few of 
their number has been read as a simple, uncomplicated rejection of his artistic generation. 
But, as accounts of the period show, he was in fact so much a part of things, present at the 
formal symposia, present at the informal gatherings—even if as irritant. Indeed, at least 
one curator and one art historian have already attempted to formulate a more complicated 
picture of Reinhardt’s relationship to Abstract Expressionism. In 1968, John Coplans, 
writing as the curator for the exhibition “Serial Imagery” at the Pasadena Museum of Art, 
argued for the strength of Reinhardt’s identity with the 1950s painters, “by virtue of the 
length of his painting life which began prior to World War II,” and because “he was a 
close friend and associate of painters of that group and an original contributor to this 
phase of American painting.”418 A decade later, in 1978, the art historian Robert Hobbs 
situated Reinhardt in this way: “Formally, his works belong with early Abstract 
Expressionism even though Reinhardt separated himself from the attitudes that intrigued 
so many of his peers. He viewed art as a tautology and found the Abstract Expressionist 
emphasis on angst-ridden brushstrokes melodramatic. Perhaps, his position can be most 
clearly elucidated if one regards him as both a participant and the conscience of Abstract 
Expressionism, who pursued in painting what he rejected in words.”419 Or, finally, as 
Lippard puts it, “Through the fifties, Reinhardt’s ideas had seemed highly eccentric; he 
was outside the circle despite his prolonged participation.”420 
Hess’s study of the art comics and satires by Reinhardt performs some interesting 
footwork in positioning Reinhardt as well. Hess, probably most profoundly identified as 
the art writer of Abstract Expressionism, as the editor of ARTnews during its tenure as 
organ for the New York School, opens the 1975 text on a personal note. The reason for 
this is perhaps the unspoken question lurking underneath the text: why is he, Hess, 
writing on Reinhardt at all? Hess states simply: “Ad Reinhardt was a good friend; we had 
lunch together weekly for over 15 years; when he couldn’t make lunch or drinks he sent a 
postcard. He upbraided me. I upbraided him. But we had many more likes and dislikes in 
common.”421 A little later on Hess—under the sign of recalling “New York Abstract-
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Expressionism, the movement (was it ever a movement?), the years (when did they begin, 
when end?)”—tries to paint a picture of Reinhardt’s location within it.  
Of course, Ad’s air wasn’t exactly anybody else’s. He moved in his own 
atmosphere and observed events and colleagues . . . through its distortions. 
Like all great satirists, he was very much his own man, and a man apart. 
For example, I can see Ad Reinhardt clearly, at the Artists Club on Eighth 
Street, with his Ivy League air, a touch of Faculty Club sports clothes and 
crew-cut, his protective colorations, his uniform, among working-man’s 
jeans and sweatshirts, with the neck and face of a Roman boxer, bob a bit 
and swivel his shoulders, ask a mean question, and then shrug and with an 
uneasy laugh turn aside arguments before they got nasty or personal.422 
 
“He was,” Hess concludes, “a man with a difference—an insider without a peer-group, 
without a pigeonhole, regular, but odd.”423 Hess offers a nuanced account of Reinhardt’s 
conflicted relationship to Abstract Expressionism that helps one in grasping why the 
artist’s openly critical stance towards Abstract Expressionism did not preclude his 
possessing a keen, sometimes bitter, awareness of his exclusion. Bois, as well, has 
suggested that the “virulence of his attacks against Abstract Expressionist painters 
implies a deep wound. Reinhardt insists time and again on what separates him from these 
artists, but he also writes: ‘Traitor, betrayal. Abstract-expressionists acted as if I were 
betraying them. But they were betraying me for two decades.’”424 “I guess,” Reinhardt 
told an audience in London at the Institute of Contemporary Arts in the spring of 1964, 
“I’ve been outside and I’ve been an outcast, or at least not a howling success.”425 Or, take 
this admission, made to Rosenberg in a private letter: “of course I have ‘personal’ beefs . 
. . complaints about being ‘left out’ of things, important social or historical events.”426 
Included in that list of important social and historical events from which Reinhardt had 
been left out, one would find the 1952 “Fifteen Americans” show, the same one Newman 
had bemoaned, and also MoMA’s highly important and world-traveling 1958 exhibition 
“New American Painting,” an exhibition which, by the way, did include Newman, though 
just barely.427 Most recently and quite explicitly, in 2000, the persistence of the Reinhardt 
problem surfaced in Craven’s critical history of Abstract Expressionism. Notably, by 
Craven’s sense of the categories, Newman belongs to Abstract Expressionism and 
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Reinhardt does not. This is a separation undeniably indicated throughout Craven’s text by 






Book Versus Paint Rag: The Difference A Degree Makes 
What I want to do now is explore the degree to which Newman’s and Reinhardt’s 
marginal and sometimes antagonistic relationship to Abstract Expressionism can be 
critically illuminated through a focus on theory and practice issues. Specifically the 
“rejection” of the two artists by their peers can be seen as based on the suspicion of their 
work failing to be praxical, of their having split apart theory and practice and open 
themselves up to the damning charge that their practice, their paintings, served as mere 
post-scriptive illustrations to their preconceived theories. In registering this charge, one 
should take into account the particular way praxis, as the authentic act of making, was 
accented. Typically, notions of good painting praxis, at this moment and with this milieu, 
meant granting a higher visibility to a practice in which the component of theory 
developed spontaneously—a theory so immediate to practice as to be just barely there, a 
mute presence, an article of faith.429 In a special issue of Arts Magazine devoted to 
looking back at the 1950s, Kim Levin wrote that the “fifties may not have wanted to 
think about anything but it did want to feel, to experience, to be absorbed by 
immediacy.”430  
If there is any doubting the simplicity and tenacity of these characterizations, one 
has only to look to James H. Beck’s retrospective account of Reinhardt in 1980.  
Ad Reinhardt belongs to a limited number of painters and, really, artists of 
every medium whose influence on their peers is far greater than the quality 
of their art. He, and I suspect I should add to this category others from the 
New York School, such as Barnett Newman and Robert Motherwell, who, 
in diverse ways and through somewhat different channels, had deep 
impact upon the art world in the 1950s and 1960s on all levels from the 
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universities to the art magazines, from the art market to the museums. On 
the other end of the spectrum are the less verbally articulate painters—
Pollock, de Kooning, Kline, and Tomlin—whose works speak exclusively 
for their aesthetic. Their art, apparently only coincidently, is more 
painterly, that is to say, more ostensively dependent upon the brush, finger 
or stick, and consequently characterized by a pictorially vital surface.431 
 
Though almost insultingly crude, Beck’s characterizing division rehearses the scheme 
broadly offered by Hess. According to Hess, one could subdivide Abstract 
Expressionism. There were the “‘downtown’ artists, the ones who might be called 
‘bohemians,’” against the “uptown ‘intellectuals.’” “Among the former were artists such 
as Gorky, de Kooning, Pollock, Kline, David Smith. They had gone through the 
disciplines of art schools and academies, not to universities. Their social life was centered 
around Greenwich Village. . . . Among the ‘intellectuals’ were Newman, Rothko, Still, 
Motherwell, Reinhardt, and, by temperament if not with a college diploma, Gottlieb. 
Their social life gravitated uptown. They lived in apartments. When talking and writing 
about art, their language was clearer, more analytical. Many of them, and their wives, had 
taught in established schools.”432  
Certainly these last lines of Hess’s appear to implicate Newman—especially if 
one knows a few things of Newman’s and his wife Annalee’s biographies. Newman’s 
outsider status was further aggravated even within the already marginalized “uptown 
intellectuals” by the fact that he, unlike a number of them, had not worked in the 1930s 
on the Project. “[M]uch of the substructure of the New York art community,” Hess 
reminds, “was based on friendships made while the artists worked together on the various 
mural and easel projects of the 1930s.” “Because Newman had been conspicuously 
absent from the scene, and because it was known that he had made his living as a teacher, 
it was assumed that he was some sort of an intellectual, a theoretician and, as far as 
painting was concerned, an upstart.”433 Indeed, Hess’s articulation of this split and his 
relegation of Newman and Reinhardt to the “uptown intellectuals” re-surfaces in a variety 
of accounts. The painter Jack Tworkov, one of the “downtown Cedar Bar set,” tagged 
Newman a “kibitzer.”434 He was a talker (even an “exceptional talker”), a social gadfly 
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coming in from outside to hang out with the artists but he didn’t seem to count as an 
“active participant.”435 Motherwell, oddly enough given his own learned pedigree, 
seconded this sentiment in a 1987 interview. He referred to “good ol’ Barney” as the 
“artist’s friend,” someone who was good at talking, joking, and entertaining but whom 
“no one took . . . seriously.”436 “Barney couldn’t paint at all,” Adolph Gottlieb told 
interviewer John Gruen, “He just wrote.”437  
Although, unlike Newman, Reinhardt had in fact worked in the government art 
project in the 1930s, Hess still found much need to talk through the issue of Reinhardt’s 
apparently excessive, and thus suspect, level of higher formal education. “His 
background as a student and his dedication to teaching also separated him from the 
others,” Hess noted. The “faculty club” look that Hess mentioned earlier went along with 
a pronounced penchant for academic erudition. “He was always studying and was proud 
of having taken classes in Oriental art from prof. Alfred Salmony and at the Institute of 
Fine Arts, N.Y.U. (he attended graduate courses there, off and on, in 1946-50. He went to 
lectures by art historians whenever he could, preferring the drier pedantic ones, who 
could supply factual data and the field he was interested in. . . .” Perhaps oddest of all, 
according to Hess, was that Reinhardt “enjoyed giving talks at College Art Association 
meetings.”438 What is particularly interesting in Hess’s apologia for Reinhardt’s cutting 
the figure of the academic amidst all that workingman’s denim of the Artists’ Club is that 
Hess suggests that the eccentricity of Reinhardt’s educational background exceeded even 
that of Newman’s. Although Newman had attended liberal arts colleges just as Reinhardt 
had, Newman had also “attended art schools simultaneously.” Reinhardt, on the contrary 
had “spent four years as an undergraduate at Columbia,” and had “entered art school full-
time only after his graduation,” and even then he had attended the National Academy of 
Design, and not the Art Students’ League.439 Budd Hopkins, as well, pointed to Reinhardt 
as the “quintessential outsider,” and described among the reasons for this—and note how 
similar these are to those given for Newman’s—that “[h]e was originally trained not as a 
painter but as an art historian and esthetician.” Indeed, for Hopkins the “fact that 
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[Reinhardt] appeared more comfortable with a book than a paint rag served later on to 
distance him from Cedar Bar shop-talk and professional camaraderie.”440  
One alignment between Newman and Reinhardt is already now set in place. Both 
have questionable credentials in the eyes of the Cedar Bar crowd. They both attend 
liberal arts colleges, earn bachelor’s degrees in philosophy—Newman from City 
University and Reinhardt from Columbia University—and go on to pursue various forms 
of post-graduate studies. They write and lecture frequently, they articulate themselves 
well in words, they appear brainy, and one suspects they might be equally as comfortable 
in the study as they are in the studio. As late as 1980, James Beck, writing in Arts 
Magazine, was still making the point about the special “nature of Reinhardt’s training,” 
that his was a liberal arts education as “opposed to what he may have lost in those crucial 
four years that might otherwise have been spent in the studio.” Beck lumps Motherwell 
and Newman along with Reinhardt as college graduates “rather than the product of an art 
school, which apparently was the [sic] very different orientation of de Kooning, Gorky, 
and Gottlieb.”441 Ultimately, he questions the adequacy of Reinhardt’s training as an 
artist (and thus, by extension, Newman’s and Motherwell’s also), that in tending to the 
liberal arts rather than the studio arts, Reinhardt more accurately ought to be considered a 
“self-taught painter,” because “in the 1930s the distance between Columbia College and 
the Art Students League was much greater than 59 blocks.”442 What this comes down to, 
in these accounts, is the book versus the paint rag, the seeming abstractness of theory 
versus the real direct practice of painting.  
Certainly Newman’s and Reinhardt’s detractors would not be overly taxed if 
asked to produce proof of their “theorizing.” Both wrote a good deal and both of them 
ended up justifying their activity of writing and publishing in notably similar ways. In 
“How to Look at the Record,” a P.M. art satire from November 1946, Reinhardt included 
in an editorial box: “The world and our local situation is not much good for painting (or 
creative activity) (or decent living) and good artists try, in their ways, to change it. The 
level of art-criticism and art-writing is so low in this country and so removed from artists’ 
art-talk that painters themselves must do something about this, too (sometime) (soon).”443  
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This sentiment is echoed, just a year later, in Newman’s terse response to a 
Tiger’s Eye query. Newman wrote: “An artist paints so that he will have something to 
look at; at times he must write so that he will also have something to read.”444 But one 
hardly needs reminding that Newman’s and Reinhardt’s stance—their active engagement 
with the need for intelligent, informed art-writing—was not a common one. A telling 
incident occurs in a letter from 1950 from Mark Rothko to Newman. In this 
correspondence Rothko complains about the many demands made of him to write 
statements. “As to the Tiger’s Eye,” Rothko writes, “I have written them two long letters 
explaining [to] them just why I do not wish to write anything now. . . .” Rothko goes on 
to explain that he is refusing the Tiger’s Eye as he is refusing the Magazine of Art, as 
well, because “I simply cannot see myself proclaiming a series of nonsensical statements 
. . . which ultimately have no meaning whatsoever.” “The real reason,” he continues, “is 
that at least at this time I have nothing to say in words which I would stand for. I am 
heartily ashamed of the things I have written in the past. This self-statement business has 
become a fad this season, and I cannot see myself just spreading myself with a brush of 
statements, everywhere, I do not wish to make.”445 It is hard not to read between 
Rothko’s lines an assertion of the author’s elevated and prior position in a hierarchy in 
which artists possess greater authenticity than the critic, curator, editor or art writer. In 
actuality, Rothko is writing to Newman as a kind of editorial intermediary between 
himself and John and Ruth Walgreen Stephan, the editors of Tiger’s Eye (a publication in 
which a number of Newman’s own writings appeared and to which Newman provided 
editorial assistance).446 Also, one wonders, what of that most famous, inflammatory and 
history-marking statement, the 1943 letter to Edward Alden Jewell, the conservative art 
editor of the New York Times, signed by Adolph Gottlieb and Marcus Rothko, but 
composed, as many suspect, under the careful guidance of Newman?447 How could 
Rothko’s flippant dismissal of the “self-statement business,” his avowed shame over 
“things I have written in the past” (or merely signed?) not have registered awry with 
Newman? For Newman did, and regularly so, have things to say, important things—in 
statements that he labored over through successive drafts, carefully choosing his words, 
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taking the “self-statement business” seriously, in writing as well as painting.448 Or, as 
Rosenberg asserted, “he believed in the reciprocal influence of paint and words.”449 But 
for his penchant for being vocal and verbal, Newman like Reinhardt, would pay. E. C. 
Goosens’s presumably celebratory review of Newman’s 1958 Bennington exhibition, one 
heralding the artist’s re-emergence after a seven-year hiatus from exhibiting, takes on a 
double edge as the author describes the artist as the “philosopher and gadfly of the New 
York School,” who during his years of not exhibiting still “remained sufficiently in 
evidence himself, producing a stir occasionally with an open-letter suggesting the 
incompetence of various members and institutions of the ‘art-world’ and making frequent 
sorties into vanguard art society where his wit, aggressive concern with principle, and his 
poetically enigmatic pronouncements seemed to be headed toward placing him 
permanently as a personality. . . .”450  
 As suggested earlier, the abstracting dualism of theory and practice provides an 
interesting lens by which to consider the shift from the “outsider” status of the 1940s-50s 
to the “insider” status of the 1960s and beyond. It acts as a pivot by which direction and 
identity are reversed. Newman and Reinhardt turn out not to be the ugly ducklings, or the 
artist-imposters, after all, but the real thing; they are simultaneously cast as the two 
fathers of the 1960s. The pay-off for the rejection, insults, mockery came with the dawn 
of the 1960s, and with a much altered accenting of praxis. Where previously Newman’s 
and Reinhardt’s “talk” had been taken as indication that something was awry, or lacking, 
with their art making, it now found sympathetic admirers in a younger generation 
revising conceptions of good praxis by up-ending the apparent priority given to practice 
over theory by the older Abstract Expressionists. This younger generation of artists were 
proficient in the artist’s “self-statement business” and displayed little, if any, of Rothko’s 
shame for things written “in the past”; they appeared not at all reluctant to pick up the 
pen, peck on keyboards, have a byline.   
Certainly the impact of Reinhardt on Joseph Kosuth stands out as a good example 
of this reversal. Kosuth has spoken forcefully of his “debt” to Reinhardt. “Ad Reinhardt’s 
paintings, for many of us, were a kind of passage.”451 But key to this notion of a debt 
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owed to Reinhardt and a passage made through Reinhardt is the crucial framing of 
Reinhardt’s project as including both his painting and his writing. In Kosuth’s estimation, 
Reinhardt worked on his definition of art through his painting “practice and in his 
writing.”452 Reinhardt’s polemic, as Nancy Spector saw it, had been the great inspiration 
behind Kosuth’s call for an “explicit merger of criticism, or writing about art, and art 
making. In Conceptualism, he [Kosuth] foresaw the annexation of the critic’s function by 
an art form dedicated to a theorisation of its own existence. His goal was to establish a 
new hybrid art premised on the fusion of theory and practice.” Thus Kosuth’s reference 
to Reinhardt as “the artist-as-critic” or as “a major intellectual presence” carried none of 
the derisive connotation such a designation bore at mid-century.453 Indeed, the force of 
Kosuth’s position can be felt in his recent tirade against the academic art historians—
particularly against Bois who authored “The Limit of Almost,” the catalogue essay for 
the Reinhardt retrospective in 1991. In Kosuth’s opinion Bois grossly misunderstands 
Reinhardt’s work by separating the writing from his painting, a separation which 
subsequently allows for the reclamation of Reinhardt into the Greenbergian narrative of 
modernist painting. “[Y]ou cannot separate Reinhardt’s paintings from his ‘theoretical’ 
works; they inform each other,” Kosuth challenges. “The experience of one would not be 
the same without the experience of the other. If Reinhardt was, indeed, our ‘guru’, it was 
precisely because of what this taught us.”454     
In a similar vein part of Newman’s appeal to many of the younger generation was 
his willingness to talk and in his skill at forcefully and coherently arguing through the 
issues that most impassioned him. Rose alludes to this shift in attitudes about artistic 
authenticity and the new value that was placed on “theory” in her accounting of 
Newman’s late career status as “patriarch of the art world.” “By the time he died in 1970 
. . . Newman had won international acclaim and had been adopted as a father figure by a 
younger generation of American artists who were impressed rather than frightened by his 
intelligence as a painter.”455 This shift in mentality is also detected in Barbara Reise’s 
attempt in a 1970 article to clarify the importance of Newman. In her closing paragraph 
she calls for the “long over-due” major retrospective and announces that such a 
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retrospective would “be a concrete refutation of cherished art-world clichés like: 
‘Painters are verbally inarticulate,’” or “‘Conceptual art requires the negation of 
objects,’” or ‘A sense of history inhibits creativity.’”456 Perhaps it was a combination of 
Newman’s verbal fluency and his status (in the eyes of many of the younger artists), as 
part of “history,” plus the older artist’s willingness to engage with the younger artists that 
made such a strong point. “[U]nlike others in his heroic generation,” Carter Ratcliff 
described, Newman “enjoyed meeting younger artists (sometimes he even looked at—
and respected—their work).”457 Likewise, another critic, Douglas Davis eulogized 
Newman as “seem[ing] to befriend everyone he met, especially younger artists, whose 
openings he alone of the senior artists attended.”458 Some of the very same qualities that 
marked him an outsider and ugly duckling with the Cedar Bar crowd came in handy in 
convincing Larry Poons’s father that a future as an artist was not an ignoble or silly one. 
In a much recounted incident, sometime in the summer of 1959, Larry Poons confessed to 
Newman that he was having “a rough time with my father with what I was doing.” As 
Poons narrates,  
Barney said very quickly, “Oh, let me talk to your father.” So we set up a 
luncheon date at Sloppy Louie’s—my father, myself and Barney. Barney 
was a pretty impressive figure to my father, a businessman with a practical 
frame of mind, and I guess even the very sight of Barney impressed him in 
a way that he would be impressed. Barney came around to saying, “Look, 
your son wants to be an artist—that’s a noble profession; you ought to get 
off his back about it.” My father got interested in Barney’s painting 
Abraham because it was Abraham who was willing to slay his son, which 
made the point. . . . 
 
The impact of this gesture on Poons was profound. He ends, “That was, at that time, and 






The Problems of Dual Paternity: Logos Canceling Logos 
The paternal topos is worth spending some time considering, in part because it has been 
called upon with frequency to negotiate the relationship between Newman and Reinhardt 
and the younger artists of the 1960s. Here are a few examples. In Rose’s 1965 essay 
“ABC Art,” in which she describes the new minimalist direction in art, both Newman and 
Reinhardt are acknowledged as highly important forbearers. Her discussion of Reinhardt 
and of his significance for the new minimalists is given an entire section (one tellingly 
titled “Art for Ad’s Sake”). “His dicta, as arcane as they may have sounded when first 
handed down from the scriptorium, have become nearly canonical for the young 
artists.”460 Rose further registers the apparent twist in Reinhardt’s fate when she states 
bluntly, “No one, in the mid-fifties, seemed less likely to spawn artistic progeny and 
admirers than Ad Reinhardt.”461 Newman, though not given the same amount of space or 
attention in this essay, is pointed to (along with Jasper Johns) as one of the artists this 
younger generation turned to in the “shift toward a new sensibility,” a part of which was 
a turning away from an increasingly unconvincing Action Painting. The “young artists” 
were looking to the “static emptiness of Barnett Newman’s eloquent chromatic 
abstractions”; the “new sensibility . . . preferred Newman and Johns to Willem de 
Kooning or his epigoni.”462  
This positioning of Newman and Reinhardt Rose would repeat in subsequent 
years. In 1971, shortly after Newman’s death, she designated Newman, the now-senior 
artist, as the “moral support of young artists, whose openings he faithfully attended.” Not 
only had Newman “enjoyed his role as patriarch of the art world,” but Rose contends 
hyperbolically that “in many respects he was the art world.”463 But also, in 1975, writing 
in the introduction to the volume of Reinhardt’s collected writings she had edited, Rose 
emphasized the artist’s “importance as a precursor of the reductionist style of minimal 
art,” “whose prescient ideas enlightened an entire younger generation.”464 Nor was Rose 
the only one keyed to this “father complex” for Newman and Reinhardt. The artist Dan 
Christensen spoke of being able to “see where many of the Minimal sculptors came from 
Newman, from that kind of physicality, of completeness.”465 Hess, too, wrote of a 
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paternal tie between Reinhardt and the Minimalists, of Reinhardt’s becoming “with 
mixed pleasure, a hero to younger painters and critics—a father of Minimal Art.”466 
Hess has hinted at an important ambiguity here, one that colored both artists’ 
reactions to being assigned this paternal role. When Bruce Glaser questioned Reinhardt 
on how he felt about “the younger generation of so-called cool artists” looking up to him 
as a “kind of predecessor,” the artist shied away, out of resistance or disbelief, from 
assuming that kind of authority: “I don’t know about the artists looking to me as a 
predecessor.”467 If it was with “mixed pleasure” that Reinhardt acknowledged this 
fatherhood, it was a situation equally ambiguous for Newman as well. Dan Flavin, one of 
the rising stars of the younger generation, and one who shared a close relationship to 
Newman, reminisced: “I came to sense that Barney reservedly desired, obtained and 
enjoyed the esteem of young artists, particularly from those whose arts he could respect 
somehow. . . .”468 When Newman himself spoke of the situation, he added a touch more 
sting to what Flavin characterized as reserve. Queried about how he felt about being 
hailed the father of these new tendencies, he countered: “If I am the father, then who’s 
the mother?”469 While this quip is generally appreciated as a dose of the artist’s wit, it 
also, underneath the chuckles, continues to ask an important question. For, and in keeping 
up the metaphor, if one takes fathering as one aspect and mothering as the other, with a 
synthesis of these two parts creating a third, then Newman, in his role of fathering, is 
being mixed with something else to produce the next generation.  
Newman was smart to think to ask about what that other thing was, to ask for the 
identity of that with which he was being paired or coupled. The more apropos (though 
arguably unavailable) question would have been to ask the identity of the other suspected 
father. The contradictions that arise from 1960s reception narratives owe to the problem 
of dual paternity. For some of the weight and baggage that comes along with this figure 
of speech are the feudal ones regarding lines of proper succession—or however else one 
wants to put it, as purity of blood, authenticity, legitimacy, inheritance, all these “true” 
identities—as opposed to the bastard, the false, illegitimate claimant, the simulacrum, the 
copy. There is perversity, indeed, in claiming both Newman and Reinhardt as father.470  
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One wonders if their liberal “fathering” philosophies are not to blame in part for 
this messy situation, for both Newman and Reinhardt, when confronted with the 
“fatherhood” question and their relationship to these younger artists, similarly attributed 
their esteemed status to their openness, their leaving the situation “free.” Listen, for 
instance, to both artists in 1966 responding in interviews to the question of their 
influence. “I think [my influence],” Newman told Alan Solomon, “is precisely because I 
have not insisted on a dogmatic situation. Somehow what I’ve done has, I think, inspired 
. . . other people to free themselves from these conventions.”471 Newman’s sentiment is 
significantly similar to Reinhardt’s, who explained to an interviewer that his policy 
towards younger artists—a stance he had taken when he was forty years old—was never 
to say anything about younger artists: “What has bothered me is that the older painters 
who preceded me made troubles for me that they shouldn’t have. Now I don’t want to 
make any troubles for the young artists, but leave them free.”472 Neither artist, then, if 
they were to be hitched to the designation “father of. . . ,” were going to play the part 
paternalistically. There would be no dogma, no conventions, no rules, no law from on 
high. Confoundedly, they were the Logos (father); with Logos (theory, talk); without 
Logos (rule, law). 
  This policy of leaving things free may well have backfired, for it opened the door 
to the most excruciating problems of mistaken identity, of confusing the identities of 
Newman and Reinhardt in a way that could only have deeply disturbed them both. It was 
a confusion of identity that radically put into question the foundations of their respective 
projects. A telling instance of this tendency to switch Newman and Reinhardt for each 
other, without apparent ideological qualm or unease, can be witnessed in the 1983 
catalogue statements for an exhibition whose theme was a retrospective look back to 
1960s abstraction. One contributor found Newman “more authoritative at that moment in 
terms both of critics’ consciousness of painting and the desires of the young painters, 
than anyone of the newer generation. . . .  He was even more important than Pollock.” 
Another contributor, however, sensed the “iconoclastic ghost of Ad Reinhardt lurk[ing] 
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behind the show and dominat[ing] [her] 1960s.”473 The examples below will show how 
Newman and Reinhardt play out this dual paternity. 
Frank Stella, a prominent figure within the younger post-Abstract Expressionist 
generation, provides an interesting, if complex, instance of this. In 1960 Stella buys the 
first of the two Reinhardt black paintings that he will eventually possess.474 In 1967 Stella 
asserted, “Ad can’t play the game anymore, but nobody can get around the paintings 
anymore either. If you don’t know what they’re about you don’t know what painting is 
about.”475 Just a year prior to purchasing the Reinhardt black painting Stella had attended 
and been keenly impressed by Newman’s exhibition at French and Company, and one 
could argue that in Newman Stella had found another artist whose paintings could not be 
gotten around, whose paintings one had to come to terms with in order to “know what 
painting is about.” It had been, as Stella recounted, a “tremendous show,” and Newman’s 
paintings were “tremendously good, and tremendously convincing.”476 Stella’s response 
to Newman has been a topic examined by Caroline Jones, who explains, “before 
Newman’s death, Stella had been more willing to compare himself with the older painter, 
and even to aspire publicly” to Newman’s achievement.477 What this statement suggests, 
and, indeed, what Jones goes on to elaborate, is Stella’s conflicted framing of the older 
artist’s influence, that Stella suffered an anxiety of influence and felt ambiguously 
towards Newman’s paternal role. In 1966, while Newman was still alive, Stella said of 
Newman’s paintings that “that’s what I would like to get.” As Jones again points out, 
however, in 1970, after Newman’s death (indeed as part of a Newman memorial event) 
Stella misdates the French and Company exhibition to post-date his own Black Paintings, 
and “dances on the head of a very small pin” when responding to an interviewer’s 
question about Newman’s influence. “When you’re sort of praising someone,” Stella 
begins, pauses, then laughs and picks up again with a different tack: “I would say that 
Barney had very little influence, if any at all.”478 As Jones charts, Stella’s framing of his 
response to this question will fluctuate over the years. By 1989, however, when Stella 
offers a favorable analogy between Newman and Velasquez—”Newman was able to 
depict the modern artist’s internal world with the same clarity that Velasquez brought to 
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the external world of Old Master painting”—one imagines that Stella’s anxiety has 
subsided. Newman’s paternity has been safely distanced into the realm of an Old 
Master.479 
Donald Judd, another highly significant artist of the younger generation, 
expressed admiration for these “older contemporaries.”480 In 1964, in a highly flattering 
assessment, Judd wrote, “Barnett Newman’s paintings are some of the best done in the 
United States in the last fifteen years.” This assessment is given further force by the fact 
of Judd’s desire to purchase Newman’s Shining Forth (to George), which was, in Judd’s 
words, “a spectacular painting.”481 Further indication of the almost reverential status 
Newman possessed in Judd’s regard can be inferred again from the latter’s eventual 
coming into possession of the older artist’s chairs.482 At some point after Newman’s 
death, Annalee presented these chairs to Judd, presumably because she knew of a special 
bond between him and her husband, and that her husband would have approved of this 
bequest and, even further, that Judd would duly appreciate them.  
The significance of this gesture requires some unpacking. First off, these were not 
any old chairs. They were, obviously, Newman’s chairs, the ones he is seen frequently 
sitting in, as in Hans Namuth’s 1951 black-and-white photograph of the artist smoking a 
cigarette in his Wall Street studio (fig. 9), or in Alexander Liberman’s 1961 color 
photograph of the artist in his Front Street studio (fig. 10), in Lane Slate’s 1963 CBS-
televised interview with the artist for the “Contemporary American Painters” series, in 
Ugo Mulas’s 1965 photograph of the artist in his apartment sitting in front of two of the 
paintings from The Stations of the Cross (fig. 11), and also in Emile de Antonio’s filmed 
interview with the artist a few months before his death. The force of the metonymic slide 
between the artist and his set of chairs—chairs distinctive in a peculiar sort of way, of 
smooth, worn wood, polished through familiar wear, with a sturdy rounded back, 
prominent armrests, and gently swelling concave back-supporting slats; overall, a bit 
heavy, with something slightly old-fashioned about them, comfortable but not cushy, 
upright but not rigid, consistent somehow with Newman’s starched shirts but slightly off-
kilter bow-tie, the tweed with only one button done up, the monocle, the mustache—is 
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made most poignant in de Antonio’s panning of the artist’s studio just after his death, 
with its unfinished canvases and Newman’s chair, now empty. The chairs very much 
assume the aura of Newman, and very much in an ex cathedra sort of way.  
The second element of the situation that should be elaborated is that of the 
recipient Judd. Hardly indifferent to his living and working environment, he ordered his 
spaces with almost fanatical precision, intention and authority. His dissatisfaction with 
prefabricated furniture lead to his decision to begin designing his own.483 The pieces that 
Judd designed—for example, in his Spring Street building, the dining room table and 
chairs and the daybed/sofa of the second floor and then later, at his complex in Marfa, 
Texas, the long library table—are (not unexpectedly) minimalistic, spartan, unadorned, 
constructed of flat planes of naked pine, with straight edges and right angles. 
With the particularities of the gift of Newman’s chairs elaborated, it becomes 
easier to weigh the significance of Newman’s chairs’ presence—at both Spring Street and 
Marfa—in terms of homage and perhaps, of continuation, of legacy. One must return to 
Judd’s 1964 review now in order to reach the crux of this anecdote. After writing of 
Newman’s work, Judd goes on to mention Reinhardt. His work, Judd states, is 
“considerably better than the European painting evident in the magazines and that shown 
in New York.”484 In comparison to the incontestable praise given to Newman, this 
compliment to Reinhardt sounds somewhat understated, diluted. Yet any suggestion of 
lukewarmness on Judd’s part towards Reinhardt’s work must be tempered by the fact that 
Judd came to possess a painting by Reinhardt, a fairly large red canvas that hung in the 
prominent location of the east wall of Judd’s Spring Street dining room.485 As with his 
furniture, Judd was infinitely particular about the artworks with which he surrounded 
himself. Furthermore, the placement of the Reinhardt red painting on the second floor 
meant that it was on a floor a notch less public than the ground floor, thus gaining in 
degrees of domesticity and privateness. It also meant that unlike the artworks Judd 
displayed on the ground floor, a space that he used for changing installations, the red 
painting had a more permanent status. And certainly one must not fail to mention the 
rather obvious: that the Reinhardt painting hung above the famous square dining room 
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table, a table that, according to Peter Ballantine (Judd’s long-time studio assistant and 
presently the caretaker of the Spring Street building), was a central location for activity—
thinking, talking, sitting, gathering, eating.486 The Reinhardt painting had both permanent 
and prominent status: Judd would have done a lot of living with it. In synthesizing Judd’s 
relationship to Newman and to Reinhardt, the hypothetical image one can compose is 
this: Judd assumes Newman’s vacated chair, his cathedra, in order to contemplate a 
Reinhardt. That he could possess both objects and have them so intimately a part of his 
hyper-conscious, particular and reasoned domesticity and not feel a disabling 
contradiction locates the opposing inclusive position to Rosenberg’s dividing judgment.  
But in a sense one can hardly blame a Stella or a Judd, or any number of other 
artists of the younger generation, for failing to make a distinction—of the crucial, one or 
the other, kind—between Newman and Reinhardt. Listening to the Andre/Frampton 
dialogue, one surmises that what binds Newman and Reinhardt as alike is that they hail 
from the Abstract Expressionists and yet the comparative minimalism of their paintings 
distinguishes them from the pervasive gesturalism of that generation.487 This bleeds into 
the other difficulty built into the task of keeping Newman and Reinhardt clearly and 
separately defined. Their radically reductive paintings appear to give the viewer very 





What Is There To Write About 
Newman and Reinhardt share obdurateness, near inscrutability, minimalism of event or 
incident, riding the edge of pictorial visibility which disallows an easy generation of 
words by which to grasp them or obvious terms by which to categorize and dissect, 
distinguish and differentiate. By way of a generalized characterization of the reception, 
criticism and scholarship on Newman and Reinhardt one might say that the recurring and 
central problem has been one of figuring the path that could possibly take the viewer 
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from these apparent visual “nothings”—so minimal, bare of incident—to the Ultimate or 
Absolute that both artists professed to be the real import of their work: how to figure the 
meaning of paintings which seemingly only minimally figure at all.  
“What is Reinhardt up to?” is how Priscilla Colt baldly addressed these issues, 
“The black squares come as close to nothing as painting can. Shrouded, exasperatingly 
hermetic, they skirt the edge of invisibility and unintelligibility, rebuffing both eye and 
mind.”488 Lippard, who authored Reinhardt’s monograph, also rehearsed and commented 
on this central trouble: “Art like Reinhardt’s . . . largely evaded critical attempts to come 
to terms with its non-relational and non-referential qualities, relation and reference being 
the critic’s chief supports.”489 Indeed, to slightly rephrase this, relation and reference are 
the basis of any language: the ability to discern like and dislike, similarity and difference 
are the mechanisms by which signs operate. Newman’s work also generated similar 
responses. One of the more interesting ones comes in the summer of 1959 in the form of 
a letter from a June D. M. Sand of Stateline, Pennsylvania, to the editor of ARTnews. The 
one-sentence letter is remarkable in its simplicity.  It follows: “Sir: It is a sacrilege and 
worse to call these abortions art.”490 The “abortions” to which the letter refers (as the 
editor’s parenthetical remark informs) are indicated by two cut-out reproductions which 
were found scotch-taped to the original letter. The source of these reproductions the 
editorial staff recognized as an earlier issue of ARTnews. One of these scotch-taped 
images was a reproduction of a Mark Tobey painting and the other is a Newman. What 
stands out in this is not that in 1959 there was hostility towards the reductive abstractions 
of Tobey or Newman. Not even the strength of the language—not just unfinished 
paintings but “abortions”—is all that remarkable. Rather, what seems most telling about 
this letter is the author’s special way of referencing them which I think stems from a very 
literal inability to come to terms with the paintings. Not only are neither artists nor titles 
of works named, but beyond the designation “abortion” and “not art” nothing is said of 
them. Their “aborted” presence is pointed to through the scotch-taped reproductions but 
there is no actual attempt to describe them—they are, in this instance, beyond the reach 
of language.  
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It is this shared condition, the non-relational, non-referential, seeming beyond the 
bounds of language, that factors into the ease with which the reductive abstractions of 
Newman and Reinhardt could be misidentified, their projects and works could be 
confused and apparently exchanged. “Barnett Newman’s art is obsessive, ritualized, 
mystical,” Hess wrote in a 1962 review of the artist’s joint show with de Kooning at the 
Allan Stone gallery. He continued, “Here the very act of repetition, over a span of years, 
creates of itself an object beyond the limitations of the initial actions. Rational means and 
ends both are transformed into mysteries. The picture turns into something different, a 
new antagonist, a dark mirror. . . . The Universal is hooked by the Banal. He makes a 
multitude of radiant negations.” Except for the use of the adjective “radiant,” Hess might 
as well be describing Reinhardt.491 Much the same case can be made for Max Kozloff’s 
1966 review of the “United States Exhibition at the VIII Sao Paulo Bienal” as it traveled 
to Washington, D.C. This was an exhibition in which Newman had been fore-fronted as a 
kind of elder precursor, or again, father figure, to the younger generation abstractionists 
included in the U.S. contingency (Larry Bell, Billy Al Bengston, Robert Irwin, Donald 
Judd, Larry Poons, and Frank Stella). The paintings as a whole, Kozloff announced, were 
antithetical to any form of “content”; they were not “not afraid to look rigid, dogmatic, 
even uninventive.”492 But the critic’s language is, as will become more explicit later on, 
all wrong for Newman and far better suited to Reinhardt. After all it is in Reinhardt’s 
collected writings, not Newman’s, that one finds statements like this: “Content is nothing, 
nothing at all,” and it was Reinhardt who made a notorious trademark of dogma, where 
things like rigidity—”the strictest formula,” “Endless repetition of infinite sameness”—
and the uninventive—”the completely conventional,” the “stereotyped image”—were 
given repeated sanction.493 Given how well Kozloff’s description could have fit 
Reinhardt, several questions are raised: why was Newman chosen as the elder 
representative of the new abstraction and not Reinhardt for the 1966 São Paulo Bienal? 
How is it that Kozloff, not an unintelligent critic, could make such a mistake, assign, as it 
were, paternity to the wrong figure?  
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I am going to treat these questions rhetorically and turn to a more recent instance 
of the confusion of Newman for Reinhardt and vice versa as a manner of reply, which 
will serve all the more to underscore the difficulty in making and maintaining a 
distinction between these two artists. The example of the contemporary misidentification 
comes from 2000 but, importantly, was pre-figured almost half-a-decade earlier in 1951. 
That year should stand out as the one in which Newman, for the second time, exhibited 
his severely reductive canvases at Betty Parsons. Among the works exhibited were two 
almost completely white paintings, The Voice (1950)(fig. 12) and The Name II 
(1950)(fig. 13), the extreme reduction of these canvases further highlighted by the 
exhibition’s white-on-white announcement card.494 The exhibition at the Betty Parsons 
Gallery immediately following Newman’s was that of a twenty-six year-old Texan, 
Robert Rauschenberg.495 One of the works exhibited, as Rosenberg later described it, was 
“four unpainted canvases joined together,” or Rauschenberg’s White Painting (fig. 14).496 
Rosenberg’s anecdote of Newman’s irritable response to the inevitable though wrong-
headed comparison between his metaphysical painting and the “easy” uninvested surfaces 
of rolled house paint was, “Humph! Thinks it’s easy. The point is to do it with paint.”497 
What Newman was insisting on was that there was a “point,” an all-important distinction 
that had to be made between his white paintings and Rauschenberg’s white painting. 
They were not identical.   
That was 1951. Here is the story forty-nine years later:  
The painted subtleties of the square that so fascinate art historians 
(variations in size, texture, and design features) do not lend themselves to 
photographic reproduction, the major form of art’s contemporary 
propagation. Overuse has caused the square to lose the mystical power that 
it had for Malevich in 1915. It has become a cliché, if not itself kitsch, and 
Robert Rauschenberg’s parody hit a sore nerve when he painted his own 
square with house paint and a paint roller—leading Ad Reinhardt to 
scream in protest: “Does he think it’s easy?”498 
 
These lines are from the concluding section—”A Short History of the Square”—of a 
chapter in Susan Buck-Morss’s Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass 
Utopia in East and West (2000). In this chapter she revisits the challenges and failures of 
167 
Bolshevik revolutionary culture and politics, that “temporary convergence of political 
and cultural avant-gardes,” from the perspective of a Left-committed Western scholar 
after the fall of the Soviet Union, or, in Buck-Morss’s words, after the “passing” of “mass 
dreamworlds.”499 The page-and-a-half of text preceding the passage quoted above gives a 
concise account of the square’s demise from its promising appearance on the 
revolutionary stage around 1915 on to the “second half of the century,” and to its final 
decline as a tired, old, ineffective actor, one who has made “so many public 
appearances.”500 Thematically, then, Buck-Morss’s misattribution to Reinhardt, rather 
than to Newman, of the “thinks it’s easy” Rauschenberg anecdote, unwittingly 
underscores her argument. For it is very difficult to see a distinctive “point” securing and 
separating the proper identities of monochromes. And in this mistaking Newman for 
Reinhardt and vice versa, Rauschenberg for Newman and vice versa, Reinhardt for 
Rauschenberg and vice versa, is all too forgivable. The Rauschenberg anecdote works, 
damningly well, with Reinhardt just as well as it did for Newman.  
What is notable here is the collapsing of the difference between Newman and 
Reinhardt, a reduction performed by both artists and critics of the 1960s but also 
persisting into the present. Rosenberg’s vital and all important dividing line separating 
the projects of Newman and Reinhardt boiled down to a choice: If one were truly aware, 
really knew what was going on in their paintings, support for one would mean 
automatically rejection of the other. But the anti-theticalness by which Rosenberg marked 
the relationship between Newman and Reinhardt was, as subsequent generations have 
proven, a difficult difference to actually see. It is a difference that dissembles; for they 
become the two fathers of the 1960s; they become one and the same.  
I want to elaborate upon this provocative notion of Newman and Reinhardt 
figuring as one and the same—to work out an excuse for why (against Rosenberg’s 
adamant distinction) this sort of conflating identification could happen. Later, I will 
return to this odd phrasing—”one and the same”—to suggest in fact that the crucial 
difference between Newman and Reinhardt is caught, ironically, within that very phrase 
meant to signify perfect equivalence, the perfectly self-evident. In the following chapter I 
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will reconstruct Newman’s and Reinhardt’s projects by articulating one against the other. 
Through the friction generated by this exercise I hope to find the relevant terms by which 
their minimally inflected canvases can be seen as embodying the meanings the artists 
professed for their painting—Newman’s Absolute and Reinhardt’s Ultimate—a 
reconciliation of form and content by which what looks like nothing could mean 
everything. What needs to be thought out next is how one goes about defining this 
difference between Newman and Reinhardt. Is it a distinction of no difference? Or it is a 









Between Pictures and Paintings 




A sign can be illuminated only with the help of another sign. 
Valentin Nikolaevich Vološinov502 
 
   [I]dentity can arise only out of opposition. 
Louis Dupré503 
 
There is a fourth quotation that could be added to the pithy three above to help round 
them out and bring them more directly to the subject of Newman and Reinhardt. In 1962 
the art historian George Kubler wrote: “The most valuable critic of contemporary work is 
another artist engaged in the same game. Yet few misunderstandings exceed those 
between two painters engaged upon different kinds of things.”504 The lines come from 
The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things, Kubler’s attempt to present a 
totalizing conception of historical processes as embedded within the morphology of 
objects. One can guess fairly well that these lines registered with Reinhardt. He refers to 
the book and its author in an “autointerview” for his March 1965 ARTnews “Reinhardt 
Paints a Picture”; soon after, in the January 1966 issue of the same magazine, he writes a 
flattering review of Kubler’s book.505 These same lines also registered several years later 
with Lippard. In her catalogue essay for Reinhardt’s 1966-67 Jewish Museum 
retrospective, Lippard boldly sets them off from the body text.506 What Lippard does not 
do next, however, is quite interesting given that the Kubler quote so tantalizingly compels 
it. She does not (operating on the assumption that the primary artist for Lippard in the 
context of an exhibition catalogue for Reinhardt is Reinhardt) name who that other artist 
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might be (i.e. the “most valuable critic” to Reinhardt). Of course, Lippard’s reticence on 
this point could be attributed to her having paid heed to the cautionary lines that 
immediately follow in the Kubler text: “Only long after can an observer resolve the 
differences between such painters, when their games are all out, and fully available for 
comparison.”507 Needless to say, in 1966, Lippard was not Kubler’s ideal “long after” 
observer, nor does one easily imagine her endorsing the notion that Reinhardt’s game was 
“all out.” Be that as it may, these come to seem a bit academic in the face of the very 
precise and quite real legalistic pressure acting on Lippard’s text and to which she and the 
Jewish Museum and its director Sam Hunter most certainly paid heed. 
 What is revealed in the 1967 correspondence between Hunter, the director of the 
Jewish Museum  at the time and Newman’s lawyer, Richard Marlin of Mnuchlin, Moss 
and Marlin, is that in an earlier version of Lippard’s text, Newman indeed had played a 
part in her analysis of Reinhardt’s work, and that the former’s “omission” in the final 
catalogue text was one of scoring out, a site of contestation. The contest at least anchored 
itself to the issue of this pair of quotations, the first Newman’s from 1947 and the second 
Reinhardt’s from 1958: “The basis of an aesthetic act is the pure idea. But the pure idea 
is, of necessity, an aesthetic act. Here then is the epistemological paradox that is the 
artist’s problem. . . . For it is only the pure idea that has meaning. Everything else has 
everything else,” and “Art is Art. Everything else is everything else.”508 Were these 
statements too close? Did they mean the same thing? It is Newman who, via his lawyer, 
will suggest that the statements are too close, indeed the same and thus that Reinhardt’s 
position is derivative, his statement a plagiarism of Newman’s. In his letter to Newman’s 
attorney, Hunter will write, “I was sorry  to see that Barnett Newman felt Ad Reinhardt’s 
well-known ‘art dogmas’ encroached on his own ideas and formulations of the purity-in-
art concept sufficiently to enlist the formal support and defense of an attorney” and will 
argue that the “repetition of the phrase ‘everything else’” was merely “coincidental.” 
[T]here seem no grounds for claiming one statement derives directly from 
the other, or constitutes plagiarism. There are substantial differences in 
phrasing content, tone and application; the point of view is itself as old as 
the “art-for-art’s-sake” doctrine, and common property available to 
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anyone who wishes to use it. The important point is how the doctrine is 
applied, stated or given an individual inflection.509 
 
Newman’s (improbable) request appears to be that proper acknowledgement be made to 
him in Lippard’s text—that he be acknowledged as the first, prior, the originator of an 
aesthetic position that Reinhardt “stole.” Newman wanted “‘amends’ to be made” by 
Reinhardt, Lippard, Hunter, the Jewish Museum. At the very least, it seems Newman 
would have been satisfied with “amends” in the form of a footnote—despite any petty 
academic connotations this form of citation might have, it is the place for locating the 
text’s sources, and qualifications.  For without this corrective amendment the Jewish 
Museum document was an “incomplete, unscholarly record,” an “inaccurate view of 
history.”510 Again, as the Jewish Museum document stands, none of these concessions are 
made to Newman, and the whole matter is left at a rather abrupt and unsatisfactory end. 
This may very well have had something to do with Reinhardt’s state of health at the time 
of these exchanges. For Hunter will explain to Newman’s lawyer why he is not 
forwarding the correspondence to the artist: “If Reinhardt were in good health—and 
unfortunately, he is in the hospital at the moment with angina, and needs a period of 
prolonged rest—I would eagerly pass on your letter. . . .”511 And, indeed, Reinhardt will 
die of a heart attack before the Jewish Museum show even comes down and before the 
exhibition catalogue goes to press.  
This incident raises a number of interesting issues: it does a good job of 
foreshadowing the thorny relation between the two artists that will be examined in the 
rest of this chapter. For now, however, it is enough to acknowledge how dramatically, 
how perfectly—and, indeed uncannily, the incident illustrates Kubler’s text. Lines from 
Hunter’s letter to Newman’s lawyer run practically parallel to lines of Kubler’s quotation. 
“It is a futile task to try to assign individual priorities for the shared and developing ideas 
in American vanguard art during the forties and early fifties, and a problem best left to 
the future historians and critics to resolve,” Hunter writes. And slightly later in the 
correspondence: “the only ‘amends’ to be made in this instance will be those of posterity 
and future historians, possessing more calm and objectivity than we do at this point in 
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time.”512 Perhaps, with Kubler’s warning in mind, and now Hunter’s as well, enough time 
has passed for revisitation, for a serious reckoning of these two artists. Naturally the 
question to begin with is this: were Newman and Reinhardt playing the same game, or 
were they playing different games, seeking different things altogether? 
Broadly, working out an answer to that question will be the remaining task of this 
dissertation. In the bluntest formulation my answer is yes, that Newman and Reinhardt 
were indeed playing the same game and that an increased sense of their identities can be 
gained—indeed, a far richer sense of the difficulties of what they were attempting, the 
very fineness of the line they walked—by mapping their projects as two maneuvers on 
the same playing field, through the Vološinovian route of a sign illuminating another 
sign. The answer becomes more complicated when Kubler’s quotation is parsed 
somewhat differently. While Newman and Reinhardt were playing the same game (they 
serve as each other’s most valuable critic), at the same time there is room for an immense 
amount of misunderstanding between them, a gap that surfaces most glaringly in the 
fierce refusal of each artist to recognize the validity of the other’s project. Before 
exploring the dissonant moment in this comparison, I first will attend to the consonance 
between Newman and Reinhardt and indicate the ways in which the two artists sought the 
same ends.  
This task can be organized through the distinction between pictures and painting. 
It was a distinction signally important to both artists, used by both as the poles, the 
limiting terms framing their projects, articulating the parameters of what was good and 
bad, valid and invalid. The stakes—and they were high—marked the difference between 
creating the true, the “Ultimate” (in Reinhardt’s language) or the “Absolute” (in 
Newman’s language) painting versus the false path of pictures and picture-making.513 
What is key is that Newman and Reinhardt defined the terms of pictures and painting 
along analogous lines. Painting, as the ultimate or absolute, was the object for both. It 
motioned toward a realm of freedom and authenticity transcending instrumental  
communication and decorative function, ideology and exchange value. Pictures, forming 
the opposing pole, were the perversions of the ideal values of painting; they were servile 
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instruments to reigning ideologies, pandering to the status quo in images easy on both eye 
and brain.  
In two lectures titled “Abstraction vs. Illustration” and “Paintings and Pictures” 
Reinhardt presented—at the fairly early date of 1943—the distinction he made between 
paintings and pictures. Pictures, in Reinhardt’s formulation, are illustrative. They possess 
recognizable subject matter, they tell stories, they are concerned with communication 
with a mass public. Although “[o]nce upon a time, a painting was a ‘picture,’” Reinhardt 
explains, with the modernization of picture production (industrial technologies), painting 
was “[r]elieved of its ‘picture purpose.’514 That Reinhardt burdens pictures negatively and 
regressively as easy transmitters of ideologies, as the perfect tokens of a culture industry 
instrumentalism, is indicated in his suggestion that with greater human liberation—
”[j]obs with shorter hours and better pay”—the need for pictures, as substitutes for 
experience, would be eliminated. “A landscape picture became no substitute for a day in 
the country. More leisure, more education, more direct and complete participation of all 
people in aesthetic activity was what had been needed, not more ‘pictures.’”515 What was 
needed, in other words, was a social order that could sustain and nurture painting and 
painters over the kind of social order that required for its ideological sustenance picture 
production and consumption. Painting was individual, free aesthetic activity; it was a 
“new object,” heralding a “democratization of art,” one which “disturbed and disrupted 
traditional values.” Reinhardt linked this new object to the “cubist, abstract tradition,” 
whose theme, he argues, was “creation itself—creation of things, objects, images that 
didn’t exist before they came into being. An abstract painting was not a rearrangement or 
distortion or re-creation of something else. It was a totally new relationship.”516 Or, as 
Reinhardt put it several years later, “We saw that pictures these days are only imitations 
and substitutes of real things and therefore not ‘high’ art. . . . We saw that an abstract 
painting is not a window-frame-peep-show-hole-in-the-wall but a new object or image 
hung on the wall and an organization of real space relations. . . . A modern painter’s 
worst enemy is the picture maker. . . .”517 One can see a line of continuity running from 
Reinhardt in 1943 (setting out the parameters of his aesthetic stakes through a valorized 
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notion of painting) to his later ultimate painting formula, the classic five-foot square 
black paintings (fig. 15), and to the more frantically pitched, “art-as-art dogma” where 
the earlier term “picture” slides into “life,” “everyday life,” or “art and life” and, the 
picture maker becomes the “philistine” and the businessman. In 1962 Reinhardt explicitly 
repeated: “The art of ‘figuring’ or ‘picturing’ is not a fine art.”518 In a late interview, 
Reinhardt testified to the deep roots of his aesthetic stances: “I had these ideas all the way 
through pretty much. I inherited them from the thirties.”519  
Although Newman would not get his formalization of a paintings/pictures split on 
record until some twenty years after Reinhardt, he did mark the transition between his 
own picture-making to painting back to the forties, and specifically to the creation of his 
all important Onement I (1948)(fig. 16). Here he “felt that for the first time for myself 
there was no picture making [emphasis added].”520 In 1963 Newman would elaborate this 
distinction in a televised interview with Lane Slate as part of an attempt to summarize his 
contribution to the field of painting. He told Slate, “I have removed the emphasis on a 
painting as an object. . . . Anyway, I’m not interested in adding to the objects that exist in 
the world. I want my painting to separate itself from every object and every art object that 
exists. . . . It is hard to say what one has accomplished. The work speaks for itself. 
However, one of the things that can be said is that I helped change painting from the 
making of pictures to the making of paintings. I never use the word ‘picture.’ Those who 
make pictures, whether realistic or abstract, are not making paintings.”521  
As with Reinhardt, the difference between pictures and paintings for Newman 
was one worth getting contentious about. Having one’s paintings discussed, as Newman 
alleged William Rubin did in the exhibition catalogue for the 1968 MoMA exhibition 
Dada, Surrealism, and Their Heritage, as if they were pictures was no small deal. In 
Newman’s mind, it amounted to nothing less than “personal injury.”522 “[A]s early as 
1947, I had moved painting beyond picture-making,” Newman asserted in a heated letter 
to the curator in which he further challenges Rubin to “[e]xamine the show in your mind 
and tell me how many other painters in that show, including Miro, carried painting 
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beyond the making of pictures. . . .”523 Doubtless, Reinhardt too would have made the 
identical claim of having moved painting beyond picture-making. 
The importance of this distinction for Newman is further underscored by the 
treatment and attention it has received in Newman scholarship. Notably, Richard Shiff 
has characterized Newman’s version/vision of painting as the “unique, immediate 
situation” and whereas picture-making is the “artificial world of reference and type.”524 
“A “painting” was not a “picture.” To Newman, as Shiff explains, a picture had to be of 
something, even if it was a picture of nothing but itself—a picture of an established type, 
exemplifying that type.”525 Pictures, once again, as fabrication, as abstractions of 
experience, as operations through “types,” become the umbrella term for all variety of 
falsification. Or, Arthur Danto offers a more recent confirmation of this point in his 
review of the 2002 Philadelphia Museum show. Danto explains that other artists of 
Newman’s milieu “had been struggling to make beautiful pictures, whereas” Newman, in 
contrast, “considered himself as having transcended beauty and picturing alike. . . . 
Onement I was a painting whereas what he had done before were merely pictures.” Danto 
elaborates, “In a painting by contrast, the surface is opaque, like a wall. We are not 
supposed to see through it. We stand in a real relationship with it, rather than in an 
illusionary relationship with what it represents. . . . A picture represents something other 
than itself; a painting presents itself. A picture mediates between a viewer and an object 
in pictorial space; a painting is an object to which the viewer relates without 
mediation.”526 Or, to point this back to Reinhardt’s 1943 statements, what has been 
effectively removed or negated is “picture-purpose.” 
These texts indicate Newman’s and Reinhardt’s mutual use of the 
painting/pictures dualism in framing their projects. The point ought be taken further, 
however, for the coincidence runs deeper. Both artists defined their painting projects (as 
against picture-making) by using the same constellated network of concerns. Their 
conjoint arguments for the identity of true painting share these points: (1) art as an 
enactment of ethics; (2) art as an embodiment of the realm of freedom; (3) art as 
transcending commodity status and resisting the culture industry; (4) art maintaining a 
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negationist stance of refusal; (5) but as a negation differentiated from the nihilism of anti-
art; all of which coalesce in (6) the normative desire for the One, unity, self-identity.   
That both artists took authentic art as a figuring of ethics, as forming an “ethical 
statement,” and as the enactment of good action, falls in line with the elevated register on 
which they took painting’s meaning to be played out. Equally, this offers insight into the 
serious nature of the consequences for what a failure of that project might mean.527 The 
prominence both artists gave to the ethical dimension in their life and work is highly 
notable. In their protesting, boycotting, posting fiery missiles, both had acquired colorful 
reputations as outspoken critics, constantly drawing a line between right and wrong. 
Newman had a “legendary reputation for integrity,” as one art historian noted. More 
recently, a critic has found in Newman’s art “the vivid conviction about art’s ability to 
convince, the forceful argument against the futile speediness and fretfulness of 
contemporary society, the summons to training for larger spiritual and intellectual life,” 
by which “we are given a vision of the human life worth living as profound as any this 
century has to offer.”528 Newman satisfied his own often quoted summation of the artist’s 
calling—”to wrest truth from the void.”529  
If Newman’s ethical commitment evokes the artist (and points to himself) as a 
truth-seeker, Reinhardt’s tends to veer, deprecatorily, towards the moralistic fervor of a 
fanatic. This reputation, nonetheless, indicates how thorough was Reinhardt’s 
identification with extreme ethical conviction. After all, he had nominated himself the 
“conscience of the art world,” a nomination easily substantiated in his rants about the 
contemporary artist’s responsibility and his colorful denunciations of fellow artists for 
“selling-out” to the evils of the commercial art world.530 Interestingly, in the preface to 
the 1991 Museum of Modern Art (New York) and Museum of Contemporary Art (Los 
Angeles) Reinhardt exhibition, William Rubin cautioned, “Ethical probity in life is not 
the same as ethos in painting,” although he goes on to make an exception for Reinhardt. 
In Reinhardt’s case, Rubin clarifies, “there is, I think, some sense of direct crossover in 
[his] mature painting—an ethical stamina that recalls his uncompromisingness, his moral 
fervor in life.”531  
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The prominence of the ethical question in Reinhardt’s thinking is testified to by 
the devotion of an entire section of his collected writings to the topic of “Art and Ethics.” 
Echoing Ludwig Wittgenstein’s similarly phrased sentiment, Rose writes of Reinhardt, 
“For him, ethics and aesthetics were one.”532 In Rose’s summation Reinhardt was, 
without a doubt, a “moralist” who “defended abstract art both as an aesthetic and as a 
moral cause.”533 Indeed, whether comparing early or late statements, public assertions or 
private journal entries, one finds Reinhardt’s consistent pursuit of an ethic embodied 
within painting. In his 1943 lecture “Abstraction vs. Illustration,” referred to earlier, it is 
abstract painting that manifests “dissatisfaction with ordinary experience, the 
impoverished reality of present-day experience,” and thus “stands as a challenge to 
disorder and disintegration. Its activity implies a conviction of something constructive in 
our time.”534 A little over twenty years later, now within the context of the highly 
polemical and contentious art-as-art statements, the sentiment is much the same: “Art-as-
art is always a battle cry, polemic, picket sign, sit-in, sit-down, civil disobedience, 
passive resistance, crusade, fiery cross, and non-violent protest.”535  
I would take Rubin’s exception and extend it to Newman as another instance in 
which ethical probity in life comes very close to ethos in painting. For Newman also 
described his project of painting in utopian terms when he affirmed that his painting 
“represented an open world,” and that “in terms of its social impact,” it denoted “the 
possibility of an open society, of an open world, not of a closed institutional world.”536 
Alexander Lieberman, Newman’s friend, fellow painter and the editorial director of 
Vogue, speculated after Newman’s death, “I think, frankly, Barney was trying to put 
painting in to the highest form of human endeavor and put it on the level of philosophy or 
religion.”537 Equally, Shiff writes in his introduction to Newman’s selected writings: “To 
create oneself through making (either writing or painting) is an ethical act of decision and 
passion: you become formed, differentiated from other; you feel your place in the world 
and find your wholeness, integrity.”538 In his notes Reinhardt, too, would express similar 
sentiments about the vital link between integrity (oneness) and identity. It was “[c]rucial 
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in [the] artist’s sensibility,” Reinhardt maintains, to have “integrity, critical sense of 
[one’s] own identity.”539 
The alliance of art with the ethical is implicated in the notion of art as a special 
realm of freedom. The “true creative artist,” as Newman put it, is one who is “free and 
insists upon freedom.”540 The activity of art, true creation, was the “good action” of 
ethics. This was a connection made explicit by Newman in his 1948 memorial tribute for 
his friend and fellow painter Arshile Gorky. “The only moral act is the useless one, and 
the only useless act is the aesthetic one. The artist is the only man who performs an act 
for no useful purpose; he is, indeed, opposed to its usefulness. His behavior is 
completely, unalterably, and profoundly futile.”541 Reinhardt echoes this sentiment when 
he announced in 1962 at the First Conference on Aesthetic Responsibility sponsored by 
the American Institute of Architects, “Painting has been the freest and purest fine art in 
this century,” and it was abstract art that Reinhardt wrote of as “art of maximum 
freedom.”542  
Painting—abstract painting as Reinhardt doubtless means—was free because it 
was pure, because it was “detached from all forms,” because it was a “place apart,” 
“unmanaged,” “unexploited,” where it could “be itself and nothing else.”543 It was a “fine 
art.” This emphasis on a fine art is one that Newman carried as well. “Now this may be 
an old-fashioned idea,” Newman told his audience in Woodstock in 1952, “but I’d like to 
raise the issue that painting is a fine art. The word ‘fine’ means ‘end,’ and I feel that 
painting is an art which is an end in itself. It isn’t something that can be reduced to a fact 
in order to find some greater truth; it is its own end.”544 Or, again, for Reinhardt, the 
“fine-art process” by definition was a “free process,” and not a job.545 Taking this another 
way, compare these statements: “The basis of an aesthetic act is the pure idea. But the 
pure idea is, of necessity, an aesthetic act. Here then is the epistemological paradox that is 
the artist’s problem. . . . For it is only the pure idea that has meaning. Everything else has 
everything else.”546 The second statement, more concisely: “Art is Art. Everything else is 
everything else.”547 The first is Newman’s from 1947 and the latter is Reinhardt’s from 
1958.548 To open up art’s equation to “everything else” (or merely something else) was to 
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begin, to borrow Reinhardt’s refrain, making a business out of it.549 True painting was 
antithetical to business-making, it frustrated attempts at capitalization, of spinning gold, 
of turning a this into a that. It was pictures that were guilty of always equaling something 
else, of performing the function of a link in a signifying chain, entering with fecund ease 
into systems of symbolic exchange. 
The antithesis to the free object and creative activity freely realizing ethical value 
can be summarized as the commodity. Both artists openly named the commodity as 
painting’s enemy. “No art as a commodity or jobbery,” Reinhardt stated in clear terms, 
adding the acerbic pique: “Art is not the spiritual side of business.”550 “A painting is 
changed and transformed when it leaves the studio,” Reinhardt explained in the Glaser 
interview. “It takes a labeling and a beating when it is out in the world where it is bought 
and sold and handled like a commodity. This is ridiculous.”551 A similar sentiment can be 
surmised for Newman. That he found the commodity situation for art equally ridiculous 
is evident from a late statement made to Emile de Antonio for the 1971 documentary film 
Painters Painting: “There’s no question that my work and the work of the men I respect 
took a revolutionary position, you might say, against the bourgeois notion of what a 
painting is as an object. . . .”552 Literally—and this was something Newman was fully 
aware of—the phenomenal size of many of Newman’s paintings, the sheer dimensions of 
these “objects” prevented them from fitting into the bourgeois domestic interior, thus 
preventing them from becoming bourgeois objects, commodities.553 In a move 
reminiscent of Reinhardt’s own anti-commodity tactics, the size of Newman’s work—
while making them (at least hypothetically) unavailable for consumption in the space of 
private bourgeois ownership—suggests the “open” public, civic and communal shared 
space of the museum where art objects, at least ideally, are supposed to transcend private 
ownership.554 It was the progressive social content of museum space that Reinhardt 
highlighted when he traced the origins of the museum back to revolutionary action. “Art 
museum,” Reinhardt jotted down in an undated note, “born—French Revolution Royal 
collections declared property of the people. . . .”555 The fine art museum was one of the 
two spaces (the other was the academy) that Reinhardt designated as safe-holds against 
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the “ridiculous” fate of art as market commodities. The museum was where art could be 
“protected,” it was the “one place for art-as-art” because it was “dead” to business and 
entertainment interest. “A fine-art museum is a treasure house and tomb, not a counting-
house or amusement center.”556 Also interesting to note is that, though Reinhardt did not 
work on the gargantuan scale of Newman—a tactic which by Newman’s logic steered his 
painting away from the bourgeois interior as commodity-form and presumably toward the 
public museum as social property—he did propose this parallel: “My making a painting 
that can’t be seen may be like making a work too large to move in and out of place.”557 
Thus, both an “invisible” painting and one “too large” thwart ease of consumption and 
share kinship in negating the commodity hallmark of easy in-and-out movement stamped 
on the tradition of easel painting as a whole.   
For both Newman and Reinhardt positing a fine art realm as an ethical practice 
and as a free space against the increasingly apparent intrusions of commodification was 
based on the assumption of a generally negationist stance. There was nothing cavalier or 
light-hearted in their negationism. The stance of refusal, Reinhardt wrote in a personal 
note, was for nothing less than the “sake of self-preservation.”558 One had to vigilantly 
refuse the values of the system, the mandates of the status quo in order to authentically 
pursue the true project of painting. “Art-as-Art,” Reinhardt pronounced, “judges itself by 
its destructions. Artists-as-artists value themselves for what they have gotten rid of and 
what they refuse to do.”559 Indeed Reinhardt’s famous lists of negatives performed the 
very task of cataloguing what to get rid of and what to refuse to do. Although Reinhardt 
is more typically associated with dramatic stances of refusal, Newman too, as Shiff has 
indicated, possessed his own “characteristic negative mode” and authored his own list of 
“nos.” For instance, when asked to comment on his teaching experience in the summer of 
1959 at the Emma Lake Artists’ Workshop in Saskatchewan, Newman “stated everything 
he had not done” (“The first thing I did not do was to bring my work with me. . . . Neither 
did I bring canvas. . . . Neither did I try to show how to make the right ‘kind’ of 
paintings. . . .”).560 Each artist, as Irving Sandler observed, had “adopted negation as a 
means of achieving his absolute.”561    
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Their negation, however, was not an anti-art position. This difference between the 
negation of their ethical painting practices and the nihilism of anti-art—a critical, all-
telling one for both artists—was one they repeatedly clarified and emphasized (many 
times in response to repeated misidentification of them as anti-art proponents). Not 
surprisingly, this issue is played out in both artists’ explications of their antithetical 
relationship to Duchamp. In a 1957 letter to John I. H. Baur, then the director of the 
Whitney Museum of American Art, Newman wrote pointedly against Motherwell’s 
proposition that Duchamp was the “father” of contemporary American art. “[I]f 
Motherwell wishes to make Marcel Duchamp a father,” Newman railed, “Duchamp is his 
father and not mine nor that of any American painter that I respect.”562 Equally as 
vehement against any Duchampian lineage, Reinhardt’s negation meant he was “anti-
anti-art, non-non-art . . . non-ready-made.” There was to be “no dadaism . . . no 
duchampism.”563 Or, again, in the Glaser interview, to the interviewer’s prompt that 
“[s]ome critics have seen in your all-black paintings some kind of relationship to the 
negative acts of the dada artists such as Duchamp,” Reinhardt responds, “There may be a 
relation to Malevich and Mondrian, but it would be the exact opposite [emphasis added] 
of Duchamp.”564  
This was a difference that hinged, once again, on the distinction between negation 
and nihilism, a distinction operating equally as importantly in both Newman’s and 
Reinhardt’s projects. Where negation was an act that secured identity, nihilism, taken as 
an anything goes attitude, destroyed the grounds for any form of self-critical identity. 
Properly or improperly, it was to nihilism that Reinhardt linked Duchamp as the 
destructive permissiveness, “free-for-all art” (versus free art) that confused art’s true 
identity, and that amounted to art’s most devastating “corruption.”565 Duchampianism 
was the bad limitlessness, whereas for both Newman and Reinhardt art was about identity 
and thus, as well, about critically maintained limits.566 It was precisely this limitlessness, 
this art-into-life and vice versa—art that is “too available, too loose, too open . . . so that 
at some point almost anything goes”—that Reinhardt spoke of in his contribution to 
“What Is Corruption,” a panel discussion with Milton Resnick.567 And, indeed, one finds 
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a similarly shaped complaint in Newman’s statement for the 1952 Fourth Annual 
Woodstock Art Conference.  
The best example of this situation is Marcel Duchamp, who identified art 
or tried to destroy art by pointing to the fountain, and we now have 
museums that show screwdrivers and automobiles and paintings. [The 
museums] have accepted this aesthetic position that there’s no way of 
knowing what is what. Well, if there is no way, I feel that it’s time for the 
Museum of Modern Art, for example, to put on an exhibition of machine 
guns. After all, they’re beautiful [in] function, they have wonderful forms, 
they’re full of content, and they actually make noise. Will the modern 
aesthetician who takes this position, if he’s confronted with the parchment 
lamps that were made from the skins of Jews killed by Nazis, just criticize 
[them] on the grounds that it’s pretty good work?568  
 
It is an acute example Newman ends with—human-parchment lamps now ushered into 
the galleries—but it, like Reinhardt’s complaint, starts with the Duchampian gauntlet 
opening onto the senseless, meaningless limitlessness of anything goes, the “too 
available, too loose, too open,” and a situation in which there is “no way of knowing 
what is what.” Or, as Reinhardt put it, “The art work itself doesn’t seem to have a limit to 
that which can be read into it.”569 What anti-art heralded for both artists was a highly 
troubling evasion of the perplexing question of art’s identity. Newman’s and Reinhardt’s 
position was not a nihilistic one in which the very questions of authentic identity are 
surrendered but, a determinate negation willed precisely as a refusal to give up on these 
very concerns. 
For both Newman and Reinhardt, the summarizing “image” for these sets of 
commitments—the ones that crucially distinguished painting from pictures—was that of 
unity, or the state signified in the former’s neologism as “onement.” “‘Onement,’” as 
Rosenberg pointed out, “is not really a word; and though its meaning is quite clear—the 
state of being one—it designates a condition that is ineffable and without qualifications. 
‘Onement’ adds an aura of indefiniteness to ‘oneness,’ the word that comes closest to its 
meaning.”570 An interesting thing that occurs in Rosenberg’s attempt to clarify Newman’s 
term “onement” is that Rosenberg also, and probably only inadvertently, names the term 
Reinhardt would use, “oneness.”571 The achievement of authentic painting meant having 
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arrived at onement/oneness, which, in turn, meant having met all of the criteria set above. 
It was painting as ethics, truth, freedom, the anti-commodity, a determinate negation. 
This achieved state of integrity and identity was the arrival at the Absolute onement in 
Newman’s painting and by Reinhardt making the one painting, Ultimate Painting.  
The figure of “one” worked both diachronically and synchronically for both 
artists. Synchronically and formally and in terms of painting composition, the work had 
to be whole and of a piece—whether in the way Newman had described as the experience 
of space declared “so that it is felt at once,” or taken in Reinhardt’s “all-over painting 
idea” where each painting is realized as “one over-all uniformity.”572 Newman had 
chastised none less than Greenberg for failing to properly describe the “sense of the 
single, total image” his paintings made.573 It was a point Newman would repeatedly drive 
home: he was dealing with the “whole image.” Mondrian “builds a painting by using 
related areas . . . a series of parts,” but Newman’s paintings, the artist maintained, were 
involved with the “wholeness of the area.” His zips did not divide his paintings, but 
rather they “unit[ed] the thing,” they “creat[ed] a totality”; he was “concerned constantly 
in doing painting that would move in its totality,” in which the “beginning and end are 
there at once.”574  
This does not sound all that distinct from Reinhardt, whose almost mantric 
intonations of the “one” would become an identifying feature of his. An early art-as-art 
statement began with an announcement: “The one thing to say about art is that it is one 
thing.” In order to make painting that one thing, the “one painting” had to be an 
achievement of wholeness of surface through a “grand uniformity,” “the single-scheme,” 
of “one formal device, one color-monochrome, one linear division in each direction, one 
symmetry, one free-hand brushing, one rhythm, one working everything into one 
dissolution and one indivisibility,” to end with “each painting into one over-all 
uniformity.”575  
Both artists’ repetitions seem to have paid off: the emphatic point of the formal 
unity, the visual onement/oneness of their paintings becomes a critical staple in art 
writing on Newman and Reinhardt. Lippard, for instance, would speak of the latter’s 
184 
work as a kind of “equalization” and insist that his black paintings “must be seen whole” 
and as a “confrontation of the whole.”576 Likewise John Elderfield would write that in 
order “to be successful Newman has to prevent us from seeing a painting as anything else 
but one thing.” Newman’s “best pictures” possess this “one-glance unity.”577 And 
Rosenberg’s posthumous monograph on Newman was liberally infused with references to 
“Newman’s holism.” His work had to be engaged in terms of the “idea of singularity,” 
and “experienced as an undifferentiated whole.”578 
The meaning of “one,” I argue, extended beyond the desire to achieve formal 
unity in the single canvas. It was also realized along a diachronic axis, through what 
Rosenberg pegged “one-idea painting.” Both Newman and Reinhardt had been 
recognized by the critic as its prime exponents.579 By this concept, Rosenberg meant that 
the painter had found his “image,” that is, the artist had found a way of working on his 
one single problem. “The basic format of Newman’s work for the remainder of his 
career,” Danto observes, “is that of one or more vertical bands, which run from the top to 
the bottom of the panel, in colors that contrast with a more or less undifferentiated 
surrounding field.”580 Likewise, Reinhardt described his own solution to the “one single 
grand original problem” of abstract painting by a formula to which he famously persisted: 
the “one work for a fine art, the one painting, is the painting of the one-size canvas—the 
single scheme, one formal device, one color-monochrome, one linear division in each 
direction, one symmetry.”581 
This gesturing towards a “one” manifest through space and time point to a 
philosophical threshold where Newman’s and Reinhardt’s states of onement/oneness 
become the proper noun of metaphysics, the Absolute/the Ultimate. This figure for 
Reality and Identity from ancient dialectic had come to mark for both Newman and 
Reinhardt the ends of their painting, the meaning of their projects. Reinhardt repeatedly, 
both in private notes and in published pieces, alluded to ultimate forms, to an absolute art, 
of that which is “indescribable,” “One” and “oneness” as “undifferentiated unity,” of “no 
divisions, no multiplicity”—as “totality, unity, finality.”582  
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Newman, for reasons that will be discussed later, was far more circumspect in 
actually pronouncing the term of the Absolute. As he indicated in 1948 in “The Sublime 
Is Now,” although “Man’s natural desire in the arts [is] to express his relation to the 
Absolute,” the dire mistake was that this “became identified and confused with the 
absolutisms of perfect creations.”583 But his commentators had no difficulty recognizing 
the identity of Onement as the Absolute. Perhaps the best indicator can be found in 
Rosenberg’s eulogy for Newman, a writing situation in which Rosenberg needed to hone 
in on what was most significant in Newman and, do no injustice to the dead—and 
especially so in this case, to a dear friend. Given these requirements, the prominence with 
which Rosenberg discusses the absolute in relation to the motivation and significance of 
Newman’s project stands out especially. “The prime attribute of Newman’s absolute,” 
Rosenberg read, “is an absence of qualities—which in terms of experience is the 
overpowering presences of ONE quality. It was ONE-NESS that intrigued him. . . .” 
“Yet,” he asks rhetorically, “how can the absolute be sought except absolutely?” 
“Newman was determined to push beyond . . . to an absolute reality.”584 More recent has 
been David Sylvester’s declaration that Newman’s “foremost imperative was the need to 
deal with ultimate things,” and John Golding’s inclusion of Newman as a primary artist 
within the thesis for his work, Paths to the Absolute, in which he writes of Onement I as 
the artist’s “absolute both in terms of its content and the forms that convey it.”585 
Arriving at the metaphysical plateau at which the meaning of Newman’s and 
Reinhardt’s projects is revealed as the achievement of Onement/Oneness, the 
Absolute/Ultimate, Identity, Presence, Truth, is a move that in achieving everything, 
reveals nothing. Its profound uselessness stems from this logic: Absolute/Ultimate being 
transcends differential identity and thus it is beyond description, analysis, and 
signification altogether. This is the dead-end of the non-signifying Absolute, the 
indescribable One. But all is not lost. It is by a return to the Kubler-inspired question 
posed at the beginning of this chapter that the situation is opened. In answering that 
question, with a “yes” and affirming that they were indeed playing the same game, their 
onement/oneness is fissured by a productive contradiction. For the trouble brewing for 
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the two artists is, of course, what universe—by the very terms of its definition—could 
allow for two Absolutes? could admit both Newman and Reinhardt? could tolerate the 
notion that they had both achieved onement/oneness in painting but that these were two 
different versions, a Newman version and a Reinhardt version? This contradiction—
which opens up an allowance for differential identity and the fact that both artists were 
exceptionally (and paradoxically) articulate about what were and were not the qualities of 
their “one”—will make them each other’s “most valuable critic.” 
Although I have angled for Kubler’s first clause (“most valuable critic”) as the 
appropriate one by which to capture the nature of Newman’s and Reinhardt’s 
relationship, this goes markedly against the grain. It would have been to Kubler’s second 
clause (“few misunderstandings exceed those between two painters engaged upon 
different kinds of things”) that Newman and Reinhardt no doubt would have placed 
themselves. They were fiercely antagonistic and, in this light “misunderstandings” falls 
somewhat flat, missing the pointedness of their antipathy. A forced misrecognition might 
be a better way to characterize it, for one might surmise, in a sense they understood each 
other’s projects only too well (they were two painters engaged upon similar kinds of 
things) and they were savvy to the fatal contradiction that each posed to the other, thereby 
making it fundamentally necessary for their mutual rejection, their joint refusal to grant 
the other recognition.  
This point can be broadly indicated through a quick examination of how the 
opposition romantic and classic was dealt with by both of the artists. For better or worse, 
the overall sensibilities of Newman’s and Reinhardt’s projects can be templated through 
the well-worn clash between the romantic and the classic. “[T]here is no doubt,” Rose 
pronounced, that Reinhardt’s was a “classic art,” and her characterization would seem to 
have accorded with Reinhardt’s own favored self-descriptors: “classicist, classicistic.”586 
Although Newman was loathe to pigeon-hole himself into any kind of reductive 
classification, he did deign in a 1962 interview to cast his lot in with the romantics: “I 
don’t consider myself in terms of labels, but if I am anything, I am romantic.”  
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What is of primary interest here is not that Newman and Reinhardt were aligned, 
by others and also by themselves, as romantic or classic but that for each artist his 
decision to identify with one of these terms meant the avid, dogmatic refusal to recognize 
its conventionally opposed member. In identifying himself with the romantics, Newman 
challenged the very idea of the classical: “There is no such thing as the classical,” 
Newman declared, “The Greek artists were a bunch of romantics.”587 Newman’s 
maneuver—the reduction of the opposing term to his—is echoed in reverse by Reinhardt. 
“The word ‘human’ is not only disreputable, it’s fake. . . . It is something that hangs 
around, I supposed, in the romantic. If you have a strict aesthetic system, you have to cut 
out all romantic work. But the romantic work becomes classic on the basis of its 
becoming good art.”588 Reinhardt’s “Plank” seventeen from his “39 Art Planks” calls for 
“The re-neo-classicisticization of neo-romanticisticization,” and is another instance of 
this canceling operation.589 Each artist assigns not only priority to their chosen term but, 
adamantly refuses to recognize any substance to the secondary term. 
Two of Reinhardt’s “How to Look at Modern Art in America” art world cartoons 
offer another example of this refusal to recognize and give recognition to the other. The 
first cartoon dates from April 1946 and was published in P.M. (fig. 17).590 What 
Reinhardt represents is the family tree of modernism. The four post-impressionist roots of 
this tree, “Cezanne, “Seurat,” “Gauguin,” and “Van Gogh,” sink into a ground of 
“Manet,” “Poussin,” “Negro Sculpture,” and “Japanese Prints,” among other influences. 
The stout trunk of the tree is made up of Braque, Matisse and Picasso and the two major 
directions—the fork of the tree—separate out into the “Abstract” and the “Social-
Surrealist” branches, or “pure (abstract) ‘paintings’” and “pure (illustrative) 
‘pictures’.”591 From there, smaller branches lead to clusters of leaves with each leaf 
representing an individual contemporary artist. The right-hand side of the tree foliated 
with artists of the “social-surrealist” or illustrative tendencies looks as if on the verge of 
breaking off. Fatally loading it down is “subject matter” and “business as art patron,” 
among other things. When this branch of contemporary art finally breaks off it will fall 
into a culture-industry-like abyss, the “cornfields,” “where no demand is made on you.” 
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Among the artists inhabiting the cornfields already are Norman Rockwell, Thomas Hart 
Benton, Reginald Marsh, and Paul Cadmus. It is an area damningly staked out with 
advertisements for “Life” and “Fortune” magazines, “Pepsi-Cola,” and “International 
Business Machines.” 
  One of the initially striking aspects of Reinhardt’s cartoon tree is the fullness of 
its heavy foliation. It appears that Reinhardt has done a thorough-going job. Indeed there 
is something of excessive, possibly obsessive, fecundity as one registers—dispersed 
alongside “Pollock” and “Motherwell” and “de Kooning”—the leaves of those artists 
who have become third and fourth tier in art history’s annals: “Slobodkina” “Spruce,” 
“Bemelmans,” “Blanch,” “Gwathmey.” Prefacing the diagram is a short statement by 
Reinhardt which both indicates Reinhardt’s desire to generate inclusive picture but also 
nods to the difficulty of capturing and categorizing everybody: “If you have any friends 
that we overlooked, here are some extra leaves. Fill them in and paste up. . . .” True to 
word, immediately following the statement are seven blank leaves. Pointedly, two 
omissions stand out. The not unexpected omission is the author’s own; the far more 
interesting omission is that of Newman.  
There are several ways of trying to account for Newman’s absence. Possibly 
Reinhardt excluded Newman out of friendship, or some form of respect which precluded 
him from pinpointing and potentially trivializing Newman’s developing aesthetic 
position, a position that perhaps Reinhardt himself felt akin to. The problem with this 
explanation is (and as many of his peers have commented upon) that Reinhardt’s cartoons 
and writings appear to make no distinction between friend or foe: everybody participating 
in the field of the art world is equally a potential target for one of Reinhardt’s critical 
jibes. However, this does bring up a second possible solution that Newman in 1946 was 
simply not much of a participant in the New York art scene, his status as an artist too 
marginal and not yet established enough to be included and therefore he was a figure 
easily “overlooked.” Certainly this is a possible accounting for Newman’s absence in the 
1946 schema but it seems improbable. Newman was visible and active in the New York 
artists community during this time. He helped Betty Parsons organize events and wrote 
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catalogue essays and although his exhibition history in 1946 was limited to only two 
shows (both of them group exhibitions), he was still very much within the community 
and those within that small community, especially that surrounding the Parsons’s gallery 
(which was also Reinhardt’s gallery) would have acknowledged his presence.592  
Not much explanatory headway would seem to have been made here; yet, the 
situation is helped substantially by adding as a coda Reinhardt’s revisiting and remaking 
of the cartoon, fifteen years later in 1961.593 For this double page spread in ARTnews the 
original 1946 P.M. version was reproduced alongside the updated revision (fig. 18). The 
1961 version is similar in overall format but the major differences are that the left side of 
the tree reserved for those coming out of pure (abstract) paintings has simply 
disappeared. This leaves a rather puzzling blank space and the right side of the tree 
reserved for illustrative pictures (contrary to what one might have predicted given its 
fragile condition in 1946, when its major limb was cracked and weighted down by 
heteronymous concerns) is the only part of the tree that remains. Another major 
difference is that many of the artists who were formerly on the progressive “paintings” 
side in 1946—such as Rothko, Tobey, Motherwell, de Kooning, Hofmann, and 
Gottlieb—are, in 1961, damningly switched over to the illustrative “pictures” limb, which 
as in the first version, dangles precariously over the “cornfields.” Given Reinhardt’s 
penchant for condemning artists for selling-out, there is little surprise that in the 1961 
revision so many of Reinhardt’s former colleagues should now find themselves on the 
fateful bough of sell-out, degraded picture-making, or equally, that the space formerly 
occupied by painters is an unoccupied blank.594  
Unlike in 1946, however, one cannot attempt to explain away Newman’s 
omission by suggesting Reinhardt’s unfamiliarity with Newman as an artist. By the time 
of the second cartoon, Newman had under his belt the two solo exhibitions at Betty 
Parsons in 1950 and 1951; and, more recently, in 1959, he had made his come back to the 
New York exhibition scene with the solo show Clement Greenberg had organized to 
debut French & Company’s new contemporary art program. All of these events 
unquestionably would have registered with Reinhardt. Even so, Newman is once again 
190 
absent from the picture; Reinhardt has, for the second time, failed to recognize Newman. 
To this now repeated silence on Newman’s place, the questions remain: is the placeless-
ness of Newman within Reinhardt’s schema a special exemption allowed to Newman as a 
respectful nod to an artist whose work defied easy classification? Or, oppositely, was it a 
disrespectful silence? Once again Newman had not made the cut, even though the cut had 
been in a doubled-edged way a generous one, widely inclusive of all the art trends 
Reinhardt condemned. Or could all of this be explainable as the protracted inability of 
Reinhardt to see Newman properly? To come to terms with him? Did Reinhardt 
understand that to give any recognition to Newman was to challenge the authority of his 
own project? 
 If from Reinhardt’s side the visibility/placement of Newman seems muddled, 
from Newman’s direction the picture is a tad clearer. He will, in an incident that I will 
discuss later on, attempt to sue Reinhardt. Further, in 1955 Newman had an opportunity 
for his own screed, performing some categorizing himself, clustering Reinhardt with 
Mark Rothko and Georges Mathieu.595  
I am not going to Rothko’s show for the same reasons that I did not attend 
those of Mathieu and Reinhardt. I am frankly bored with the uninspired, or 
to put it more accurately, I am bored with the too easily inspired. It was 
Rothko who said to me that it does not matter that an artist “looks” at 
other painters. It is not what he ‘sees’ but what he “does” with what he 
“sees” that counts. This is the credo of a virtuoso, of the salon painter, of 
the social and public man, and whether it be Mathieu, Reinhardt, or 
Rothko, this easy ability to be inspired not only reduces the concepts that 
form his sources, not only distorts the act of painting itself, but it is so at 
variance with my own point of view that I can only reject everything it 
involves.596 
 
One of the undercurrents of this passage pulls to the notion of “looking” at other painters 
and one suspects—reading between the lines—the charge that Rothko (and by extension, 
Reinhardt) was copying his work, albeit, superficially.597  
Newman’s letter indicates both the very difficult nature of the line he had to walk 
and the absoluteness of it. On the one hand, Newman is making (and probably responding 
to) comparison of likeness between his own work and Mathieu, Reinhardt and Rothko. 
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On the other hand, he has to assert that this likeness is merely a superficiality that 
obscures crucial differences. If these other artists were doing too much “looking” at him, 
his contrary response was to refuse to look their way at all. Thus, Newman had boycotted 
Reinhardt’s solo show at the Betty Parsons Gallery (January 31-February 19, 1955), he 
had not seen the increasing force and insistence of Reinhardt’s uniform black paintings in 
that show and presumably had not read the accompanying statement on the black 
paintings—the first such statement Reinhardt makes concerning the black paintings. 
Newman’s stance was firm and absolute: “only rejection.”   
Summarizing and rehearsing, there is a problem and a question here. The problem 
is this: Newman considered himself a creator of paintings and considered Reinhardt a 
maker of pictures. Reinhardt, in turn, saw the exact opposite; he was doing the proper 
work of painting, where Newman was in the category of the corrupt, of pictures. How is 
it then that they could have both defined the stakes of the game in such similar, or even 





The Name of the Game: Before and After the Moment of Identity 
1. The Ideographic Picture 
In early 1947, “The Ideographic Picture” opened at the recently established Betty Parsons 
Gallery. The eight-person group exhibition was curated by Newman and included works 
by Hans Hofmann, Pietro Lazzari, Boris Margo, Mark Rothko, Theodoros Stamos, 
Clyfford Still and also by Newman and Reinhardt—all artists who at that point were 
represented by Parsons.598 Each of the eight showed two paintings apiece. Newman 
himself exhibited the modest-sized oil crayon on cardboard drawing from 1944-45 Gea 
(fig. 19) featuring a white ovoid surrounded by biomorphic insect-like shapes on a red 
background and The Euclidian Abyss (fig. 20), another modest-sized work, this time an 
oil and gouache painting on canvas board, dating to 1946-47, and stylistically contrasting 
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to the earlier drawing with two vertical, more angular yellow elements (as “zip”-
prefigurations possibly) against a darkish background. Reinhardt was represented by 
Dark Symbol and Cosmic Sign (figs. 21-22).599 Not surprisingly, given the negative 
current of Newman’s and Reinhardt’s pre-1960 (or thereabout) reception histories, both 
artists shared the dubious honor of having both their submissions marked at $200, the 
lowest price being asked.600  
Despite some recent speculation about the inclusion of Reinhardt—reasonable 
suggestions that he was perhaps not Newman’s choice, implying that Newman had felt 
pressure to include Reinhardt—there is still the strength of Newman’s language in the 
catalogue statement to contend with it and it is language that boldly speaks of the eight 
individuals as a community of artists, sharing certain aesthetic intentions.601 The closing 
two-line paragraph of Newman’s statement drives this home: “Mrs. Betty Parsons has 
organized a representative showing of this work around the artists in her gallery who are 
its exponents. That all of them are associated with her gallery is not without 
significance.”602 But even beyond this—whether or not one believes Newman would 
have written so forcefully about the integrity of the artists selected had he truly believed 
Reinhardt to be such a misplaced black sheep or whether one believes he wrote those last 
lines in order to squelch his own bad faith for having included something heterogeneous 
to his concept—one could argue that the appropriateness of Reinhardt’s inclusion in “The 
Ideographic Picture,” is suggested, at the very least, by the titles to Reinhardt’s two 
entries—”Dark Symbol” and “Cosmic Sign”—titles which appear more engaged with the 
named theme of the exhibition than say, The Fury I and The Fury II, Hofmann’s titles or 
Burnt Offering and The Firmament, Pietro Lazzari’s, or even, one might suggest, 
Newman’s own titles of “Gea” and “Euclidian Abyss.” The fact remains that both 
Newman and Reinhardt participated in this early, highly seminal exhibition and it can 
serve to mark a noteworthy instance in which to see, in a more concrete fashion, the 
convergence of their projects. 
The theme of this 1947 Parsons’s exhibition, the kinds of problems and motives it 
framed, plays a highly significant role in both Newman’s and Reinhardt’s developments 
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of the pictures/painting problematic and it provides a compelling starting point from 
which to navigate future comparisons of the artists. The exhibition’s theme was 
addressed in the short statement Newman produced for the catalogue. It opens with three 
definitions of the ideograph/ideographic: 
IDEOGRAPH  A character, symbol or figure which suggests the idea of 
an object without expressing its name. 
IDEOGRAPHIC  Representing ideas directly and not through the medium 
of their names; applied specifically to that mode of writing which by 
means of symbols, figures or hieroglyphics suggests the idea of an object 
without expressing its name. 
    Century Dictionary 
IDEOGRAPH  A symbol or character painted, written or inscribed, 
representing ideas. 
    Encyclopedia Britannica603 
 
All three definitions aim at the notion of figuring a meaning, or marking significance, but 
to do so without the “name,” without the very tool by which “something is known or 
designated.”604 But it is evident—both from the definitions rehearsed above and the 
expanded context of Newman’s statement—that what is desired here is something that 
exists both without the name but also without being “nameless,” or anonymous, 
unknown, without proper identity, something “impossible to specify or describe.”605 That 
was the trick. Reinhardt himself explicitly arrived at this same paradox through the notion 
of the “ideogram.” In an unpublished note the artist wrote of the ideogram as standing 
“for what is beyond utterance, unutterableness.”606 In a similar vein and in another 
unpublished note Reinhardt wrote of the “Sign which refuses to signify.”607 Another way 
of saying this is to suggest that what both Newman and Reinhardt desire is identity but 
without the name.  
This contradiction, I believe, can be thought about in relation to the sets of terms 
introduced in chapter 2, of Rosenberg’s setting up of the actor/artist as the engagement 
between identities, personalities and personifications, or the Adornian dialectic in which 
authentic art is the identity of identity and non-identity. All are expressions of the desire 
for the good form of identity (selfhood, the actor, the special sign) wrested from non-
identity (Nature, the formless, inarticulate being) but against the bad form of identity 
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(ratio, the name). Indeed, the vexatious nature of this battle for the special sign, for 
painting as ideograph/ideogram is registered already in Newman’s epigraph quoted 
above. The very form in which Newman prefaces his statement is the definition, material 
procured through lexica—dictionaries and encyclopedias—domains of the “name” or the 
rationalized, categorizing of knowledge if there ever were ones. Though, in no way do I 
take this glitch in Newman’s statement as really undermining the aim of “The 
Ideographic Picture.” The paradox is too obvious not to be taken as a reinforcement of 
the frame of the problematic. What I believe is located in this exhibition—its thematic 
premise, Newman’s and Reinhardt’s participation in it, and in the contradictions 
suggested above—is the desire to articulate a problematic about articulation itself. 
 
2. The Possibility of Language: Painting & Iterability 
One of the ironies of the general reception histories for Newman and Reinhardt has been 
that both were seen as having produced works that seemed inarticulate—inscrutable; 
objectless or subjectless; obdurate, or just plain nothing.608 When Thomas Hess panned 
Newman’s first one-person show in 1950, he complained that “there was almost no 
interest here for the average spectator,” an observation I am tempted to extend beyond the 
“average spectator” to other critics and artists as well.609 Even so enlightened and art-
savvy a figure as Allan Kaprow writing in 1963 and with the distinct advantage of 
slightly over a decade to acclimate to the new austerity, proclaimed that with Newman’s 
works “we are left to contend with their opaque mysteries.”610 Barbara Reise, as well, in 
an article praising Newman’s accomplishment had to admit that his zip paintings 
demanded “a sort of ontological agnosticism for full comprehension.”611 This need for 
“ontological agnosticism” could be extended to Reinhardt’s work, described as “mute,” 
“taciturn” with a “non-declamatory presence,” or “as close to nothing as painting can.”612 
One critic remarked on how successfully “Reinhardt’s austere reductionism” kept “the 
critic and criticism at bay.” With “no subject, no reference, no symbol, and no sign,” 
Reinhardt’s work stood “most defiantly aloof of analysis.”613 Another viewer has called 
his work the “most imperturbably self-referent objects,” and has taken Reinhardt’s 
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project to be one of insisting on the “object in itself.”614 In a manner of speaking, what 
Newman and Reinhardt negated was the very possibility of recognition.  
The ironic twist, then, comes when listening to the other side of reception, those 
who identify Newman’s and Reinhardt’s primary concern as one of articulation itself, in 
which their painting becomes a highly self-reflexive project about iterability, the 
processes of figuring, marking out the grounds for utterance, for sign-making and 
meaning-making, about, if one were allowed to press this to the grand scheme, the 
possibility and nature of language and communication, and thus, ultimately, in the even 
grander scheme, gesturing to concerns of the social as well.615 The absolute or ultimate of 
their painting then is its meta-figuring for figuration itself, it stages the very—the 
ultimate—grounds for meaning at all. This patently runs against the apparent figureless-
ness of their canvases: how to have figuration without figures; how to have significance 
without signs; how to say something but with seemingly nothing; how to give 
determinate, concrete identity to the One, and (to borrow from Reinhardt’s notebook) the 
One that “Differentiat[es] itself yet remain[s] in itself undifferentiated”? And this, as one 
may well recognize, re-states the classic paradox of dialectical resolution.616 
This challenge was played out in Newman’s and Reinhardt’s concerns with 
formal unity in their surfaces. Both strove to articulate the entirety of the canvas’s surface 
(wholeness, or Newman’s “totality” and Reinhardt’s “all-over”) without relying on 
figure/ground relationships. Given the centrality of figure/ground relationships for 
perceptual possibility, that to see is largely to see shapes in contradistinction to each 
other, one grasps a sense of the difficulty, if not the near impossibility, of this operation. 
The point was to achieve this unity, transcend the convention of figure/ground, and still 
to be making a painting. The indication of failure for Newman was the spread of an 
environment and for Reinhardt the sculptural. 
Lippard understood Reinhardt’s paradoxical articulate all-over-ness when in 1966 
she pointed out that the “trisection” of Reinhardt’s classic black paintings (1960-1967)—
symmetrical with one vertical and one horizontal—was “not important as form” (fig. 15). 
“Form per se has never been his prime concern,” Lippard argued, his reduction did not 
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stem from formalist doctrinarism, the resulting cruciform had nothing to do with a love of 
pure form. “I try to lose the forms,” Reinhardt insisted, “the color, and the overlappings 
are irrelevant.” Nor was the repeated use of the cross iconological in intent, it was not a 
religious symbol. Rather the trisection was “important as armature,” Lippard affirmed, as 
a way of articulating something. The grid-like structure perceived through the subtle 
color modulations in a black painting was not relevant as a particular shape to look at—as 
Lippard informs, “He does not expect the viewer to retain the vertical-horizontal 
division,” and as Reinhardt explains “The intention is that it’s eliminated”—but for what 
they did; they grid, they did the job of making a space a space as it were, a conceptually 
available thing, or, an identity. It was as if Reinhardt were attempting to articulate the 
“ground” of the figure/ground relationship but in a way that bypassed the “figure.” The 
trisection or cross-shape is crucial, as Lippard pointed out, in this extremely delicate 
operation because it “deliver[s] it from amorphousness and stat[es] the fact of 
neutralization, equalization.” “It makes the painting a painting and not a black relief”—it 
kept it from being sculpture.617  
With a similar sort of intent, Yve-Alain Bois has described the special perceptual 
phenomenon of a Newman zip painting (fig. 16). Newman’s “strategy,” Bois writes, “was 
to emphasize the intentional nature of the perceptual field.” Newman engages the viewer 
in an “intended” looking “by urging us to shift from our preconscious perceptual activity 
(or the ‘normal’ preconscious level of perception) to a conscious one.” “At the same 
time,” however, Newman wants to “prevent this consciousness from crystallizing in any 
definite way.”618 Slightly later Bois describes the process of looking in this intentional 
way (i.e., the kind of looking that seeks a figure or object located in a visual field) as one 
in which the viewer is “constantly in the process of adjusting and readjusting the 
fundamental figure/ground opposition, never finding a moment of repose when this 
structure could coalesce.” What this leaves the viewer with, “the only factual certitude 
that we will be able to grasp,” is the “lateral expanse of the canvas, the pictorial field as 
such.”619 Or, take Allan Kaprow, writing in 1963 in the pages of ARTnews describing 
Newman’s Vir Heroicus Sublimis as, “strik[ing] us as a whole, rather than a part-to-part-
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to-whole conception.” This occurs, Kaprow explains, through the paradoxical 
relationship between the vertical zips (what Kaprow refers to as the “stops”) and the color 
field.  
How strongly the whole works upon us can be deduced by the relation of 
the stops to the field. We look at it, either from the right side or the left, 
along the dominant horizontal axis of the canvas. Although nearly all of 
Newman’s paintings have vertical stops, it is the total shape of the format 
which tells us whether we should move with the direction of the stops (up 
and down) or across their flow. Since they possess no substance per se, 
we cannot feel that they function singly, or as an aggregate, in 
contradistinction to the whole. There is, therefore, no real object-ground 
exchange.620  
 
Newman himself tried to explain it in a 1962 interview with Dorothy Gees Seckler when 
he brought up the topic of drawing and indicated that though it had gone unrecognized 
drawing was central to Newman’s “whole concept.” “I don’t mean making drawings, 
although I have always done a lot of them,” he clarified, “I mean the drawing that exists 
in my painting. Yet no writer has ever confronted that issue. I am always referred to in 
relation to my color. Yet I know that if I have made a contribution, it is primarily in my 
drawing. . . . I hope that I have contributed a new way of seeing through drawing. Instead 
of using outlines, instead of making shapes or setting off spaces, my drawing declares the 
space. Instead of working with the remnants of space, I work with the whole space.”621 
 Contrary to homespun reason, the end result of the above is neither Newman’s or 
Reinhardt’s paintings as figureless (without meaning) or groundless (without possibility). 
Rather, if their paintings can be said to picture anything it would be the enacting of the 
possibility of language itself. What the “figureless” and “groundless” canvases of 
Newman and Reinhardt end up articulating is the space of painting itself as the place for 
both the figuring and grounding of meaning-making. Paradoxically, however, as one 
arrives at this deeper coherence between Newman’s and Reinhardt’s projects, one also 
draws closer to the juncture at which the two part ways.   
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3. Two Possibilities of Language: Individualistic Subjectivism & Abstract Objectivism 
Compare these two statements. “Man’s first expression . . . was an aesthetic one. Speech 
was a poetic outcry rather than a demand for communication.”622 Newman wrote those 
lines in 1947. “The first word of an artist is against artists.”623 Reinhardt wrote those lines 
in 1966. The contradictory directions of these lines tells in condensed form much of the 
story of where and why and how Newman’s and Reinhardt’s problematic diverges. For 
the moment I want to elaborate the nature of that divergence by turning to the debates on 
language associated with the Russian Formalists of the early part of the twentieth 
century.624 While this may not appear a likely place to turn for further illumination on the 
meaning of Newman’s and Reinhardt’s painting practices, I would suggest that these 
debates provide an important template by which to shed light on the vital difference 
animating their projects. Specifically, I want to look to the work of a Russian linguist 
Valentin Nikolaevich Vološinov and sections of his 1929 work Marxism and the 
Philosophy of Language. In this work, and more precisely the first chapter of Part II 
“Toward a Marxist Philosophy of Language,” one finds a schema which remarkably well 
describes the kinds of arguments about the processes of articulation that Newman and 
Reinhardt made and made against one another. 
The relevant chapter, “Two Trends of Thought in Philosophy of Language,” 
describes, as its title suggests, what Vološinov locates as the two predominant theories of 
language. They are, as the author terms them, individualistic subjectivism and abstract 
objectivism. 
“The first trend,” or individualistic subjectivism, Vološinov states, “considers the 
basis of language . . . to be the individual creative act of speech. The source of language 
is the individual psyche.”625 He goes on to outline the three fundamental aspects of 
language conceived as individualistic subjectivism. The first two are:  
1. Language is activity, an unceasing process of creation (energeia) 
realized in individual speech acts;  
2. The laws of language creativity are the laws of individual psychology. 
 
The third is of particular significance:  
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3. Creativity of language is meaningful creativity, analogous to creative 
art.626  
 
It is highly important that this trend in the philosophy of language, a trend that the 
Russian linguist will also refer to as romantic creationism, is posed as “analogous to other 
ideological phenomena, in particular to art—to aesthetic activity.”627 Vološinov cites two 
adherents of this view of language in which aestheticism is highly pronounced. Karl 
Vossler, for instance, maintains a “purely aesthetic conception of language.” For Vossler, 
as Vološinov summarizes, “the basic manifestation, the basic reality, of language should 
not be language as a ready-made system, in the sense of a body of inherited, immediately 
usable forms—phonetic, grammatical, and other—but the individual creative act of 
speech.”628 What mattered, where real language occurred was at the level of style, as 
opposed to the level of grammar.629 Or, as Vossler wrote in 1910: “Linguistic thought is 
essentially poetic thought; linguistic truth is artistic truth, is meaningful beauty.”630 It was 
to the Vosslerian school of thought that Vološinov placed the Italian philosopher of 
language and art, Benedetto Croce. “For Croce,” too, Vološinov wrote, “language is also 
an aesthetic phenomenon. The basic, key term in his conception is expression. Any sort 
of expression is, at the root, artistic.”631  
In dramatic contrast to the creationism of the first trend with its foundational 
belief that language, any meaningful expression, is a generative activity centered or 
originating in the individual creator/subject/speaker, the second trend that Vološinov 
introduces, abstract objectivism, locates the truth of language in completely reversed 
terms: that is, grammar over style. This opposing trend is neoclassicist and rationalist, 
and Vološinov will associate it with the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure.632 In this 
second approach, although it is allowed that “[e]ach individual creative act, each 
utterance, is idiosyncratic and unique,” what is significant (and quite literally so) is that 
“each utterance contains elements identical with elements in other utterances of the given 
speech group.” “And it is precisely these factors—the phonetic, grammatical, and lexical 
factors that are identical and therefore normative for all utterances—that insure the unity 
of a given language and its comprehension by all members of a given community.”633 In 
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other words, language-ness truly and only happens at the level of grammar, of that which 
is communal, of that which precisely can transcend the stylistic quirkiness, the non-
rational density, of the individual. It is the very grounds of possibility for the social. 
“[F]rom the standpoint of language . . . all these idiosyncratic peculiarities,” or what the 
individualist subjectivists thought of as style, “are totally unimportant.” “What is 
important is precisely . . . normative identity.”634 Vološinov explains this position further: 
It is clear that the system of language in the sense characterized above is 
completely independent of individual creative acts, intentions, or motives. 
From the point of view of the second trend, meaningful language 
creativity on the speaker’s part is simply out of the question. Language 
stands before the individual as an inviolable, incontestable norm which the 
individual, for his part, can only accept. . . . The individual acquires the 
system of language from his speech community completely ready-made. 
Any change within that system lies beyond the range of his individual 
consciousness. The individual act of articulating sounds becomes a 
linguistic act only by measure of its compliance with the fixed (at any 
given moment in time) and incontestable (for the individual) system of 
language.635 
 
Where the first approach seemed fuzzy on the question of how authentically individual 
expressions could work on the level of communicative (shared) language, this second 
approach shows an anemia towards the individual and individual content by simply 
discounting the realm of individual expression. With abstract objectivism, as Vološinov 
states, there is simply no “access to the problem of expression.”636 Language, in this 
theory, has a “compulsory nature,” it stands outside of or “exterior to the individual 
consciousness.” It is, “as a system of forms . . . completely independent of creative 
impulses or activities on the part of the individual” a “product of collective creativity,” it 
is a “social entity.”637 
Neither of these two models are Vološinov’s. Both are faulted by the Russian 
linguist for not being situated materially—or dialogical—and so both models remain two 
very different but nevertheless equally idealist explanations of language. “[T]he theory 
underlying individualistic subjectivism must be rejected,” Vološinov argues, because the, 
organizing center of any utterance, of any experience, is not within but 
outside—in the social milieu surrounding the individual being. Only the 
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inarticulate cry of an animal is really organized from inside the 
physiological apparatus of an individual creature. . . . Yet, even the most 
primitive human utterance produced by the individual organism is, from 
the point of view of its content, import, and meaning, organized outside 
the organism, in the extraorganismic conditions of the social milieu.638 
 
But, equally, in rejecting abstract objectivism, Vološinov cautions against taking 
language as organized outside the organism undialectically, without some creative 
agency on the side of the individual speaking subject. “[T]he logic of language is not at 
all a matter of reproducing a normatively identical form.”639 For what is achieved with 
this is just as without meaning as the individualistic subjectivist’s “cry.” The 
reproduction and recognition of normatively identical form results merely in the 
repetition of the “signal” as opposed to the true (and thus meaning-laden) sign. As 
Vološinov explains: “The process of understanding is on no account to be confused with 
the process of recognition. These are thoroughly different processes. Only a sign can be 
understood; what is recognized is a signal. A signal is an internally fixed, singular thing 
that does not in fact stand for anything else, or reflect or refract anything, but is simply a 
technical means for indicating this or that object (some definite, fixed object) or this or 
that action (likewise definite and fixed).”640 
Vološinov states the difference and the dilemma summarily: 
The difference between the first and second trends is very graphically 
brought out in the following contrast. The self-identical forms comprising 
the immutable system of language represented for the first trend only the 
inert crust of the actual generative process of language, i.e., of the true 
essence of language implemented in the unreproducible, individual act of 
creation. Meanwhile, for the second trend, it is exactly this system of self-
identical forms that becomes the essence of language; individual creative 
refraction and variation of linguistic forms are, for this trend, only the 
dross of linguistic life or, rather, of linguistic monumentality, only the 
mercurial and extraneous overtones of the basic, fixed tone of linguistic 
forms.641 
 
The dilemma remains: “What, then, is the true center of linguistic reality: the individual 
speech act—the utterance—or the system of language? And what is the real mode of 
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existence of language: unceasing creative generation or inert immutability of self-
identical norms?”642 
 
4. Newman’s Self-Evidence & Reinhardt’s Ruse 
As with Vološinov’s two opposing schools of language theory, so Newman and 
Reinhardt desired identity as a moment of articulate being or self, an articulate present. 
But, as with the individualistic subjectivist stylists and the abstract objectivist 
grammarians, they came at the “true center” and “real mode” from different directions. 
To synthesize, this true center, this moment of articulation that both Newman and 
Reinhardt desired, might be described as the liminal join between identity and non-
identity, or the identity of identity and non-identity. What is sought is neither pure 
identity (the ratio, the already known, the Name), nor pure non-identity (the never 
knowable, the void, nameless Nature) but the mutually realizing moment of the two, self-
realization as forged out of that dialectical crucible. The difference, as in Vološinov’s 
opposing models, is that Newman will start from “pure” non-identity and Reinhardt from 
“pure” identity.  
The now famous anecdote that begs to be mentioned here is the one of Newman’s 
debate with the art historian Erwin Panofsky in the letters to the editor section of 
ARTnews in 1961. Here is a quick summary of that correspondence: In the April issue of 
that publication Panofsky (writing from The Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, 
New Jersey) complains of finding it “increasingly hard to keep up with contemporary 
art.” His “signal example” turns out to be Newman’s Vir Heroicus Sublimus, the 
reproduction of which Panofsky had encountered in the pages of ARTnews a few months 
previous. Ostensibly, Panofsky’s complaint issues from a grammar mistake, in Latin. The 
“sublimus” in the title of Newman’s painting had been incorrectly declined, the scholar 
pointed out. Panofsky then offered three possibilities for this error: (1) sloppiness: that it 
is a printing mistake the fault of ARTnews; (2) ignorance: that Newman, the artist, suffers 
from “plain illiteracy”; or (3) arrogance: that he, “as Aelfric says of God, is ‘above 
grammar.’”643 It is hard not to imagine a face-off between two highly distinct figures, 
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Panofsky as the celebrated scholar, saturated in European learning and culture, 
admonishing the combined ignorance/arrogance of an upstart like Newman, an American 
and bête comme un peinture and, moreover, pretentious enough to title his works in the 
ancient lingua franca of the learned. In the very next issue, however, Newman comes 
back with a remarkable “reprimand” to this “august don.” First he points out that 
“sublimus” was in fact a misprint. The actual title of Newman’s painting employs the 
“correct” spelling. This both exonerates the quality of Newman’s Latin and puts into 
question the quality of Panofsky’s own reading skills. For Newman does not fail to point 
out that it is only the painting’s caption that carries this misprint. The implied criticism is 
that Panofsky did not bother to read the article. Not leaving things at that, Newman goes 
on to demonstrate that “sublimus”—the form of the word that Panofsky alleges is 
incorrect—is in fact, equally as correct. The “stupid painter” turns out to be more agile in 
his Latin etymologies than the professor. But what is perhaps more at issue—not nit-
picking over the grammatical form of a dead language—is indicated in the closing lines 
of Newman’s letter. He writes, “As for the matter of Aelfric, the tenth-century monk had 
a greater sensitivity for the meaning of the act of creation than does Panofsky. One would 
think that by now Prof. Panofsky would know the basic fact about a work of art, that for a 
work of art to be a work of art, it must rise above grammar and syntax—pro gloria 
Dei.”644 Thus, to go back to the Vološinovian paradigm and to the claim of the abstract 
objectivists that the basic fact of language is what is identical, normative, grammatical, 
and rule-bound, here, in this example, Newman speaks the part, perfectly, of its opposite, 
of individualistic subjectivism: the basic fact of a work of art, its essence (“that for a 
work of art to be a work of art”) is to “rise above grammar and syntax” for the glory of 
the Creator’s/creator’s high purpose. 
Here is an elaboration. If one could tell (or rather repeat) a creation/articulation 
story for Newman it would begin with the artist forging himself and his work out of the 
primal substance of non-identity, as pure inarticulate being pulling itself together, 
summonsing itself up, in the manner of an Old-Testament patriarch, calling upon the 
entirety of its metaphysical force in order to generate self-identity, in order to “wrest truth 
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from the void.”645 This is akin to the conception of language as unceasing creative 
generation. Self expression is genuine, authentic—and inimitable because it is forged 
each time, for the first time. Identity as self-evidence and self-realization occurs without 
the aid of interlocutors, mediators, pregivens, ready-mades, without any previous and 
thus conventional forms of identity, and thus as well uncontaminated by duplicity, 
uncomplicated by the possibility of being anything other than itself. Newman’s self-
evidence is the ex nihilo miracle of non-identity coming to identity. He is the “intuitive 
painter,” the “direct painter.” As he remonstrated in 1962: “I have never worked from 
sketches, never planned a painting, never “thought out” a painting. I start each painting as 
if I had never painted before [emphasis added]. I present no dogma, no system, no 
demonstrations. I have no formal solutions.”646 In this Newman acted as “an exemplary 
‘first man,’” as Richard Shiff has pointed out, he “made decisions in his writing and 
painting as if there were no precedents; the products of his though were ever new, as if 
emerging from primeval chaos.”647 Each and every painting had to be generated out of 
this non-identity “as if I had never painted before.” And thus, coherence had to be 
immediate, had to come together at the “moment of creation” and not at any time before. 
Nothing could be set out in advance. True identity had to be singular. Newman’s self-
evidence was self cognition without re-cognition, without the repetition of an “over and 
over again.” It could never be the “repeat act.”648 
Reinhardt took this to be sheer nonsense. Assertion of ex nihilo coming to oneself 
was mere romantic subjectivism, an illusion hopelessly faltering in the untenable myth of 
access to some realm of the communicable outside the ratio, as if paintings really could 
be made on Newman’s supposition—”as if I had never painted before.” This Reinhardt 
emphatically denounced and to which he responded: “Art is always made by craftsmen—
it’s never a spontaneous expression. Artists always come from artists and art forms come 
from art forms. . . . Expression is an impossible word.”649 It is precisely with the “over 
and over again,” the “repeat act” that Reinhardt’s story begins. He comes to the moment 
of articulation from grounds thoroughly, inescapably mediated by identitarian forms, 
from the “inert immutability of self-identical norms.” Articulation for him can exist only 
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logically as language—form given socially; recognized communally; spoken 
intersubjectively. Reinhardt, the rationalist, believes one starts out with form, with 
identities, with systems. The ratio is already there. It speaks first. Repetition, geometry, 
symmetry, ratio are the very grounds of articulation. Only when a space is already 
gridded out, made regular, given some form of measure is there possibility for being. For 
Reinhardt only blindness or utopianism buys into myths of an anterior state where the 
ratio is not already pre-forming or pre-articulating the space of experience.  
If Rosenberg took Reinhardt’s entire project with a sense of the dire—the 
infamous “black, square trapdoor” that the critic imagined so much of 1960s art 
descending through—then one might do well to temper this judgment with a reminder 
from Adorno: “Artworks, no less than reason, have their cunning.”650 And it is by this 
suggestion, the possibility of the artwork’s cunning, that I hope to indicate how 
Reinhardt’s project was still one of championing painting over pictures.  
What keeps Reinhardt’s articulation from being merely instances of the bad forms 
of identity—mindless repetition, commodities, products of the culture industry, cells in 
the dread prison-house of language—is that although the artist travels through what 
appears to be the most relentless, pernicious and deadening logic of modern, 
bureaucratized identity, he uses identitarian form in reverse, as a passage towards the 
non-identical. Reinhardt’s ruse, in other words, is to set the identitarian mode against 
itself. In a double movement, he both presents the blankness of the sign as formal 
identity, and unmasks the presence of otherness. The non-identical emerges as something 
also produced in any moment of identity-formation-repetition. Thus Reinhardt, as does 
Newman, harbors a moment of utopian possibility, of the union of identity and non-
identity. The difference in his version is that this comes to fruition after one is made 
explicitly aware of the ratio, of identity, of form. The sign-form is drained of its “life,” 
voided of content, until it is perfectly hollow, an empty “as such.” It is through this 
dogmatic insistence on identitarian form that one finds the secret revolving door. With a 
turn, what is revealed is the passage to an enriching non-identity, to a quality of 
presentness that is essentially non-translatable and thus victoriously transcendent of the 
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ratio itself. Posed as if it were an answer to Jameson’s call and question, “But we must 
reach this experience of the new and of the other through conceptuality. . . . Is it possible 
to do something to the concept, which otherwise tendentially locks us into sameness, in 
order to use it as a mode of access to difference and the new?,” the sign is Reinhardt’s 
ruse.651 It represents the only possibility really existing within the present situation, the 
only viable route to the destination of a utopian outside to the system, of the good 
congruence of identity and non-identity. This cunning passage alone offers that ability to 
“unshape itself.”652 One can, in Reinhardt’s story, only arrive at the void as a passage 
taken through the forms of language to the underside of the sign: it is a paradoxically 





Dialectics of Identity and Non-Identity: Dogma and Freedom 
More detail and specificity, a firmer grasping of the quality of Newman and Reinhardt’s 
difference is gained by examining how their arguments for painting may be plotted 
through a series of oppositional pairs. Out of such an exercise, the notion of pairing 
Newman and Reinhardt takes on aspects of perversity and, oddly, suitability. For what 
could be more perfectly opposed than this: Newman, the romantic, the “artist’s friend,” 
who valued his paintings for achieving fullness and for marking a new beginning, coming 
out of an early surrealist-organic abstraction, believing in a living, plasmic art of 
originality, spontaneity, creation along individualistic subjectivist lines, in the quest for 
singular expression and contact with the new, the unknown, while shunning symmetry, 
geometry, dogma, repetition, formalism, objectivism, academicism, rationalism; and, 
Reinhardt, the “classicist,” the bullying “conscience of the art world,” who thought of his 
paintings as achieving emptiness and as the end, the final, the last paintings, coming from 
a cubist/constructivist abstraction along A.A.A. lines, propagating for a dead, lifeless, 
plastic art of repetition, reproduction, tradition, dogma, order, who sought an impersonal 
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“contentless” form of geometry against expressionism, asymmetry, primitivism? The 
importance of these and other related oppositional sets (plastic/plasmic, 
beautiful/sublime, place/space, primitive/European, known/unknown, size/scale, 
creation/performance, living entity/geometric form, tradition/the new, classical/romantic, 
chaos/order, form/content, dogma/freedom) for clarifying an understanding of Newman’s 
commitments and antitheses has already, and on several occasions, been discussed by 
Richard Shiff.653 An obvious debt will be owed to Shiff’s previous work on the 
structuring oppositions operating in Newman’s conception of painting. My deviation will 
be in opening up a dialogue in which Reinhardt becomes the prolocutor for all the terms 
banished to the underside of Newman’s truth in painting; revealing how the flip-side of 
Newman’s argument does the work of articulating Reinhardt’s version of the “truth in 
painting.” What will become quickly apparent is that the multitude of oppositional pairs 
through which Newman and Reinhardt speak against each other are rearticulation of old, 
familiar struggles over how and where to locate the moment of truth (of 
onement/oneness) in a dialectic of identity and non-identity.  
“In one of the memorable formulations for which he was noted,” Rosenberg 
recounted, Newman had “summed up the intellectual predicament of the artists of his 
generation.” The formulation and predicament was this: “The history of modern painting 
has been the struggle against the catalogue.”654 Certainly a provocative enough a 
statement coming from an artist surely aware of the kinds of functions artists’ catalogues 
come to perform: playing a key role in the recognition and identification of works, as an 
exercise in organizing an oeuvre, a quite literal taking stock—all things important to 
marketability, for the art market’s mechanisms for making its evaluations. Newman’s 
antipathy to the catalogue provided an encapsulation of his larger problems with 
regimented “identity” altogether. On one level, Newman’s struggle with the catalogue is 
one against modern technologies of image reproduction when applied to works of art. 
This sort of reproduction was a supreme instance of a rationalization of artworks—it 
processed artworks into an abstraction, a sign founded on absence rather than the kind of 
unique Sign grounded in presence that Newman so sought. It violated at the core the 
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nature of the identity of artworks, replacing the good identity of self-presence for the bad 
identity of brand recognition and bureaucratic order (“based,” in Newman’s words, “on 
nonexperience”). It was for reasons like these, one assumes, that Newman took such a 
fierce stance against Andre Malraux’s “museum without walls,” and refused, on 
principle, to possess any reproductions of artworks.655 Experience of art had to come 
from “In Front of the Real Thing,” as Newman suggested in his title to an ARTnews 
centennial celebration of the Metropolitan Museum of Art. “[A]nything that I knew or 
studied about ‘art history,’” the artist claimed, “came from my encounter with the 
original works. It was not through photographs, reproductions or from slides. I have 
always had a distaste—even a disdain—for reproductions and photographs of artworks. . 
. . That is why I do not own a collection of books of reproductions.”656 Reproductions 
only abstracted the work, reduced it to the sort of entity—a “mirage” in Newman’s 
words—more easily processed in systems of information, including the “placeless” 
system of capitalist exchange. Art reproductions and catalogues only managed identity on 
the order of generic recognition where values or meanings were derived differentially 
from their position within a structured system. 
In the foreword to a reissue of Peter Kropotkin’s Memoirs of a Revolutionist, 
published in 1968, a year that no doubt echoed for Newman’s older Left generation with 
revolutionary choices and failures they had faced three decades earlier, Newman wrote 
that he “felt destroyed by established institutions.”657 This leads to the second accent on 
Newman’s rejection of the catalogue. Catalogues are by definition of the nature of 
registers, series, lists. To catalogize is to tally up, to enumerate, to deal in numbers, with 
the countable. It is as the Oxford English Dictionary suggests, “(a) The giving of form or 
order to a thing; orderly arrangement; regulation. (b) The established order by which 
anything is regulated; system.”658 Most definitely this is the territory of Adorno’s ratio, 
the key to reductive identitarian systems and all that Newman felt “destroyed” him—
institutions, outside authority, heteronomy, standardized (and thus abstract) systems of 
measure, tools for imposing general identities. Newman’s lifelong argument will be with 
identity as ratio, and against any outside imposition of identity.  
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In this however, it is vitally important to keep distinct Newman’s rejection of 
rationalized identity from an embrace of formlessness, a rejection of identity, of forming. 
After all, he himself spoke of the true painter’s process as one of giving form to chaos. 
“All artists,” Newman wrote in 1945, “have been involved in the handling of chaos.” One 
did this, one formed or handled chaos, however, not through a concern with “geometric 
forms per se but in creating forms that by their abstract nature carry some abstract 
intellectual content.”659 The danger and threat that Newman detected in all 
institutionalisms was the distortion of forming-as-generation into formalism-as-
regulation: the problem, as it might be put, lies within the compound predicate of the first 
entry of the OED definition: to give form without order. Newman’s biography offers 
plenty of examples of his protests against identitarian forms. For example, in 1937 
Newman contested the New York City Board of Examiners over the qualifying 
examinations required of all full-time high school art teachers (Newman, as were a 
number of his friends, had been working at the level of substitute high school art teacher, 
a lesser position that did not mean less working hours but significantly less pay and no 
benefits or job security). Newman’s charge against this institutional board would be made 
on two counts: (1) the absurdity itself of measuring artistic ability through a system of 
grades, through any system of quantification; and (2) the patent exploitability of a 
situation in which costs were kept down by limiting the number of “full-time” instructors 
through an impossible exam, thereby keeping the majority of instructors within the 
system at the reduced-pay “part-time” status. To make his point Newman even went so 
far as to interview Thomas Hart Benton on the matter. In the New York Times article from 
September 19, 1938, Newman emphasized Benton’s amazement when told that the 
“board uses a numerical scale to mark drawing ability.”660 To this Benton responded: “I 
know of no method that can properly evaluate artistic expression mathematically or 
mechanically. . . . Any scale attempting such a thing is ridiculous. . . . A false 
mathematical scale may eliminate the progressive, the individual, the inspired. . . .”661 In 
1967 at the First International Congress on Religion, Architecture and the Visual Arts, in 
lines that sound remarkably similar to the ones Newman quotes in his interview with 
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Benton, Newman stated, “I find it sort of embarrassing to talk on the title of ‘Spiritual 
Dimensions of Contemporary Art.’ I had no idea that the spirit could be so easily 
measured—I wonder who is holding the ruler?”662 It is a statement, like all of Newman’s 
best, that manages with an impressive concision and simplicity to make its point 
provocatively clear.  
The strength of Newman’s resistance to generic identity is met and answered by 
Reinhardt’s embrace of regularity, repetition, recognition, the “completely conventional, 
formalistic.”663 In contrast to Newman’s proud abstention from possessing any 
reproductions of art, Reinhardt obsessively collected and categorized images of “types,” 
amassing what became a famed slide collection. As Dale McConathy relates, “During his 
travels, Ad Reinhardt began to take centered, frontalist photographs of architecture, 
paintings, sculpture, and other artifacts, which became his vast collection of slides. When 
these slides were shown, either informally at home or as part of a lecture series, they were 
organized by motifs, patterns, forms—sometimes buttocks, breasts, doorways, faces, 
windows—with often witty cross references. Soon, the collection became encyclopedic—
a system of signs that leaped cultures and times.”664 Reinhardt was the meta-cataloguer, 
seeing identity articulated across types, in genera, and banishing with his categories the 
incoherent, chaotic, inhuman mire of non-identity, of formlessness. It is the opposition of 
these basic positions that play out below. 
 One way to begin is with this question: what was the appropriate comportment for 
a work of art? Should it be a living shape or lifeless and cold; should it be dead or alive? 
An art “lifeless, breathless, cold, empty, sterile, dull, monotonous, repetitious, rigid . . . 
dehumanized . . . uninteresting” was what Reinhardt demanded.665 Lippard, in the 
catalogue essay for the 1966-67 Jewish Museum retrospective, discussed the significance 
of Reinhardt’s formal choices in the black paintings as devices that neutralized the sense 
of action and movement, all in order to achieve an inactive, static surface. The square, for 
instance, was the obvious choice over the circle, because the circle, “while perfect, and 
cornerless,” was an “active, organic shape with connotations of rolling, spinning, the sun, 
the moon, and other natural and symbolic impedimenta,” whereas the “square is patently 
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static, man-made, lifeless, inert and innactive.” Relatedly the symmetrical, the completely 
even, all-over incident (or incidentlessness) maintained equilibrium, a static nothingness. 
Color, likewise, had to be rejected because it had “come to represent the vulgarities of 
‘life.’” “Colors are barbaric,” Reinhardt noted, they were “unstable, primitive” and too 
thoroughly “woven into the fabric of life.”666 The negationist solution for Reinhardt was 
black—a black so seeped of oil that it did not shine or reflect any light. One of 
Reinhardt’s “Twelve Rules for a New Academy” from 1957 read: “There should be no 
shine in the finish. Gloss reflects and relates to the changing surroundings.”667 A 
reflective surface would be dynamic, lively. Reinhardt’s success in achieving this static 
deadness is suggested in the propensity in descriptions of the quality of Reinhardt’s 
blacks to evoke images like empty stages or timeless voids, sucking the life out of the 
room, leaving a profound breathlessness.668 The registration of inert, dead surfaces was 
such that Lippard nominated Reinhardt as “unquestionably the first painter to resolve 
these regions of lifelessness into a strong esthetic program.”669 The relentless morbidity 
of Reinhardt’s propositions would lead Rosenberg, with far from congratulatory 
intentions, to refer to “the black extinction of Reinhardt” and to describe his paintings as 
possessing a “dead fish eye glint.”670 
Furthermore, for Reinhardt it was not a matter of simply stating that “Art is 
always dead,” but of calling its opposite, “living” art, a deception.671 But how, by what 
system of values was Reinhardt able to argue that dead art should be valued and living art 
disparaged? I want to answer this question by turning to Reinhardt’s thoughts on the role 
of museums. Museums were institutions of high importance to Reinhardt. He idealized 
them as akin to tombs or shrines, “quiet respectful place[s]” for “dead” things.”672 
Museums were the preserve of a “kind of owlish, introspective person.” “It was a musty, 
dusty place,” a “void,” a place for “remains.”673 Reinhardt uses the death motif to speak 
of a kind of autonomy for art, as of things left alone, either out of the sanctity of dead 
things, or out of their uselessness, as things beyond the capacity to transform. What was 
improper to the true museum were the living arts. They turned the museum into a “three-
ring circus,” into a place of “popular entertainment activity.”674 “Now,” Reinhardt 
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lamented of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in 1958, “the Museum has glass walls, a 
garden, a cafeteria, movies, commercial and industrial art, arts and crafts, textiles, 
posters, children’s art, Surrealist and Expressionist art. A museum of fine arts should be 
separate from everything else.”675 Kitsch, entertainment, culture industry products, the 
truly living arts of late capitalism were now incorporated into the museum, enlivening 
them, making them of “interest.”676 As Reinhardt had warned, “If somebody is interested 
there is already something wrong. They are interested for the wrong reasons.”677 This 
was, as I read Reinhardt’s warning, a comment on the perversion of human interest 
whereby interest refers not to gratuitous curiosity but rather to appetitive interest—the to-
have-and-to-multiply of capitalism’s all-devouring consumer subjects.678 Pandering to 
that appetite was a mistake. “There is nothing less significant in art, nothing more 
exhausting and immediately exhausted,” he wrote in an art-as-art manifesto from 1962, 
“than ‘endless variety.’”679 It is by this understanding of “interest” and variety that one 
can glimpse the sort of contrarian’s logic by which Reinhardt placed value on the boring, 
on creating objects generating no interest and therefore, theoretically at least, working in 
a region “dead” to capitalism. The argument for an art of deadness, lacking life, beyond 
the Pale of interest of the fecund processes of business, entities passed over by the living, 
dynamic processes of capitalist transformation, signifies, for Reinhardt, the realm of art’s 
truth, the realm of art as art. 
Newman, as one recalls, had been anti-capitalist as well. Against the arts of 
capitalism, he had set his version of painting in opposition to the bourgeois object and to 
bourgeois activity. However, in contradistinction to Reinhardt’s framework for counter-
capitalist strategy, Newman saw the “living”—a living art, living form and living 
shape—as precisely that which escaped the reign of capitalism’s dead forms and its 
mortifying logic of standardization and exchange. Furthermore, it was geometry and its 
ontological effectuation—”space”—that served so well within capital’s mordant regime. 
It was in 1959—a triumphal year for Newman with his one-person French and Company 
show (organized by Clement Greenberg) and his inclusion in MoMA’s highly traveled, 
publicized and discussed exhibition, “The New American Painting,” and all of this 
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shortly after his Bennington exhibition in May 1958—that he came out with perhaps his 
strongest statement condemning the mentality of geometry. “It is precisely this death 
image, the grip of geometry,” Newman proclaimed in his catalogue statement for the 
latter exhibition, “that has to be confronted.” Geometry, the art of space, was dead. In 
contrast, “Painting like passion, is a living voice, which, when I hear it, I must let speak, 
unfettered.”680 To arrive at a better sense of how the living/dead opposition worked for 
Newman one can look to a lengthy but unpublished twelve-part essay that Newman 
worked on in 1945. Entitled “The Plasmic Image,” and written, not insignificantly, with 
Mondrian’s MoMA retrospective fresh in Newman’s experience, this essay marked his 
theoretical working out of the distinction between plasmic entities and plastic objects.681 
The difference separated the “new painter” from the “traditional abstract painter.” The 
new abstract painter engaged and created the plasmic, a term that, according to Newman, 
“implies the creation of forms that carry or express abstract thought, a presentation in 
tangible symbols of some inner idea or concept.”682 It meant the presence of what 
Newman will refer to in this essay variously as subject matter, the subjective element, of 
intellectual content, of idea, of the mind’s expression. This contrasted thoroughly, in 
Newman’s mind, with the limited intentions of the traditional abstract painter, proponents 
of the old “plastic attitude,” an attitude which, much to the danger of serious, high art, has 
been the “dominant postulate of modern art.”683 “Art critics and aestheticians have been 
constantly concerned with the plastic elements in painting and sculpture. This attitude, 
based on the scientific approach, treats pictures and sculpture as if they were objects.”684 
Or, as one might amend, as if they were merely objects—inert things. What was 
egregiously ignored by this aesthetic approach (Newman’s term for it is scientific but it 
might also be called formalist and objectivist) is the “spiritual content of a work of art,” 
the animating agency of the subject, that which invests nature with consciousness, with 
intention, desire, or will. The plastic orientation—the scientific, rationalizing attitude—
not only ignored spiritual content and refused to engage in “philosophic language” but its 
“analysis of art has been so intensely objective that the prevailing point of view has 
transformed art into objects, a collection of gadgets. The attitude toward pictures has 
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been to reduce them to the objective elements that make them up.”685 Richard Shiff has 
articulated this difference between the plastic and plasmic in very clear and useful terms. 
“Newman chose his terms ever so deliberately,” Shiff explains. “‘[P]lasma’” (or 
‘plasmic’) connotes an organic fluidity; it also suggests the more familiar word ‘plastic,’ 
which refers to an organic quality in materials. Semantically, ‘plasmic’ and ‘plastic’ are 
closely related (both derive from the Greek word for molding or forming); but they are 
also inversions of one another, with the one term oriented to living organisms and the 
other to inert matter. Simply put, the plasmic is lively and active (like the movement of 
thought, it gives form to things), whereas the plastic is passive (it is the form that thought 
and other forces produce).”686 Put into the terms of dialectic, the plastic is more object-
like, inert and static and the plasmic more subject-like, animated, enlivened. Enlivened 
“organic fluidity” would be the target of Reinhardt’s intense program of eradication. 
Newman’s plasmic entity was precisely what Reinhardt found so corrupting of high, 
serious, fine art; it belonged, damnably in Reinhardt’ lexicon, to the category of 
“expression.” But equally contrarily, Newman would pitch his battle against the plastic, 
against Reinhardt’s lifeless geometries, against his “death image.” 
 Thus Newman’s and Reinhardt’s opposed stances are schematized: Reinhardt 
seeking an end through geometry, Newman seeking a beginning in an “art of no-
geometry” but both attempting to articulate identity, to arrive at the proper measure of 
man, whether as with Reinhardt through the rational geometry of space and size or as 
with Newman through the expressive no-geometry of place and scale.687  
The challenge for Newman was to achieve identity, the Name, truth wrested from 
the void and chaos, while circumventing all the modes of geometric identity: the ratio, 
dogma, institutions, systems, sketches, models, a prioris.688 Newman did not equate this 
rejection of geometry with wishy-washiness, an inability to take an identifiable stand, or 
with an acceptance of vagueness or ambiguity. In a 1951 review of Hess’s Abstract 
Painting: Background and American Phase, Newman vocalized, with a certain 
sharpness, his trouble with this facile embrace of non-identity. He warned against the 
author’s praise of Willem de Kooning’s pictorial ambiguity: “To talk about the 
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ambiguous man or the ambiguous poetic image has become fashionable, but it is a bit too 
simple.” Additionally, Newman warns, “man may have become in current philosophy the 
figure of ambiguity, but a man conscious of his ambiguous nature may also only be 
muddled and have very little to offer of profound wisdom. . . . One thing is certain: 
ambiguity as a deliberate act, as a program for either art or life, is an anomaly and an 
evasion that can lead only to some form of slavery. Clarity alone can lead to freedom.”689 
The trouble was: to achieve clarity (an identity, meaning, a sense of self) but in some 
other way other and outside of the kind declared by institutions, to do it without 
“geometry.” For, as Newman suggests above, mere ambiguity was not an adequate stance 
from which to struggle against dogma. An important distinction had to be made. Being 
simply without an identity was not a valid way to combat the systems of identity that 
destroyed personal freedom. As such, readings of Newman’s work as a meditation on the 
“void” and nothingness profoundly disregard one of the artist’s most important claims: 
that he wanted his paintings to give a person a sense of fullness, presence, a sense of 
place and a sense of scale. 
Newman’s most intense grappling with the problem of achieving identity as an 
authentic sense of self (neither the preformed identities of the institutional world nor the 
formless non-identity of Nature, the void) are performed over a series of statements in 
which he differentiates place from space and scale from size. As a number of scholars 
have indicated, written evidence of Newman’s specific engagement with this problem 
dates to his 1949 visit to the prehistoric earth mounds in Akron, Ohio, an experience that 
had a profound effect on him. The short but forceful statement “Ohio” resulted from that 
trip. What comes out of Newman’s description of his experience with the earth mounds is 
an early attempt to discount one type of space and valorize another of a wholly different 
order, one that he will eventually distinguish as “place.” Newman writes: “There are no 
subjects—nothing that can be shown in a museum or even photographed. . . .” Indeed, 
these are things that “cannot even be seen.” Put slightly differently, there are no easy 
identities. There is no figure, no image: missing is that element that would announce 
closure, that some properly delimited unit had been in fact properly “seen.” Rather what 
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the mounds do is “make the space”; and the experience which “must be experienced there 
on the spot” is “[t]he feeling that here is the space.”690 It was that qualitatively enriched 
experience of space that made obvious the paucity of quantitatively given notions of 
space. This new order of space had nothing to do with the kind of space that contains 
objects, that is amenable to figure/ground relationships; “It has nothing to do with space 
and its manipulation,” Newman insisted. It was not, in other words, the space of formalist 
composition.691 Space was that generic substance with which formalism dealt. Space 
could be cut up (or divided as Newman would say), or measured and arranged, a little 
here, a little there—responsive, in short, to the twin evils of decorating and cuisine, and 
to which one might easily add a significant third, administrating.692 Newman was 
completely antithetical to space—space was always administered from outside, it was 
bureaucratic, preconceived, regulated, given form through harsh geometries.  
What Newman would oppose to all of this was a qualitatively new experience of 
space that, by the late 1950s at least, would stand in Newman’s lexicon as “place.” “Place 
means everything,” he wrote in 1959 to Alan Power, ”but place is created—and it is 
created by men with vision, with courage, and with the desire for freedom.”693 Space, in 
contrast, had nothing ethical to it: it was bureaucratically impersonal. The experiential 
focus to Newman’s notion of place would develop more fully in subsequent elaborations 
of the concept. In 1965 he could summarize authoritatively: “One thing that I am 
involved in about painting is that the painting should give man a sense of place: that he 
knows he’s there, so he’s aware of himself.” Similarly, a few years later, he writes, “The 
artist . . . is still involved if he is a true artist in the basic issues of a work of art. And to 
my mind the basic issue of a work of art, whether it is architecture, painting or sculpture, 
is first and foremost for it to create a sense of place, so that the artist and the beholder 
will know where they are. . . . What matters to a true artist is that he distinguish between 
a place and no place at all; and the greater the work of art, the greater will be this feeling. 
And this feeling is the fundamental spiritual dimension. If this doesn’t happen, nothing 
else can happen.”694 Doubtless, statements such as these have helped foster the 
understanding of Newman’s work as fundamentally engaged in the matter and process of 
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self-identity. “In the place defined by a Newman painting,” Carter Ratcliff announced, 
“one defines oneself.”695 Or, as Shiff has argued, “the artist’s self had to realize its place, 
becoming self-aware, grounded in the painting.”696 
The relevance and relatedness of Newman’s notion of place to a sense of oneself 
(to a self and to a self identity) is reiterated in the oppositional pair of scale and size. 
Shiff has explained that the difference between size and scale was for Newman 
“analogous to that between ‘place’ and ‘space’; size was generalized and measurable, 
whereas scale was not only specific to a situation but also escaped all standard means of 
description and could only be felt, subjectively.”697 Just as he did with space and place, 
Newman would discount size in favor of scale. As he put it succinctly to de Antonio just 
before his death: “Size doesn’t count. It’s scale that counts. It’s human scale that counts, 
and the only way you can achieve human scale is by content.”698 No doubt part of what 
Newman is speaking against is the receptive tendency to focus on the large size of many 
of his canvases. It was a mistake, as Newman saw it, that a sense of grandeur, or of a sort 
of existential fullness and expansiveness, had been too simply correlated with bigness in 
terms of sheer yardage. As Newman was quick to point out, even his extremely narrow 
zip paintings, though small in actual area, possessed a commanding scale. And it was 
scale that was felt, experienced through the specificity of encounter. Thus, to put 
Newman’s statement slightly differently, in the end, size only counts (as enumeration) 
and that is precisely the problem with it. It is scale that counts in the sense of mattering, 
of registering significance.  
Had Newman lodged a complaint against Reinhardt’s dogma based on these pairs 
of terms it might have run something like this: Reinhardt’s paintings take up space and 
insistently so—again and again and again—but precisely without ever generating that all 
vital sense of place—as unique, individual, unrepeatable. What appears to count in them 
is precisely counting—measure as size and space, for the generalized, standard, generic, 
abstract means of articulating identity. This was a flat reversal of Newman’s own set of 
priorities. If a sense of place and a sense of scale were privileged notions in Newman’s 
aesthetic—tied to an authentic sense of self, of good and true identity, as modes of 
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identity not amenable to the abstracting, generalizing, homogenizing regime of the 
“ruler” mentality—it is the reverse, generic space cut to a formula that are clearly and 
insistently prioritized in Reinhardt. Contrast Newman’s not-measuring to what Reinhardt 
insistently reiterates after 1960, a formula for his black paintings which is explicitly 
framed by that very system of measure Newman found so pernicious and contrary to the 
liberatory, self-realizing politico-aesthetic potential within true painting. What one hears 
in Reinhardt’s pronouncements is the insistent style of the ratio: “The one direction in 
fine or abstract art today is in the painting of the same one form over and over again.” 
“The one work for a fine artist, the one painting, is the painting of the one-size canvas—
the single scheme, one formal device, one color-monochrome, one linear division in each 
direction, one symmetry . . . each painting into one over-all uniformity and non-
irregularity.”699 And for the explicit formula: “A square (neutral, shapeless) canvas, five 
feet wide, five feet high, as high as a man, as wide as a man’s outstretched arms (not 
large, not small, sizeless), trisected (no composition), one horizontal form negating one 
vertical form (formless, no top, no bottom, directionless). . . .”700 Indeed, beginning in 
1960, Reinhardt would stick to this plan by limiting his painting production to the “one 
painting” (the black five foot square of canvas) and by repeating the formula “over and 
over again” until his death seven years later. Further underscoring this emphasis on 
uniformity and anonymity are those instances where the title of a black painting includes 
the canvas’s dimensions, “sixty by sixty inches square.” Here an explicit alignment is 
made between the name/title/identity of a work and, prosaically, its standard measure.701 
It is with this formula in mind—this intrusive reminder as one stands in front of a black 
painting that one is dealing with a token of a type, a painting made out to a checklist of 
precise specifications—that the anonymity of Reinhardt’s cut-outs of gridded space stand 
in such contrast to Newman’s concept of place. The space that Reinhardt delimits is, in 
effect, placeless. 
Posing Reinhardt’s choice of means (space and size) against Newman’s (place 
and scale) in this manner tends to cast Reinhardt’s project as grossly anti-humanist, as 
embracing or at least paving the way for the annihilation of the subject, as ushering in the 
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nightmare of technocratic sublime, a one-size-fits-all reduction of individual personality 
and experience. But I want to offer another way of taking Reinhardt’s seemingly perverse 
insistence upon the impersonal, generic, uniform that in fact places him very much within 
humanist tradition. For Reinhardt too, though armed with the seemingly antithetical 
quantifying tools of size and space, will take his ultimate aim to be the articulation of 
identity, of a sense of self, and of the human. In other words, if for Newman the so-called 
measure of man came through an innate sense of scale (each man standing for himself, in 
front of the real thing) for Reinhardt it came from size, from the identity conferred from 
within a communal and communicable system and scale of measures stemming from 
traditions and conventions both pre-existing and outlasting any individual appearance. It 
is precisely a standard, generic system of measures that figures the human. This point can 
be illustrated when one recognizes in Reinhardt’s formula for the black paintings—”A 
square . . . five feet wide, five feet high, as high as a man, as wide as a man’s outstretched 
arms”—the image of Vitruvian Man (fig. 23), the ideal, proportionate male human 
rendered with arms outstretched, circumscribed by a square and circle. Inspired by 
passages in De Architectura, the famed architectural treatise of the classical Roman 
architect and engineer Vitruvius, “Vitruvian Man” comes to summarize the ethos of 
Classical and Renaissance humanism in which man is taken as existing within a rational 
universe of symmetry, proportion and balance, and in which reason governs form through 
the universal language of geometry.702 In referencing this humanist canon what Reinhardt 
seems to be suggesting is that human identity—a sense of self—comes precisely through 
one’s relation to an ideal, a standard measure, a set social form, through recognition of an 
order outside privatized experience. This characterization of space as not addressing 
“private experience,” as being anonymous and impersonal was exactly what lead to 
Newman’s “boredom” with it. The problem of space, as Newman dismissively put it, was 
that it was “common property.”703 For Reinhardt, however, the alignment of space with 
common property (shared social convention, as social being) was the very thing of 
redeeming significance.  
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Newman’s and Reinhardt’s disagreement over the merits and demerits of space 
and place can be extended and spoken through another oppositional pair: rationalism 
versus expressionism. “Apes and birds, I think, do a decorative, expressionist kind of art, 
but in no case abstract art, which is always rational.”704 This, just one of many charged 
pronouncements in Reinhardt’s long-standing battle against expressionists satisfies the 
cliché by killing several birds with one well-aimed stone. For in this statement Reinhardt 
makes the highly unusual pairing of expressionist art with the decorative. This is a 
particularly pointed re-coupling for the “decorative” was a term of persistent irritation for 
Reinhardt, a continual reminder to him of how little abstract art was understood. The 
supposed decorativeness of abstract art commonly meant the assumption of a vacuity and 
servility (in contrast to expressionism’s authentic content). Abstract art’s pointlessness 
was indeed misrecognized. Things are flipped remarkably by Reinhardt’s statement. 
Expressionism, usually taken as an authentic and singular exteriorizing of an individual 
subjective core is neutralized by its preceding adjective, putting into question all the high 
sounding rhetoric of expressionism. The other bird, figuratively speaking, is the notion 
that there is something “inhuman” (possibly “plastic”) about rational, abstract art. To that 
sort of misbegotten logic Reinhardt suggests that it is animals that are aligned with the 
expressionist. Abstract art is rational and human and “non-expressionist.”705 
Reinhardt’s basic stance against expressionism and its variants will surface early 
and remain constant through his career. From a 1943 statement one can see the artist 
avidly rehearsing and reworking the division between surrealism and cubism. “The main 
current of surrealism is chaos, confusion, individual anguish, terror, horror—in the decay, 
aimlessness, discontinuity, unrelatedness, and inexplicableness [of the world], in the 
accidental, unconscious, amorphous, and irrational. In surrealist painting, man is 
overwhelmed, lost, unable to dominate his space and time. The world and life itself are a 
prisonlike enigma one moves about in without any understanding, direction, or rest. Its 
relation to a world of war, destruction, insecurity, formlessness is obvious.” In contrast, 
Reinhardt explains, “The theme of cubism was just the opposite; it stressed unity, totality, 
connectedness of things in its single, one world. In cubist paintings one finds a discipline, 
221 
a consciousness, an order that implies man can not only control and create his world, but 
ultimately free himself completely from a brutal, barbaric existence.”706 The expressionist 
element of surrealism meant for Reinhardt not a failure stemming from an over-assertion 
of the “I”/ego but precisely the opposite; the problem was in the “I”/ego’s inability to 
locate itself, because unable to secure a rational framework or inhabit a form-order that 
would allow for the structuring of human space (a totality, a sociality). These, of course, 
were precisely what Reinhardt saw cubism providing. The cubist “I”/ego makes a stab at 
an image of totality, it articulates itself through “discipline, a consciousness, an order” 
and in that articulation generates the space, as the separation from Nature, from 
immediacy, formlessness, “brutal, barbaric existence.” It keeps Nature at bay.  
The terms will shift only nominally through Reinhardt’s career—surrealism will 
be invoked in “expressionism,” “abstract expressionism” and so on, while cubism be 
referenced in Mondrian and Malevich, pure abstraction and the like—but the basic 
schema remains in tact. In 1957, the third of Reinhardt’s “Twelve Rules for a New 
Academy” reads: “No expressionism or surrealism. ‘The laying bare of oneself,’ 
autobiographically or socially, ‘is obscene.’”707 A year later one of the “44 Titles for 
Articles for Artists Under 45” announces: “Expressionism. Unadulterated cheek. Bedlam 
of half-baked philosophies and cockeyed visions. . . . Barnumism.”708 Or Barneyism. In 
1960, as part of “The Artist in Search of a Code of Ethics”: “Artists who peddle wiggly 
lines and colors as representing emotion should be run off the streets.”709 Similarly two 
years later at a conference on aesthetic responsibility: “Primitivism, irrationalism, anti-
intellectualism in art are ugly. Surrealism and expressionism in art are ugly.”710 And, up 
to the last, in 1967: “Expression is an impossible word.”711 The ideology of 
expressionism was mired in a sinister hubris (“unadulterated cheek”) of imagining that 
“human” content could be properly discussed in terms of the sole (almost autistic) 
individual; of imagining it spoke itself, as if from some primal fount; or of imagining a 
special access to an authentic non-identical, the mysterious unknown of which it alone is 
magically capable of “knowing.” This hubris went hand-in-hand with blindness. It was an 
222 
inability to see the conventionality underwriting the availability of “wiggly lines” as 
marks of “authentic” expressive language. 
 Newman’s hostility to rationalism has already been shown to be fully in evidence 
in his call for an “Art of No Geometry” and in his overarching rejection of dogmas of 
rationalized identity and rationalistic meaning. This hostility took on another or extended 
appearance in his rejection of “Western European aesthetics”—which Newman takes 
more specifically as the doctrines of beauty formulated by the Ancient Greeks and more 
generally as any traditions of academicism. And again, the pernicious aspect in these was 
that of reiterations of bad forms of identity, as ideological mechanisms for ensuring the 
production and reproduction of the ever-same: it amounted to a Newmanesque (and 
Adornian) nightmare of formula writ large. For what were the canons of beauty, the 
traditions of Western European aesthetics, the discipline of the academy, Newman might 
have questioned us, but a set of rules, laws, ideals that demanded the conformity of the 
artist to a preformulated plan and system in order to produce comfortable, known, 
unchallenging, decorative, vapid objects? In a grand reduction, the content of Western 
civilization is bureaucratic rationalism, scientific order, pure formalism, a bad self-
reflexivity, a tautological mise en abyme. What had been lost, according to Newman, was 
subject matter—the human subject, man, self-presence. 
 The way out of this prison-house of formal identity was through expression. 
Newman’s belief in expressive possibility (of the kind that Reinhardt found untenable) 
implied the achievement—somehow—of a raw moment before identity, before pre-
figured identity, and thereby working up authentic identity. This emphasis on rawness, 
before-ness, unmediatedness slides easily into Newman’s express valuation of the 
“primitive.” The opposition between expressionism and rationalism can be coordinated 
with a discussion of Newman’s embrace of the primitive and Reinhardt’s anti-
primitivism as another way of defining their difference.  
In the mid-forties Newman would start deploying the “primitive” (and primitive 
art) as the challenger to “geometry.” His interest in primitive art will be made publicly 
manifest in September 1946 when the exhibition of Northwest Coast Indian painting that 
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Newman curates inaugurates Betty Parsons’s new gallery. In the short statement for the 
exhibition Newman will assert, without qualification, that a proper understanding of 
modern art had to be premised on an “appreciation of the primitive arts.”712 Even earlier, 
however, Newman had done some serious thinking on the subject. In the unpublished 
essay “The Plasmic Image” (written approximately a year before the Northwest Coast 
Indian painting exhibition at Parsons’s), he had already begun to locate the “primitive” as 
a term central to his problematic. In this essay Newman argues that a gross 
misunderstanding of primitive art is to blame for the “failure of abstract painting,” or “the 
abstract and nonobjective art of the last thirty years,” mere, though deadly, “puristic 
design.”713 The root of the problem that disastrously confused the identities of true, 
authentic abstraction with its deceptive simulacrum lay there within primitive art 
traditions. It was in the artifacts produced by primitive culture that Newman could begin 
to describe the ontological schism existing between good and bad abstraction, or once 
again, between painting and pictures. “[T]here always existed in the majority of primitive 
cultures even from prehistoric times,” Newman explained, “a strict division between the 
geometric abstraction used in the decorative arts and the art of that culture.”714 Newman 
goes on to elaborate the difference between this decorative, geometric abstract design 
which Newman pointedly associates with the mundane, the domestic sphere of “weaving, 
pottery, etc.,” and the exalted realm of symbolic abstraction which expressed the truths of 
religion, the spirit, ultimate meanings.  
I want to try to quickly summarize what Newman valued in his notion of the 
primitive and to indicate why this could so effectively serve as the all-significant wedge 
by which to split apart the conceptual domains of good and bad abstraction. What the 
notion of the primitive offered to Newman was a way of entering the dialectical 
encounter, raw, fresh, as an absolute beginning, before the social and its mediations. This 
was, as Newman had dramatically described, the moment of “Original man” yelling in 
“awe and anger at his tragic state, at his own self-awareness and at his own helplessness 
before the void.” “Man’s natural desire in the arts” was the metaphysically charged one—
”to express his relation to the Absolute.”715 The primitive subject-object dialectic, as 
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Newman valued it, is a moment of authentic speech, when language bears real content, 
where meaning is forged out of a naked subject-object encounter of facing the world 
immediately and confronting the unknown. This primitive sublime was Newman’s 
attempt to locate a place of identity outside western identitarian systems and beyond (or 
before) all its evils (i.e., ideological bondage, institutional preforming of subjectivity). 
The identity wrought from this originary experience was pure cognition, being.  
This was not an argument Reinhardt bought. Cognition was always recognition, 
repetition, convention, tradition—civilization. “Art is always made by craftsmen,” 
Reinhardt wrote in 1967, “it’s never a spontaneous expression. Artists always come from 
artists and art forms come from art forms.” The role of the artist was to “[s]can our past 
for our present.”716) To this Newman’s suggestion that the artist could operate out of a 
“primitive,” unadulterated moment before identity was pure mischief.  
One of Reinhardt’s cartoons offers a concise and explicit account of his problems 
with Newman’s location of a moment of authenticity within the primitive. On the upper 
right-hand side of Reinhardt’s P.M. cartoon “How To Look at the Record” (November 3, 
1946) (fig. 24) one finds a separate section under the heading “Timeless Picture” (fig. 
25).717 A simple stick-figure drawing shows two figures and a teepee. The caption reads: 
“A figure with empty hands hanging down helplessly, palms down, as an Indian gesture 
for uncertainty, ignorance, emptiness, or nothing, means ‘no.’ A figure with one hand on 
its mouth means ‘eating’ or ‘food.’ It points toward the tent, and this means ‘in the tent.’ 
The whole is a message stating, ‘(There is) no food in the tent.’” The first figure is almost 
certainly Reinhardt’s character spoof on timeless, existentialist man, who faces the 
sublime “uncertainty” of the void. Indeed, one is tempted to plug in here Newman’s “first 
man” expressing his “helplessness before the void.” In general, the direction of the humor 
seems to be that of a wry materialism against idealism’s grand content. For what 
Reinhardt does in this cartoon is force the negation to take a specific object. This is not 
the timeless “nothing” of popularized existentialism but now, in contrast, the comically 
material and mundane: no food in the tent, a nod to the “base,” the material grounds for 
existence as the first term. But Reinhardt takes it a notch further. Immediately below the 
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text box and image is an additional note. The pseudo-anthropological exegesis is 
formatted in italicized font typically used by Reinhardt to signify his own editorializing 
commentary or explanatory text, and it reads: “A pictorial message scratched on wood by 
Alaskan Indians. The signs convey ideas without expressing exact words. For example, 
while one man might read ‘No food in the tent,’ another might see ‘Lack of meat in the 
wigwam,’ still another ‘Without sugar in tepee.’” What Reinhardt’s comical, pedantic 
text shows up is the nagging problem of ambiguity in the relation of sign to meaning. 
These glorified “absolute” signs associated with the primitive arts, become, under 
Reinhardt’s manipulation a primer in structuralist semiology: identity (meaning) is 
differential, it is articulated through the grid of paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes. 
Newman did not back down. If anything, he became even more explicit in his 
stance. Reading Newman’s “The First Man Was an Artist,” which appeared in October 
1947 in the inaugural issue of Tiger’s Eye, one hears an almost direct rebuttal to 
Reinhardt and a reversal of Reinhardt’s deflating materialism. In line with the essay’s 
namesake, Newman prioritizes the aesthetic to the social, and to the socially 
instrumentalist forming (or processing) of material; the first man was not “a hunter, a 
toolmaker, a farmer, a work, a priest, or a politician,” but an artist.718 Indeed, one can use 
the first stick-figure in Reinhardt’s cartoon—the one with “empty hands hanging down 
helplessly,” sign-gesturing for “uncertainty, ignorance, emptiness, or nothing”—to 
illustrate Newman’s “first man.” Listen here to Newman describe the artist as this first 
man: “Man’s first expression, like his first dream, was an aesthetic one. Speech was a 
poetic outcry rather than a demand for communication. Original man, shouting his 
consonants, did so in yells of awe and anger at his tragic state, at his own self-awareness 
and at his own helplessness before the void.” Summarily, aesthetic emotion precedes 
utilitarian need. Just a short paragraph further, Newman writes, “The human in language 
is literature, not communication. . . . Man’s first address to a neighbor was a cry of power 
and solemn weakness, not a request for a drink of water.”719 Whereas Reinhardt’s first 
stick figure appears in line with Newman’s point, the second stick figure critically alters 
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the direction of the message towards something much more in line with asking for a drink 
of water and as such with concern over material sustenance. 
 If Newman and Reinhardt share the prime motive of articulating the good, 
authentic identity, then the major difference between them can be said to manifest itself 
in the former’s investment in a moment of originary cognition occurring before or outside 
of social articulation (a figure before ground) and the latter’s investment in a moment of 
rehearsed recognition, occurring after or within social articulation (the ground before 
figure).  
This difference can be drawn out through certain formal expectations and 
restrictions in their canvases that relate to issues of viewer orientation. Schematically, the 
mode of orientation typically associated with Newman’s painting is that of a one-to-one 
encounter—of the singular, upright viewer surveying a field. For Reinhardt it is an aerial 
view, with the viewer looking down upon a map or reading a plan. Initially, this 
proposition can be supported through statements and suggestions both artists made 
concerning orientation of viewer-ship. When Reinhardt enumerated the elements of his 
black-square painting formula in 1963, i.e. that the square should be “five feet wide, five 
feet high,” with “one horizontal form negating one vertical form,” he included in this 
description that the canvas should have “no top, no bottom,” thus becoming 
“directionless.”720 The perfect squares of Reinhardt’s black paintings, possessing neither 
top nor bottom—no proper orientation—thus open themselves, theoretically, to endless 
rotation. Indeed, the toplessness and bottomlessness of the black square paintings begin 
to corrode one of the deep conventions of the easel painting tradition—that paintings 
hang upright on walls, because they, like their viewer, have tops and bottoms, a 
necessary, proper orientation in space. This gives the hanging of Reinhardt’s black square 
paintings on walls something of a gratuitous quality that undermines the sense of the 
privileged and authorized view of the single viewer. However, it does this not by 
implying that any one view or orientation is the wrong one, but each view/orientation 
must factor into any sense of its rightness, three other equally valid orientations. That is 
to say, the awareness of these canvases as directionless makes it difficult when viewing a 
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black square painting not to have one’s viewing haunted by three other equally “proper” 
viewers/orientations. The result is vertiginous. The major re-orientation that would seem 
to answer the situation of toplessness and bottomlessness is that of laying the canvas 
down flat along a horizontal surface. Interestingly enough, this was the arrangement 
Reinhardt used when painting, as shown in a number of studio shots and which his wife, 
Rita, has corroborated (figs. 26 and 27).721 Situated thus, each side hypothetically 
becomes equally available to viewers. Within the logic of the painting, one cannot grant 
one’s own upright viewing encounter with the painting the privilege of the proper. For 
haunting the edges of the canvas is the possibility that each edge might serve as a ground-
line, a ground-line that could in turn be used to suggestively posit the situation of another 
viewer; and another ground-line and another viewer, and so on all the way around. This 
play with orientation opens out onto the social, and suggests already a multiplicity. 
  Contrast this directionlessness and all it implies to Newman’s paintings: they 
always have tops and bottoms (“all my paintings have a top and a bottom”) and, thus, 
there is always, and insistently so, a proper orientation to them.722 Newman had a lot to 
say about the experience, or what he hoped for as the viewer’s experience, of standing in 
front of his work. Already by the time of his second one-person exhibition in 1951, 
Newman explained what he believed to be the proper viewing relationship for his 
paintings. “There is a tendency to look at large pictures from a distance,” the artist had 
written in a notice attached to a gallery wall, “The large pictures in this exhibition are 
intended to be seen from a short distance.”723 A short distance implies a fairly intimate, 
direct encounter—the one-to-one experience of two entities facing each other. The classic 
image associated with this is the 1958 photograph (taken by Peter A. Juley) of Newman 
and a woman standing in front of Cathedra, facing the canvas, with their backs to the 
photographer (fig. 28). Looking at this photograph one is typically reminded of the 
emphatic verticality generated by Newman’s zips. For although Cathedra (along with, to 
name a few more in this category, Vir Heroicus Sublimis [1950-51]; Uriel [1955]; Anna’s 
Light [1968]) is well over twice as long as it is high there is no sense of reclining.724 The 
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overriding sensibility not just of this painting but for the majority of Newman’s body of 
work, is of uprightness, of standing tall and looking out.725  
This orientation and stance had a lot to do with Newman’s sense of place. One 
can look to a number of Newman’s statements for elaboration. Describing his experience 
of the Ohio earth mounds and how this experience gave him important insight into a 
sense of place, Newman explained to Hess: “Looking at this site you feel, Here I am, 
here . . . and out beyond there [beyond the limits of the site] there is chaos, nature, rivers, 
landscapes . . . but here you get a sense of your own presence. . . . I became involved with 
the idea of making the viewer present: the idea that ‘Man Is Present.’”726 This was an 
idea that Newman had further opportunity to explore in his submission of an architectural 
model for an ideal synagogue. In his statement he referred to the synagogue as a place in 
which one had the “subjective experience” of the “exalted,” of Makom, of place. In 
Newman’s model “each man sits, private and secluded . . . waiting to be called . . . to go 
up on the mound, where, under the tension of ‘Tzim-Tzum’ that created light and the 
world, he can experience a total sense of his own personality before the Torah and His 
Name.”727 But perhaps one of Newman’s most powerful and clear articulations of this 
idea came in a 1965 interview with David Sylvester.  
One thing that I am involved in about painting is that the painting should 
give man a sense of place: that he knows he’s there, so he’s aware of 
himself. In that sense he relates to me when I made the painting because in 
that sense I was there. And one of the nicest things that anybody ever said 
about my work is when you yourself said that standing in front of my 
paintings you had a sense of your own scale.  
 
This experiencing a sense of scale, Sylvester’s reaction to the paintings was perfect, and 
Newman continues: “[T]his is what I have tried to do: that the onlooker in front of my 
painting knows that he’s there. To me, the sense of place not only has a mystery but has 
that sense of metaphysical fact.”728 
 These concerns have been dealt with provocatively by Yve-Alain Bois in his 
essay “Perceiving Newman.”729 Bois’s essay attempts to unpack Newman’s idiosyncratic, 
though all-important, sense of place through a framework of perception theories. Bois, 
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too, first sets up the viewer’s situation with a Newman zip painting (Onement I, to be 
specific) as an encounter in which the painting “addresses the spectator directly, 
immediately, as an ‘I’ to a ‘You,’” thus giving a “‘sense of place’ to its beholder.”730 In 
Onement I, Bois argues, Newman achieves this goal “by the conspicuous use of 
symmetry.” For it is symmetry, as an “essential condition of our perception,” that 
“presupposes the vertical axis of our body as the dividing vector of our visual 
perceptions, of our situation in front of what we see. It thus implies the irreversibility of a 
top and a bottom as much as our being situated in or engaged with the world implies our 
erect human posture.”731 What is at stake is a description of the perceptual act by which 
the self and world are constituted, the “birth of the self to the world.”732 Newman, Bois 
reminds us, will be compelled to find a solution beyond that of biaxial symmetry for 
achieving the “sense of place.” Nor should this come as a surprise. Symmetry, after all, 
was geometry, Mondrian, the pure abstractionist school of painting.733 It is through 
asymmetry that Newman ends up achieving the exalted sense of place, of identity 
“orienting” itself through the perceptual act of lateral scannation of an unarticulated 
(ambiguity of the figure/ground relationship) field. In perceiving this irregular, 
identityless field (which denies perception defined as the perception of figures against 
grounds) perception self-reflexively turns back on itself, thus beginning to describe the 
sensation of the perceiver, the upright viewer as “I” (a “You-I/I-You”)—the singular 
organizing pivot, the originary locus, the center of creation.  
 What I want to suggest now is that these differences in orientation between 
Newman and Reinhardt can be used to suggest two very different worldviews. Later, 
these differences will serve as the armature by which to construct Newman’s and 
Reinhardt’s political differences. Once again, Reinhardt’s implied orientation is that of 
the plan, amenable to the aerial view. Newman’s implied orientation is that of the single, 
upright and centered viewer scanning a lateral, frontal field. The question then, is by what 
common axis can these two orientations be brought into dialogue with one another? The 
imagery and metaphor that I believe can serve as this third relating term in the concept of 
the axis mundi.  
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From “the most primitive tribes,” as Mircea Eliade has explained, the axis mundi 
(world axis), sometimes called the universal axis, has been the central component in 
mythic consciousness.734 Within the mythic cosmographies of a broad range of primitive 
and ancient traditions the axis mundi is the link or pathway connecting earth and the 
heavens, marking the navel of the universe, the center of creation. This concept has been 
imagined variously as mountains (Mt. Meru), mounds or burial mounds (stupas, 
pyramids, ziggurats), trees (the tree of life in Eden, the tree of knowledge, the ephirotic 
tree of the Kabbalah, the bodhi tree), as well as in pillars, crosses, temples or towers and 
special natural geological formations. The significance of the axis mundi for many of 
these mythological traditions has been that of the first mark or the primary designation 
that must be made in order for the universe (space or place) to exist. It is the initial spot, a 
starting point, a position that has first to be conceived in order to conceive: a generative 
source, the logos, the moment for setting up a universe, the point central to creation.735 In 
many ancient traditions the axis mundi is thought of as the central point of a mandala, or 
a representation, map or diagram of the universe, laying out the cosmic order, a 
spatialization of being. Formally, the mandala is usually a combination of a square 
circumscribed or circumscribing (sometimes both) a circle, articulated into quadrants 
through horizontal and vertical bisection, the intersection of which locates the center of 
the cosmos, the axis mundi. 
  In comparing the general formula and format of the ancient mandala and 
Reinhardt’s formula for the black square paintings it is indeed difficult not to see the 
black paintings—what Reinhardt himself called the “ultimate diagram”—as mandalas. 
Their cruciform shape (with neither top nor bottom) both asserted an order (a universe, a 
oneness) and served potentially as a meditative device (the viewer is forced to stand in 
front of them a long time in order to see them, it becomes trance like, very meditative)—
both important traditional mandalic operations.736  
What is of further interest, as Hess has drawn particular attention to, was that 
Reinhardt’s final art world satire bore the loaded title, “A Portend of the Artist as a 
Yhung Mandala” (fig. 29). This satiric mandala would resonate on a number of levels. 
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On one level it served as the artist’s pre-emptive strike leveled precisely at faddish and 
facile interest in Asian art and Eastern philosophy, especially the art world’s apparent 
interest.737 But in this Reinhardt unsparingly implicates himself as well. By the level of 
detail and the logic of construction of Reinhardt’s art world mandala, however, the extent 
of Reinhardt’s own genuine knowledge of mandalic traditions is revealed. In other words, 
a spoof this sharp surely requires a sense of the real thing. Hess has cautiously suggested 
a further importance for this art satire. In “A Portend of the Artist as a Yhung Mandala” 
Hess will see a way of linking the Eastern mandala and the ultimate format of 
Reinhardt’s black square paintings.738 “In his last complete satire, the ‘ultimate’ 
‘Mandala’ of 1956, there is a simplification process at work that may, or may not, parallel 
his pictorial interests,” Hess writes. “By 1956, he had achieved his “ultimate” format, the 
square, symmetrically trisected image, even though he would not bring all his pictures to 
their “ultimate” color, black, and “ultimate” dimensions, five foot square, until 1960. The 
mandala, a square in a circle, meant for contemplation, relates to Reinhardt’s simplifying 
pictorial development.”739 
I, too, find it of interest that Reinhardt’s concluding art satire is a mandala (comic 
or not) and that the basic formula for the articulation of space in the signature black 
square paintings is so neatly prefigured in it. I want to go further, however, and propose 
that the concept of the axis mundi (the mandalic scheme) offers a powerful summarizing 
image of Reinhardt’s creative philosophy. This in turn goes back to the place/space 
antagonism between Newman and Reinhardt; and it further shows the differences in how 
the two artists orient the subject within the dialectic of subject and object.  
Here it might be constructive to consider some of the social-material motives 
animating the concepts of the axis mundi and the mandala. Reaching through the 
religious, esoteric membrane of these concepts, one find oneself handling far more 
mundane terms, specifically terms having to do with the organizing social space. It is 
believed that the origins of the axis mundi and the mandala stem from the ancient Aryan 
civilization and served as a model of social planning.740 Ancient Aryan villages were 
organized through the coordinates of the centrally located Tree of Knowledge or Tree of 
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Life or axis mundi, which in turn marked the intersection of a community’s two main 
thoroughfares, one east-west, one north-south. As one Asian art scholar explains, “Where 
they crossed, at the center of the village, a small square contained in its center a Tree of 
Knowledge. Under this tree the village elders (or leaders) met to legislate and to discuss 
religion and matters of council.”741 It existed by and as social fact—by the mechanisms 
of committee, consensus and social recognition. It was a method for marking out space as 
social space, a way of dealing with the shapeless chaos of space. Giving it location, a 
center and boundaries was thus forming space into something socially inhabitable. 
Ultimately what was generated was the rationality of the grid, and as such, it was 
completely conventional. Like language, it existed by social convention alone.742 
Certainly one of the troubling apparent contradictions this helps to explain is how the 
replicability of the axis mundi (every village possessed one) did not undermine its 
definition as a singularity, as the unique point of entry and connection between earth and 
the heavens. Knowledge was communal. What existed was a social plan, a repeatable 
conceptual apparatus, the traditional tools for ordering chaos, the template for setting up 
parameters—all for establishing identity. The condition of identity was social through 
and through; its very grounds for existence were inescapably so.  
For Reinhardt Newman had erroneously granted priority and significance to a 
sense of place—as almost inarticulately personal and individual (the ideology of a pre-
articulate reality, the auto-generative moment of self-cognition). Newman’s “sense of 
place,” by Reinhardt’s logic, had to be put in its proper place, or proper order: it existed 
within and secondary to the social, impersonal, communal and generic articulation of 
space. Thus, when I suggest that the toplessness and bottomlessness of Reinhardt’s black 
square paintings is a way of putting into question the necessity of their installation as 
objects hanging vertically on walls and thus opening up the possibility of other potential 
orientation—one acknowledging the lack of top/bottom priority, as a horizontal 
orientation, the aerial view of looking down upon a map or plan—one can extend this as 
an “orientation” to the social and its concept of space. The orientation of reading a map—
say, in order to find out where you are—is one in which the viewer is forced into a more 
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totalizing vision, having in effect to see the whole picture in order to locate oneself. 
One’s own position is radically relational, formulated through measuring proximities and 
distances within a gridded social matrix.  
To return one last time to the “Yhung Mandala,” almost certainly the title is 
playing off of James Joyce’s autobiographical novel, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man (1916). Joyce was a literary staple within the Abstract Expressionist milieu and his 
popularity with them likely stemmed from felt kinship over notions of the romantic 
subject and artistic creativity.743 The story, as Joyce’s title so tellingly announces, is that 
of the development of the artist-genius’s unique subjectivity and sensibility. It is the 
Bildungsroman.744 But, of course, the “Portrait” is given in appropriately Joycean 
language—idiosyncratic, singular, the wrought expression of a subjective interior whose 
content struggles against the limits of conventional language. The classic problem with 
Joyce and Joycean language is its tendency to be so idiosyncratic, so singular, so much 
about being a vehicle for an unmappable personality, that it becomes a private language, 
turns into an opaque substance. The butt of Reinhardt’s joke, as Hess has indicated, is the 
artist who draws upon orientalism, esoteric mysticism, Eastern philosophy as the fitting 
cultural accouterment for the life of the spiritual and creative interior signifying an 
outside to conventional identity, something off the charts, the realm of private language. 
The ironic reversal, however, is that the universe of Reinhardt’s mandala is far from that 
of the spirit. It is neither a sacred diagram of the cosmos, nor can it be used as a 
meditative device the contemplation of which would help the viewer to reach a blissful 
state of both non-identity or oneness with the universe. Cynically, Reinhardt’s mandala 
maps the art world, diagramming its major directions (“Art and Government,” “Art and 
Education,” “Art and Business,” “Art and Nature”) and categories (“Artist as Recorder,” 
“Artist as Explainer,” “Artist as Cathartic,” “Artist as Commodity”). The target of this 
pointed joke is the romantic construction of the artist as the locus of an expressivity so 
profoundly original that its coordinates presumably cannot be found on any social, 
conventional grid (Newman’s sense of place). But, of course, Reinhardt’s mandala does 
that precise pinpointing: everything exists within, achieves identity through social space.  
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Remembering back, of course, it was precisely this sort of pinpointing—when 
Reinhardt positioned Newman as an “identity” within a (art world) system in 1956—that 
had incited Newman’s rage. For it was Newman who believed that identity, a sense of 
self, could be self-evident, that it came out of expressive originality. The moment 
Newman was invested in was the beginning, the before to forming, identifying, 
systematizing, before the grid.745 And Newman’s difference from Reinhardt on this 
essential point can as well be visualized by going back to the concept of the axis mundi—
but coming to it from a conspicuously different orientation. Combining Newman’s 
thematic of the Origin and Bois’s reading of Newman’s canvases in terms of 
consciousness scanning a field of potentiality before realization, one can arrive back at 
the axis mundi. But it is seen not as Reinhardt’s aerial shot, as the center within a 
mandalic plan but as a vertical shaft (with a top and bottom). The viewer, standing in 
front of an expanse of Newman’s canvas—presumably, much like the artist himself did—
assumes the position and function of an axis mundi as, to repeat once more, the central 
organizing pivot, the creative origin, the first mark out of which a universe is created. The 
difference in Newman’s conception of this originary moment/position is that it is 
radically individual, achieved singularly, each man for himself, by himself—not by 
committee or institution. This achievement of a sense of place is thus also a location of 
identity but the vital condition of that identity are that it come out of nothing, without 
relation, without a semiotic, without social measure. What I hope this comparison has 
suggested is the beginnings of a path by which differences in formal orientation open out 
to differences in social orientation. The next section will serve as an important transition 
to a fuller elaboration of this social difference by looking at series and seriality as a 
preliminary way of figuring the social as, among other things, the agon of part and whole, 






Question of Series: Is It One or the Same? 
I think a man spends his whole lifetime painting one picture. . . . 
Barnett Newman746 
 
   There Is Just One Painting 
Ad Reinhardt747 
 
At series one arrives at a great reckoning. It is with the question of series that things come 
to a head. In trying to sort out the various ways to map the possible differences and 
similarities of intention set out by Newman’s statement, “I think a man spends his whole 
lifetime painting one picture” and Reinhardt’s statement, “There Is Just One Painting,” 
one reaches a fragile, but totally charged, nexus. “Is it one and/or the same?” could serve 
as shorthand for the range of questions raised by painting in series/seriality in painting. 
Are Newman and Reinhardt realizing the one and ultimate painting or, are they 
performing the same painting, over and over, again and again, merely repeating 
themselves? The question(s) of series lays great stress on both Newman’s and 
Reinhardt’s painting projects. The critical test of series is where things threaten to fall 
apart or promise to come together.  
In this section I will focus primarily on just two sets of series, one by each artist, 
and both bodies of work created over a substantial period of time, between seven to eight 
years. They are Newman’s Stations of the Cross of 1958-66 (fig. 30) and Reinhardt’s 
black square paintings of 1960-67 (fig. 31).748 In 1958 Newman began what would 
eventually become the Stations of the Cross as the first new work after his heart attack in 
1957 and prolonged six week recovery in the hospital. He would continue to work, off 
and on and not exclusively, for another eight years on this project up to 1966, the year 
when the series of fourteen canvases (plus a fifteenth member, the canvas Be II) 
premiered at the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York.749 In 1960 Reinhardt’s 
so-called classic black square paintings became his exclusive object of painting 
production. These starkly reduced paintings were a culminating moment to Reinhardt’s 
previous aesthetic negations—over the years, giving up color, asymmetry, irregularity, 
etc. For the next six years, until his death in 1967, Reinhardt continued to make the 
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“same” black square painting with perhaps their most important exhibition (during 
Reinhardt’s lifetime) occurring in late November of 1966 at the Jewish Museum, New 
York, less than half a year after Newman’s Stations of the Cross at the Guggenheim.750  
Why, one might ask, take the issue of series to be of such importance. Why would 
an examination of series in relation to these two artists reveal interpretive riches? Why 
would this shed light on the relentless opposition structured by the binaries described in 
the previous section?   
The fact is both Newman and Reinhardt have complicated relationships to the 
notion of series and there has been notable disagreement over the appropriateness of 
discussing these artists in connection with the term at all. For instance, John Coplans, 
curator of the 1968 exhibition “Serial Imagery” at the Pasadena Art Museum, included 
Reinhardt, unquestionably embracing him as a bona fide serial artist. “Apart from Albers 
who had been working in Series since 1931,” the curator wrote in the exhibition 
catalogue, “the first American painter to adopt the Serial format was Ad Reinhardt, in the 
mid-fifties.”751 Although Coplans would name and credit several other serial artists (Yves 
Klein among them, though Reinhardt is still considered “more important for a number of 
reasons”) it is clearly Reinhardt whom Coplans views as the “key figure in the evolution 
of Serial Imagery in the United States.”752 No such claim would be made for Newman 
and the distinctness by which the curator separated Reinhardt from Newman is belied by 
the latter’s non-inclusion in the show. Coplans’s explanation for this absence is both 
informative for the reasons he gives and suggestive by the mere fact that Coplans feels 
the need to make it. The “New American Painters,” he asserts, were in fact antithetical to 
the use of “Serial structure.” He elaborates: “Essential to the morphology of Serial 
Imagery is the abandonment of the conspicuous uniqueness of each painting. The New 
American Painters, on the contrary, were extreme individualists who asserted, as a central 
part of their esthetic, the unique identity of each individual painting. Small changes in the 
overall size of a canvas—even an inch or two—as well as differences in degree of color 
saturation, changes in hue or texture or density of paint, were used to avoid 
standardization and to enhance singularity.” Unsurprisingly, the artist Coplans finds 
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exemplary of this is Newman. “Many paintings by Newman, for example, are similar to 
one another—yet at the same time each painting in vastly different from any other. Each 
asserts a different solution and expresses a different mood. . . .”753 Again, not particularly 
surprisingly, Coplans has in mind the artist’s series of quasi-series Stations of the Cross. 
“Although it is true Newman . . . painted in series at one time or another, to paint in series 
is not necessarily to be Serial. Newman’s series of Fourteen Stations of the Cross [sic] 
are all painted in black and white—but they are linked by a narrative theme. . . . 
Newman’s paintings are classical instances of theme and variation.” The marginality by 
which Coplans views Newman’s nominal and narrative series is palpable: Newman is not 
a properly Serial artist because he merely exploits formal similarities in order to enhance 
the visibility, as it were, of the unique, individual identity of each painting. This is in 
marked contrast to the purity of Reinhardt’s serial propositions: equality, standardization, 
a theme minus any variation and thereby the unproblematic ease by which Reinhardt 
appeared to inhabit series, to be a Serial artist. What Coplans’s characterizations begin is 
a sketch of Newman’s and Reinhardt’s opposed relations to series, how the two artists 
react very differently to the questions put into play by series. In both paradoxical and 
fitting ways, the “cross” figures—literally and symbolically—in both of these series. 
Series locates, as an “X” that marks the spot, for Reinhardt the solution to the problem of 
figuring oneness (one is achieved through the same). Quite oppositely for Newman, 
series becomes a cross to bear, the true test of onement (how to have one but never the 
same?). 
 
1. Reinhardt’s Parable: the Weaver & Tailor 
In several obvious ways series is precisely the solution Reinhardt desired and needed: it is 
absolutely what he had been asking for, it is his long sought confirmation. Serialization 
was “Repetition as the first idea of form, identical, interchangeability,” “Endless 
repetition of infinite sameness,” “Grand sameness,” “Regularity, repetition, reminder, 
recognition.”754 Or, as a 1962 “Art-as-Art” manifesto announces explicitly: “The one 
direction in fine or abstract art today is in the painting of the same one form over and 
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over again. The one intensity and the one perfection come only from long and lonely 
routine preparation and attention and repetition. . . .”755 These qualities (or what 
Reinhardt sometimes will refer to as “non-qualities”) of series: repetition, 
standardization, stereotype, formula, sameness—qualities considered by the romantic 
wing of aesthetic modernism, and indeed by those of the Abstract Expressionist milieu to 
be highly inappropriate descriptors for a serious and authentic work of art—Reinhardt 
will repeat again and again, as dogma, art dogma, art-as-art dogma. This is his signature 
repetition. Nevertheless, by this seriality Reinhardt hardly intended to pull off a mere 
sophomoric negation of his peers’ values. Far more was at stake. For repetition was not 
merely a ploy, a way of not doing what the others appeared to be doing—merely a facile 
negation of the rhetoric of uniqueness and authenticity that had come to typify Abstract 
Expressionism—but operated in Reinhardt’s understanding as the very ground by which 
form (language, consciousness) existed at all. Repetition was the absolute necessity for 
recognition, the key for identity. Without it one was imprisoned in the non-identity of 
continual flux, of formlessness. 
The question to ask is how more specifically did Reinhardt’s logic work? By what 
manner of reasoning did he come to see the endless repetition of infinite sameness—or 
“series-ness”—as the “one” liberating path to “ultimate” painting? The apparent 
contradiction lies in this: For an artist who quite openly opposed the exchange-principle 
(“Everything into irreducibility, unreproducibility, imperceptibility. Nothing ‘usable,’ 
‘manipulatable,’ ‘salable,’ ‘dealable,’ ‘collectible,’ ‘graspable’”) as part and parcel of his 
professed hatred of the commodity-form (“no art as a commodity”) as a corruption of 
artistic work (“no art as . . . jobbery”), who sought spaces free of the market (“I tried to 
oppose the academic to the market place.”), who riled at any confusion of culture 
industry products and high artistic production and who warned bitterly against the 
violence of modern rationalism (of “consciousness in danger of being crushed by [its] 
own constructions, conventions, systems”)—for all of this, his embrace of seriality seems 
frankly untenable.756 For what the black painting series of 1960-67 looks and what its 
programmatic descriptions sound nothing so like is painting made over into the kind of 
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formulaic identity amenable to processes of capitalist production and consumption, into 
absolute commensurability. The fetish of modern art as a repository or remembering of 
creative, non-alienated labor—the incommensurable expression of the artist—becomes 
the fetish of the commodity as Reinhardt standardizes his own mode of production, 
thereby perfectly assimilating the identity principle of capitalist exchange. Everything 
will be reduced to an identical unit, the “sameness” of “sixty by sixty inches, square”: 
“The one work for a fine artist, the one painting, is the painting of the one-size canvas—
the single scheme, one formal device, one color-monochrome, one linear division in each 
direction, one symmetry, one texture, one free-hand brushing, one rhythm, one working 
everything into one dissolution and one indivisibility, each painting into one over-all 
uniformity and non-irregularity.”757 This is the formula, the disclosed trade recipe or 
Reinhardt’s signature product line, for Art-as-Art. 
This contradiction is the setting for Reinhardt’s artful ruse, his moving from 
identity toward non-identity. The maneuver is to unravel the commodity structure, to 
subvert its logic through a critical mimesis of that very same structure and logic. Reading 
further through the 1962 Art-as-Art statement quoted above one finds a remarkable 
revelation. Reinhardt writes: “Only a standardized, prescribed, and proscribed form can 
be imageless, only a stereotyped image can be formless, only a formularized art can be 
formulaless.”758 This suggests a paradoxical passage by which the newness of non-
identity emerges from the regiment of identity. The movement toward the imageless, the 
formless, the formula-less passes through the standardized, prescribed, proscribed, 
stereotyped, formularized image/form. Perhaps it was possible to work through the logic 
of the same in order to reach the one, the ultimate. Or, to arrive at, as Reinhardt 
succinctly posed it, “Not sameness but oneness?”759 But how in fact might that be 
achieved? How does one describe this maneuver beyond the charge of dialectical hocus-
pocus, inflated-sounding nonsense? I suggest the place to begin is the tautology, with 
Reinhardt’s art-as-art. This tautological construction served the artist as both a way to 
state an identity and to frame an experience of non-identity.  
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 A tautological statement is an assertion of identity par excellence. The form of the 
tautology is repetition, a repeat of the same on both sides of the equation, a doubling that 
confirms the first, which sets the scene for recognition. A discussion that might helpfully 
be recalled here is one from Rosalind Krauss’s essay, “The Photographic Conditions of 
Surrealism.”760 Doubling, Krauss writes, “marks the first in the chain as a signifying 
element: it transmutes raw matter into the conventionalized form of the signifier. Lévi-
Strauss describes the importance of pure phonemic doubling in the onset of linguistic 
experience in infancy—the child’s dawning knowledge of signs.” The example from 
Lévi-Strauss’s The Raw and the Cooked that Krauss offers is the difference between the 
meaningless phoneme—the “wild sound”—”pa” and how its status changes with 
repetition or its doubling into “papa.” “Repetition,” Krauss continues, “is thus the 
indicator that the ‘wild sounds’ of babbling have been made deliberate, intentional; and 
that what they intend is meaning. Doubling is in this sense the ‘signifier of 
signification.’”761 Or, to return to Reinhardt, “Repetition is the first idea of form.” It is the 
sign and process of identity: repetition is the cognitive template through which lies the 
realm of possibilities offered by symbolic exchange—language, communication, the 
social. This is identity established and secured through repetition, readied and groomed, 
as it were, to become a social object. 
In a second sense, however, the tautological form can also be said to be that 
which silences, freezes, shuts-down identity processes, that which precisely cannot think 
outside itself, cannot communicate, cannot imagine or speak itself in any other terms, 
cannot, as it were, get beyond its perfect equivalence, its absolute self-evidence. I turn, 
for an illuminating example of this, to Marx’s legendary discussion of the nature of the 
commodity form in Capital (chapter 1, Book 1, Part 1, Volume 1). The text opens by 
both identifying the commodity as the “elementary form” of the capitalist mode of 
production and also by cautioning that though the “commodity appears at first sight an 
extremely obvious, trivial thing, its analysis brings out that it is a very strange thing, 
abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties.”762 The commodity’s 
apparent simplicity falls away by the unveiling of its “dual character” as both use-value 
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and exchange-value. As use-value it possesses a specific quality able to satisfy a specific 
human want and, as such, it is directly oriented to oneself. As an exchange-value, in 
contrast, it operates as an expression of homogenous quantity, and, as such it possesses 
the ability to command other commodities in exchange, relating to other things by 
speaking a common language, in a dialogue oriented not to oneself but played out 
laterally across other commodities. The commodity, then, is an object shown to be split 
between its real content and its surface appearance, between use and exchange.763  
  One of Marx’s classic illustrations of this split within the commodity is his 
comparison between yards of linen and a coat, between the labor of the weaver and the 
labor of the tailor. He explains that the coat and linen are “qualitatively different use-
values” and that, “If the use-values were not qualitatively different, hence not the 
products of qualitatively different forms of useful labour, they would be absolutely 
incapable of confronting each other as commodities. Coats cannot be exchanged for 
coats, one use-value cannot be exchanged for another of the same kind.”764 A little later 
Marx expands on the necessity of this difference—”qualitatively different use-values”—
for the expression of value. “I cannot, for example, express the value of linen in linen. 20 
yards of linen = 20 yards of linen is not an expression of value. The equation states rather 
the contrary: 20 yards of linen are nothing but 20 yards of linen, a definite quantity of 
linen considered as an object of utility. The value of the linen can therefore only be 
expressed relatively, i.e., in another commodity.”765 In other words, the commodity needs 
something else and other in order for the reduction to exchange-value to work. It gets 
stuck in its asocial singularity, its concrete sensuousness, if it cannot form a relation to 
something other than itself. If it cannot establish a relationship its social identity, its 
identity as exchange value, cannot be expressed.766 The processes of calculation and 
abstraction are shut down in the equation “20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen.” The 
tautology dead-ends in a state of expressionlessness; either, depending on how one 
imagines it, in the fullness or emptiness of its being.  
 The importance of this second reading of the tautological form for Reinhardt is 
not difficult to gauge. “Art as something else is always a fake,” and “Art as a thing to be 
242 
used for some other end is ugly.”767 Art-as-art meant x = x, it meant no translating x into 
y terms, no x commodity A = y commodity B. It was the “translator” (or the 
expressionist) who, always caught up in the process of substituting one thing for another, 
was the “traitor.”768 Substitution, translation, transferring, exchange were all operations 
of “business”: spinning gold, turning a profit, transforming something into something 
else. As early as 1952 Reinhardt had proclaimed: “no reality-reducing . . . no abstracting 
from anything . . . no confusing painting with everything that is not painting.”769 Ten 
years later the message was fundamentally the same: “The one, eternal, permanent 
revolution in art turns over art from art-as-also-something-else into art-as-only-itself.”770 
The point was to stop the process, to “Succeed in breaking the endless chain,” to not be 
“part of the flux.” The tautology in this second aspect provided the very means for posing 
the incommensurability of the artwork, for shorting out the circulatory paths of transfer. 
What was offered in this resultant stasis and inexchangeability was the utopian possibility 
of a thing being nothing but itself, of possessing at long last self-identity. Fittingly 
enough, the translator-traitor was also in Reinhardt’s terms the “sell-out,” the person who 
made a business out of his or her work, transforming it into Marx’s “strange thing,” the 
commodity.  
 What series offers Reinhardt is a means for working together these two readings 
of tautological form in order to create the anti-commodity situation, or a situation in 
which total exchange results in a paradoxical inexchangeability, in which the logic of 
interchangeability is made to serve the antithetical ends of incommensurability. And, 
vitally, series allows Reinhardt to fathom the artistic expression of incommensurability 
precisely not as a romantic idealist but as a materialist. His solution had to be worked out 
as an expressive possibility existing within present reality. To bring back the 
Vološinovian language problematic by which I first began to describe the disjuncture in 
Newman’s and Reinhardt’s projects, Reinhardt, unlike Newman, refused to imagine any 
manner of pristine grounds. There could be no artist as god-like creator with special 
access to previously unarticulated regions and possessing the ability sui generi to bring 
new reality into being, there was no speaking miraculously outside of all previous social 
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articulation. The “New,” Reinhardt insisted, is “formed on dead ground”—not from new 
ground.771 In other words, the critically maintained limitation on Reinhardt’s project was 
precisely that any image or possibility of utopian difference would have to be set in and 
wrought from its antithesis in the present or, more precisely, in the commodity logic of 
capitalism. If the situation was one in which the commodity—its structure, its logic—
prevailed totally and everything existed by and through the logic of exchangeability then 
those were the very conditions, means, tools and language by which he would have to 
work up an expression of difference. Reinhardt, at base, afforded himself no luxury in 
fanciful positing of redemptive “others” and “outsides” and “difference” (a “New”) to the 
situation at hand. This meant, quite strictly, that if Reinhardt desired the special sense of 
identity that he called “oneness” he would have to figure out a path towards it through the 
sense of identity that goes by the term “sameness.” The possibility the artist held out for 
himself, he succinctly referred to as the “[o]ne concept escaping concept.”772  
One can concretize some of these points by looking at the installation photographs 
of the black paintings in exhibition.773 Gretchen Lambert’s photograph of the black 
square paintings in 1966 at the Jewish Museum is the classic, iconic installation shot and 
it goes far in capturing the severity of Reinhardt’s proposition for the “same” painting, an 
endless repetition of the same form again and again (fig. 31). The cropping of the 
Lambert installation view cuts off sections of black paintings on both left and right-hand 
sides as well as taking in the architectural corner or lip in the right of the gallery. All of 
these visual cues by intensifying the terrific sense of endlessness. These are the black 
square paintings bearing down in their most ominous aspect: an infinite sameness, as the 
totalitarian identity regime, as the violence of the concept, a thing punched out in brutal, 
inhuman repetition providing an awful glance into the sublime of endless reproducibility. 
Nothing so much as a progression suggests itself: with no place to begin and no place to 
end, there is no backwards or forwards, no right or left, no up or down, not a thread by 
which to hang. Without handles, without a here or there, there seems no way of 
particularizing one’s position, marking one’s own space, of grounding oneself—and all 
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of this offers itself in such contrast to Newman’s efforts to provide the viewer with a 
sense of place, of groundedness. 
The photographic reproduction performs a further degree of leveling by 
eliminating even the pretense of looking with the connoisseur’s eye, attempting to 
pinpoint or delectate over minute variations, hunting for that special mark of distinction 
that would signal unique identity. In this vein, I agree with Coplans’s assessment that “in 
Reinhardt’s Serial Imagery the threshold of difference between each painting is so low as 
to finally deny difference, though it is true each painting occupies a different space,” and 
disagree with the attempts to treat the viewings of these paintings as visual hunting 
exercises in which finding accidents, imperfections, anything suggestive of nuance or that 
might serve to particularize any one black square painting from all the others, indicates 
the keen perception of the viewer.774 One should consider this: Reinhardt not only spoke 
of his painting as “anti-accident,” “no personality-picturesqueness, no texturing-
gesturings,” “no brushwork-bravura,” but he also committed to a practice of eliminating 
these conventionally given indexes of particularity, individuality, singularity. Thus, 
straining to see the ever-slightest modulation in paint surface seems a very perverse 
direction indeed.775 Similarly misguided in my view are those who approach the paintings 
as an entertaining optical game in which the reward for persevering with a black square 
canvas is a glimpse of the hidden treasure, the cruciform shape. But all the avid effort put 
into these visual exercises as ways of viewing a Reinhardt black square painting (having 
something to look for) seem to speak more to a stubbornness, a willed myopia perhaps, 
and even a blind faith, that if one could just fathom some sign of singularity, some 
differentiating imperfection, something, anything to grasp on to, one could be steadied 
against the impending vertigo threatened in the sideways glance. What these blinders, 
devices for looking straight ahead, work to prevent is actually seeing and in that fully 
registering the regime of the black paintings, and the experience of being neither here nor 
there in the double sense of not being able to ground oneself and of meaninglessness: this 
is the placeless and the arbitrary. While the fetish of a detected surface irregularity or of 
the perceived cross-shape might work to anchor one’s vision for a moment—to pretend 
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as if there were really only one—these blinders in the end, I would think, fail in shutting 
out the recognition of insistent sameness, fail in convincing the viewer that the relevant 
mode of experiencing the black square paintings is through the particularities of an 
individual canvas over their experience as seriality.776 This is to drive home identity as 
articulated through class and type, through the logic of sameness and repetition, and to 
challenge notions of singular identity. A Reinhardt black square painting is a token of 
type and as such it participates in the nightmarish monstrosity of all rationalizing 
modernisms: this is identity formulated as non-entity, things bearing identity but lacking 
proper self-identity. This is the first move Reinhardt’s ruse: fully establishing the terror of 
dystopian identity, the reign of the concept as brutal uniformity.  
That said, however, it should be noted that it is in fact quite rare to have the 
opportunity afforded by the 1966-67 show. To see more than one Reinhardt black square 
painting at a time does not happen frequently, if at all, outside of specifically identified 
“Reinhardt” exhibitions. The last major one of these occurred over a decade ago in 
1991.777 This observation activates important tensions of quantity and quality: one can 
either have a lot—the innumerable, the endlessness suggested by the Lambert 
photograph—or just one. Although a great deal of the significance of a Reinhardt black 
square painting is precisely in this seriality, typically, one finds just a single canvas on 
display (fig. 32) Here the museum mobilizes all its powers to endow the object with the 
auratic privilege of a masterpiece, of a singularity—to shift the semantics of the black 
square paintings from “one of a kind” (merely one token of a type) to “one of a kind” 
(originality).  
The possible motivations for this type of shifting relate, I believe, to a certain 
impossibility built into the logic of Reinhardt’s project, and which Reinhardt exploits to 
potentially expressive, purposive ends. There is a pointed pointlessness to acquiring more 
than one Reinhardt black painting. Indeed one might venture to put it in these terms: it is 
impossible to collect Reinhardt black square paintings, rather one can only accumulate 
more of the same. More than one of this type of object displaces the situation out of the 
realm of quality into the blunt counting house of quantity. It shows up that aspect of 
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collecting which looks more like accumulating, like stock-piling, certainly an activity for 
merchant warehouses not marble-floored museums. In this sense, one can possess as 
many Reinhardt black paintings as one can afford, but no matter how many one 
accumulates/collects, in the end, one will still possess only one—that is, possess only one 
quality. In this sense, the black paintings do act as Reinhardt had suggested, as an “effigy 
against [the] business world.”778 Once again, the systematic interchangeability of the 
paintings (all Reinhardt black paintings are made according to an absolute formula) turn 
into the conditions for absolute inexchangeability. The logic of equivalence has 
preempted the logic of exchange. Marx’s tailor cannot exchange coats for coats. Within 
the system of his series Reinhardt’s paintings are “incapable of confronting each other as 
commodities,” as exchange values.  
This can be put differently: in posing a system of an interchangeability that results 
in a paradoxical inexchangeability, Reinhardt realizes a stasis from out of the conditions 
of flux and exchange. Because Reinhardt’s series is a static one in which there is no 
forward or backward, no progression, no development, no change, they are, in a sense, 
without temporality. The beginning and end are there at once, they are timeless, they are 
“Timeless” paintings.779 In other words, one finds oneself in the present. What this 
answers is that ultimate dream of dialectical resolution: it is a situation in which cognition 
of a single black square painting rather than marking a loss of totality, is simultaneously a 
recognition of the whole. One has the particular and the whole at once. It is the 
achievement of Oneness.  
 
2. Newman’s Passion: The Stations of the Cross   
There are some obvious reasons for Newman’s unease with series (and the question of it 
poses). For where series apparently provided Reinhardt with a manner of final solution in 
the form of the “concept escaping concept,” it presented Newman, quite in contrast, with 
a powerful challenge threatening to undermine the authority of his project, the very 
grounds of his argument for what properly separates painting from pictures. The qualities 
and ideas associated with series—as an idea (plan, sketch, theory) set out in advance of 
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the process/implantation, a model of repetitive production, the negation of individuality 
and singularity, the part being governed by rules, parameters set up above and beyond the 
reality of the particular instance—were all qualities of the bad identity regime against 
which Newman struggled. “The history of modern painting,” he insisted, “has been the 
struggle against the catalogue.” And, if one is allowed to dig just slightly into the 
etymological turf of “catalogue” one unearths the synonyms “list,” “register,” 
“enumeration,” and, not least of all, “series.”780 Thus, in another incarnation, the 
statement might have read, and suggestively so, like this: “The history of modern 
painting has been the struggle against the series.” But repetition (as examined in the 
discussion of Reinhardt above) was also the very mechanism by which identities are set 
up—by asserting and reasserting, by articulating the I against the non-identity of mere 
existence. Mere existence—chaos and formlessness—were not adequate solutions, as 
Newman had explained. Nature still had to be kept at bay. The problem with non-identity 
as the “unpresentable vision of the ceaseless flow of the absolutely new,” as Jameson 
describes it, as the Deleuzian flux of “perpetual change, in which neither subject nor 
object can yet be imagined, but only the terror and exhaustion of radical difference 
without markers or signposts,” was precisely that it was “unpresentable.”781 The bind 
Newman found himself in was this: he understood that recognition (identity) needed, 
indeed cognitively necessitated, repetition, but that the very processes of repetition 
generated the kinds of non-originary, inauthentic, fabricated identities Newman so 
detested. Repetition dispersed and flattened identity into the terrible logic of the ever-
same. How did one go about gaining the recognition of self-identity, a sense of self and 
of ultimate meanings, without succumbing to repetition? Was it possible to achieve One 
and not the Same? A sense of Onement but without a trace of sameness? 
That Newman should stage his most dramatic confrontation with series through 
the highly loaded and potentially explosive theme of Christ’s Passion deserves, in this 
regard, our particular attention. Perhaps the first and most obvious point to consider is the 
apparent incongruity between the artist and his particular choice of subject matter. For 
Newman, a Jew who had lived during an era freshly fraught with the horrors of modern 
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anti-Semitism, the Passion might appear either an unlikely choice in subject matter or one 
exceptionally charged with tension, or both. For the Passion of Jesus was a prominent 
wedge used in anti-Semitic ideology by which to harshly articulate the difference 
between Christian and Jew. It was a powerful rallying point in the argument for the 
condemnation of Jews.782 Certainly Rosenberg thought summoning up this controversial 
material was a bad idea and he had given Newman his cautionary advice against it. “To 
my mind, the title The Stations of the Cross was a mistake, and I argued against it with 
Newman on the ground that an event held sacred by a cult and standing for it as a symbol 
ought not to be appropriated by outsiders and given changed meanings. . . . The harm of 
the title lay, it seemed to me, not so much in invoking the impenetrable concept of the 
‘why’ of human suffering as in associating the question with Christian lore, to which the 
artist was essentially alien.”783 Rosenberg who was no stranger to the heated debates of 
the post-war period on Jewish identity, the issue of exceptionalism or assimilation and on 
understanding the roots of modern anti-Semitism, probably saw this as a needless 
opening of the proverbial can of worms. This series, in Rosenberg’s opinion, functioned 
perfectly well without the assignation of this particular title; in appropriating the title The 
Stations of the Cross the artist only took upon himself a perverse burden and left himself 
exposed to countless, possibly violent, misreading. As it was, Rosenberg’s advice was not 
heeded, which leaves open the question: what then was the necessity between the theme 
of Christ’s Passion and Newman’s attempts to come to terms with series? 
I would like to think that Newman’s stubborn insistence upon sticking with this 
difficult material came, in part at least, from Newman’s acknowledgement of the 
intriguing thematic interpenetrations between the challenge of Series and the tragedy of 
the Stations and from his recognition of how perfectly, if damningly so, Series and 
Stations signed for each other. The relationship is a tidily self-reflexive one: Newman 
made a series of the Passion, but also as well made a passion—a struggle, a suffering, an 
agonistic moment—out of the Series. The paintings operate both as a series of the 
Passion and a passion of the Series. In this vein I think the referent to Newman’s Stations 
is neither the religious fabula of the Christian savior nor a more esoteric one of 
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Kabbalistic symbology but is a third and prior point, a generic source that when stripped 
bare of these sectarian guises, reveals itself to be the motor of philosophical dialectic—
the question, why? (lema).  
In establishing, and adamantly so, the theme of this series of fourteen canvases as 
the Passion, Newman retells the ancient story of dialectical struggle: the philosophical 
crisis of metaphysical dualism, with the fateful coming to self-cognition in the act of 
distinguishing between subject and object and subsequently with its implication of 
division, difference, distance between part and whole, between man and Absolute Being, 
the cognizance of not being one and the same. This was the tragedy at the heart of 
dialectical narratives. The human condition meant contingency, alienation, never being at 
one with oneself, never being present. Identity could never be the authentic identity of 
immediate self-presence but always was the contrived and belated identity of systematic 
substitutions. “Finite and conditional beings,” as one philosopher summarized, “are 
constantly moving from a past that has cease to be into a future that does not yet exist; 
they are obliged to see themselves in terms of memory or anticipation; their self-
knowledge is not direct, but mediated by the distinction of what was and what will be. 
They are not self-identical or ‘all of a piece’: they live in a present that vanishes even as it 
comes to be, and can then only be revealed through memory.”784 It is consciousness of 
this tragic flaw (“The ones who are born are to die”) that propels the question—the 
“question that has no answer” and the “original question”—as Newman put it in his short 
statement for the Stations of Cross exhibition catalogue: “Lema Sabachthani—why? Why 
did you forsake me? Why forsake me? To what purpose? Why?”785 This is the agony, the 
suffering, the passion. And still one seeks meaning and identity and presence, seeks the 
reunification of subject and object. Still there is the desire for that ultimate reckoning by 
which our singularity, particularity and contingent existence and the One are reconciled, 
our at-one-ment. 
There is, however, another narrative harbored within Newman’s Stations. This 
other narrative returns to the second part of my proposal, that this is also a passion of the 
series, a struggle with seriality as the logic of sameness and the dangers of its absolutist 
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threat—to homogenize human singularity and particularity into a single universal 
identity. If above, the Passion was read through a Neoplatonic lens in which the Christ 
figure makes the redemptive journey from part (human) to whole (divine), it can also be 
read through the dark lens of primitive magic and superstition. Seen thus, the 
Christological narrative is one of sacrifice and the Christ figure is one of substitution, 
operating as a token in a process of exchange, a this-for-a-that.  
It is interesting to return again to the Dialectic of Enlightenment and listen to 
Horkheimer and Adorno on the topic of sacrifice. In the process of working out their 
thesis of the barbarism of Enlightenment principles and the catastrophe of modern 
bourgeois rationality, one of the notions the authors refuse is the potentially comforting 
retreat to imaginings of a primitive world, of a prehistory in which humans had access to 
a more authentic being and in which the troubles of the modern world held no account. 
The authors quickly unhinge this possibility by arguing that the sacrificial practices of 
primitive magic are the early templating of the “modern” logics of substitution and 
representative identity. “Substitution in the course of sacrifice marks a step toward 
discursive logic,” they proclaim. “Even though the hind offered up for the daughter, and 
the lamb for the first-born, still had to have specific qualities, they already represented the 
species. They already exhibited the non-specificity of the example.”786 Primitive magic’s 
ritual sacrifice—already an action in a universe demanding of the reckoning or settling of 
cosmic balance sheets—sets the foundation stone for future economies of symbolic 
exchange. Thus, the high pitch of Newman’s agon is belied by his choice of figure: 
Christ, the exemplary figure of the dialectical resolution of part and whole as the beatific 
realization of self-identity and self-presence but, also, the exemplary substitute, the token 
of a type.  
The textual traces of Newman’s struggle with series are found in several 
statements that accompanied the public exhibition of The Stations. The difficulty of the 
problem of series is suggested by the artist’s repeated forays into defining and defending 
what he was doing. He would attempt to work it out several times: there would be an 
interview with Newsweek, a statement for ARTnews, and a statement for the exhibition 
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catalogue, all in 1966, plus several related passages from slightly earlier statements 
dating to 1962 and 1963-64. Perhaps the most openly aggressive and tense of these is the 
one that appeared in ARTnews. The prose has a tight, fists-held-close-to-the-body stance 
of a fighter on the defensive, anticipating heavy criticism, and it is a tone conspicuous in 
its difference from Newman’s far more characteristic verbal presence: expansive, filling 
space with confident assertion. Already the defensive turn is heard clearly in the opening 
sentence: “No one asked me to do these Stations of the Cross.”787 It is a forceful, blunt 
reassurance that Newman’s principled work ethos remains in tact still, despite the subject 
matter and despite that subject matter’s traditional association with the institution of the 
church. As the very next line begins, “They were not commissioned,” they were not the 
result of an outside demand. This lack of predetermination is highlighted in the following 
paragraph, as Newman writes, and again in what I take to serve as reassurance: “I began 
these paintings eight years ago the way I begin all my paintings—by painting.” The 
particular theme, the Stations of the Cross, in other words, rather than having preceded—
stood before and outside as an idea to which practice must serve and implement—
Newman is careful to note that it was only “while painting them that it came to me (I was 
on the fourth one) that I had something particular here. It was at that moment that the 
intensity that I felt the paintings had made me think of them as the Stations of the 
Cross.”788 The very next paragraph drives home this point about the dialectical fluidity of 
Newman’s process, whether in the case of one painting or in the case of a serial grouping 
of paintings. His process is the balanced interpenetration of theory and practice, idea and 
matter, subject and object. This dialectic is palpable in the artist’s famous lines: “It is as I 
work that the work itself begins to have an effect on me. Just as I affect the canvas, so 
does the canvas affect me.”789 Nevertheless, this return to Newman’s more familiar 
voice—concise, powerful, without apology—is a mere lull in the storm as uneasiness 
surfaces again in the following lines. 
From the very beginning I felt that I would do a series. However, I had no 
intention of doing a theme with variations. Nor did I have any desire to 
develop a technical device over and over. From the very beginning I felt I 
had an important subject, and it was while working that it made itself clear 
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to me that these works involved my understanding of the Passion. Just as 
the Passion is not a series of anecdotes but embodies a single event, so 
these fourteen paintings, even though each one is whole and separate in its 
immediacy, all together form a complete statement of a single subject. 
That is why I could not do them all at once, automatically, one after 
another. It took eight years. I used to do my other work and come back to 
these. When there was a spontaneous, inevitable urge to do them is when I 
did them.790  
 
The tension in this prose is perspicuous. Strikingly, it is because one knows something of 
Newman’s project (what was at stake) that one appreciates the significance of Newman’s 
description of how and why he made a series. For the contradiction is plain: how does 
one reconcile a knowledge, a plan, “from the very beginning” of series with the image of 
the painter acting on, and only on, the authentic, spontaneous urge, between knowing 
something (that it would be a series, that it had an important subject matter) “from the 
very beginning” and figuring something out while in the process, “while working” (“I 
was on the fourth one.”)? How does one reconcile each “part” as “whole and separate in 
its immediacy” but also that those autonomous parts are a unity as well? As Newman 
would write in his statement for the catalogue, “Can the Passion be expressed by a series 
of anecdotes, by fourteen sentimental illustrations? Do not the Stations tell of one 
event?”791 A series of anecdotes, the episodic, was precisely the pitfall Newman had to 
avoid. He spoke in the summer of 1962, when already well into the Stations series, of the 
necessity of being “antianecdotal.”792 Painting that was episodic, “call[ed] for a sequel.” 
This must happen if a painting does not give a sensation of wholeness or 
fulfillment. That is why I have no interest in the episodic or ecstatic, 
however abstract. The excitement always ends at the brink and leaves the 
subject, so to speak, hanging there like the girl in The Perils of Pauline. 
The next painting repeats the excitement, in a kind of ritual. One expects 
the girl to be saved finally, but she is again left hanging on the brink, and 
so on and on. This is the weakness of the ecstatic and the episodic. It is an 
endless search for a statement of personality that never takes place. The 
truly passionate exists on a different level.793   
 
In other words, it described a series of deferrals, where presence, “wholeness or 
fulfillment” is held out as a promise but endlessly put off. Krauss, once again, though she 
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had in mind a generation of artist’s younger than Newman, expressed these concerns 
succinctly when she questioning the “viability of the very notion of painting in series” 
when dealing with paintings presumably explicitly concerned with “singleness-or 
wholeness-of-aspect.” With serialization, she wrote, “we feel that we are not copresent 
with the ‘picture,’ that indeed the idea of it and the multiple serial developments which 
support the burgeoning of that idea, are somewhere else.” A painting “suddenly appears” 
to possess “several facets or aspects, not all of which face the viewer, so that the painting 
in some way is not everywhere equally open and simultaneously available to the 
viewer.”794 In other words, to be “copresent” with one painting of a known series is 
equally to be absent from all the other members belonging to that series. All of this is to 
register something seemingly counter to the notion of “onement.” The question that 
remained for Newman was how to reconcile the apparent contradiction between series 
and its character of being parceled out and the “single event” of experiencing it all at 
once? 
There was a lot of hesitation in associating Newman so closely with the notion of 
series. Newman took on a huge risk: he had to demonstrate that his participation in series 
was not an outright reversal of his professed aesthetic commitments. This unease can also 
be observed in the statements made by Lawrence Alloway, the curator responsible for the 
exhibition of The Stations at the Guggenheim. Alloway made several attempts to buttress 
Newman’s claim that it was possible to work in series and to still also speak of the “one 
event.” An examination of the curator’s statements has the benefit not only of 
highlighting where both the artist’s and curator’s arguments ran parallel but also 
Alloway’s statements tend to reveal more clearly the perplexity of the situation. Where 
Newman had the benefit of a dose of poetic logic to get past snags, Alloway, as both the 
curator and as a critic, was left with the task of explaining to the public—without 
recourse to the artist’s license—the mechanics of the operation. 
Before tracing Alloway’s struggle with reconciling Newman and series, I first 
would like to rehearse briefly the chronology of events surrounding the Alloway-
Newman-Stations congruence, as the sequencing of plan and execution will play a 
254 
significant role. The advent of what would become the canvases for The Stations 
occurred sometime around February 1958, several months after Newman’s debilitating 
heart attack of November 1957. In the spring of 1958 Newman had his highly 
consequential Bennington College exhibition, a show to which Alloway traveled and saw 
in person. Presumably what Alloway saw at Bennington piqued his interest for, soon 
after, he would visit Newman’s New York studio. During that studio visit he saw the first 
two canvases of what would become the Stations series.795 In 1960 Newman would 
complete the next two canvases of the series, and according to the artist, it was at this 
stage—and only at this stage—that he realized the theme of his series was (had 
been/would be) the Passion of Christ. Over the next several years Newman will 
experiment with “series” in media outside of painting: a series of twenty-two ink 
drawings of 1960 and a lithographic series, 18 Cantos, from 1963-64. By 1964 he will 
have made significant headway in the Stations, and importantly, plans will be hatched 
with Alloway (now a curator at the Guggenheim) for the series’s exhibition. These plans 
come to fruition on April 20, 1966, when “The Stations of the Cross: Lema Sabachthani” 
opens at the Guggenheim.  
As curator and chief organizer of the exhibition, Alloway contributed the 
catalogue essay. Before examining that essay, I want to turn first to an article Alloway 
wrote and published earlier, in June 1965, in Artforum. What stands out in this piece is 
the author’s attempt to dissociate Newman’s project from serial work. From the 
chronology above, it is clear that Alloway is not only well aware of Newman’s own 
engagement with a painting series but that the curator also is well along in preparing and 
organizing an exhibition of this series for the upcoming year. Alloway opens the essay 
with the suggestion: “One way to approach the painting of Barnett Newman is by raising 
the question, do you believe in masterpieces?” Alloway’s own implied answer is that 
Newman’s work is still very much within the masterpiece mindset. This stands against 
what Alloway locates as two current anti-masterpiece trends, serial work and the 
“spontaneous sketches and unfinished works” of “diaristic notation.”796 Alloway’s 
Newman, to phrase this differently, belongs neither to the spontaneous gesturalism of 
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1940s and 1950s Abstract Expressionism nor to the serial, system-like minimalism of the 
1960s. It is to the latter of these anti-masterpiece traditions that I want to focus. First, 
listen to Alloway’s description of this trend: “Artists who work in open-ended series of 
the same image and the same size . . . tend to confer equal validity on all the works 
executed as a group, with the result that it is the whole series that counts as the expressive 
unit. Under the conditions of serial painting, as we may call it, the continuity of sequels 
tends to outweigh the determinate form of any one of the works in isolation.”797 The part, 
in other words, is swallowed up by the whole; collective, mass identity overwhelms 
individual, singular identity, all of which stands antithetically to the idea of a masterpiece 
as excellence, remarkability, singular achievement, and originality.798 Alloway is quick to 
assert a distinction between Newman and serial painting practices. “Newman’s paintings 
are opposed to work which follows . . . serial form.” But here Alloway obviously needs to 
tread mindfully. He has already put his full support behind The Stations. Newman’s 
paintings, he admits, do possess a “central image”—the vertical zips with minimally 
inflected color fields—an image that is sustained through all of Newman’s mature 
graphic work. Doubtless, Alloway is aware of how close this sounds to some manner of 
seriality, what a tight spot he is finding himself in, for his very next move is to argue that 
the artist’s “extraordinary sense of scale,” is able to “diversif[y] his central image so that 
none of the run-on effects of serial painting blurs the identity of individual works.” It 
sounds as if Alloway is pegging the argument vaguely on the suggestion that there is just 
enough difference between Newman’s canvases that the integrity of the individual works 
is maintained. Although Alloway is able to avoid a collision here, it is a narrow miss, a 
hair’s breath.  
This 1965 essay was a mere skirmish compared to the work Alloway would need 
to do a year later for his catalogue essay to The Stations. If earlier material had hinted at 
the relevance and proximity of issues of seriality to Newman’s painting production, the 
year 1966 with its public unveiling of Newman’s series brought the troublesome issue to 
its full-blown state. The tone of Alloway’s essay, as the tone had been in Newman’s 
statement, borders on the tense and defensive. In what feels like a preemptive move, he 
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concedes to the seeming misfit between Newman’s aesthetic and the conceit of series. 
“The production of series by Newman,” the curator readily admits, “is an unexpected 
development in his work. Unlike other artists of his generation, given to numbering their 
paintings and to production in runs, he has consistently defined his work by separate 
titles, a verbal statement of autonomy of each work.”799 But, now, the task set out for 
Alloway, was to develop strategies for defending Newman’s use of series.  
Alloway’s first strategy is indicated in the following two lines: “Newman did not 
begin these paintings with The Stations in mind,” and “The discovery of a subject that 
proposed fixed limits did not mean that Newman could now work easily by filling in a 
given schema.” What these statements serve to guarantee is the status of the artist’s 
praxis. Despite the “production in runs” quality of series, here, with Newman’s series, 
theory did not precede practice. There was no preexisting schema or predetermining plan 
dictating what Newman did in front of the blank canvas.800 Quite the contrary in fact, and 
again in a reiteration of Newman’s statement but also with elaboration, Alloway asserts 
that, “Newman’s Stations were arrived at through a process of self-recognition [emphasis 
added],” and that “Newman worked, first, without pre-knowledge of group or cycle; then, 
as a result of developing possibilities within the work itself, he accepted a definition that 
partially determined the future course of the series.”801 “It became a project, a speculative 
extension into the future, demanding paintings for its realization. This method of learning 
from the initial stage of work is parallel to the kind of responsiveness that Jackson 
Pollock revealed in single paintings. He would make a mark and then develop or oppose 
it by other marks until he reached a point at which he had exhausted the work’s cues to 
him to act further. Newman had demonstrated the possibility of such awareness operating 
not in terms of visual judgment and touch within one painting, but as a source of structure 
for a series.”802   
The parallel to Pollock that Alloway is proposing is a fascinating one. One hears 
some of Rosenberg and American Action Painting echoed in its lines. “There is no reason 
why an act cannot be prolonged from a piece of paper to a canvas. Or repeated on another 
scale and with more control,” or, one might add, from one canvas to another. Also, these 
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lines seem to fit as well: “The canvas has “talked back” to the artist . . . to provoke him 
into a dramatic dialogue. Each stroke had to be a decision and was answered by a new 
question,” or, again, the artist had to be responsive to the work’s cues, a process of marks 
“develop[ed] or oppos[ed] . . . by other marks.”803 To this last statement, I would include 
also an elaboration of the point made some years later by Rosenberg in his Dallas 
Museum catalogue on Action Painting in which he writes: “Action Painting has extracted 
the element of decision inherent in all art in that the work is not finished at its beginning 
but has to be carried forward by an accumulation of “right” gestures.”804 Thus, to take 
Alloway’s explanation and read it along with Rosenberg what one has in Newman’s 
series is an interesting accord between the Action Painting principle of theory and 
practice in total dialogue but, in an expanded arena: the dialogue now extends through a 
series of canvases. The surprising twist comes in this: where one thought with serial 
practice there would be a productionist mentality there is the ethos of the Action Painter. 
There could be no charges that Newman’s work was “finished at its beginning,” for the 
theme, as one is repeatedly reminded was arrived at somewhere in the middle, in medias 
res, when Newman was already well into his process, already acting on the canvas, with 
enough of a dialogue in progress that the work could talk back to him, reveal to the artist 
his theme. To rephrase Alloway, the possibility of the Passion developed out of the work 
itself. 
Unfortunately, one problem may have been tended to but another troubling issue 
surfaces immediately. For, to come to an understanding of this theme—the Passion, the 
Stations of the Cross—is also to register (on some level, at least) its identity as a set 
series, that part of its identity is indicated in its formal structure of fourteen units, events, 
“stations.” Therefore, even if Newman came to the realization that he was working on a 
series of the Stations, as he insisted, well after he began the project, it means that the end, 
at some point, had to be predetermined. Somewhere near mid-way Newman decided that 
the “conversation” would stop, that the back-and-forth, question-and-answer period 
would end, or, as Alloway carefully, almost legalistically, couches it, the artist had 
“accepted a definition that partially determined the future course of the series.” Alloway 
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attempts to work out of this bind in two ways, neither of which, to my mind, is 
completely successful in blotting out our knowledge of this series’s predeterminations or 
“partial” determinations. On the one hand Alloway appears to congratulate Newman for 
imposing a limit to his series. “One problem of working in serial form is knowing when 
to stop,” the curator warns. In the face of serial endlessness, Newman’s possession of a 
definite ending point is vaunted as a redeeming quality. Secondly, Alloway reminds the 
reader of the particular symbolic importance of fourteen in this situation. “The number 
fourteen is both an absolute limit and a symbol; more or less than this number would 
make it impossible to recognize any connections with the declared iconography. Thus 
Newman’s series embodies an order inseparable from the meaning of the work.” As 
Alloway would have it, the number of units in the series is an expression then, of the 
perfect marriage of content and form. Nonetheless, the reassurances about the 
outstanding virtues of Newman’s series—not an endless number and not an arbitrary 
one—fall somehow short of the task of sorting out what feel like serious contradictions in 
Newman’s decision to work in series. Indeed, given all that is known of the commitments 
involved in Newman’s argument for painting, that Alloway concludes this first part of his 
argument by remarking that Newman is “working with a subject which is personal but 
regulated by number [emphasis added]” should raise flags indeed.805  
  The second main point in Alloway’s argument—which again is a revisitation of 
one made by Newman—concerns the unity of the fourteen canvases. Newman had 
written, and problematically so, “each painting is total and complete by itself, yet only 
the fourteen together make clear the wholeness of the single event.”806 Alloway’s line is 
essentially the same though the curator’s thoughts on the topic place even less emphasis 
on the notion of each painting being total and complete by itself, thus reducing the 
potentially perilous separation between part and whole semantically allowed for in 
Newman’s statement. Alloway’s work at closing this gap occurs in the passage below. 
Newman has emphasized that he regards the Stations as phases of a 
continuous agony and not as a series of separate episodes, in which he is 
basically at one with traditional iconography. . . . One consequence of this 
view is that it would be a serious misreading of the work to consider it in 
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formal terms as a theme and variations. Theme-and-variation readings are 
applicable neither to the subject matter nor to the restriction of means to 
black or white paint on raw canvas, because such a form assumes a first 
statement (giving a theme) accompanied by modifications. In fact, there is 
no such key to the Stations of the Cross, which have to be experienced as a 
unit of fourteen continuous parts.807 
 
This point is one that Alloway continues to labor upon in the every next paragraph, and 
again, emphasizing, at all costs, the “unity of the Passion.” “Indeed so strong is 
Newman’s sense of the unity of the fourteen paintings that he regards the group as a cry,” 
he writes. The unifying cry will replace “duration by spreading the climax of the Passion 
over its earlier phases.”808 Slightly later, Alloway reinforces his argument for the 
essential unity of the fourteen parts through a discussion of their spatial arrangement. 
“Although Newman’s Stations have no obligatory arrangement (something of the 
flexibility of easel painting is retained), they need to be adjacent, so that repetitions and 
cross-references can perform identifying and expressive roles. Flexible as the paintings 
are, their spatial unity, as a group, is essential to their meaning.”809 This prompts the 
question: where does onement then lie? Is it in the separate parts (“each painting is total 
and complete by itself”) or the communal whole (“only the fourteen together make the 
wholeness of the single event”)? 
These were, are still, monumentally difficult questions. What should be pointed 
out here is that these were challenges Newman had confronted before The Stations. He 
had rehearsed, in a manner of speaking, the problem and practiced his justification earlier 
and in situations far less charged. Many of the same perplexing issues that nagged at the 
Stations had already been posed with the artist’s lithographic series, the 18 Cantos of 
1963-64.810 In the statement that accompanied the boxed edition of the lithographic series 
Newman was at pains to point out the individuality of each print. Formally, this was 
expressed by the individualized margins for each print. “[E]ach canto has its own 
personal margins,” Newman explained, “Each print and its paper had to be decided by 
me, and in some cases the same print exists with two different sets of margins, because 
each imprint means something different to me.” Then, in language that sounds very much 
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like the kind of justification he will eventually use for the Stations, he writes, “These 
eighteen cantos are then single, individual expressions, each with its unique difference. 
Yet since they grew one out of the other, they also form an organic whole—so that as 
they separate and as they join in their interplay, their symphonic mass lends additional 
clarity to each individual canto, and at the same time each canto adds its song to the full 
chorus.” Although this serves as a prefiguration of the issues of the Stations, an important 
difference was in scale. Newman continues: “I must explain that I had no plan to make a 
portfolio of ‘prints.’ I am not a printmaker. Nor did I intend to make a ‘set’ by 
introducing superficial variety. These cantos arose from a compelling necessity—the 
result of grappling with the instrument.”811 Again, the familiar refrain, the artist did not 
intend to make a set (or a series) but the set evolved out of a necessity within the process 
of working. Theory did not dictate practice. However, the stakes, compared to those of 
the Stations, were far lower. His anxiety about working in series and in an explicit 
medium of reproducibility was reduced by the simple declaration that he was not a 
“printmaker,” and that the series/set was the result of working with a new “instrument.” 
The diminutive connotations are hard to miss in Newman’s description of lithography. 
Not a “medium” proper, lithography was but an instrument. “For me,” Newman states, 
lithography “is an instrument that one plays. It is like a piano or an orchestra; and as with 
an instrument, it interprets.”812 Those familiar with Newman’s writings will catch the 
particular connotations of “playing” and “interpreting”: these were both things Newman 
found completely antithetical to the pursuit of painting proper.813 Nevertheless, despite 
this difference in scale of importance—the lesser realm of lithography, the higher pursuit 
of painting—there is not a marked change between the Cantos and the Stations in the 
type of justification Newman would present for his implementation of series. The 
relationship between part and whole is marked in each accompanying text as a site both 
troublesome and vital but one would be pressed to say that the later text had in fact come 
any closer to reconciling being “of a piece” with being of a series. 
The strategist’s question here might be, if the qualities of series carried such 
potential to undermine the qualities that Newman held to be of supreme value in painting, 
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why then would the artist put himself in a position to have to confront it? Why attempt a 
non-serial series at all if one could avoid it? Why, given the option, willingly assume this 
cross to bear? Just for a moment let me return to Alloway’s discussion as a way of 
situating the problem and to indicate that the issue of series and seriality were far from 
unnecessary to Newman: they were not merely the late career whimsy of an already 
established master with nothing to lose, nor could one say Newman was merely 
experimenting, out of curiosity, with an idiom to which the younger generation of 1960s 
abstract painters seemed particularly drawn. Immediately after commenting on the 
unexpected arrival of a series by Newman, Alloway states: “The fact that Newman has 
now painted a series does not, in fact, dissolve the compactness and solidity on which his 
earlier work seems predicated.” This sounds like an attempt to nip in the bud what 
Alloway might have imagined as a dangerous recursive logic: to imagine that Newman 
had just possibly been doing series all along, that the layperson’s initial suspicions had in 
fact been right on: he had been doing the same thing, over and over again, since day 
one.814 What Alloway is trying to protect against is the perception that would take 
Newman’s identity—the one of the miraculous rebirth in 1948, the Newman of the 
startling zip paintings—as an identity predicated on or articulated through sameness. But 
arguably Alloway was in no position to avoid the question, for in a sense the dilemma of 
series had in fact been born simultaneously with Onement I itself. The Stations only 
brings out to the open a contradiction already present in Onement I. Series, repetition, the 
sense of having or revisiting a moment again, once more and another time—the 
episodic—are already implied within the title to the inaugural work. And, indeed, the 
numerical addendum proves to have been useful, for Onement I would eventually be 
followed, series-like, with Onement II, Onement III, Onement IV, Onement V, and 
Onement VI.815 Which of course, raises a perplexing but interesting question: what 
quality of Onement (singularity, absoluteness, identity, presence) could Newman possibly 
be referring to if there were to be more and others? 
This perplexing moment in Onement I goes far beyond an issue of titles. The 
question of seriality in Newman’s work pops up not just in the Onement series proper but 
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indeed extends as a general query to be posed to all of Newman’s zip paintings. In her 
recent essay for the 2002 Philadelphia Museum of Art Newman retrospective, Ann 
Temkin provides a succinct account of this issue. Though she does not mention “series” 
by name, she does suggest that the special quality of Onement I, its originality, was 
linked “paradoxically,” to its “repeatability.”  
Onement I appeared sufficiently independent to persuade its maker that it 
was, so to speak, an orphan. Then what it needed was siblings, to produce 
a totality of paintings that would be recognized as such by their family 
resemblance. . . . What was it about Onement I that would have struck 
Newman as an act of origin, rather than a depiction of it? The answer lies, 
paradoxically, in its repeatability. . . . Onement I is open to repetition 
precisely because it sets out a template for a language that can regenerate 
itself; it resolves the paradox of how to be original, again and again. . . .a 
road map for a way of painting that could last a lifetime. This is what 
Newman had needed.816  
 
She continues: 
This is the amazing tightrope that Newman’s paintings walk. On the one 
hand, each is sufficiently alike to forge an identity as a “Newman,” 
something that was of infinite importance to him. On the other hand, each 
is sufficiently different to be recognized, individually, as an original. It is 
their close connection to one another, crucially, that underscores the 
uniqueness of each. Were they a group of very different paintings, the 
question of uniqueness would not arise; one would take it for granted. 
Newman’s development of a visual language that is so sharply pared down 
raises the question he badly wanted raised: How am I, this painting, 
different, original, all to myself, despite many apparent signs to the 
contrary?817  
 
Temkin highlights in these passages the importance—and very likely necessity—of series 
and seriality as the backdrop or ground(s) for the appearance, visibility and 
recognizability of the individuality of each Onement’s individuality. This complicates the 
understanding of Newman’s immediacy and presence. It asks that one imagines some 
manner of interpretative route, whereby meaning and identity and presence can be 
articulated across relational entities but all this accomplished beyond the semiotic 
operation presence/absence. In such a universe the registration of an other’s presence 
neither reduces nor infringes upon the fullness of one’s own being. 
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“They seemed to move through time—a kind of sense of the evolution of a 
process unfurling itself so that each individual unit within the whole reflected the whole 
and in order to see the whole one had to relate all the paintings together. I thought of 
Bach in the feeling of the separate notes working in and out of each other in a fugal way 
to make up a oneness again.”818 This was how the artist Philip Wofford in 1971 described 
his reaction to The Stations at the Guggenheim. One wonders if this was the sort of 
understanding of series that Newman hoped to effect, where the problem of identity 
incarnated in the tension between part and whole is worked out “fugally” and finally 
resolved in oneness. Nor should one fail to notice in Wofford’s appreciation a classic 
description of dialectical resolution. It is a rehearsal of how to have oneness, unity, 
identity, how to possess something beyond the fleeting, ungraspable, instantaneous 
flashes of pure difference, and how to have it not as the impoverished sameness of perfect 
homogeneity but how to go out into the world of difference, and embody the 
heterogeneous richness that enriches identity (fig. 33).819 Or, as Reinhardt put it, not 
sameness but oneness. But where Reinhardt’s approach to the problem meant working 
out a path to oneness through the very mechanisms of sameness, here in contrast, 
sameness was precisely what Newman’s notion of authentic identity, true oneness, was 
both threatened by and was forced to struggle against. An early piece of Newman’s 
writing dating to 1945 speaks to how deeply this dialectical narrative informed his 
project. “Man is a tragic being, and the heart of this tragedy is the metaphysical problem 
of part and whole. This dichotomy of our nature, from which we can never escape and 
which because of its nature impels us helplessly to try to resolve it, motivates our struggle 
for perfection and seals our inevitable doom. For man is one, he is single, he is alone; and 
yet he belongs, he is part of another. This conflict is the greatest of our tragedies. . . .”820  
I would argue that Newman’s engagement with the theme of the Stations of the Cross is 
strong evidence that his position had not changed much in almost twenty years. For, as 
Newman indicated with poetic force, this series was the cry, the suffering beset by the 
tragic consciousness of the part-and-whole situation describing humanity’s ancient 
alienation.821 Onement I had been that act of articulation that miraculously created 
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identity as wholeness, oneness, unity (there was no having a “piece” of it, no fragmenting 
the “image,” one took it all in at once or one took nothing) without having that identity 
articulated through part/whole relations, without the separation into figure/ground. Even 
so, as I mentioned above, the solution of Onement I, already opened out to the problems 
of series. Series became the arena where the problems of figure/ground and part/whole 
were displaced. The victorious wholeness, the long-desired and utopian of-a-pieceness 
revealed to Newman in Onement I was a short-lived one. With series the achieved 
wholeness of the single canvas became but a part, a piece, a figure articulated through 
and against the whole, the ground, the community, the language of series. The seriality 
puts into question the integrity of the part. Returning to Krauss’s perplexed questions, 
how does one speak of wholeness, the experience of full presence when a painting is part 
of a known series? What it appears to introduce is absence, the lack of self-presence or 
the fully self-evident. It admits to identity articulated differentially, thus paradigmatically 
and therefore not of speaking and mastering one’s own self-identity but having identity 
spoken through the conventionality of a system, of a social order. In this light The 
Stations of the Cross is a crystallization of Newman’s dilemma: how to forge authentic 
identity given the tragic part/whole, individual/social “dichotomy of our nature.”  
 To draw this discussion to a close I will turn to the mysterious case of the 
“Fifteenth” station. This is a canvas appended to the series but differing from the fourteen 
other canvases in both dimensions (several inches taller and approximately a foot wider) 
and in the use of color (a deep red zip). There has been disagreement on how exactly to 
place or think about this canvas in relation to the rest of the series. Alan Stone, when he 
first showed this work, made the mistake—and one can hardly blame him—of calling it 
“Resurrection,” but this was a title Newman “disavowed.” Instead, Newman thought of it 
as a “conclusion” to the series and titled the painting Be II. This anecdote leaves one to 
wonder, what is the difference between concluding the Stations with a “Resurrection” 
and “Be II”? Does not the latter also signify the former? Cannot one read “Be II” as “to 
be” again, once more, as in a “resurrection”? But obviously Newman felt the difference 
strongly. Stone’s title had been disavowed. My suggestion is that a “Resurrection” would 
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have made the series into a tidy package. The “Resurrection” scene conventionally is the 
redemptive and promising conclusion, the happy ending. For Newman to insist that his 
conclusion not be taken as a resurrection but is “Be II” is to upend any neat cathartic 
closure. It is, in an oddly poignant maneuver of Newman’s, an acknowledgement of 
series, a reminder of returns and doublings. It is also to juxtapose quite plainly the 
competing aspects of identity with which Newman’s series grapples: first, the self-
evidence of “to be” as that which is “immutably and absolutely,” is “undifferentiated and 
outside time” and secondly, the appending “II” which is already to suggest dualism, 
differentiation, mutability, secessionality. If Newman’s relationship to series does not 
resolve itself cleanly, then one might turn to the idea of Newman’s keeping things at the 
level of the tragic. Tragic self-awareness is perhaps the most pointedly human moment of 





A Political Allegory 
Throughout the history of our civilization, two traditions, two 
opposed tendencies, have been in conflict: the Roman tradition and 
the popular tradition, the imperial tradition and the federalist 
tradition, the authoritarian tradition and the libertarian tradition. 
Peter Kropotkin 822  
 
Marxists can march here hand in hand with anarchists, provided 
both parties uncompromisingly reject the reactionary police-patrol 
spirit represented by Joseph Stalin. . . . 
Leon Trotsky, Andre Breton and Diego Rivera823  
 
Thus far I have structured the comparison of Newman and Reinhardt as a movement from 
sameness towards difference. As I have outlined, the similarity of their ultimate aims for 
painting, once established, fork out into two highly contrary paths. But though these paths 
appear to be heading in opposed directions, Newman and Reinhardt both arrive at 
seriality as the critical crux in their arguments for painting/identity. What I intend to do 
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now is to return to the earlier suggestion that the comparison of the two artists’ painting 
projects also engaged and elaborated political ideals as well.824 In this section I will 
attempt to more explicitly address those political claims by showing that the difference 
developed between Newman’s and Reinhardt’s arguments for “true” painting (and how 
this plays out in series) simultaneously articulated a vital philosophical difference within 
the political problematic of “true” socialism. 
Before taking this on, however, something should be said about the resistance to 
making claims like the above. One of the most obvious ways of mounting this kind of 
resistance traces back to the artists’ own dissociations of art and politics on occasion. 
Take, for instance, Newman in 1943 condemning a situation in which art serves as the 
“plaything of politicians.” According to Newman, the present conditions (in 1943) could 
only improve, the “new America” that is the “cultural center of the world” could only 
come about by “free[ing] the artist from the stifling control of an outmoded politics.”825  
Two years later the art-for-art’s sake tone is even more pronounced: “Art is a realm of 
pure thought. As such, it, like all other realms of pure thought, must be concerned with its 
own problems. Art is self-contained. Politics is not only unnecessary, it is irrelevant.”826   
Reinhardt, likewise, generated a slew of statements deterring the art-and-politics 
question. He told an audience, in 1960, during a symposium on art and morality that “in 
the thirties, it was wrong for artists to think that a good social idea would correct bad art 
or that a good social conscience would fix up a bad artistic conscience. It was wrong for 
artists to claim that their work could educate the public politically or that their work 
would beautify public buildings.”827 Social realism’s error of mixing politics with art was 
a mistake shared with surrealism and abstract expressionism, both styles considered by 
Reinhardt to be two other “achievement[s] in romancing.” All three “dumped together . . . 
painting with politics. . . .”828 Even more potent fuel for the apolitical reading of 
Reinhardt’s work is culled from the artist’s art-as-art dogma. The art-as-art formulations 
appeared to argue straightforwardly for a pure art—a state in which the aesthetic has 
nothing to do with “life,” and thus, presumably with matters social, historical, political. 
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Finally, if there were any question remaining, Reinhardt squelches it in this: “Art has 
never ruled the world./ Art-as-art cannot win the world without losing its soul.”829   
Supplied with testimony like this, there is little difficultly in imagining the surge 
of confidence in those who see any questions of political content in Newman’s and 
Reinhardt’s painting as muddying and misleading. Bruce Barber, for instance, indicates 
that after 1950, Newman was careful in his writings not to suggest overt political 
meanings. “In fact,” Barber writes, “to be successful in Newman’s terms, the work of art 
had to acquire some transcendent condition over politics.”830 Lippard as well found 
Reinhardt to be “one of those people” described in Rosenberg’s and Motherwell’s 
editorial statement for Possibilities, who “h[u]ng around in the spaces between art and 
political action” in the aftermath of political disillusionment. By Lippard’s reasoning, 
Reinhardt did this “by rigorously separating the two.”831   
Those are the disclaimers. However, one needs to factor in the claims as well, for 
both artists issued remarkably bold and insistent revolutionary mandates for their work. 
At the relatively early career point of 1943, Reinhardt wrote that “Mondrian, like Marx, 
saw the disappearance of works of art when the environment itself became an aesthetic 
reality. In its dissatisfaction with ordinary experience, the impoverished reality of 
present-day experience, an abstract painting stands as a challenge to disorder and 
disintegration. Its activity implies a conviction of something constructive in our time. . . 
.”832 These sentiments are rehearsed and repeated in his later art-as-art statements: “Art-
as-art is always a battle cry, polemic, picket sign, sit-in, sit-down, civil disobedience, 
passive resistance, crusade, fiery cross, and non-violent protest.” Art-as-art can be linked 
to these forms of political expressions because it gets to the heart of the matter: “Art-as-
art is a creation that revolutionizes creation [emphasis added].”833   
Remarkably, the underscoring through repetition (something typically associated 
with Reinhardt), characterizes Newman’s classic line on art and politics. For when in 
1962 Newman went on public record with the following assertion, he was already 
repeating himself: “Almost fifteen years ago Harold Rosenberg challenged me to explain 
what one of my paintings could possibly mean to the world. My answer was that if he and 
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others could read it properly it would mean the end of all state capitalism and 
totalitarianism. That answer still goes.”834 But then listen once more in 1969, Newman 
repeats himself a third time. He reiterates: “There is no question that my work and the 
work of the men I respect took a revolutionary position. . . . Some twenty years ago in a 
gathering, I was asked what my painting really means in terms of society, in terms of the 
world, in terms of the situation. And my answer then was that if my work were properly 
understood, it would be the end of state capitalism and totalitarianism . . . and I still 
believe, that my work in terms of its social impact does denote the possibility of an open 
society, of an open world, not of a closed institutional world.”835   
The obvious problem is this: these two sets of statements appear openly to 
contradict each other. The first set suggests that both Newman and Reinhardt denied any 
valid access between the political and the aesthetic. The second set suggests that both 
artists conceived of their projects as very much speaking to a social revolutionary 
dimension. Whether one is arguing for a reading of political disengagement or of political 
engagement, the existence of these two sets of contrary statements poses a challenging 
problem. The way out of this stalemate is to return to the earlier pictures/painting 
distinction (discussed in chapter 3) and to use it to distinguish between two different 
registers of the art-and-politics relationship. The resulting difference would be the highly 
significant one between a political picture and political painting.  
As a step towards examining what this difference between a political picture and 
the political on the level of painting means concretely, one can look at an attempted—
though to my mind inadequate—route out of the bind presented by the artists’ seemingly 
contradictory statements. The proposed solution has been to take up examples of 
explicitly political productions made by Newman and Reinhardt and to locate (and 
ultimately contain) in those heterogeneous examples the substance and execution of each 
artist’s political claims and thereby absolving the need to address this issue at deeper 
levels of the artists’ practices. In other words, it has been far more convenient to 
reconcile Newman’s and Reinhardt’s political stances and statements with areas of their 
production regarded as marginal to their central projects. As Craven noted, “Reinhardt 
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and the Abstract Expressionists did in fact produce several works of this period that were 
more explicitly political, or at least much more topical in orientation, than was generally 
consistent with the basic premises of their aesthetic.”836 Certainly, two late career 
pieces—both done shortly before each artist’s death—Reinhardt’s lithograph No War and 
Newman’s sculpture Lace Curtain for Mayor Daley, fit Craven’s description.   
In 1967 Reinhardt produced No War (fig. 34) a 26 1/4 x 21 1/4” poster lithograph 
to be included in the Artists and Writers Portfolio (1968), a project that was part of the 
larger anti-Vietnam War movement.837  The lithograph mimed the form of an airmail 
postcard, and it was addressed to the “War Chief, Washington, D.C., USA.”838 One side 
of this “postcard” listed off twenty-four negatives: 
  NO WAR 
  NO IMPERIALISM 
  NO MURDER 
  NO BOMBING 
  NO NAPALM 
  NO ESCALATION 
  NO CREDIBILITYGAP  
  NO PROPAGANDA 
  NO BULLSHIT 
  NO LYING 
  NO IGNORANCE 
  NO GRAFT 
  NO DRAFT 
  NO FEAR 
  NO SLAVERY 
  NO POVERTY 
  NO HUNGER 
  NO HATE 
  NO INJUSTICE 
  NO EVIL 
  NO INHUMANITY 
  NO CALLOUSNESS 
  NO CONSCIOUSLESSNESS 
  NO CONSCIENCELESSNESS839  
 
The “stamped” and addressed side included a shorter ten-line list of negatives: 
  NO ART OF WAR 
  NO ART IN WAR 
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  NO ART TO WAR 
  NO ART ON WAR 
  NO ART BY WAR 
  NO ART FROM WAR 
  NO ART ABOUT WAR 
  NO ART FOR WAR 
  NO ART WITH WAR 
  NO ART AS WAR 
 
Ironically, given that this is presented as an example of Reinhardt’s “political art,” the 
general gist of the poster appears instead to lend support to the argument that Reinhardt 
was against political art, art-and-politics. The simple and insistently repeated syntaxical 
pattern of all ten statements (on the postcard’s “stamped”) seems to bear this out. Two 
terms—art and war—are presented and their relationship is given through the negative 
“no.” The only variable in this pattern is in the choice of preposition (of, in, to, on, by, 
from, about, for, with, as). Reinhardt employs the classical orator’s device of symploce 
here for emphatic vehemence, to make oneself absolutely clear, and to make a statement 
impregnable to the kind of tooling around associated with a bureaucratic legalism, in 
which the loophole may very well rest on the choice of preposition.840 Reinhardt has 
separated out these two terms, art and war, and has insistently hammered home his point: 
there are no “and’s, if’s, why’s or but’s” about it—there exists no prepositional link that 
could possibly bridge the two. But, of course, the lithograph is doing exactly and 
emphatically that, bringing art and war together by making an artwork against war. That 
“against,” however, is precisely the prepositional loophole through which Reinhardt, as 
an artist dismissive of “political art,” makes a space for himself. After all, what is 
cleverly missing from Reinhardt’s list is “NO ART AGAINST WAR.” 
 Nevertheless, while Reinhardt may have carefully and cleverly fashioned this 
loophole for himself—one may make art against war—he hardly needed it in this 
instance. No War did not require this defense because it was already so marginal to 
Reinhardt’s conception of serious, fine art. This is not to say that there is not quite a lot of 
“Reinhardt” here. For, of course, by the time of this work and indeed much earlier in fact, 
the “classic negative” list in the artist’s “carefully handprinted Gothic script” was a well-
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recognized Reinhardt signature move. And, indeed, No War reads, more or less, like an 
art-as-art statement and those in turn relate to Reinhardt’s pre-1956 art comics and 
broadsides. It was in these—manifestos, written statements, and the media of the applied 
arts—that Reinhardt expressed “extraneous” content, where he offered commentary on 
the events, controversies and issues of the day. Reinhardt maintained, as Michael Corris 
has well studied, a rigorous separation between a fine art and an applied art. “There was,” 
as the artist had written, “an achievement in separating fine art from other art.”841 Rose, 
as well, made careful note of this separation between Reinhardt’s “pure art” and his other 
activities and she read this division as a way of purging his art—his painting—of 
anything extraneous.842 Even more to the point, Lippard spoke specifically to Reinhardt’s 
choice in submission to the Protest portfolio when she described his position as “a model 
for socially conscious abstract artists who chose not to change their art but at times 
assigned a slightly different function or title to it. . . . Occasionally they made an object 
like Reinhardt’s postcard that was seen strictly as ‘propaganda’ and bore no relation to 
their normal, stylistically recognizable work.”843 In other words, this was a production 
marginal to Reinhardt’s oeuvre, a production outside Ultimate painting. What I would 
add is that Reinhardt achieves this distance in part through the fact of No War’s 
representational quality. The lithographic poster is presented as a likeness of a postcard. 
The representationalism runs through the dashed-border edge of the poster miming the 
design of an airmail postcard, as it does through to the careful figuration of an eagle-
bearing six-cent U.S. postage stamp.844 Clearly, what Reinhardt had produced was a 
picture, not painting.  
Newman’s work dates to a year later, 1968. Like Reinhardt’s lithograph, Lace 
Curtain for Mayor Daley (fig. 35) comes out of an engagement with highly specific 
political situations. Responding to the Chicago police force’s brutal treatment of anti-war 
protesters at the 1968 Chicago Democratic Convention, the Richard Feigen Gallery 
organized a protest exhibition which included artworks whose content specifically 
engaged the incident.845 Lace Curtain for Mayor Daley was Newman’s submission. Made 
of lines of barbed wire organized into a grid within a heavy steel frame, the Lace Curtain 
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is for, or “addressed to,” Chicago’s Mayor Richard J. Daley. This addressee functions in 
much the same way as the “War Chief” did in Reinhardt’s poster-postcard but with a 
pointed difference: Newman, uncharacteristically, has decided to name names. Nor is this 
the only uncharacteristic element of the work. The “lace curtain” reference has been 
taken as an ethnic and classist slur upon urban Irish immigrants to the United States and 
thus as something of a low blow aimed at Mayor Daley. The work also evokes a social 
realist tone, a quality which again stands out because social realism was something 
Newman so deplored. The barbed wire—the “Devil’s Rope” and a “ubiquitous 
instrument of oppression”—seems too crude a cliché for brutality, violence and 
injustice.846 Even so, the flat-footedness of the barbed wire pales comparatively to the 
spray of dark red paint—the “blood”—flecking parts of the barbed wire and 
accumulating in larger, more visible drops along the base of the steel frame (fig. 36). 
A number of critics, artists and art historians have commented upon the 
bizarreness by which Lace Curtain stands in relation to the rest of Newman’s work. 
Rosenberg acknowledged this piece as having a “frankly political purpose” and described 
it as possessing an exceedingly “literary flavor.” He also spoke of Newman’s sculptural 
production in general, though it may seem “paradoxical,” as more “pictorial” than the 
paintings, with Lace Curtain serving as a prime example.847 Rosenberg got it right, I 
think, in pegging all these uncharacteristic elements evidenced in Lace Curtain 
“pictorial,” and in this in such marked contrast to Newman’s arguments in painting. Like 
the trompe l’oeil representationalism of the eagle-stamp in Reinhardt’s No War 
“postcard” the literary and literal flavor of Lace Curtain aligns Newman’s sculpture with 
the realm of pictures. And, one might add, lace curtains are made, after all, for windows   
. . . picture windows. 
As I suggested above, looking to these two works is a relatively uncomplicated 
way by which to account for the political content of Newman’s and Reinhardt’s projects. 
Both No War and Lace Curtain become convenient containers for any alleged Left 
political meanings suggested by the artists’s second set of statements (art = politics) 
without putting into serious question the first set (art ≠ politics). It is a facile, and to my 
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mind, an extremely unsatisfactory reconciliation. The works chosen as bearers of this 
political content are marginal enough, outside the artists’ normative production as to not 
truly matter much. Placing the burden of Newman’s “if my work were properly 
understood, it would be the end of state capitalism and totalitarianism” and of Reinhardt’s 
“Art-as-art is a creation that revolutionizes creation” upon the these selections, to imagine 
that the radical political content suggested by these two statements is adequately covered 
or accounted for by No War and Lace Curtain is to mistakenly and myopically settle for a 
political picture—a mere illustration of a theme, when the real engagement should be on 
the scale of political painting. To argue, as I will, that the political claim, to be of any 
serious relevance, must be dealt with on the level of painting will entail looking at 
Newman’s and Reinhardt’s politics and political differences as woven into the very fabric 
of their problematics and their contrasting arguments for the achievement of “One” in 
painting. The political on this level, on the level of painting, means a politics embedded 
in praxis and thus engaged with the dialectic of form-giving and identity-making itself—
situated at and operating on what that join between theory and practice might be 
imagined or felt as, with how a critical and libratory moment between identity and non-
identity might be achieved. 
Despite what I have argued to be the insufficient account for the radical claims the 
artists made for their projects, No War and Lace Curtain are helpful in beginning to 
sketch the artists’ political portraits and to fill in the details of their specific political 
commitments. For No War and Lace Curtain situate both artists in the political scene of 
the late 1960s and attest to their active engagement within it. Both Newman and 
Reinhardt were, as others have previously researched and documented, generally 
supportive of those causes associated with the New Left: anti-racism and the civil rights 
movement (Reinhardt was a supporter of the Congress of Racial Equality, donating his 
work in 1963 to a benefit sale at the Martha Jackson Gallery and he was also associated 
with the Civil Rights Congress); anti-nationalism, pro-internationalism, pro-disarmament, 
anti-war (Reinhardt was an active supporter of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee and served as vice-chair for its Artists Committee, he is a signer of the 1965 
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New York Times “Declaration to Ambassador Adlai Stevenson” and of “End Your 
Silence,” appearing in the same publication several months later. Newman helped write 
an anti-Vietnam protest letter). When Dissent: A Quarterly of Socialist Opinion, an 
important Left publication, was ailing financially, both came to its support. Newman 
would donate work to “The Dissent Art Show” in 1961 and both Newman and Reinhardt 
donated works to “The Second Dissent Art Show” in 1963.848 However, rather like their 
situation artistically—being both inside and outside two generational identities—
politically, as well, they find themselves once again spanning the gap. Their mutual 
appearance in the political arena of the New Left was not merely a late efflorescence of 
social conscience and activism but issues from far deeper histories of leftism, those 
grounded in their radicalized youths with the Old Left of the 1930s.  
On the biographical level to begin, both Newman and Reinhardt bear the suspect 
marks of New York’s Old Left: both were born into poor, recently emigrated families 
(Newman’s mother and father arrived in New York in 1900 from Lomza, Poland, and 
Reinhardt’s father emigrated to Buffalo, N.Y., from East Prussia in 1907 and his mother 
from Germany two years later) and spent their earliest years in working-class 
communities.849 Newman spent his first decade as a resident of Cherry Street on the 
Lower East Side, which was then one of the poorest streets in Manhattan, while his 
father, Abraham Newman, supported the family by selling “sewing-machine heads to 
garment workers.”850 Lippard observed that Reinhardt had grown up poor and socially 
conscious in a family strongly identified with Left politics. A draft version of Reinhardt’s 
chronology offers a description of his father as a “member and organizer in [the] 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union and [a] life-long socialist.”851 As young adults 
Newman and Reinhardt were further politicized during their college years in which both 
continued to examine ideas of radical social reconstruction.852 Later, after college, both 
would play active roles in labor organization. In the mid-30s, during a period in which he 
himself was struggling with the New York public school system as a substitute teacher, 
Newman published The Answer—America’s Civil Service Magazine in an effort to rally 
the “sleeping” civil servants out of their exploitation.853 Likewise, during this period, 
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Reinhardt worked as a labor organizer, joins the Artists’ Union (Local 60 of the CIO) 
helping the “trade union movement’s organization of graphic designers and newspaper 
staff artists.”854  
Taking these snapshots of late and early moments in the political narratives for 
Newman and Reinhardt do a lot towards suggesting a high degree of political 
commonality. Before becoming too comfortable with the idea of their kinship in political 
commitments, I want to offer the wedge by which this apparent likeness sharply divides 
into political opposition. That wedge is the episode now referred to as the Siqueiros 
Affair.  
Briefly, in 1960, the radical Mexican artist, David Alfaro Siqueiros, took part in a 
violent, insurrectionary demonstration in Mexico City. The Mexican government 
sentenced the aged, and to many, venerable, Siqueiros to eight years imprisonment. 
Concerned artists in the United States gathered to the famous Mexican muralist’s cause, 
demanding his release from what they perceived as an unfair and harsh retaliatory 
sentence. Reinhardt numbered among those of the Artists Committee to Free Siqueiros of 
the U.S. Friends of Mexico, a stylistically diverse group of artist-activists including 
Rudolf Baranik, Philip Evergood, Adolph Gottlieb, Jacob Lawrence, Jack Levine, Mark 
Rothko, Ben Shahn, David Smith, Isaac and Moses Soyer, and May Stevens.855 The 
actions of this group included the signing and publishing of statements defending 
Siqueiros and a benefit exhibition in January 1962 at the A.C.A. Gallery.856   
These open, public acts of support given by the U.S. Friends of Mexico to 
Siqueiros quickly generated hostile denunciations. Siqueiros, the opposition claimed, 
should neither be defended nor supported; he is a subject of the law like others, and as 
such, his actions were deemed criminal. Newman was among those, like Robert 
Motherwell, Norman Lewis, Elaine de Kooning, Willem de Kooning, Meyer Schapiro 
and Harold Rosenberg, who took this counter-stance to the Artists Committee to Free 
Siqueiros.857 Reading the hostile letters back and forth (mostly printed in the pages of 
Dissent) one might be mislead to conclude that the issue at stake was either: (a) whether 
or not a famous artist should be granted special treatment or (b) whether or not art and 
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politics should openly commingle. I would suggest, however, that the really divisive 
issue rested on what brand of leftist politics. Meyer Schapiro’s reaction to the Siqueiros 
issue, printed in Dissent, reveals quite a lot. Schapiro will not let be forgotten Siqueiros’ 
“sinister political role.” “In 1940, he organized and led an attack on the house of the 
Russian Revolutionist, Leon Trotsky. . . . He was also accused of a part in the 
assassination of Trotsky. Siqueiros never denied this role in the attack on Trotsky’s house 
and boasted of this action as ‘one of the greatest honors of my life.’. . . He has never been 
tried for his crimes.”858 One of the important reminders that comes out of Schapiro’s 
comment, if obliquely, is that the question of Siqueiros’s identity—is he a revolutionary 
hero in danger of becoming a martyr or is he a criminal and traitor to the revolution?—is 
tied inextricably to the question of how one sorts out Trotsky’s identity as well, and 
again, as either revolutionary hero-martyr or traitor to the revolution. Siqueiros as the 
revolutionary hero is the fiery leader in the Mexican Communist Party, an active believer 
in the revolution whose commitment is demonstrated in his attempts to overthrow the 
Mexican government. His commitment is further revealed in his staunch protecting of 
revolutionary purity; he will purge the Left of contaminant bourgeois remnants and 
traitors to the revolution, namely, in this case, the founder of the heretical so-called 
Fourth International, Trotsky. Siqueiros as the traitor-criminal is a hard-core doctrinaire 
Stalinist, a brain-washed agent for the Comintern, the would-be murderer of Trotsky who 
was a precious beacon of hope, and who in founding the Fourth International heroically 
rescued humanist socialism from the Stalinist Third. The question posed by the Siqueiros 
Affair is this: Who is the hero? Who is the traitor? Wherein lies the true revolution? With 
Newman and Reinhardt standing on opposite sides of the Siqueiros Affair, one infers that 
they came up with different answers. The forking provided by the Siqueiros incident sets 
up the template by which to examine the split in Newman’s and Reinhardt’s political 
identities.  
  By the blunt logic of the Siqueiros Affair, Reinhardt’s political alignment is with 
the Communist Party, the U.S.S.R., and through an associative chain, with Stalin. This 
was precisely the conclusion that Lippard—and I think for understandable reasons—did 
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not wish to reach in her monograph of the artist. The subject of Reinhardt’s politics has 
not been an easy one for period scholarship. Needless to say, the sort of political portrait 
that would allow for the artist’s political affiliation with anything like Communist 
orthodoxy, is the least popular of all. One senses in Lippard’s characterization of 
Reinhardt’s politics and in the positioning of those politics in relation to his aesthetics a 
bit of hedging. “[W]hen his [Reinhardt’s] own aesthetic crystallized, Reinhardt saw his 
work as materialist and historical, and related his interest in the synthesis of opposites to 
the Marxist concept that contradictions are inherent in every phenomenon. Marxists 
considered the material primary and the idea of it secondary, or derivative; Reinhardt 
evolved his paintings-as-paintings with the idea, or anything else, distinctly 
secondary.”859 But Lippard is equally able to describe Reinhardt’s desire for a “pure art” 
as part of being drawn to a “talisman of an ideal society. This last aspect is most clearly 
felt in Reinhardt’s own writings from the thirties and early forties, and relates, in turn, to 
what Harold Rosenberg (who sees action painting as an unexpected result of the previous 
decade’s desire to say something—a way of being inversely political, by getting out of 
politics) remembers as ‘endless discussions about how to get a Marxist aesthetic.’”860  
Finally, again, within the same text, Lippard seems to resolve her opinion: “His own 
Marxism leaned heavily on purely aesthetic utopianism.”861 While Lippard finishes her 
political portrait of Reinhardt with the image of the cultural turn of the type that Nancy 
Jachec describes, other scholars have been far less willing to cede Reinhardt’s politics to 
a cultural turn thesis. Corris’s work on Reinhardt, for one, has pushed for the image of a 
far more seriously politically engaged artist. “Reinhardt’s involvement with the American 
Communist Party (CP-USA) during the thirties and forties was far more extensive and 
has far more relevance to his development as an artist than previously thought.” 
Disagreeing with Lippard, he argues that Reinhardt’s “relationship to Marxism and the 
Party was not merely ‘intellectual’ and ‘aesthetic’ but rather political, as demonstrated 
by, among other activities, his production of more than 350 editorial illustrations, 
advertising designs, full-page cartoons and magazine covers for New Masses and Soviet 
Russia Today.”862 Others also have started more readily accepting this view of 
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Reinhardt’s far more developed and exacting political presence. Terry Atkinson, for 
example, referred to Reinhardt as a “political obsessive” whose “constant stream of work 
. . . made for various left-wing magazines is vehement testimony to [his] deep 
involvement with political issues.”863 David Anfam, as well, positions Reinhardt as the 
closest of all the Abstract Expressionist/New York School milieu to being a “doctrinaire 
radical” who never abandoned his socialist principles.864   
But what has been the most important development in filling out the picture of 
Reinhardt as a political radical is Craven’s work in the field. Looking at the artist’s union 
activity in the early part of his career, his editorial and illustrational work for radical 
publications, and his association with organizations and institutions that would later be 
targeted as subversive by the United States Attorney General and his later activism in the 
1960s, Craven describes a radical whose commitment remained remarkably consistent 
even though sustained at such a high pitch. What has seemed the cinch to Reinhardt’s 
identity as a life-long socialist, who in Craven’s opinion was a “probable member of the 
Communist Party USA during the 1930s and 1940s, eventually to come to a position very 
close to Leon Trotsky’s pro-Soviet Union but anti-Stalin stance,” has been Craven’s 
uncovering of the F.B.I. file monitoring Reinhardt as a communist security risk.865  
Craven obtained this new material through the 1966 Freedom of Information Act which 
opened to the public the files the F.B.I. kept of the agency’s secret surveillance of 
“security risks.” What is clear from both the very existence of Reinhardt’s F.B.I. file and 
from the file’s specific content is that the artist’s politics were taken very seriously by the 
U.S. government. A long file, kept from 1941 to 1966 (just a year before the artist’s 
death), running to a sizeable 123 pages, and still not totally declassified—twenty-three 
pages, as Craven indicates, have not yet been released and further, “a sizeable portion of 
those [pages] that were released being blotted out for reasons of ‘national security’”—
Reinhardt’s FBI classification is “Security Matter-C.” This means, as Craven explains, 
“According to the F.B.I., along with other government agencies, the subject constitutes a 
national security threat and is a subversive because of his or her sympathies for 
communism and/or socialism make him or her a ‘potential’ collaborator with foreign 
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agents.” The gravity of this charge is further underscored by reports in the file: 
Reinhardt’s travels abroad were carefully monitored by the government; at least one 
attempt was made to revoke his U.S. passport; at one point the State Department was 
considering trying him for perjury (for denying that he was a Communist); and there were 
even thoughts of putting him into “custodial detention.”866 According to the F.B.I., at 
least, Reinhardt was indeed a Communist “doctrinaire radical.” 
It was of course Newman who loathed the doctrinaire radical, who in evoking the 
“true revolution,” wrote unequivocally that “sacred” and “programmatic” doctrine were 
its antithesis. What then was the “true revolution?” Newman’s answer comes in the title 
to the foreword he wrote for the 1968 Horizon Press reissue of Peter Kropotkin’s 
Memoirs of a Revolutionist: “The True Revolution Is Anarchist!”867 Against the 
“shouting dogmatists,” the “Marxist, Leninist, Stalinist, and Trotskyite alike,” Newman’s 
own radical politics were openly anarchist.868  His sympathy with anarchism, and 
particularly with Kropotkin’s social ideals, has been well-rehearsed in the Newman 
literature. Like Reinhardt, Newman became involved in radical social doctrine during his 
college years. However, but unlike many of that 1930s generation Newman would 
embrace not the Comintern’s collectivist rhetoric of individual self-sacrifice in the name 
of a mass-movement but the far less popular vision of anarchist social restructuring.869   
The basic principles of anarchism are clearly in evidence in Newman’s personal 
ethos and in the ways in which that ethos bears upon his aesthetic positions. No 
institutions (“I said that I felt destroyed by established institutions.”), nothing that 
infringes upon personal freedom, no one controlling anybody else. Pointedly, it was 
Communism, as Newman saw it, that broke all three anarchist principles. “Anarchism,” 
he wrote “is the only criticism of society which is not a technique for the seizure and 
transfer of power by one group against another, which is what all such doctrines amount 
to—the substitution of one authority for another. What is particular about anarchism is 
not its criticism of society but the creative way of life it offers that makes all 
programmatic doctrine impossible.”870 This sat in almost perfect contrast to the social ills 
he located in Russia. “In Russia, a group of ‘idealists,’ idealistic enough to use every 
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fascist tool and weapon, invoking the name of the ‘working-class revolution’ and the 
‘classless society,’ have found the holy excuse to seize every human activity and 
liquidate its membership for the benefit of its own party members. The Communist party 
has destroyed Russia’s internal capitalistic creditors to become, for the good of the 
worker, of course, the country’s sole creditor. They hold the mortgage and they make 
everybody pay.”871 The Bolshevik revolution, in other words, rather than truly realizing 
something new, was merely one in a series of static historical repetitions: the pattern of 
seizing and transferring power, the substitution of one thing for another all composed 
within the overriding system of state. As with Reinhardt, scholars have come up with a 
number of appellations for trying to summarize Newman’s political profile. Jonathan 
Harris describes the artist as committed to socialist politics and to the idea of a non-
capitalist U.S. in the 1930s.872 Anfam remarks that Newman’s anarchism was a life-long 
commitment: his politics, unlike those of many of his peers, did not change dramatically 
from the 1930s through the 1960s.873 Certainly the fact that Newman could endorse the 
same text—Kropotkin’s Memoirs—in the 1930s and still in the 1960s serves as good 
proof of this. And Craven has called the synthesis of both Newman’s rejection of 
capitalism and his staunch defense of individualism, anarchist communalism. As a form 
of romantic anti-capitalism, anarchist communalism (as Craven summarizes it) upholds 
the ideals of participatory democracy in communes that both operate through mutual aid 
but are also spontaneously self-organized. All of this is premised on an ethos of the 
individual’s unalienable right: to be an untrammeled person. As a model for this type of 
social organization, Newman, as did his anarchist mentor, Kropotkin, looked to the mir of 
the Russian peasants, as that closest to the ideal of a community developing “spontaneous 
order” where its members freely associate to form a co-operative whole.874  
 Having now sketched Newman’s and Reinhardt’s political profiles, one sees how 
heavily overdetermined is their difference. This is a rehearsal of the bitter tale of socialist 
schism and a reenactment of the feud between the Communist and the Anarchist. The 
point of origin of this split some trace back to September 1872, a year after the blood bath 
of the Paris Commune, at The Hague congress of the First International when Marx so 
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dramatically expelled Bakunin and his Anarchist Federation from the ranks of the 
International.875 Others push the beginning even further back, to 1848 and Paris and the 
young socialist movement’s coming to terms with the failure of the “bloody June days” 
and the difference in conclusions the defeated revolutionaries marking the “starting point 
of the two-fold development of European socialism, anarchism and Marxist.” The 
historical fact of the intense antagonism between these two groups, the bitterness of their 
mutual denunciations, has often tended to obscure their common denominator as socialist 
doctrine.  
 The suggestion of a moment of Communist and Anarchist coherence was present 
in the name Kropotkin gave his program—”anarchist communism [emphasis added].” 
Though many subsequent anarchists have been careful to make the verbal rearrangements 
so that the adjective becomes the noun, and “communism” is dropped altogether, 
Kropotkin’s use of the word does much to remind one of common ground between 
Marx’s communism and Kropotkin’s anarchism. Both, as forms of revolutionary 
socialism (equally scornful of the revisionism embodied in the Second International), 
share these mandates: the criticism of existing society, the repudiation of capitalism and 
the system of commodity-exchange, the negation of class society and the dissolution of 
private property, the principle of mutual cooperation and the ideal of creating the 
conditions for the free development of human possibility, for, ultimately the 
“emancipation of man.”876  
 The divisive wedge is a methodological one and can be summed up in a word, the 
“state.” The anti-statism of anarchism is one of its prime attributes. Anarchist 
communism, as Kropotkin described, was the “no-government system of socialism.” No 
central organizing mechanism would exist, no state authority would rule over the 
individual.877 “You cannot modify the existing conditions of property,” Kropotkin 
reasoned, “without deeply modifying at the same time the political organization. . . . To 
each new economic phase of life corresponds a new political phase.” He continues, “in a 
society where the distinction between capitalist and laborer has disappeared there is no 
need of such a government; it would be an anachronism, a nuisance. Free workers would 
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require a free organization, and this cannot have any other basis than free agreement and 
free cooperation, without sacrificing the autonomy of the individual to the all-pervading 
interference of the State. The no-capitalist system implies the no-government system.”878  
This was a point that Kropotkin was quite obviously at pains to repeat: “We are 
communists. But our communism is not that of the authoritarian school: it is anarchist 
communism, communism without government, free communism. It is a synthesis of the 
two chief aims pursued by humanity since the dawn of its history—economic freedom 
and political freedom.”879 The state and statist mentality were precisely what fatally 
turned communist doctrine towards the “authoritarian school,” features which it damning 
shared with capitalism. What distinguished Kropotkin’s anarchist communism was the 
total absence of statism and this made it the “free” communism, true communism.  
 On the other side of the divide is Marx and Lenin and the Marxism-Leninism of 
what would become the Third International. These are the so-called “state” socialists or 
communists. Lenin’s State and Revolution, a concise volume composed in 1917 in the 
thick of the momentous Bolshevik drive to realize the world’s first workers’ state, serves 
as an illuminating rebuttal to anarchism’s criticism. 
To begin, Lenin accuses the anarchist critics of falsely polarizing the positions 
over the issue of the “state” and of thoroughly distorting the Marxian view of it. 
“Marxism has always taught,” Lenin reminds the reader, that “together with the abolition 
of classes, the state will also be abolished.”880 In other words, it is a gross mistake for 
anarchists to characterize Marxism as a doctrine of state communism. A Marxist-inspired 
version of communism, just as much as anarchism, means and envisions a stateless 
society. To further make his case, Lenin refers to a letter of Engels’s from 1875, whose 
contents in Lenin’s opinion and had the letter been brought to light earlier, would have 
squelched the anarchist confusion-making on the question of state. In this letter Engels 
writes: “it was stated definitely that, with the introduction of the Socialist order of 
society, the state will dissolve of itself and disappear. . . . The state is only a transitional 
phenomenon which must be made use of in struggle, in the revolution. . . . As soon as it 
becomes possible to speak of freedom, then the state, as such, ceases to exist. We would, 
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therefore, suggest that everywhere the word ‘state’ be replaced by ‘community’ 
[Gemeinwesen], a fine old German word, which corresponds to the French word 
‘commune.’”881 Of course, replacing “state” with “community/commune” does a good 
deal, at least on the symbolic level, to collapse the difference and reassert the 
commonality of these two rival factions.  
Next Lenin turns to what he believes is the real locus of contention between these 
socialist programs—the phrase “transitional phenomenon.” For while the Marxist 
believes that communism does ultimately define a stateless society, the state is still—as 
Engels suggested in the letter above—a “transitional phenomenon which must be made 
use of in struggle, in the revolution.” The state is a social form and organization to be 
addressed and exploited. As Lenin summarizes: “Marx purposely emphasizes the 
‘revolutionary and transitional form’ of the state necessary for the proletariat. The 
proletariat needs the state only for a while. We do not at all disagree with the Anarchists 
on the question of the abolition of the state as an aim. We maintain that, to achieve this 
aim, temporary use must be made of the instruments, means, and methods of the state 
power against the exploiters. . . .”882 The state becomes a tool, and a necessary one, of the 
revolution.  
According to the Marxist narrative, as communism is successfully realized there 
will occur a “withering away of the state.” The argument that Marx, Engels and Lenin 
had with the Anarchists was not one directed against them “for being in favour of the 
abolition of the State, but for preaching that the state can be abolished ‘within twenty-
four hours.’”883 As Lenin writes elsewhere, “We are not Utopians, we do not indulge in 
‘dreams’ of how best to do away immediately with all administration, with all 
subordination,” which are but “Anarchist dreams.”884 The bourgeois state—all its 
mechanisms, organizations, hierarchies, orders, rationalizations and social efficiencies—
were to be taken as necessary elements in a dialectical sublation. Working with the reality 
of the situation, the known, the already situated and situating forms of the social, 
political, economic, speak to a level of pragmatic reckoning that has notably has been the 
weakest register in Anarchist doctrine. Critics of Anarchism have pointed out that what 
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Kropotkin’s anarchist communism sorely and crucially misses is a mediating term, or, a 
way of describing and communicating the passage between the present and the future, 
between the bourgeois capitalist state and the ultimate co-operative body. 
To summarize, Lenin’s argument in this volume, as elsewhere, was that although 
Communism meant a stateless society (as did Anarchism), its negation had to be wrought 
from the very forms of State. As dialectical reversal, one worked through the state-form 
in order to reach to something beyond it; one worked through the forms of the old in 
order to realize the new. The revolution progressed “from the state . . . into something 
which is no longer really the state in the accepted sense of the word.”885 This is the 
argument for the “transformation of quantity into quality,” from identity to non-identity, 
from bourgeois rationalism to the end of pre-history, and the beginning of that which the 
world has never known. The realization of true identity, of the truth of free human 
potential and the non-identical as that which has never existed before in human history—
classless society, a completely new human nature—is only spoken through the old forms 
of identity (the state). Complementing this line of reasoning, the mir which Lenin so 
hated and Kropotkin held as exemplary (and Newman deeply admired), was a naïve myth 
whose delusional supporters believed one could achieve socialism by attempting a return 
to the “primitive” moment of the peasant commune, a return that meant as well a denial 
of the reality, the concrete form and content, of the present moment. The delusion was in 
thinking one could go back to a condition prior to the systems of rationalized identity—
without first “pass[ing] through the fires of Capitalism.”886   
What Anarchists and mir proponents appeared to endorse was the belief of a 
spontaneously realizable goodness and rightness, a belief, as it were, in authentic, 
originary expression. Furthermore, this spontaneous expression was the only answer; the 
state was dismissed out of hand. “State organization,” as Kropotkin argued passionately, 
“having been the force to which the minorities resorted for establishing and organizing 
their power over the masses, cannot be the force which will serve to destroy these 
privileges . . . the economic and political liberation of man will have to create new forms 
for its expression in life, instead of those established by the State.” The logic parallels the 
285 
idea that the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house, but only build more 
of the same. For the Anarchists the bottom line of an authentic revolutionary situation 
was this: “everything would have to be remade at once.”887  
It is hard not to hear in Kropotkin’s call for the immediate re-birth into authentic 
identity and into a new revolutionary society Newman’s call for a new art. When in 1948 
Newman saw a potentially revolutionary situation for art in America, the outstanding 
quality of the new painters was their refusal of “obsolete props and crutches,” and that 
they “creat[ed] images whose reality” was the “self-evident one of revelation, real and 
concrete, that can be understood by anyone who will look at it without the nostalgic 
glasses of history.”888 Rosenberg referred to this as Newman’s “ideology of creation-out-
of-nothingness.” The artist conceived of painting as “an act that generates new 
substance” and the profound importance of this creator/creation image can be gauged by 
how often it is repeated.889 Listen to Newman’s famous and stirring statement made in 
1967 as part of a symposium on Pollock: “In 1940, some of us woke up to find ourselves 
without hope—to find that painting did not really exist . . . painting . . . was dead. . . . The 
awakening had the exaltation of a revolution. It was that awakening that inspired the 
aspiration—the high purpose—quite a different thing from ambition—to start from 
scratch, to paint as if painting never existed before. It was that naked revolutionary 
moment that made painters out of painters.” Three years later, he stated with more 
concision: “We couldn’t build on anything.”890 Indeed this refrain—the naked 
revolutionary moment, starting from scratch—is something that is heard in the artist’s 
much recounted narrative of his coming to his mature artistic identity and finding his 
ultimate image. Newman’s famous “breakthrough” of 1948 with Onement I, was a 
dramatic rebirth—all at once, immediate, a totally new paradigm. What had happened on 
this modest burnt orange canvas was, as Newman would recall in a late interview, his 
“first painting.” It was “where I felt that I had moved into an area for myself that was 
completely me,” and the doubling of the event with his birthday added dramatic 
reinforcement: it had been “painted on my birthday in 1948.”891 Or, listening closely, one 
might even hear a faint echo of Rosenberg and specifically this passage from the 
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“American Action Painters.” “[M]ost of the artists of this vanguard found their way to 
their present work by being cut in two. Their type is not a young painter but a reborn one. 
The man may be over forty, the painter around seven. The diagonal of a grand crisis 
separates him from his personal and artistic past.”892   
While Rosenberg’s description sounds virtually tailor-made for Newman, it fails 
completely in describing the coming-to-be of Reinhardt’s artistic identity. No diagonal of 
grand crisis separated an old identity from a new in Reinhardt’s case. “No painting . . . 
can be established as the turning point” Lippard reflected as she outlined Reinhardt’s 
stylistic development. There could be no “breakthrough” for Reinhardt, Lippard further 
suggested, because the notion of the artistic breakthrough was “in itself a romantic 
concept with no place in an art as classical as Reinhardt’s.”893 “His one-color decision 
was not a gesture, but a plastic development, a refinement rather than an abrupt reversal 
of previous work.” “There was no sudden element” in his decision to more towards black, 
rather, “Each exhibition moved closer to monotone.”894 Part of what this meant was the 
stylistic co-presence of the old and the new. Lippard acknowledges, “The years from 
1949 to 1952 are confusing chronologically, for Reinhardt was working simultaneously 
in several transitional manners.”895 This fits with Reinhardt’s conception of change and 
transition on a larger historical scale. For had not Reinhardt asserted that we “[s]can our 
past for our present,” that the new was “formed on the dead ground,” and that “Historical 
awareness” was “part of artistic creation itself.” He had described the work of art as 
“loaded,” carrying “traditions, conventions, [the] history of forms.”896 All of this implies 
a view fundamentally at odds with Newman’s. Indeed, this point is further borne out in a 
comparison of Newman’s dramatic account of his founding moment (with Onement I) 
with Reinhardt’s description of his evolution to the classic black paintings. In the artist’s 
self-authored “Five Stages of Reinhardt’s Timeless Stylistic Art-Historical Cycle” he 
enumerates: 
a. Late-classical mannerist post-cubist geometric abstractions of the late 
thirties 
b. Rococo-semi-surrealist fragmentation and “all-over” baroque-
geometric-expressionist patterns of the art 
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c. Archaic color-brick-brushwork impressionism and Black and white 
constructivist-calligraphic of the late forties 
d. Early-classical hieratical red, blue, black monochrome square-cross-
beam form symmetries of the fifties 
e. Classical black-square uniform five-foot timeless trisected evanescences 
of the sixties897  
 
Opposed to Newman’s singular breakthrough Reinhardt’s narrative reads more like a 
sequence of five-year plans. How fitting, in this light, is Rosenberg’s wry tag for 
Reinhardt: the art-world Lenin.898   
To summarize, in suggesting these alignments, on the one hand, between 
Kropotkin’s and Newman’s anarchist vision of the miraculous and immediate rebirth to 
new identity (“everything remade at once”) and, on the other, between Marxism-
Leninism’s and Reinhardt’s Communist vision of the progressive stages by which the 
ideal state is achieved through the negation of the old (“withering away”) the 
methodological dilemma of revolutionary agency is posed: spontaneity versus 
organization. How did one move from the old identity to radically new identity, to the 
fully human self-realizing subject? The status of the “state” in Kropotkin’s and the 
Marxist-Leninist argument over spontaneity versus organization functions much like the 
status of “geometry” in Newman’s and Reinhardt’s argument over spontaneity versus 
organization. Attendant in both the “state” and “geometry” are the notions of identity 
structured as generic and rationalized measure operating within systems of social 
language and larger institutional articulation. Does one imagine that some miraculous 
leap is possible by which wholly new substance—new being—spontaneously realizes 
itself, or does one premise revolutionary possibility as imbedded precisely and only-ever 
in the old forms and patterns and languages and organizations? How is the dialectical 
resolution of form and content performed? Where does priority lie: in genesis or 





At-One-Ment, or, The End of Dialectic 
There is therefore one language which is not mythical, it is the 
language of man as a producer: wherever man speaks in order to 
transform reality and no longer to preserve it as an image, 
wherever he links his language to the making of things, 
metalanguage is referred to a language-object, and myth is 
impossible. This is why revolutionary language cannot be 
mythical. 
Roland Barthes899  
 
The basic shapes and directions of the dilemma are posed in almost allegorical fashion 
(and in a certain irony to the Barthes quote above) by Newman’s and Reinhardt’s names. 
There exists a remarkable fittingness of Newman’s name to Newman and Reinhardt’s 
name to Reinhardt by which, if not saying all, the name foretells much. For instance, 
many have noted how perfectly Newman’s name signifies for an artist attempting to 
generate new substance, totally new being. Newman was, of course, Newman, the “new” 
man.900 This image, certainly, though not directly stated, served as the unspoken refrain 
underlying Rosenberg’s monograph on Newman. (Newman had to “start from scratch,” 
“The true beginning lay in the visual, aesthetic, and cultural chaos of the modern 
situation, which for Newman was to be the plangent prelude to renewal, to acts of 
origination modeled on the Book of Genesis.”)901 And though Newman’s name is 
perhaps the pun more readily acknowledged, Reinhardt’s name was no less appropriate as 
a shorthand for his painting program. Indeed, Rosenberg had worked out and played upon 
just this appropriateness. On a small postcard written to the artist (but apparently never 
sent), Rosenberg addresses Reinhardt as “Brother Adtoniuus Purehardt.” “Adtoniuus” 
breaks down easily into “atone” and “at-one-ment” and thus suggests a probable 
reference to Reinhardt’s dogma of the “one painting” and his search for the Ultimate. But 
given that these were also important qualities that Rosenberg discussed in his firm 
support of Newman, this cannot be exactly what perplexed Rosenberg, what shades the 
appellation towards insult rather than praise. The distinction, rather, is carried in the last 
name: it qualifies the goals of the first (one, at-one, atone) by suggesting something about 
the manner or methodology through which that quality is sought; it remarks on the way in 
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which that atoning is being performed. That Rosenberg substitutes “pure” for “rein” is 
indication enough of his cognizance of how the artist’s name translates in German. 
“Rein” is “pure” and so effectively names Reinhardt the purist, who is clean and clear, 
unadulterated, undiluted. With equal appropriateness, “hardt” is hard, difficult, 
troublesome, laborious, harsh, rough, severe, austere, inflexible, adamant, pitiless, 
unfeeling.902 The at-one for Reinhardt is achieved as a purity, a clarity of identity but at a 
potentially devastating price—through a means severe, rigid, unfeeling, and as Rosenberg 
added, inhuman, dead.903 These qualities point to the name and reference underlying the 
extension of “Ad”—not to the semi-playful “Adtoniuus”—but to the totalitarian, the 
dictatorial “Adolph.”904 The dilemma was summed up in the name: On what grounds 
would the “Newman” ever be able to begin? How would the “Reinhardt” ever be able to 
break to new ground and figure anew? 
That question, in its various forms—grounding new figure, figuring new 
ground—is agonizing. And my posing it here has less to do with any real motivation to 
try to present something like a tidy answer, but rather to exploit its structuring of the 
profound political dilemma that both Newman and Reinhardt struggled with—gave form 
and content to—in painting. This question and its structure takes us back to Rosenberg 
and Action Painting. For, loosely, the question of how Newman’s and Reinhardt’s 
paintings can be said to embody serious engagement with socialist ideas can be answered 
through the Action Painting dialectic. And, so, in the manner of a good dialectical tale, 
one has followed Newman’s and Reinhardt’s “sameness” through its difference and 
opposition and now come to the spot at which that opposition might be resolved, made 
“one” again. 
To lay this out more concretely, as in Rosenberg’s Action Painter, the artist for 
both Newman and Reinhardt is a political figure—more specifically a “socialist” figure—
in positing the mode of the free, praxical, self-realizing subject. But this has been seen 
before: naming the artist already invokes its inverse as well—the worker, 
commodification, alienation, the system of capitalism—and that dialectical pairing itself 
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already sums up much of the politics involved. One can look to a number of interesting 
places in both artists’s writings where this alignment explicitly and passionately occurs.  
Take, for instance, Newman’s “cultural turn” political position in 1933. “We must 
spread culture through society,” Newman declared during the height of the Great 
Depression, “Only a society entirely composed of artists would be really worth living 
in.”905 This particularly potent statement, which captures with admirable concision the 
ideal of a society of unalienated producers, was one used by Newman and his friend (and 
running mate) Alexander Borodulin for their campaign for major of New York City. 
Their political platform is a decidedly cultural one, one being put forth by, as Newman 
and Borodulin describe themselves, intellectuals—an artist-teacher and a writer—with 
three outstanding issues: education; the arts; cultural life in general. Their address is to 
the intellectual, to “all creative workers,” and to “all men who pretend to any culture 
whatsoever,” and not to the worker, the proletariat, the masses. The reason underpinning 
their decision for this emphasis of address is conveyed in the following passage from the 
candidates’ aptly titled campaign manifesto, “On the Need for Political Action by Men of 
Culture”: 
[T]he intellectual who assumes that since he is himself a worker he 
therefore can afford to be invisible as a member of a labor party is blind to 
the metaphysical distinction between appearance and reality. Though it is 
true that the artist labors and suffers like a worker, in his nature he is 
profoundly opposed to the principle of the worker. The worker creates for 
use, but the artist definitely does not. It is only the slave psychology of 
masses in chains, given expression in the Marxian parties, that insists that 
art must be useful. The worker recognizes the true creative artist as his 
enemy, because the artist is free and insists upon freedom.906   
 
Significantly, this was a thesis that Newman would continue to work on in the 1940s and 
particularly in “The First Man Was an Artist.” He would bring to a high pitch the 
emphatic difference between the worker and the artist by lodging his argument in Biblical 
proportions, literally. “The artistic act is man’s personal birthright,” Newman declared. 
“The earliest written history of human desires proves that the meaning of the world 
cannot be found in the social act. An examination of the first chapter of Genesis offers a 
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better key to the human dream. It was inconceivable to the archaic writer that original 
man, that Adam, was put on earth to be a toiler, to be a social animal. The writer’s 
creative impulses told him that man’s origin was that of an artist, and he set him up in a 
Garden of Eden close to the Tree of Knowledge, of right and wrong, in the highest sense 
of divine revelation.” This is exceptionally strong language and powerful imagery. The 
essence, the origin, the truth and meaning of human activity is the artistic, creative act. 
Man’s ultimate self-identity is that of a creator, an artist, a maker of worlds. Free creation 
is the human birthright. Toil, activity dictated by sheer necessity, is the meaning of 
alienation and the metaphysical exile. “In our inability to live the life of a creator can be 
found the meaning of the fall of man.”907 The “raison d’être” of the present artist was to 
defy the alienating productive logic of the worker and to return to the “Adam of the 
Garden of Eden.”908 The paradise, utopia, the true home of man would be the conditions 
by which all objectifications of the subject became moments of the self-realizing artist.  
Additionally, in Newman’s naming the artist as the figure of a genuine humanity, 
one should keep in mind the breadth of Newman’s vision in order not to confuse his 
intention as a recommendation along the lines of revamping society with an army of 
professional artists, or as boosterism for the modern profession of the artist. The 
professional artist was not a solution but a hypostatization. As Newman explained in a 
late interview, “I’m as much against Art with a capital A as anybody else,” and, “I’m also 
very unwilling to assume the role of Artist with a capital A. I think a man’s painting is a 
matter, as I once said, of his birthright, and if a man thinks of himself as an Artist with a 
capital A, he think of himself the way a lawyer thinks of himself as a Lawyer. It seems to 
be that the problem of painting has to relate to me as a person, as a man, rather than as an 
artist.”909   
Compare to the above several of Reinhardt’s statements from the 1940s. 
Returning once again to the 1943 “Painting and Pictures” lecture one finds an equally 
concise and pointed articulation of the argument for the social revolutionary content of a 
culture turn. Here Reinhardt speaks, in positive terms, of the “democratization of art” as a 
condition entailing the “realization that the artist was not a special kind of human being, 
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but that every person was a special kind of artist.” As with Newman, the concept of the 
artist is not reduced to a specialized professional, but is taken globally, as the figure 
signifying the true achievement of humanity in the universalization of activity as self-
realizing praxis.  
The notable difference that stands out in Reinhardt’s account, however, is in his 
discussion of the interrelation between the principle of the artist and the principle of the 
worker. Specifically, the artist is bound to that which it negates, to toil. What Reinhardt 
acknowledges is a process and movement from pictures to paintings. “Once upon a time, 
a painting was a ‘picture.’” Pictures, which here Reinhardt generally associates with the 
representational function, are the product of a pre-modern period when the images artists 
made had specific tasks to perform; while the picture-painter might have been 
“considered a special kind of human being” on one level, on another, the very fact of his 
productive activity resulting in pictures complexed his objectifications as a form of 
unfree, necessary labor. And here is the specific key divergence. Pictures and a society of 
workers evolve towards paintings and a society of painters/artists in a process of 
liberation through modernization. As representational technologies develop along 
industrial and mass mechanical lines (“New inventions like the printing press and the 
camera”), better, more efficient forms of picture-making take over the traditional picture-
function of paintings—(“[M]agazines and movies began to make better pictures and 
cheaper. They gave people more entertainment and more information.”) But, obviously, 
modernization’s impact extends far beyond simply freeing painting of its representational 
function. Modernized productivity sets up the necessary material conditions for the 
democratization of art (praxical activity) through an increased effectivity of labor. Or, 
more succinctly, it creates the possibility for more artists, less workers. 
Aesthetic values were found to be around in all activities. Jobs with 
shorter hours and better pay permitted many apparently artless people to 
lead a richer aesthetic life than the picture-artist, who was still trying to 
restrict a visual experience to arbitrary and special aspects of it on canvas. 
A landscape picture became no substitute for a day in the country. More 
leisure, more education, more direct and complete participation of all 
people in aesthetic activity was what had been needed, not more 
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“pictures.” Painting which functioned as a picture prevented people from 
seeing its basic meanings and reduced painting eventually to a wall 
decoration.910   
 
In his own way Reinhardt is likewise describing a return to a figurative Garden of Eden, a 
realm without toil. “Working toward a synthesis of the arts, to an eventual absorption of 
the imaginative artist in a more collective and anonymous job of creating better places for 
people to live in, this thinking, aware of the implications and potentialities of scientific 
knowledge, projected with a democratic political philosophy the possibility, ultimately, 
of every individual being his own artist, his own architect.”911 Elsewhere in Reinhardt’s 
notes one finds lines very closely echoing Newman’s 1933 cultural platform: “the central 
problem in art, too, will be one of democracy and education, of direct and complete social 
participation of all the people in cultural and creative activities.”912   
 Once again, as with Rosenberg’s Action Painter, what made the artist this special 
figuring of socialism, what separated the worker and the picture-maker from the 
painter/artist or the special principle of the artist and the basic meaning of painting, was 
the artist’s unique access to a mode of objectification/realization, his or her praxis. The 
artist enacted the ideal dialectic between subject and object, theory and practice, mind 
and matter. The artist’s labor was an undivided one, his work represented the whole act. 
And this is a point that can be illustrated in both artists’ adamant resistance to having 
their work fabricated. Even though Newman opposed the artist to the worker and 
Reinhardt saw the artist as the negation of the worker, both artist harbored much of the 
“laborer” in their practices: the mind would not be allowed to forget the hand. They 
insisted that they could not simply phone in orders for their work; they persisted in the 
notion that the artist had to be present at the moment of making in order to be “present” 
in the work. In 1966, for instance, part of Reinhardt’s complaint against the “lousy” 
“Present Situation in Art,” was that “Artists make telephone directions for making art 
instead of making it themselves.” This mode of production makes them “like 
businessmen.” Subsequently, “Artists are selling themselves like hot cakes. . . . Artists 
are jobbing.”913 Newman’s hostility to these modes of production is evident as well, not 
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only in the strength of his rhetoric of painting as the acts of self-creation but also in his 
insistence on being physically present and as physically-engaged as possible in his 
sculptural pieces that required outside “fabrication.”914 Thus, no matter how simple 
Newman’s or Reinhardt’s work appeared, nor how amenable their signature styles 
seemed to fabrication at a plant or commercial workshop, what they could not do was call 
in orders. For here was the great ambition of their projects: precisely to mend the division 
of labor.  
This point came up in the Glaser interview with Reinhardt. Not without 
reasonable logic, Glaser asks, if the artist has already worked out the formula for the 
perfect painting, if he knows what he wants in advance, “Why don’t you have someone 
paint them for you?”  
REINHARDT: Someone else can’t do them for me. they have to do their 
own for themselves. But I’m not quite sure why. It’s a little like asking 
why I paint. I certainly don’t believe in having someone else carry out my 
painting. It’s not really that kind of idea. And also, just as I still use a 
brush and oil on canvas, I wouldn’t go into blowguns or new materials or 
anything like that. Those would be unnecessary—though I’m not 
maintaining an old handicraft-do-it-yourself idea either. I’m merely 
making the last painting which anyone can make. 
GLASER: Your painting, then, seems to be more about ideas than it is 
about materials? 
REINHARDT: Well, it has nothing to do with materials any more than it 
has to do with ideas. Whatever I do has come from doing and only relates 
to what’s done. 
GLASER: That almost sounds like the process of “action” painting. 
REINHARDT: I suppose there is always an act or action of some kind. 
But the attempt is to minimize it. There are no gymnastics or dancings 
over paintings or spilling or flinging paint around. 
GLASER: On the other hand, you have said that a painting should be 
thought out beforehand. Doesn’t thinking it out imply an idea? 
REINHARDT: You get the thought from having done something first and 
the thought is the painting anyway.915  
 
A number of interesting and unexpected things happen in this exchange. Glaser’s 
understanding of Reinhardt’s project is challenged and not at some peripheral point but 
fundamentally. It is flummoxing, for how does one coherently synthesize the Reinhardt 
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of dogma, pre-conceived systems of identity, geometry, the repeated plan where “theory” 
is set out in advance of practice, and who explicitly insisted that “Everything, where to 
begin and where to end, should be worked out in the mind beforehand,” with the 
Reinhardt who could be mistaken for an “Action Painter”?916 One might dismiss the 
artist’s surprising response to Glaser as an instance in which Reinhardt was being simply 
contrary, a quality for which he was well enough known. But, in fact, there are other 
instances that similarly undermine the security of the antagonism of the spontaneous 
realization of the Action Painter and the planned performance of art-as-art. Take for 
instance a note written sometime around 1962-63, during the period of the classic black 
square paintings. “These paintings and comments present no clear understanding, no 
precise ground plan for our labors to follow. They represent only bricks and mortar 
materials awaiting use in the shaping of our own individual understanding. Until that time 
they remain but random comments.”917 Again, in this, one finds that odd, unexpected 
opening in Reinhardt’s dogma. Exchanging Reinhardt’s architecture metaphor for a 
culinary one, one might even see in Reinhardt’s statement a kinship to Engels’ 
discoursing on the relation of revolutionary theory and practice: the proof is in the 
pudding.918 Even so, one need not only cull from these more exotic, atypical sounding 
statements to catch a whiff of this rupture. At around the same time Reinhardt 
announced—in a line composed in the typical art-as-art tone—”The one way in art comes 
from art-working.”919 Drawing out this line, I would jump to a very straight-forward 
distinction Reinhardt made between the “fine-art process”—what I would argue is 
synonymous with art-working—and its opposite, with coerced forms of making. “I don’t 
want the fine-art process, which to me is a free process, in which you didn’t have a job to 
do, confused with something else. It was not unconscious or automatic, it was free. If you 
were painting, you had a lot of painting to do; if you stopped, you didn’t have any to do. 
You didn’t have some idea yourself or somebody else had an idea and then you carried it 
through and then somebody could tell you if you did it right or not. That’s the 
commercial or industrial process.”920 Thus, art-working as a free process meant refusing 
to occupy either pole of a “job”: neither did one make a job (send out specifications for 
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work), nor do a job (fill out an order). This locates the heart of Reinhardt’s revolutionary 
claims for his project, for painting, for art-as-art.  
The way to enrich or socialize painting is to get more and more people to 
paint, to use and handle colors—not to acquire skills of illustration. 
Mondrian, like Marx, saw the disappearance of works of art when the 
environment itself became an aesthetic reality. In its dissatisfaction with 
ordinary experience, the impoverished reality of present-day experience, 
an abstract painting stands as a challenge to disorder and disintegration. Its 
activity implies a conviction of something constructive in our time. It is 
more difficult to write or talk about abstract painting than any other 
painting because the content is not in a subject matter or story, but in the 
actual painting activity [emphasis added].921 
 
  Reinhardt, an artist always reluctant to speak of content, names it, and indeed, names it 
achingly close to Action Painting.  
 But this unexpected reversal is not only Reinhardt’s. Likewise, on closer 
inspection, any simple formulation of Newman’s project as prioritizing practice to theory 
has to be questioned. The resistance to this is strong and stems from the foundation myth 
of the making of Onement I. As Newman recounted to de Antonio on the creation of the 
zips, “I really don’t know how I actually thought of them exactly. The reason that I say 
this, when I painted this painting, which I call Onement, my first Onement, so to speak, I 
stayed with that painting about eight, nine months, wondering to myself what had I done. 
What was it?”922 There existed eight, nine months of gestation before conception, before 
figuring out what he had done, before coming to terms with its identity. Elsewhere 
Newman drove the point home by insisting, “The fact is, I am an intuitive painter, a 
direct painter. I have never worked from sketches, never planned a painting, never 
‘thought out’ a painting. I start each painting as if I had never painted before.”923 But this 
spontaneous realization was a difficult moment to specify. One had to be particularly 
careful and walk an exceedingly fine line between not knowing and knowing what one 
was doing. In a highly critical review of Hess’s book Abstract Painting: Background and 
American Phase, Newman complained that the author had equated “art” with “the act of 
painting—i.e., the manipulation of the paint itself.” When art is conceived this way, “as a 
playing instrument, an immense grand piano, the art of painting is reduced from a fine art 
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to an interpretive one, the artist’s role from that of a creator to one of a performer.” 
Newman further elaborates on the problems of this position. “This view is not as 
eccentric or isolated as it may seem. During the last few years, it has become popular 
among social theoreticians, particularly ex-Marxists, pseudoexistentialists, psychiatrists, 
historians, and literary men in general (Malraux is typical), when they refer to painting. 
The artist is approached not as an original thinker in his own medium but, rather, as an 
instinctive, intuitive executant who, largely unaware of what he is doing, breaks through 
the mystery by the magic of his performance to ‘express’ truths the professionals think 
that they can read better than he can himself.”924 Thus, although painting should not be 
“thought out,” it still had to contain thought—though “original” thought. Nor was this a 
new position for Newman. As in Reinhardt’s case, the tendency is to polarize the theory 
and practice debates, to misrecognize them as a set of positions arguing for the priority of 
either a theory before practice or practice before theory, rather than as an attempt to 
describe a moment of mutuality between theory and practice. For instance, Newman, 
already with “The Ideographic Picture,” had indicated this as a major feature of his 
problematic, when he wrote in the short exhibition statement: “The basis of an aesthetic 
act is the pure idea. But the pure idea is, of necessity, an aesthetic act. Here then is the 
epistemological paradox that is the artist’s problem . . . the idea-complex that makes 
contact with mystery.”925 Later and elsewhere the language will shift nominally but the 
crux of the dilemma will remain recognizable, as when in 1965 he tells Sylvester, “The 
problem of a painting is physical and metaphysical, the same as I think life is physical 
and metaphysical.”926 Painting had to be a manifestation of the thought-act and one of 
Newman’s most profoundly pointed indications of this comes out in the Gees Seckler 
interview. “In 1951, at the time of my second one-man show,” he related, “I was asked by 
a viewer how long it took me to paint Vir Heroicus Sublimis. I explained that it took a 
second but the second took a lifetime.” He further elaborates, “The conception and 
execution have to work together at the exact same moment. Impulse and control have to 
join. This is obviously unscientific and illogical, since theoretically one follows the other. 
But physically this is what has to happen. This is the paradox of the miraculous event. 
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Somehow the two things get joined.”927 Or, in language close to Reinhardt’s, he told an 
audience at Hunter College, “content has to be determined at the very moment [the 
painting] is being made.”928 This is the infrathin moment of painting as dialectic. 
 For both Newman and Reinhardt the achievement or state of theoretical practice 
and practical theory—of dialectical praxis—was described by the equally nebulous figure 
of the identical subject-object. Reinhardt’s penchant for impossible contradictions—as 
what Lippard described as his “fusion of polarities”—accesses both an appropriate tone 
of conceptual perplexity to this idea and the mechanism of using polarities to express 
each other’s identity.929 The point or the “End,” as Reinhardt indicated in his journal, was 
to “Not distinguish knower from known/Not ‘see’ it, but ‘oned’ with it.”930 The absolute, 
miraculous, mutual realization of theory and practice in the identity of subject and object 
was the “Path of the razor’s edge,” a “balancing,” on the “sharpest, thinnest line.”931 
“Paintings,” Reinhardt wrote, “are the end of the beginning, beginning of the end, the 
unknown of the known, known of the unknown/ Threshold.”932 Again, the figure of the 
artist—the “one who works upon forms and whom forms work upon”—was the primal 
site for this dialectical tension.933 Newman also, in a 1963 interview, provides an image 
of his painting process in the bare-bone terms of dialectic. “I’m the subject,” Newman 
explained to Lane Slate, “I’m also the verb as I paint, but I’m also the object. I am the 
complete sentence.”934 Or, here is Newman in an expanded and elaborated version of that 
response.  
One of the things that I feel that I’ve done [if I’ve done] something at all is 
that I have removed the emphasis on a painting as an object. . . . At the 
same time, it doesn’t mean that I’m ignorant of the fact that the painting 
inevitably is a physical object, and today there is an emphasis in painting 
on creating new kinds of objects. . . . I’m trying to make a distinction 
between an aesthetic object and a work of art. In this regard, I think of my 
painting as an object, but only as an object in a grammatical construction. 
When I was a young kind studying French, I studied with a man, Jean-
Baptiste Zacharie, who used to teach French by saying, ‘Moi, je suis le 
sujet, I’m the subject; vous, vous êtes l’object, you are the object; et voice 
le verbe,’ and he’d give you a gentle slap on the face. The empty canvas is 
a grammatical object—a predicate. I am the subject who paints it. The 
process of painting is the verb. The finished painting is the entire sentence, 
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and that’s what I’m involved in. Those who emphasize the world of 
objects and insist that an object can be art must, it seems to me, in the end 
make man himself an object. Now, this attitude is okay for generals, for 
politicians, for professional patriots, and for pagan aestheticians, who 
make man into so much material; but I think man is more than an object. 
Anyway, I’m not interested in adding to the objects that exist in the world. 
I want my painting to separate itself from every object and every art object 
that exists.”935   
 
And, as Newman would explain in another interview two years later, this is what 
Onement I participated in. “[W]hat it made me realize is that I was confronted for the first 
time with the thing that I did, whereas up until that moment I was able to remove myself 
form the act of painting, or from the painting itself. The painting was something that I 
was making, whereas somehow for the first time with this painting the painting itself had 
a life of its own. . . .”936   
Obviously some shifting occurs through these three different self-accounts. 
Though they do not tell exactly the same story they tell enough of a similar account to 
indicate that Newman and Reinhardt were both working on figuring this image of the 
dialectical moment while suggesting as well the difficulties, perplexities, contradictions 
involved in attempting to describe this very image. For if Newman and Reinhardt can be 
said to share as their ultimate/absolute moment of identity—of onement/oneness—as the 
interpenetration of part and whole and of theory and practice that is given notation in the 
figure of the identical subject-object, they share in the image/process of praxis that Marx 
described when “all objects become for him the objectification of himself, become objects 
which confirm and realize his individuality, become his objects: that is, man himself 
becomes the object.”937 And, further, they share in it the quality or promise of change. 
The identical subject-object “mediates, regulates and controls his material interchange 
with nature by means of his own activity. . . . [A]cting upon nature outside of him, and 




Divisions of Labor 
 
 
Ho, here we have our two heroes and which side to choose? Fire 
or water? Progress or romance? Apollo or Dionysius? The city of 
God and the light of reason and the cold white peaks of art? Or the 
fires of hell and dark passions and muddy waters and old times? 
Ad Reinhardt939 
 
Neither the spontaneous non-identity of Newman’s argument nor the organized identity 
of Reinhardt’s argument holds up at this level. Instead, qualifications have to be made for 
both, and what had been posed earlier as differences lose their effective edge. For, does 
not Reinhardt’s contradiction (“You get the thought from having done something first 
and the thought is the painting anyway”) and Newman’s paradox (“The conception and 
execution have to work together at the exact same moment”) describe rather the same 
perplexing spot? Rehearsed in this is the familiar pattern: if Newman and Reinhardt are 
the same here, how come they are not one? Where again is their vital, defining 
difference?940 
The key might be in taking a step back. The divide is not about the joining of 
theory and practice in the artist but the divisions in the theory and the practice of making 
that join. Or, put differently, Newman’s and Reinhardt’s argument is not over the figure 
of the artist but over the artist’s very figuring or grounding. For Newman the artist 
precedes the laborer and for Reinhardt the laborer precedes the artist. 
To recall from the 1947 issue of Tiger’s Eye, this was an order of priority that 
Newman had forcefully announced in his statement’s title—“The First Man Was an 
Artist.” I have already dealt with earlier sections of this essay arguing against materialist 
and utilitarian origins of speech (“The purpose of man’s first speech was an address to 
the unknowable. His behavior had its origin in his artistic nature. . . .”). But now traveling 
a little farther into the statement, Newman writes, “The God image, not pottery, was the 
first manual act. It is the materialistic corruption of present-day anthropology that has 
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tried to make men believe that man fashioned pottery before he made sculpture. Pottery is 
the product of civilization.”941 The God image versus pottery. But as pedestrian and 
secondary as Newman makes it sound, a lot can be read into this “pottery.” For it is in 
Neolithic cultures with the invention of pottery that one could argue “time” was created, 
time for consciousness to grow, expand beyond the immediate, the positing of the future 
tense. It represented the grounds of possibility for planning, rationalization—as an 
excess, something held beyond the present, immediate need, a gleaning and a hoarding. 
Pottery as a vessel allowed for a delay, a removal, a distancing of the tyranny of the 
immediate.  
This was an accounting Reinhardt had performed and come to terms with. It was, 
as already examined, the increased efficiency of labor through modernization whose 
byproduct was time, leisure-time that generated the horizon of possibility for the artist. 
His counter proposition to Newman’s first man, something that might easily be dubbed 
“The First Man Was a Laborer,” was spelled out in the following note.  
 One paints when there is nothing else to do. After everything else is 
done, has been “taken care of,” one can take up the brush 
After all the human, social physical needs, pressures have been accounted 
for, only then can one be free to work. 
There is nothing worse than a fine artist who has something to do, a “job” 
or “commission,” thinks he has a “job” to do. 
. . . . 
After the mail has been read and answered, bills paid, the place, studio 
cleaned and swept, children packed off to school or camp, wives released 
for shopping, after one has eaten, gone to the john, has taken a morning, 
noon or afternoon nap, free from any anxiety, all pains, pleasures, all 
distractions, obstacles, hindrances 
. . . . 
Pension, income, when finally one has absolutely no reason not to work, is 
the exact ideal time to begin942  
 
What is apparent is that Reinhardt makes the same division between necessary work and 
free labor, but that the artist’s freedom was unquestionably predicated, as it were, on all 
that the “pottery” made possible. Painting, poetry, art-making were all posterior 
extensions of pottery. Indeed, Reinhardt was only too well aware of this order of priority. 
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As he notes in a draft for what would become the chronology for his 1966-67 Jewish 
Museum show, in 1946, his newspaper “day jobs” mean that he “paints nighttimes, 
midnights to mornings—is irritated and becomes extremely tired.”943 Reinhardt had from 
the beginning of his career and all the way to the end steadily worked jobs. He was, as he 
referred to himself in a postcard to Rosenberg, “a working class stiff.”944   
Historically, the formal line dividing Newman and Reinhardt, the one that serves 
to announce their famous schism, is drawn in 1954. In that year Reinhardt presented a 
text, “The Artist in Search of An Academy, Part Two: Who Are the Artists?,” at the 
annual conference of the College Art Association. The text subsequently appeared in the 
organization’s publication, the College Art Journal.945 There is nothing spectacular or 
unusual or special about this text. Simply, it is classic Reinhardt, his combination of 
fantastic screed and dark humor from the “conscience of the art world,” performed in his 
characteristic mode of satiric categories and lists. Here, specifically, Reinhardt sets out a 
number of types of artist. The fourth and final type, is “the latest up-to-date popular 
image of the early fifties, the artist-professor and traveling design salesman, the Art 
Digest philosopher-poet and Bauhaus exerciser, the avant-garde huckster-handicraftsman 
and educational shopkeeper, the holy-roller explainer-entertainer-in-residence,” artists 
such as (and true to form, Reinhardt provides a list of names), “Albers, Bolotowsky, 
Chermayeff, Diller, Ferren, Greene, Holtzman, Holty, Morris, Motherwell . . . Wolff, 
Vytlacil, etc.”946 It was to this category, this type that Reinhardt assigned Newman.   
What stands out in this incident is Newman’s remarkable response to Reinhardt’s 
art world jest. Newman attempts to sue Reinhardt for libel and for the astoundingly 
improbable sum of $100,000.  Had Newman won the case, this undoubtedly would have 
spelled Reinhardt’s financial ruin. It would have been his end. But the threat of ruination 
exists on another level too, and this is one which Annalee Newman herself raised in a 
very late interview. As she recalls the event, “Now, I always thought that Reinhardt 
didn’t want to get on the stand in the worst way. You never know why people don’t want 
to get on the witness stand. . . . And my feeling was that he [Reinhardt] might have been 
a communist. . . . And afraid that that might come out.”947 Speculating on this far more 
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sinister punitive possibility, taking Reinhardt to court could well have spelled his loss of 
political freedom as well.  Legally, however, nothing so extreme happened. The libel suit 
is eventually thrown out, though only after two years and after two full days of court 
hearings. And some sense of symmetry is restored when one hears Sam Hunter’s 
explanation for the judge’s decision for dismissing the case: he found out Newman was 
an anarchist, bearing his own notable “history of agitation and writing crank letters to 
public officials.”948 “Barney never got over it,” Annalee reflected; after this incident the 
two artists never speak to each other again.949 
  Several questions are  immediately raised by this incident. To begin, one wonders 
about Newman’s heated reaction, why he took such personal offense. From most 
accounts of the New York School milieu, this was a rather tough verbal community and 
one imagines its inhabitants developing thickened skin. As a whole, name-calling and 
insult-making and heated challenges were not infrequent in the Cedar Bar Tavern, at their 
various symposia, or in the pages of ARTnews. Furthermore, by the mid-50s Reinhardt’s 
comic-critical interventions in the art world were a well-established mode for him. The 
potential sting of being the object of a Reinhardt satire could be alleviated by the fact that 
practically everybody was one at some point or another. That indiscriminateness and all-
inclusiveness in Reinhardt’s rants make it very hard for them to be at all pointed. Most 
accepted their harmlessness. Rosenberg, for one, took his with the proverbial grain of 
salt, withstanding Reinhardt’s references to him as both the “howling rosen-bird,” and as 
a “hairstylist.”950 Betty Parsons, a long-time dealer of the artist, “laughed at Ad 
Reinhardt’s humorous jibes,” such as in his satire on art galleries: 
  ParsongiftShoppe 
  antiquesjewelry 
  workesofarte 
  for the 
  upperlowbrow951  
 
By this time as well, the joke was fairly evidently on Reinhardt, the outsider and sore-
loser, casting aspersion on the sell-outs from his position of phenomenal lack of success. 
That is, much of the sting was taken away by simply looking at the source. 
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Another point is this. Newman interpreted Reinhardt’s 1954 text as a personal 
assault, a slanderous act meant to harm his being, but the fact remains that Newman’s 
name is just one is a series of artist’s names associated with a type. That type, one might 
add, included artists to whom Reinhardt had had quite close and important friendships. 
Carl Holty was an early “sympathetic and respected mentor” for Reinhardt and it was 
through Holty that he was introduced to the American Abstract Artists.952 The same is 
true of Harry Holtzman, who is also included in this list, also prominent in A.A.A. and an 
important friend and teacher of Reinhardt’s. Indeed, the company that Newman finds 
himself with is not all that bad. In other words, although being called a “traveling design 
salesman” and a “huckster-handicraftsman” might be cutting, overall Newman finds 
himself in good company. Of the categories described, this last one appears to be the best, 
the one Reinhardt would be most sympathetic to, and the one that would be closest to 
describing his own predicament of artistic identity. Finally, this proviso should be 
acknowledged: Reinhardt ends his statement by putting into serious question the validity 
of “artist names.” “I’ve been called a great many artist names myself,” Reinhardt admits, 
“romantic abstractionist, geometric expressionist, classicist, purist, abstract 
impressionists, sensationalist, decorative cubist, fauvist, surrealist, Mondrian disciple, 
avant-gardist, experimentalist, Orientalist, neo-Platonist, religious painter (Protestant), 
witty cartoonist, critic, writer, Indian-blanket designer, painter of window frames, 
waterfalls, autumn leaves, railroad signs, neon signs, and empty spaces, anarchist, 
gangster, cynic, escapist, negativist, ivory towerist, etc.”953 And, indeed, the list—
enumerating insults, half-truths and absurdities—certainly shows up the absurdity of this 
name-calling.   
Indeed there exist several indications that Reinhardt himself was quite puzzled by 
Newman’s severe reaction. In a postcard to Betty Parsons from October 1954 Reinhardt 
lays out a short defense of his actions. Although he opens by saying “its easy for me to 
understand the thing [Newman’s reaction],” the rest of the letter makes clear that he does 
not. 
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But for pulling it into the legal world, making it a vulgar act that’s not 
easy to forgive, and a fantastic fluke—I can explain to you perhaps why I 
listed names (to avoid the ambiguity of general statements) and I made 4 
groups, for 4 decades (no one younger than  40 my age) for 4“general 
ideas” about artists 13 artists in each group, all of them my friends and 
colleagues, all of them distinguished—But how explain the listing of BN’s 
name as a way of “including” him as a way of “not excluding” him in my 
consideration of influential artists?—how in my “tongue-in-cheek” writing 
as a kind of self-questioning? Which  BN knows? and knew?954 
 
One might sympathize with Reinhardt’s dilemma here. Obviously, by including Newman 
Reinhardt had taken a grave, unforgivable misstep in Newman’s eyes. Annalee claims 
that Newman was “horrified” by the College Art Journal piece and that this stemmed 
from Newman’s hating to be grouped or called names, to having been identified as it 
were in this manner. “What Barney resented was being grouped with the kind of 
abstraction that he was fighting . . . to have grouped him—what he resented the most, I 
think was that he was grouped with Albers, Bolatowski, Diller.”955  On the other hand, as 
one who had definitely felt similar pains of exclusion from the art world as Newman,  
Reinhardt needed to “not exclud[e]” Newman as well. The postcard to Parsons quoted 
above was indeed found in Newman’s papers. At some point, whether before Newman 
decides to take legal action or after, he was familiar with this justification presented by 
Reinhardt. Indeed, in all likelihood Reinhardt himself had attempted to explain his 
actions and innocuous motives to Newman. Even by the fact of Newman’s difficulty in 
securing a witness—someone to second his claim—for the official court hearing, 
something of the lack of support for Newman’s position is suggested.956 In the end, as a 
last resort, Annalee is put on the witness stand, even though, as she puts it, “I was the 
wife . . . I couldn’t be a real witness.”  
In an interview that transcribed runs to over sixty pages, Annalee’s response to 
this incident stands out as one of the very few instances in which she registers anything 
less than absolute conviction in her husband’s right and rightness. She explains her poor 
performance as a court witness on not devoting proper attention to the affair because she 
was very busy working, but what seems the more compelling excuse is what she adds 
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next: “But I suppose my heart wasn’t . . . I didn’t want Barney to do it.”957 How could 
Newman not know, not have known, not have understood? 
This begs the question: was there something else motivating Newman’s reaction 
to Reinhardt’s gimmick in 1954? It hardly makes sense that this could have fomented 
such life-long ire in Newman.958 It would have taken a lot of effort on Newman’s part to 
read Reinhardt’s text as a malicious personal assault. It would necessarily have been a 
quite willful reading, and more so when one realizes that this was an event that developed 
out of the context of a long friendship, not only between the artists but between their 
wives as well.  In an interview throughout which Annalee is quite diligent in insisting on 
a remove, a distance between herself and her husband’s friendships with artists and 
artist’s wives, her tone is markedly different when talking about Rita Reinhardt. With 
Rita, Reinhardt’s widow, the tone carries respect, even approval, and especially when 
contrasted to Annalee’s censure of Lee Krasner. “She [Rita Reinhardt] is not like Lee 
Pollock,” in acting “instrumental[ly]” for her husband’s art career. “No. Not at all,” 
Annalee emphasizes, and in fact, “She has her own life,” and “She’s remarried.”959 
Further, Annalee suggests that she herself was the matchmaker for Rita and Ad’s 
marriage, an act or position that suggests some degree of intimacy with both the future 
wife and husband, and this prior to the couple’s official union. And though it is unclear 
whether this is limited to her relationship with Rita or extended to the relationship of the 
two couples, the Newmans and  the Reinhardts, Annalee states, “We were sort of 
friendly.”960 Surely this much at least is gestured towards in the photograph in the Barnett 
Newman Foundation papers taken just a year earlier, in 1953, which shows the two 
couples, the Newmans and the Reinhardts—Ad, Barney, Annalee, Rita—after hours, 
gathered around a table, at a Harlem nightclub (fig. 37).961 What had truly happened 
between 1953 and 1954?   
Michael Corris, a scholar and artist with a long-time interest in Reinhardt, has 
thrown out the provocative suggestion that the 1954 split between Newman and 
Reinhardt had far less to do with the College Art Association piece than with the fact that 
Rita Reinhardt became pregnant in that year. What Corris is suggesting is that the social 
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split between Newman and Reinhardt stemmed from possible guilt Newman might have 
felt towards his wife: that he had not provided Annalee with a child, that they had made 
no family, they had not, in essence, reproduced. 
As a way of ending, I want to make a speculative extension on Corris’ comment 
and use it as an illustration of the political problem involved. The speculation is this: 
Newman’s bitterness in 1954 came from a very pointed recognition. For what Rita’s 
pregnancy highlighted was Annalee’s sacrifice. From Annalee’s own account and from 
accounts of the material hardship the Newmans faced, it seems likely that Annalee’s 
childlessness had much to do with material limitations of both time and money. When 
one looks at the facts of Annalee as the breadwinner—supporting her husband and herself 
on her salary, including periods that demanded the supplementation of income by 
working two jobs—one realizes that a child and a family were very much out of the 
question.962 The paintings were the substitution, and Annalee will indeed refer to her late 
husband’s paintings as his “babies, his children,” ones that she became responsible for, 
that become hers only after his death. “But once he was gone, then I had to take over.” 
“[T]he paintings are like children to me,” she states, and the process of carefully placing 
them in museums throughout the world “like getting your children married off,” 
something from which she derives “pleasure” and a “sense of joy” by placing/marrying 
them well: “I want them to have homes and good homes. And so everytime I place a 
painting it has to be in a good home. But I feel I’ve taken care of it.”963 Annalee’s 
childlessness could be taken as a sign of the much larger sacrifice she had made in her 
husband’s stead. Indeed, in the same interview again, she speaks of marriage as 
surrender, that this was how Newman thought of it, and of the clear understanding she 
and Newman had before their marriage.964 “Now, what he [Newman] said was that he 
had to be an artist. And if he couldn’t be an artist, he couldn’t live. And that was the 
understanding. There was no possibility that we could have a family. And I understood 
that completely.”965  
In a prosaically material sense, the grounds of possibility for Newman’s art—his 
career, his high passion, his life’s work, all of his moments of and monuments to 
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individual self-realization—were premised upon the performance of Annalee’s diligent 
labor, upon a social relation in which certain priorities had been set and specific sacrifices 
had been made. Although Newman would work as a substitute teacher in the New York 
public school system for the first several years of their marriage in 1936, and on occasion 
would have temporary employment, it was significantly Annalee who in 1938 would 
eventually pass the public school examination board, and it was she who a year later 
would come up with the regular job—teaching stenography and typewriting in a high 
school in Queens (skills, one might note, of bureaucratic modernizing and rationalizing 
communication, if there ever were any) . “[W]hen I got my permanent job,” Annalee 
recalls telling her husband, “Allright now. . . . Now I have a job. . . . So now I want you 
to be free. I said I don’t want you to have to work. I don’t want you to have to teach. I 
want you to be  free so that you can be an artist. . . . I want to be like the rock of Gibraltar 
for you. So that he could work and not have to worry about how we were going to 
live.”966 After 1939 Newman was supported by Annalee’s salary. This was the financial 
arrangement that would hold for the next seventeen years. “[T]his was just a job to . . . 
make a living to make it possible for him [Newman] to achieve what he had to achieve. . . 
. For me it was no career. It was just a job. A job to earn a living so I could free 
[emphasis added] my husband. . . . We were two people who had a single cause.”967   
In other words, Newman’s freedom had come at a price, and his wife had picked 
up the tab. It all comes back with terrific irony, and one that could not but have been felt, 
one imagines quite poignantly, by Newman. The first man might have been an artist but 
that figure was preceded by another figure, a woman, and a laborer (“It was just a job”). 
Newman’s precious creative work was inextricably bound with and premised on a 
division of labor and one far from subtle. Nor would the ironies stop there. Certainly 
Newman would have been aware of the anthropological thesis that the first division of 
labor is thought to stem from sexual reproduction and a separation of tasks based on 
child-bearing.968 For Newman the anarchist having the good immediacy of his practice 
(that glorious self-affirming at-once) shown to be mediated by all of Annalee’s unfree 
labor, which kept the bad immediacy of nature and necessity at bay, could only be a 
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demoralizing blow: this was the necessity of the social act (all that “pottery”) predating 
and underwriting the “freedom” (the good immediacy) of the artistic act. But nor does 
this speculative narrative let Reinhardt off the hook so easily. The productive (or re-
productive) Reinhardt, the “statist,” can in a sense only ever reproduce, only keep 
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Fig. 2. Hollis Frampton, Frank Stella, 1959. This is the photograph of Stella used in the 






































Fig. 4. Hans Namuth photographs of Pollock from 1951, best those that accompanied 









Fig. 5. Diagram accompanying Amy Goldin’s “Harold Rosenberg’s Magic Circle,” Arts 





















Fig. 6. Nina Leen, The Irascibles, Life, 1950. Photograph, “Irascible Group of Advanced 






















Fig. 7. Ad Reinhardt, Number 18, 1948-49, 1948-49. Oil on canvas. 40 x 60 inches. 













Fig. 8. Ad Reinhardt, Untitled, 1947. Oil on canvas. 40 x 32 inches. National Gallery of 




























































Fig. 11.  Barnett Newman in his apartment, sitting in front of two paintings from The 
















Fig. 12. Barnett Newman, The Voice, 1950. Egg tempera and oil on canvas. 96 1/8 x 105 








Fig. 13. Barnett Newman, The Name II, 1950. Oil and Magna on canvas. 104 x 94 1/2 






Fig. 14. Robert Rauschenberg, White Painting, 1951. Oil on canvas. 72 x 72 inches. 















Fig. 15. Ad Reinhardt, Abstract Painting No. 9, 1960-66. Oil on canvas. 60 x 60 inches. 














Fig. 16. Barnett Newman, Onement I, 1948. Oil on canvas and oil on masking tape. 27 
















Fig. 18. Ad Reinhardt, “How to Look at Modern Art in America,” ARTnews, vol. 60, no. 






Fig. 19. Barnett Newman, Gea, 1944-45. Oil and oil crayon on cardboard. 28 x 22 inches. 








Fig. 20. Barnett Newman, Euclidian Abyss, 1946-47. Oil, oil crayon, and wax crayon on 


















Fig. 22. Ad Reinhardt, Abstract Drawing, 1947. Brush and ink collage. 24 x 18 3/4 


























































Fig. 29. Ad Reinhardt, “A Portend of the Artist as a Yhung Mandala” (1955), originally 
published in ARTnews (May 1956). Collage of ink and paper. 20 1/4 x 13 1/2 inches. 








Fig. 30. Installation shot of the artist with The Stations of the Cross: Lema Sabachthani, 



























Fig. 31. “Ad Reinhardt: Paintings,” exhibition installation shot, Jewish Museum, New 
















Fig. 32. Ad Reinhardt, Black Painting and George Segal sculpture, installation shot, Art 










Fig. 33. Installation shot of The Stations of the Cross: Lema Sabachthani, Solomon R. 









Fig. 34. Ad Reinhardt, No War, 1967. Lithographic poster. 26 1/4 in. x 21 1/4 in. From 
The Artists and Writers Portfolio (1968), compiled by Jack Sonenberg. Museum of 






Fig. 35. Barnett Newman, Lace Curtain for Mayor Daley, 1968. Steel, paint and barbed 


































Fig. 37. Photograph of Barnett and Annalee Newman, Ad and Rita Reinhardt, at a 
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